J.H. v. Warren Hills Board of Education

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. J.H. v. Warren Hills Board of Education (A-77-24) (090726) Argued March 3, 2026 -- Decided August 4, 2026 JUSTICE HOFFMAN, writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the elimination of the “within the household” requirement from the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA) through a provision of the Child Victims Act (CVA) applies retroactively to acts of sexual abuse that occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date of December 1, 2019. In November 2021, plaintiff J.H. filed a complaint alleging that, between 1976 and 1978, when he was twelve and thirteen years old, F.M. was employed as a custodian and wrestling coach at Warren Hills Junior High School. Plaintiff asserts that F.M. sexually abused him on school grounds and that the school permitted F.M. to transport him from the school to F.M.’s residence, where additional acts of sexual abuse occurred. In addition to several common law claims, plaintiff raised statutory claims, including under the CSAA. Defendants Warren Hills Junior High School and the Warren Hills Board of Education moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court held that the removal of the “within the household” requirement applied to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019, irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred, and denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. 481 N.J. Super. 536, 540- 41 (App. Div. 2025). The Court granted leave to appeal. 261 N.J. 156 (2025). HELD: Pursuant to the plain language of the CVA and the Legislature’s unequivocal statement that the amendment operates prospectively, the Court holds that the removal of the “within the household” requirement applies only to instances of sexual abuse committed on or after December 1, 2019. 1. In 1992, the Legislature enacted the CSAA, thereby establishing the first statutory cause of action for sexual abuse in New Jersey. The new law set forth the procedures to be followed in civil actions for injury based on child sexual abuse, which the CSAA defined as “an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between a child under the age of 18 years and an adult.” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 (1992). In addition to persons who inflict the abuse, the statute addressed “passive abusers,” or 1 those persons who know of the abuse and fail to protect the child. Under the 1992 statute, “[a] parent . . . or other person standing in loco parentis within the household who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse.” Ibid. Whether an entity was deemed “within the household” was a fact-sensitive determination, considering the particular qualities and characteristics of the relationship between the entity and the individual alleging abuse. (pp. 3 n.1; 12-13) 2. In 2019, the Legislature overhauled the CSAA and other existing legislation through a series of amendments collectively referred to as the Child Victims Act. The Court reviews the amendments. As to the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse, the CVA removed the requirement that passive abusers be “within the household” of the victim. The second sentence of the definition, which addresses passive abusers, now reads: “A parent, resource family parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse.” N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(a)(1). The removal of the “within the household” requirement permits “any individual person, or private or public entity, who takes custody and control of children even on a limited, temporary basis to potentially be liable as a passive abuser.” S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477 5 (Mar. 7, 2019). The Legislature specified that this amendment “[was] intended to only apply prospectively.” Id. at 6. (pp. 13-15) 3. With regard to whether legislative enactments should apply prospectively or retroactively, courts have established a distinction between substance and procedure. Procedural statutes regulate the litigation process and are generally applied to all actions and proceedings -- those which have accrued or are pending, as well as those yet to be brought. Because substantive statutes, in contrast, impact vested rights, courts generally look to the event giving rise to the claim and construe such statutes prospectively. To determine whether a substantive statute should instead be applied retroactively, New Jersey courts employ a two-part test. First, a court considers whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application. There are three situations that support a finding that the Legislature intended for a statute to apply retroactively: (1) when the Legislature explicitly or implicitly expresses an intent that a law be retroactive; (2) when an amendment is ameliorative or curative; or (3) when the parties’ expectations warrant retroactive application. The second part of the test considers the results of retroactive application. (pp. 15-17) 4. The Court explains that the removal of the “within the household” requirement from the CSAA is a substantive change, not a procedural one. The “within the household” amendment does not simply remove a procedural obstacle; rather, it imposes new legal burdens and expands substantive liability. It alters “substantive rights” by creating new liability where none previously existed. (pp. 18-20) 2 5. Turning to whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application, the Court first considers any explicit or implicit expression of such intent. The plain language of the statute of N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2c provides that the amendments of the CVA “shall take effect on December 1, 2019.” This phrase has consistently been interpreted to provide for prospective and not retroactive application of a statutory provision. Other sections of the CVA, unlike the amendment at issue here, expressly call for retroactive application through reference to circumstances “that occurred prior to” the CVA’s effective date. That distinction further evinces the Legislature’s intent that the elimination of the “within the household” requirement operates only prospectively: when the Legislature has carefully employed a term in one place and excluded it in another, it should not be implied where excluded. The Court finds further support for the conclusion that the amendment was intended to apply prospectively in the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Statement and in the reasoning of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Doe ex rel. Doe v. Small, 654 F.Supp.3d 376, 383-84 (D.N.J. 2023), which reached the same conclusion the Court reaches here. (pp. 21-26) 6. Turning to the nature of the legislative enactment, the Court explains that the Legislature may signal its intent for a statute to apply retroactively when it is “ameliorative” or “curative” in nature. Plaintiff does not raise this argument or address this part of the test, and the Court finds that the amendment alters the substantive scope of the CSAA, rather than cures a “perceived imperfection” or “misapplication” of the statute. Turning to the last consideration for determining the retroactivity of statutes -- the parties’ expectations -- the Court notes that the expectation of retroactive application should be strongly apparent to the parties in order to override the lack of any explicit or implicit expression of intent for retroactive application. Stressing the well-established presumption that statutory amendments apply prospectively, the Court explains why the general statements found in the CVA’s legislative history on which plaintiff relies do not satisfy that standard. Having found no support for a legislative intent that the amendment removing “within the household” from the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse apply retroactively, the Court does not reach the second part of the retroactivity test. (pp. 26-29) REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, FASCIALE, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE HOFFMAN’s opinion. 3  SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-77 September Term 2024 090726 J.H., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Warren Hills Board of Education and Warren Hills Junior High School, Defendants-Appellants, and The Estate of F.M., Defendant. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 481 N.J. Super. 536 (App. Div. 2025). Argued Decided March 3, 2026 August 4, 2026 Cherylee O. Melcher argued the cause for appellants (Hill Wallack, attorneys; Cherylee O. Melcher, on the briefs). Jeffrey M. Russo argued the cause for respondent (Russo Law Offices, attorneys; Jeffrey M. Russo, on the briefs). Marie Cepeda Mekosh, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New 1 Jersey (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Jeremy M. Feigenbaum, Solicitor General, Benjamin M. Shultz, Assistant Attorney General, and Marie Cepeda Mekosh, on the brief). Eric G. Kahn argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey Association for Justice (Javerbaum Wurgaft Hicks Kahn Wikstrom & Sinins, attorneys; Eric G. Kahn and Annabelle M. Steinhacker, of counsel and on the brief). Craig J. Hubert argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Christine A. Amalfe, of counsel, and Craig J. Hubert and Thomas J. Manzo, on the brief). William F. Cook submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Municipal Excess Liability Fund (Brown & Connery, attorneys; William F. Cook and Ryan J. Kelly, on the brief). Peter J. Pizzi submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae New Jersey Defense Association (Walsh Pizzi O’Reilly Falanga, attorneys; Peter J. Pizzi, Eric S. Padilla, and Carmen I. Abrazado, on the brief). Robert E. Levy submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae the Northfield Board of Education, Northfield School District, Northfield Community School, Lincoln Park Board of Education, Lincoln Park School District, and Lincoln Park Elementary School (Scarinci Hollenbeck, attorneys; Robert E. Levy, of counsel and on the brief, and Seraphema Menna, on the brief). Adam S. Weiss submitted a brief on behalf of amici curiae School Alliance Insurance Fund, DIPLOMA Joint Insurance Fund, and School Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund (The Busch Law Group, attorneys; Adam S. Weiss, of counsel and on the brief, and David B. Rubin and Caitlin W. Lundquist, on the brief). 2  JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the opinion of the Court. In 2019, the Legislature enacted the Child Victims Act (CVA), which implemented “landmark amendments to the Child Sexual Abuse Act (CSAA), Charitable Immunity Act (CIA), and Tort Claims Act (TCA)” by extending the statute of limitations and creating a two-year filing window for previously time-barred actions. See W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 510-11 (2023); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1), -2b. One amendment to the CSAA, which is at issue here, “expand[ed] the categories of potential defendants” by removing the requirement that a passive abuser be “within the household” of the victim; this amendment now makes non-resident individuals and entities potentially liable for child sexual abuse. 1 S. Judiciary Comm. Statement to S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477 1 (Mar. 7, 2019). In this case, we consider whether the amendment eliminating the “within the household” requirement applies retroactively to acts of sexual abuse that 1 “The CSAA . . . establishes two classes of abusers:” (1) “active abusers” are “those persons who inflict the abuse”; and (2) “passive abusers” are “those persons who . . . know of the abuse and who fail to protect the child.” Hardwicke v. Am. Boychoir Sch., 188 N.J. 69, 86 (2006). Prior to being amended in 2019, the CSAA required that a passive abuser be “(1) a person (2) standing in loco parentis (3) within the household.” Ibid. “In loco parentis” is defined as “relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caregiver of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent.” Id. at 91 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 803 (8th ed. 2004)). 3 occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date of December 1, 2019. Pursuant to the plain language of the CVA and the Legislature’s unequivocal statement that the amendment operates prospectively, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and hold that the removal of the “within the household” requirement applies only to instances of sexual abuse committed on or after December 1, 2019. I. A. This matter arises from allegations of sexual abuse occurring between 1976 and 1978, when plaintiff, J.H., was twelve and thirteen years old and F.M. was employed as a custodian and wrestling coach at Warren Hills Junior High School. Plaintiff asserts that F.M. sexually abused him on school grounds, including in the custodian supply room, bathrooms, and the basement boiler room. Plaintiff further alleges that the school permitted F.M. to transport him from the school to F.M.’s residence, where additional acts of sexual abuse occurred. Plaintiff contends that, as a result of the abuse, he suffered mental and physical harm, including anxiety, severe emotional distress, extreme trauma, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and addiction. 4  B. On November 29, 2021, plaintiff filed a complaint against Warren Hills Junior High School, the Warren Hills Board of Education, and the estate of F.M., who passed away in 1995. Plaintiff raised: (1) common law claims of negligence, gross negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring and retention; (2) claims under the Law Against Discrimination (LAD); and (3) claims under the CSAA. Warren Hills Junior High School and the Warren Hills Board of Education (collectively, defendants) moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. 2 In support of their motion, defendants argued that “the unmistakable legislative intent expressed in the Senate Judiciary Committee Statement” clearly establishes that the elimination of the “within the household” requirement for passive abuser liability under the CSAA is to be applied prospectively to acts of sexual abuse occurring on or after the 2 Defendants also moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s LAD and common law claims, specifically arguing that the common law claims were barred for failure to comply with the TCA’s notice requirement. The trial court denied defendants’ motion as to both claims. Defendants later withdrew their request for summary judgment on the LAD claim and moved for leave to appeal the denial of summary judgment on the common law claims, raising the issue of whether plaintiff’s common law claims are subject to the TCA’s notice requirement. 5 amendment’s December 1, 2019 effective date. Thus, defendants contended they could not be held liable as passive abusers because they were not “within” plaintiff’s “household” at the time of the abuse. In its statement of reasons, the trial court granted defendants’ motion, finding that plaintiff’s CSAA claim was “not cognizable against the school board” because public day schools do not fall “within the definition of ‘household.’” However, in the corresponding order, the court, inconsistent with the statement of reasons, denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to this claim. Defendants moved for reconsideration and modification of the trial court’s findings on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court clarified that its intent was for its order, not the accompanying statement of reasons, to control. It affirmed the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s CSAA claim. The trial court relied on W.S., which held that the elimination of the TCA’s notice requirement to actions for injuries resulting from sexual abuse applies to all CSAA claims filed on or after the statute’s effective date. The trial court similarly construed the removal of the “within the household” requirement to apply to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019, irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred. 6  The Appellate Division granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal and affirmed the trial court’s orders denying defendants’ motions for summary judgment and reconsideration. J.H. v. Warren Hills Bd. of Educ., 481 N.J. Super. 536, 540-41 (App. Div. 2025). The appellate court found that restricting application of the “within the household” amendment to sexual abuse occurring on or after its effective date would contradict the CSAA’s plain language and purpose to provide for liability for non-resident entities as “passive abusers.” Id. at 547-48. The Appellate Division acknowledged that “changes to the law that are procedural rather than substantive” are treated differently, citing Maia v. IEW Construction Group, 257 N.J. 330, 348 (2024), but relied on W.S. to conclude that the removal of the “within the household” requirement is akin to removing the TCA’s notice requirement for CSAA actions and applies to all complaints filed on or after the amendment’s effective date. 3 Id. at 550. This Court granted defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. 261 N.J. 156 (2025). We also granted motions by the Attorney General; New Jersey 3 The Appellate Division further held, consistent with the rationale this Court applied in W.S., that the 2019 amendment to the TCA -- removing its procedural requirements from actions for injuries resulting from sexual abuse -- applies to common law claims. J.H., 481 N.J. Super. at 547. Defendants did not appeal that aspect of the Appellate Division’s judgment, and plaintiff’s common law claims remain. 7 Municipal Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund; New Jersey Defense Association; Northfield Board of Education and School District and Lincoln Park Board of Education and School District (School Districts); School Alliance Insurance Fund, Diploma Joint Insurance Fund, and School Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund (Joint Insurance Funds) to appear as amici curiae. The New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA) and the New Jersey Association for Justice (NJAJ), who participated as amici curiae before the Appellate Division, continue to participate. II. A. Defendants contend that the Appellate Division erred in applying the “within the household” amendment to plaintiff’s claim of sexual abuse, which occurred prior to the amendment’s effective date. They argue that such retroactive application of a change in substantive law is unsupported by the plain language and legislative history of the CVA and is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent. The Attorney General echoes these arguments, emphasizing that a substantive amendment is one that alters a party’s liability for tortious conduct. Thus, because the “within the household” amendment rendered passive abuse occurring outside the household actionable for the first 8 time under the CSAA, the Attorney General asserts that it must be applied prospectively. The New Jersey Municipal Excess Liability Joint Insurance Fund, in urging this Court to adopt defendants’ position, highlights the insurance and risk management consequences of applying the amendment retroactively to public entities, who never contemplated or insured themselves against this unforeseen liability. Similarly, the New Jersey Defense Association cautions that the retroactive application of the “within the household” amendment could unjustly expose numerous entities to new liability and disrupt the resolution of many pending cases by drastically reducing the likelihood of settlement. The School Districts assert that applying the “within the household” amendment retroactively to allegations of abuse occurring prior to December 1, 2019, “would be an expansion of liability against public entities which the [L]egislature did not contemplate, and surely did not intend for.” Such application, they argue, would “place public entities at risk for limitless litigation for matters which are decades old.” The Joint Insurance Funds add that this would “irreparably harm hundreds of school districts,” compelling them to “exhaust immeasurable financial resources” on CSAA lawsuits. This unanticipated increase in litigation expenditures, the Joint Insurance Funds 9 submit, will have a “negative effect on school district budgets,” requiring schools to divert funds from student programming and educational services. B. Plaintiff maintains that the Appellate Division correctly applied the “within the household” amendment to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019, regardless of when the sexual abuse occurred. Plaintiff contends that such application aligns with this Court’s reasoning in W.S. and is necessary to effectuate the Legislature’s intent in enacting the CVA as expressed in its legislative history: namely, “to vastly expand the opportunities of child sexual abuse victims to seek long overdue justice.” Plaintiff asserts that a cause of action under the CSAA provides for “significant . . . damages not otherwise available to victims under common law” and argues that common law claims are insufficient to remedy the societal harm caused by child sexual abuse. The NJSBA urges adoption of plaintiff’s interpretation that the “within the household” amendment applies to all actions timely filed under the CSAA, irrespective of when the sexual abuse occurred. The NJSBA submits that applying the amendment only to sexual abuse arising on or after its effective date would undermine the Legislature’s remedial intent to “keep[] the courthouse doors open for all sexual assault victims.” 10  The NJAJ argues that the Legislature’s intent in enacting the “within the household” amendment -- that “all victims of sexual abuse should be given broad access to our courts” -- is “obvious” such that the amendment must apply to all claims filed on or after December 1, 2019. The NJAJ also asserts that defendants’ proposed application, limiting the “within the household” amendment to conduct occurring on or after its effective date, “disenfranchises a small subset of sexual abuse victims from judicial review.” III. A. We review a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Whether the trial court and Appellate Division properly denied defendants’ motion for summary judgment in this case turns on the application of the “within the household” amendment, “‘a purely legal question of statutory interpretation’ that also requires de novo review.” Maia, 257 N.J. at 342 (quoting Johnson v. Roselle EZ Quick LLC, 226 N.J. 370, 386 (2016)); see also Affrunti v. Reed Smith LLP, 483 N.J. Super. 133, 143 (App. Div. 2025) (“Our review of whether the [legislation at issue] applies retroactively or prospectively is de novo because it involves an issue of statutory interpretation.”). 11  In interpreting a statute, our objective is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent by “constru[ing] and apply[ing] the statute as enacted.” DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005) (quoting In re Closing of Jamesburg High Sch., 83 N.J. 540, 548 (1980)). “[G]enerally, the best indicator of [legislative] intent is the statutory language.” Ibid. Therefore, we look first to the statute’s plain language, giving the enacted “words their ordinary meaning and significance and read[ing] them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the legislation as a whole.” Ibid. (citation omitted). B. Here, the legislative language we interpret is a 2019 amendment to the CSAA. “Prior to 1992, victims of sexual abuse were limited to common-law theories of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 85. Such actions were constrained by N.J.S.A. 2A:14- 2, which provided that “an action at law” for these injuries must be “commenced within two years.” In 1992, the Legislature enacted the CSAA, L. 1992, c. 109, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1), thereby “establish[ing] the first statutory cause of action for sexual abuse in New Jersey.” Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 84. 12 The new law set forth the procedures to be followed in civil actions for injury based on child sexual abuse, which the CSAA defined as an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between a child under the age of 18 years and an adult. A parent, foster parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis within the household who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse. [N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1 (1992) (emphasis added).] Whether an entity was deemed “within the household” was a fact- sensitive determination, considering the particular qualities and characteristics of the relationship between the entity and the individual alleging abuse. Compare Hardwicke, 188 N.J. at 94 (concluding that a private residential school providing “amenities characteristic of both a school and a home” was “within the household” for purposes of its students), with J.P. v. Smith, 444 N.J. Super. 507, 524 (App. Div. 2016) (finding that the term “within the household” “connotes a degree of ‘residential’ custody” not present in the students’ relationship with their public school). In 2019, the Legislature “overhauled” the CSAA, CIA, and TCA by enacting a series of amendments collectively referred to as the Child Victims Act, effective December 1, 2019. See W.S., 252 N.J. at 511; see also N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2c. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Statement to Senate Bill 477 (Committee Statement), the bill enacting the CVA, set forth the purpose, 13 scope, and rationale underlying the legislation. The Committee Statement also provided a comprehensive section-by-section analysis, describing the intended effect of each provision of the bill. Section 2 of the bill, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a, expanded the statute of limitations for claims of child sexual abuse by permitting survivors “to file a claim any time before reaching the age of fifty-five, or seven years after discovering the harm, whichever is later.” W.S., 252 N.J. at 511. The Legislature explicitly provided for the retroactive application of the extended statute of limitations, thereby “reviving claims that would have been barred under the prior two-year statute of limitations” prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:14- 2. Ibid. As the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated, “some [civil] actions permit retroactive application.” Comm. Statement 1. Section 9 of the bill, codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2b, established a two- year filing window. That provision allowed certain victims whose claims for injuries arose from sexual abuse occurring prior to December 1, 2019, to commence an action so long as it was filed by December 1, 2021. Section 4 of the bill amended the CSAA’s definition of sexual abuse. First, it replaced the term “foster parent” with “family resource parent” in the list of individuals who may be held liable as passive abusers. Second, it 14 removed the requirement that passive abusers be “within the household” of the victim. The CSAA’s definition for sexual abuse now reads as an act of sexual contact or sexual penetration between a child under the age of 18 years and an adult. A parent, resource family parent, guardian or other person standing in loco parentis who knowingly permits or acquiesces in sexual abuse by any other person also commits sexual abuse. [N.J.S.A. 2A:61B-1(a)(1).] The removal of the “within the household” requirement permits “any individual person, or private or public entity, who takes custody and control of children even on a limited, temporary basis” to potentially be liable as a passive abuser. Comm. Statement 5. The Legislature specified that this amendment “[was] intended to only apply prospectively.” Id. at 6. The Legislature’s fiscal estimate expected the CVA to “expose the State, school districts, and local units of government to civil claims that may result in . . . substantial settlements and judgments against affected governments.” Legislative Fiscal Estimate to S. 477 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2019). School districts, in particular, may be more “exposed to the filing of additional tort claims . . . given the nature of their responsibilities.” Id. at 3. When the CVA was enacted into law on May 13, 2019, Governor Philip D. Murphy stated that the amendments were intended to provide “victims the ability to seek redress in court for sexual abuse that often leaves trauma lasting 15 a lifetime.” See Governor’s Statement on Signing S. Comm. Sub. for S. 477 (May 13, 2019). C. Established principles guide the determination of whether the 2019 removal of the “within the household” requirement from the definition of sexual abuse in the CSAA should be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred prior to the CVA or prospectively to conduct occurring on or after the enactment of the CVA. “With regard to whether legislative enactments should apply prospectively or retroactively, our courts have established a distinction between substance and procedure[.]” State ex rel. Edelweiss Fund, LLC v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2026) (slip op. at 15). Procedural statutes regulate the litigation process. Ibid.; see also State Bar Ass’n v. State, 387 N.J. Super. 24, 48 (App. Div. 2006). We generally apply procedural statutes “to all actions and proceedings -- those which have accrued or are pending, as well as those yet to be brought.” Hoek v. Bd. of Educ. of Asbury Park, 75 N.J. Super. 182, 191 (App. Div. 1962). That is because the relevant date for a procedural statute is the invocation of the procedure, rather than the conduct giving rise to the claim. W.S., 252 N.J. at 522. Thus, even when procedural statutes are applied to matters that arise 16 from conduct that occurred prior to the statutes’ enactment, their application is prospective, not retroactive. Edelweiss Fund, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 17); W.S., 252 N.J. at 522. Substantive statutes, in contrast, affect “substantive rights,” such as by creating “new causes of action, defenses, and damages.” Maia, 257 N.J. at 352. Because substantive statutes impact vested rights, we generally look to the event giving rise to the claim and construe such statutes prospectively. In re Registrant J.D-F., 248 N.J. 11, 22 (2021); accord Edelweiss Fund, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 15) (holding that the prospective application of substantive statutes “ensures individuals have advance notice of the substantive liability rules that will attach to their underlying conduct” (citing Lombardo v. Revlon, Inc., 328 N.J. Super. 484, 489 (App. Div. 2000))); Maia, 257 N.J. at 349. However, this rule “is not to be applied mechanistically.” Gibbons v. Gibbons, 86 N.J. 515, 522 (1981). To determine whether a substantive statute should be applied retroactively, we employ a two-part test. Maia, 257 N.J. at 349. First, we must determine “whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application.” James v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 216 N.J. 552, 563 (2014) (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 50 (1996)). There are three situations that support a finding that the Legislature intended for a statute to apply retroactively: “(1) when the Legislature explicitly or implicitly 17 expresses an intent that a law be retroactive; (2) when an amendment is ameliorative or curative; or (3) when the parties’ expectations warrant retroactive application.” Maia, 257 N.J. at 350. The second part of the test is “whether retroactive application . . . [would] result in either an unconstitutional interference with vested rights or a manifest injustice.” James, 216 N.J. at 563 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. at 50). IV. To apply the foregoing principles to the legislation before us, we begin by noting that the removal of the “within the household” requirement from the CSAA is a substantive change, not a procedural one. Two recent decisions illustrate the differences between procedural and substantive amendments. In W.S., this Court addressed whether a procedural amendment to the TCA applied to plaintiff’s CSAA claim, which accrued in 2016, alleging that his sixth-grade teacher sexually abused him. 252 N.J. at 510-12. The amendment at issue, effective December 1, 2019, removed “a procedural requirement[] of the TCA” that required plaintiffs “to file a notice of claim with a public entity within ninety days after accrual of the cause of action.” Id. at 522 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). The Court explained that the plain language of the amended TCA provides that its “procedural requirements” no longer apply to “‘action[s] at law for an injury 18 resulting’ from sexual abuse.” Id. at 513 (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:8-3(b)). Accordingly, “child sexual abuse survivors who file a CSAA complaint against a public entity after December 1, 2019 -- even if their cause of action accrued much earlier -- need not file a TCA notice of claim before filing suit.” Id. at 511, 519. In so holding, we “applied the law in effect at the time” plaintiff filed his complaint. Id. at 521. The following year, in Maia, this Court determined whether amendments to the Wage and Hour Law (WHL) and Wage Payment Law (WPL) applied to plaintiffs’ allegations of violative conduct arising both before and after the amendments’ effective date. 257 N.J. at 337, 344-45. Prior to the amendments, the WPL permitted aggrieved employees to recover only the full amount of wages improperly withheld by their employer, and the WHL authorized an award of attorney’s fees. Id. at 344-45. The amendments, effective August 6, 2019, expanded the available relief to include liquidated damages under both statutes, and attorney’s fees under the WPL. Id. at 345- 46. We observed that the determination of “whether a statute’s application is retroactive . . . focus[es] on any changes to the legal consequences created by a statute or statutory amendment.” Id. at 342. “By adding liquidated damages . . . to both the WPL and WHL, [and] attorneys’ fees to the WPL,” we concluded 19 that the amendments “impose[d] new legal consequences to events that occurred prior to [their] enactment.” Id. at 347. We held that the amendments were “substantive.” Id. at 352. The Legislature, however, did not express an intent for these amendments to apply retroactively, either in the statutory text or legislative history, nor did it characterize them as ameliorative or curative, and there was no evidence that the parties expected retroactive application. Id. at 351-52. Therefore, we held that the amendments were “to be applied prospectively to conduct that occurred on or after August 6, 2019 . . . not retroactively to conduct that occurred before the effective date.” Id. at 351. At oral argument, plaintiff asserted that the “within the household” amendment is procedural rather than substantive, contending that it merely removes a “barrier” to suit. Plaintiff relied on W.S. to argue that the removal of the “within the household” requirement must be treated similarly. However, the amendment at issue in W.S., which indeed eliminated a procedural “barrier” by removing the requirement that plaintiffs file notice within ninety days of their CSAA claim accruing, is distinguishable from the amendment before us. The “within the household” amendment does not simply remove a procedural obstacle; rather, it imposes new legal burdens and expands substantive liability. Just as the amendments at issue in Maia impacted 20 “substantive rights” by adding “new causes of action, defenses, and damages to the WPL and WHL,” 257 N.J. at 352, the “within the household” amendment alters “substantive rights” by creating new liability where none previously existed. We therefore turn to the established two-part test for determining the retroactivity of substantive amendments. V. Applying that two-part retroactivity analysis, we hold that the removal of the CSAA’s “within the household” requirement for passive abuser liability operates prospectively and applies only to instances of sexual abuse occurring on or after December 1, 2019. A. The first prong of the analysis requires the Court to ascertain “whether the Legislature intended to give the statute retroactive application.” James, 216 N.J. at 563. In making that determination, we consider any explicit or implicit expression of such intent, the nature of the legislative enactment, and the reasonable expectations of the parties. Maia, 257 N.J. at 352. 1. The Legislature may convey its intent that a statute operate retroactively by explicitly stating so “in the language of the statute or in the pertinent 21 legislative history.” Id. at 350 (quoting Gibbons, 86 N.J. at 522). Both the text of the CVA amendments and the legislative statement accompanying the CVA -- which expressly states that the “within the household” amendment applies “only . . . prospectively,” Comm. Statement 6 -- support a clear Legislative intent that the amendment be applied “only” in that manner. We be