David B. Wilson v. City of Newark
CourtSupreme Court of New Jersey
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketA-21-25
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
SYLLABUS
This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.
David B. Wilson v. City of Newark (A-21-25) (090835)
Argued September 22, 2026 -- Decided November 19, 2026
JUSTICE WAINER APTER, writing for a unanimous Court.
In this appeal, the Court considers whether N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, a provision of the
Tort Claims Act (TCA), immunizes a public entity from liability for a violation of
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which mandates that municipalities mark the height of “[e]very
bridge or overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches” and post a
separate sign “warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are approaching”
such a low-clearance bridge at the “last safe exit or detour.”
At approximately 5 a.m. on March 26, 2015, plaintiff David Wilson was
driving a 13-foot-6-inch tractor trailer through the City of Newark. At the
intersection of Foundry Street and Avenue P, Wilson saw a sign with the words
“TRUCK ROUTE” above an arrow pointing toward both the right and left on
Avenue P. Because the sign indicated a “truck route to the right,” Wilson “made a
right” onto Avenue P. While looking down to avoid potholes, Wilson crashed into a
12-foot-2-inch railroad overpass. The trailer became wedged beneath the bridge,
and Wilson injured his neck. According to the police report, there was no sign
posted on the railroad overpass marking its height at the time of the accident. There
was also no sign posted at the last safe exit or detour before the overpass warning
drivers that they were approaching a low-clearance bridge.
Wilson and his wife (plaintiffs) sued the City. The jury ultimately awarded
plaintiffs $562,500 in damages. The jury explicitly found that: (1) the City’s
“actions or failure to act create[d] a dangerous condition”; (2) the City had “actual
or constructive notice that a dangerous condition existed”; (3) the City was negligent
and its “negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”; and (4) the City’s
“actions or non-actions [were] palpably unreasonable.”
The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the City “has discretion
concerning where it places” low-clearance-bridge signs and that Wilson’s claim was
barred by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, which immunizes a public entity “for an injury caused by
the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar
devices.” Finally, the Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs “provided no
1
expert testimony to contend that the City had exercised its discretion in a manner
that was palpably unreasonable.”
The Court granted certification. 262 N.J. 427 (2026).
HELD: A municipality’s failure to post the low-clearance signs mandated by
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is not immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. Here, plaintiffs presented
evidence at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the City
of Newark acted palpably unreasonably in creating a dangerous condition under
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a).
1. The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 in 1986 to correct the situation in
which motor vehicles get wedged between the road surface and a bridge or overpass
because of inadequate posting of height restrictions. Together with the Manual on
Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, which the statute
references, N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 requires that, for any bridge or overpass with less than
14 feet 6 inches of clearance, the municipality that has jurisdiction over the road
beneath the bridge must post both: (a) a sign on or in advance of the bridge alerting
drivers of the bridge’s maximum clearance; and (b) a sign at the “last safe exit or
detour preceding the bridge” warning drivers that they are approaching a low-
clearance bridge and indicating the bridge’s maximum clearance. (pp. 11-12)
2. To prevail on a claim under TCA provision N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a) by alleging that a
public entity “created the dangerous condition,” the plaintiff need not prove that the
public entity had “actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” under
subsection (b) but must prove that the public entity’s actions or inaction were
“palpably unreasonable.” Actions are palpably unreasonable if it is obvious that no
prudent person would approve of the course of action or inaction. TCA provisions
N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and 4-5 set forth specific rules of liability and immunity for failure
to provide traffic signals. N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 identifies circumstances under which “a
public entity shall be liable for injury proximately caused by its failure to provide
emergency . . . signs,” whereas N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 provides that “[n]either a public
entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the
failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.”
In Civalier by Civalier v. Estate of Trancucci, the Court held that public entities are
immune from liability for “their initial discretionary decision” about whether or “not
to post a [traffic] sign at all,” noting the many considerations that underlie decisions
about traffic control devices. 138 N.J. 52, 62, 64 (1994). However, when “the
absence of a traffic signal that had been at [an] intersection” and then disappeared
“was actively deceptive or lulled at least one of the drivers into a false sense of
security,” it “constitut[ed] a trap under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4,” and the municipality was
not immune under 59:4-5. Id. at 64, 66. (pp. 12-17)
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3. The Court holds here that signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 are not “ordinary”
within the meaning of 59:4-5 because public entities do not have discretion over
whether or not to post them. In Civalier, the Court explained that a public entity’s
immunity for failure to place an ordinary traffic signal “is directly related to the
discretionary nature of the subject matter.” Id. at 62-63 (quotation omitted).
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, however, leaves the City no discretion regarding whether to place
low-clearance or last-safe-exit signs. Instead, 27:5G-4 and the Manual referenced in
27:5G-4(a) mandate that municipalities with jurisdiction over a road beneath a low-
clearance bridge post two signs. Here, the City concedes that it posted no sign
warning drivers that they were “approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14
feet 6 inches clearance” at the “last safe exit or detour.” N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b). The
Court explains why Spin Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 136 N.J. Super. 520 (Law
Div. 1975), does not support the proposition that the failure to post signs mandated
by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is immunized under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. (pp. 17-21)
4. The City’s violation of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b) does not on its own create liability.
For plaintiffs to prevail, they must have presented sufficient evidence at trial for the
jury to find the City liable under 59:4-2. The jury specifically found that the City’s
“actions or failure to act create[d] a dangerous condition” and its “actions or non-
actions [were] palpably unreasonable.” Those conclusions were amply supported by
the evidence presented at trial. Both the City and the Appellate Division faulted
plaintiffs for not calling an expert to testify about how the City’s actions were
palpably unreasonable. But the question of whether the City acted palpably
unreasonably by creating a dangerous condition through the combination of the
absence of a last-safe-exit sign before unmarked low-clearance bridge and the
actively deceptive “truck route” sign was not beyond the ken of an ordinary juror,
and New Jersey courts have recognized that the need for safety measures to protect
the public from a dangerous condition ordinarily can be determined by a jury
without the aid of expert testimony. Here, both the City and the Appellate Division
emphasized that plaintiffs “provided no expert testimony . . . that the City had
exercised its discretion in a manner that was palpably unreasonable.” (emphasis
added). But, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b), the City had no discretion regarding
whether to place the required sign at the last safe exit before the low-clearance
overpass. And it had no discretion to post an “actively deceptive” truck-route sign
on the corner of Foundry and Avenue P that “lulled [Wilson] into a false sense of
security” that he could safely turn right without immediately crashing into an
unmarked, low-clearance bridge. See Civalier, 138 N.J. at 64. (pp. 21-26)
REVERSED. The jury’s verdict is REINSTATED.
CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
FASCIALE, NORIEGA, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s
opinion.
3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
A-21 September Term 2025
090835
David B. Wilson and
Cheryl Wilson, husband
and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
City of Newark,
Defendant-Respondent,
and
State of New Jersey and
Norfolk Southern
Corporation,
Defendants.
On certification to the Superior Court,
Appellate Division.
Argued Decided
September 22, 2026 November 19, 2026
Anthony Granato argued the cause for appellants (Jarve
Granato Starr, attorneys; Anthony Granato, on the brief).
Christian R. Martinez argued the cause for respondent
(Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Christian R.
Martinez and Raymond M. Brown, on the brief).
1
Justine M. Longa, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey
(Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie
Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and
Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
A provision of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, immunizes a
public entity from liability for failure to post ordinary traffic signals. In this
case, we decide whether that provision immunizes a violation of N.J.S.A.
27:5G-4, which mandates that municipalities mark the height of “[e]very
bridge or overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches,” and post
a separate sign “warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are
approaching” such a low-clearance bridge at the “last safe exit or detour.”
We hold that it does not. We also hold that plaintiffs presented evidence
at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the City of
Newark created a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a) and acted
palpably unreasonably. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate
Division overturning the jury’s verdict.
I.
At approximately 5 a.m. on March 26, 2015, plaintiff David Wilson was
driving a 13-foot-6-inch tractor trailer through the City of Newark. The sun
2
had not yet risen, and it was dark. Wilson drove down Foundry Street and
approached the intersection of Foundry and Avenue P. He testified at trial that
at the intersection, he saw a sign with the words “TRUCK ROUTE” above an
arrow pointing toward both the right and left on Avenue P. Because the sign
indicated a “truck route to the right,” Wilson “made a right” onto Avenue P.
While looking down to avoid potholes, Wilson crashed into a 12-foot-2-inch
railroad overpass. The trailer became wedged beneath the bridge, and Wilson
injured his neck.
According to the police report, there was no sign posted on the railroad
overpass marking its height at the time of the accident. There was also no sign
posted at the last safe exit or detour before the overpass warning drivers that
they were approaching a low-clearance bridge.
Wilson and his wife (plaintiffs) sued the City. During discovery, the
City produced evidence that, prior to the accident, it had posted a 12’2” low-
clearance sign along the side of Avenue P approaching the bridge from
Foundry Street. That sign was reported missing and replaced at least four
times between 2011 and 2015. The last work order before the accident
indicates that the City replaced the sign thirty-seven days before Wilson struck
the bridge, on February 17, 2015. At the time of Wilson’s accident, all that
remained of the sign was the pole to which it had been attached.
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The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no
evidence as to when the 12’2” sign disappeared during the thirty-seven-day
period, and there was “nothing in the record to indicate when the City had notice,
or if the City . . . had notice” that the sign was missing. It also argued that there
was no “issue of fact as to the palpable unreasonableness” of the City’s actions or
inaction because Wilson had not retained a “traffic and signals expert” to testify
that sign inspections were required at certain times “[o]r that replacement of a
fallen sign should be reasonably” completed in a specific number of days. The
trial judge denied the motion.
At trial, plaintiffs submitted evidence that, on the day of the accident,
there was neither a sign on the railroad overpass marking its height nor a sign
at the intersection of Avenue P and Foundry -- the last safe exit before the
overpass -- alerting truck drivers to detour. Wilson testified that under federal
law, bridges or overpasses less than 14 feet 6 inches from the ground must be
marked, so “if you don’t see a sign saying the height of the bridge or the
overpass, almost every truck driver will assume it’s over 14’6”.”
Wilson narrated a video that he had taken a week after the accident
showing the “truck route” sign with the bidirectional arrow pointing to the
right and left on Avenue P. He also narrated a portion of the video that
showed a 12’2” low-clearance sign along Avenue P approaching the bridge
4
from the opposite direction and testified that the approach from Foundry Steet
had no such sign. Plaintiffs did not call any expert witnesses regarding sign
installation or maintenance.
At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence, the City moved for a directed
verdict. The City argued that plaintiffs had failed to prove either that the City
had actual or constructive notice of the missing 12’2” low-clearance sign or
that the City’s actions were palpably unreasonable. Plaintiffs responded that
the City ignored N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which required the City to post a sign both
on the bridge itself and “at the last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge or
overpass.” The trial judge denied the City’s motion.
A maintenance worker then testified for the City that Newark’s road
system spans approximately 350 miles, with tens of thousands of traffic signs.
A three-person maintenance team is responsible for the signs, relying on
reports from drivers and their own observations to determine if a sign is
missing. The maintenance worker also testified that the City could not install
a sign directly on the Avenue P overpass because the City did not own the
overpass, and when he “approached [the railroad company] . . . about putting
signs on their bridges,” “[t]hey just never answered.” According to the
maintenance worker, the City therefore placed the 12’2” sign on the side of
Avenue P within the City’s right-of-way.
5
At the close of the evidence, the City renewed its motion for a directed
verdict. The trial judge again denied the motion.
Plaintiffs requested the jury be charged that “if [it] find[s] that Newark
created the [dangerous] condition, [actual or constructive] notice is not
required.” The court refused, concluding “there has to be notice of some
kind.”
The jury ultimately awarded plaintiffs $562,500 in damages. The jury
explicitly found that: (1) the City’s “actions or failure to act create[d] a
dangerous condition”; (2) the City had “actual or constructive notice that a
dangerous condition existed”; (3) the City was negligent and its “negligence
was a proximate cause of the accident”; and (4) the City’s “actions or non-
actions [were] palpably unreasonable.”
The City appealed the trial judge’s orders denying its motion for
summary judgment and denying its motions for a directed verdict. The
Appellate Division reversed.
The appellate court first concluded that “there was no evidence
presented on the summary judgment motion or at trial establishing that the
City created the dangerous condition” by violating N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 because
“the City did not violate the statute.” Instead, the City “has discretion
concerning where it places” low-clearance-bridge signs. And the City acted
6
within “its discretion, in accordance with the Manual [on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways],” when it placed the low-clearance
sign “near the overpass at a location within the City’s right-of-way.”
Moreover, “to the extent that plaintiff argues that the City should have
placed more than one sign, or should have placed the existing sign in a
different location, that argument is precluded by the TCA as a matter of law.”
Specifically, the Appellate Division found that Wilson’s claim was barred by
N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, which immunizes a public entity “for an injury caused by the
failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar
devices.”
Finally, the Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs “provided no
expert testimony to contend that the City had exercised its discretion in a
manner that was palpably unreasonable.” The appellate court emphasized that
plaintiffs “presented no . . . expert testimony that the City should have
performed routine inspections of its signs, or that, even if the City had
performed routine inspections, it deviated from a standard of care by not
discovering the missing sign in a reasonable period of time.”
We granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification. 262 N.J. 427 (2026).
We also granted leave to the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae.
7
II.
Plaintiffs urge us to reverse the Appellate Division’s conclusion that
N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 immunizes the City’s failure to place signs required by
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4. They argue that signs required by 27:5G-4 are not
“ordinary” traffic signals under 59:4-5. Plaintiffs also challenge the Appellate
Division’s conclusion that the City had discretion under 27:5G-4. According
to plaintiffs, 27:5G-4 “requires that the height of a low overpass be placed on
the overpass and that there needs to be a sign at the last exit point to allow a
driver to avoid the low overpass. . . . There is no discretion.” Plaintiffs also
contend that the jury heard sufficient evidence to conclude that the City
created the dangerous condition and its actions were palpably unreasonable.
According to plaintiffs, where the public entity creates the dangerous condition
under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a), “notice is inapplicable and not required.” They
therefore ask us to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment.
The City counters that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that
signs required by 27:5G-4 are “ordinary traffic signals” under 59:4-5 and that
the City is therefore immune from liability for failure to provide them. The
Legislature, the City asserts, adopted 27:5G-4 after New Jersey courts had
already interpreted 59:4-5 to immunize a municipality’s failure to place signs
indicating the height of an overpass. (citing Spin Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 136
8
N.J. Super. 520, 523-25 (Law Div. 1975)). “If the Legislature did not intend
for the signs required by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 to be considered ordinary traffic
signs under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5,” the City contends, it would have said so
expressly. The City also maintains that it properly “exercised its discretion to
post a sign on Avenue P near the overpass.” And, the City asserts, “even
assuming” it “created the dangerous condition or had notice of that condition,
Wilson did not present any evidence showing the City acted palpably
unreasonably.” The City therefore asks us to affirm the Appellate Division.
The Attorney General agrees with the City that a “sign prescribed by
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is ‘ordinary’” under 59:4-5. The Attorney General relies on
both dictionary definitions of the word “ordinary” and prior New Jersey cases
it contends interpreted “‘ordinary traffic signs’ to include signs indicating the
height clearance for an overpass.” (citing Civalier by Civalier v. Est. of
Trancucci, 138 N.J. 52, 60 (1994); Spin, 136 N.J. Super. at 524-25).
Moreover, the Attorney General emphasizes that the Legislature adopted
27:5G-4 fourteen years after 59:4-5, and “[n]othing in the statute or legislative
history [of 27:5G-4] indicates that the Legislature intended to classify
overpass-clearance signage as something other than ‘ordinary.’” The Attorney
General also asks us to confirm that not only did plaintiffs need to present
expert testimony to show that the City’s actions were palpably unreasonable in
9
this case, but any plaintiff bringing a dangerous condition claim must present
expert evidence if “a public entity’s discretionary actions are at issue.”
III.
We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
judgment de novo, “applying the same standard that governed the trial court’s
determination.” Padilla v. Young Il An, 257 N.J. 540, 547 (2024). Summary
judgment must be entered if the evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to” judgment “as a
matter of law.” R. 4:46-2(c).
Similarly, when reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for a directed
verdict, we “apply the same standard that governs the trial courts” and
determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as
a matter of law.” Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 269 (2003) (quoting
Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). “If, giving
the [non-moving party] the benefit of the most favorable evidence and
inferences . . . , reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome,” the case
“must be submitted to a jury.” Ibid. (quotation omitted).
10
A.
The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 in 1986 “to correct the . . .
situation wherein because of inadequate posting of height restrictions certain
commercial motor vehicles get wedged between the road surface and a bridge
or overpass.” S. Transp. & Commc’ns Comm. Statement to S. 396 with S.
Comm. Amends. 1 (Mar. 6, 1986). The statute became effective on September
5, 1986, and public entities had two years to comply. L. 1986, c. 104, § 5.
The statute does not require public entities to post any signs for bridges or
overpasses that are at least 14-feet-6-inches tall. For bridges or overpasses
that are not, it requires two separate signs:
a. Every bridge or overpass carrying a railroad, with a
clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches from the roadway
beneath, shall have the maximum clearance marked or
posted thereon in accordance with the current standards
prescribed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control
Devices for Streets and Highways.
b. Signs warning persons driving motor vehicles that
they are approaching a bridge or overpass with less than
14 feet 6 inches clearance shall be posted at the last safe
exit or detour preceding the bridge or overpass and the
maximum clearance of the bridge or overpass shall be
indicated on these signs.
c. The signs or markings required by this section shall
be posted or marked, as appropriate, by, and shall be
maintained by the governmental entity, be it the State
or the political subdivision, which has jurisdiction over
the roadway underneath the bridge or overpass. . . .
11
[N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4.]
The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and
Highways referenced in subsection (a) provides that the “Low Clearance sign
may be installed on or in advance of the structure.” U.S. Dep’t of Transp.,
Fed. Highway Admin., Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets
and Highways (Manual) 120 (2009).1
Thus, pursuant to the statute and the Manual, for any bridge or overpass
with less than 14 feet 6 inches of clearance, the municipality that has
jurisdiction over the road beneath the bridge must post both: (a) a sign on or
in advance of the bridge alerting drivers of the bridge’s maximum clearance;
and (b) a sign at the “last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge” warning
drivers that they are approaching a low-clearance bridge and indicating the
bridge’s maximum clearance.
B.
In 1972, fourteen years before the enactment of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, the
Legislature enacted the TCA to ensure that “public entities shall only be liable
for their negligence within the limitations of this act.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-2; L.
1972, c. 45. “When both liability and immunity appear to exist” in the TCA or
1
This accident occurred in 2015. We cite the version of the Manual in effect
at that time.
12
at common law, “the latter trumps the former.” Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347,
356 (1993).
N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 sets forth what a plaintiff must establish to hold a public
entity “liable for injury caused by a condition of its property”:
A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition
of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the
property was in dangerous condition at the time of the
injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the
dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition
created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of
injury which was incurred, and that either:
a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an
employee of the public entity within the scope of his
employment created the dangerous condition; or
b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice
of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a
sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken
measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose
liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition
of its public property if the action the entity took to
protect against the condition or the failure to take such
action was not palpably unreasonable.
[N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (emphasis added).]
Because the statute uses the word “or,” if the public entity “created the
dangerous condition” under subsection (a), the plaintiff need not prove that the
public entity had “actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition”
under subsection (b). To prevail on a claim under either subsection (a) or (b),
13
however, a plaintiff must prove that the public entity’s actions or inaction were
“palpably unreasonable.”
Actions are palpably unreasonable if it is “obvious that no prudent
person would approve of [the] course of action or inaction.” Polzo v. County
of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 76 (2012) (quotation omitted); see also Kolitch v.
Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985) (explaining that the term “palpably
unreasonable” “implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given
circumstance”). That standard “differs in degree” from ordinary negligence
and “implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty.” Kolitch, 100 N.J.
at 493 (quotation omitted). “[O]rdinarily the question of whether a public
entity acted in a palpably unreasonable manner” is one for the jury. Polzo, 209
N.J. at 75 n.12.
N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and 4-5 then set forth specific rules of liability and
immunity for failure to provide traffic signals. N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 provides:
Subject to section 59:4-2 of this act, a public entity shall
be liable for injury proximately caused by its failure to
provide emergency signals, signs, markings or other
devices if such devices were necessary to warn of a
dangerous condition which endangered the safe
movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably
apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a
person exercising due care.
14
The Legislature did not define the word “emergency” in this section. We have
construed it to mean “conditions that are sudden [or] unexpected.” Weiss v.
N.J. Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 383 (1992) (quotation omitted).
Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, on the other hand, “[n]either a public entity
nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the
failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar
devices.” Section 4-5 codified New Jersey courts’ “uniform[] hold[ing]” prior
to the TCA “that a governmental determination to install or not to install
traffic control devices cannot ground a cause of action.” Hoy v. Capelli, 48
N.J. 81, 91 (1966); see also Att’y Gen.’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity,
Report, cmt. on N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 at 222 (1972) (referencing Hoy and stating
that “[t]his section is consistent with existing New Jersey law”).
Nearly 30 years ago, the Appellate Division explained why: “The
determination as to the advisability or necessity of a traffic sign or warning
device at any particular place requires the exercise of discretion, and hence
N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 simply specifies one particular type of discretionary activity to
which immunity attaches” under the TCA. Aebi v. Monmouth Cnty. Highway
Dep’t, 148 N.J. Super. 430, 433 (App. Div. 1977).
We reached the same conclusion in Civalier, in which we considered
whether Section 4-5 immunized a public entity when the disappearance of an
15
existing stop sign “actively dec[eived]” a driver. 138 N.J. at 57, 64, 66-67.
We first noted that “New Jersey patterned its Tort Claims Act largely on the
California Tort Claims Act,” id. at 61, and that the Legislature “intended, in
the absence of other express intent, that we follow the California courts’
interpretations of the [California] Act,” id. at 67.
We then held that under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, public entities are immune
from liability for “their initial discretionary decision” about whether or “not to
post a [traffic] sign at all.” Id. at 64. Relying on a California treatise, we
explained:
Whether or not to install regulatory traffic devices in
particular locations requires an evaluation of a large
variety of technical data and policy criteria, including
traffic volume frequency and peak load factors,
physical layout and terrain, visibility hazards and
obstructions, prevailing weather conditions, nature of
vehicular use, normal traffic speed in the area, volume
of pedestrian traffic, alignment and curvature, need for
similar precautionary measures at other like places,
alternative methods of control, and availability of funds
to do the job. Decisions not to adopt control devices,
when based on premises of this order, do not appear to
be readily susceptible to intelligent and rational
reexamination by untrained juries or judges sitting as
triers of fact.
[Id. at 62 (quoting Arvo Van Alstyne, California
Government Tort Liability 197 (1964)).]
However, when “the absence of a traffic signal that had been at [an]
intersection” and then disappeared “was actively deceptive or lulled at least
16
one of the drivers into a false sense of security,” it “constitut[ed] a trap under
N.J.S.A. 59:4-4,” and the municipality was not immune under 59:4-5. Id. at
64, 66 (cleaned up).
IV.
We hold that a municipality’s failure to post the low-clearance signs
mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is not immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. We also
hold that plaintiffs presented evidence at trial from which the jury could have
reasonably concluded that the City acted palpably unreasonably in creating a
dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a). We therefore reverse the
Appellate Division’s judgment.
A.
Recall that 59:4-5 immunizes public entities from liability only for “an
injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings
or other similar devices.” We hold that signs mandated by 27:5G-4 are not
“ordinary” within the meaning of 59:4-5 because public entities do not have
discretion over whether or not to post them.
That conclusion flows directly from Civalier, the text of 27:5G-4, and
the other case cited by the City and the Attorney General, Spin. In Civalier,
we explained that a public entity’s immunity for failure to place an ordinary
traffic signal “is directly related to the discretionary nature of the subject
17
matter” because a decision regarding whether or not to install specific “traffic
devices in particular locations requires an evaluation of a large variety of
technical data and policy criteria” that are not “readily susceptible to
intelligent and rational reexamination by untrained juries or judges.” 138 N.J.
at 62-63 (quotation omitted). The Attorney General agrees that “the very
purpose of the TCA is to shield the government from suit when it
exercises . . . discretion.” See also Polzo, 209 N.J. at 76 (“[A] public entity’s
discretionary decisions to act or not to act in the face of competing demands
should generally be free from the second guessing of a coordinate branch of
Government.” (quotation omitted)).
N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, however, leaves the City no discretion regarding
whether to place low-clearance or last-safe-exit signs. Instead, 27:5G-4 and
the Manual referenced in 27:5G-4(a) mandate that municipalities with
jurisdiction over a road beneath a low-clearance bridge post two signs: one on
or in advance of the bridge alerting drivers of the bridge’s maximum
clearance; and the second at the “last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge”
warning drivers that they are approaching a low-clearance bridge and
indicating the bridge’s maximum clearance. As Wilson correctly points out:
“The statute dictates what needs to be done. There is no discretion.”
18
The Attorney General argues that, because “N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 directly
references the Manual . . . , which describes ‘options’ as to the placement of
overpass clearance signage,” the Legislature intended to give public entities
“discretion over where to place signs” and therefore immunize violations of
27:5G-4. But any discretion over where to place a sign is not the same as
discretion over whether to place the signs at all, and the Manual provides no
such thing.
As earlier noted, only 27:5G-4(a) (requiring a sign on or in advance of
the bridge) references the Manual; 27:5G-4(b) (requiring a sign at the last safe
exit or detour) does not mention the Manual at all. And even if 27:5G-4(b) did
reference the Manual, the portion of the Manual relevant to the signs mandated
by subsection (b) grants municipalities no discretion as to whether these signs
are posted, stating only that they “should be placed at the nearest intersecting
road or wide point in the road at which a vehicle can detour or turn around.”
Manual 120.
Here, the City concedes that it posted no sign warning drivers that they
were “approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches
clearance” at the “last safe exit or detour.” N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b). It also
admits that it posted no such sign “at the nearest intersecting road or wide
point in the road at which a vehicle can detour or turn around.” Manual 120.
19
The Appellate Division therefore erred in concluding that “the City did not
violate” 27:5G-4(b).
The City and the Attorney General cite Spin as support for their
argument that the low-clearance signs mandated by 27:5G-4 are “ordinary,”
and the Legislature therefore intended N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 to immunize a failure to
post them. But a cursory read of Spin shows this argument fails.
In Spin, which predated N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 by more than ten years, the
owner of a backhoe sued the New Jersey Highway Authority when the boom of
the backhoe hit an overpass of the Garden State Parkway that “was erected in
accordance with the minimum clearance standards of the State Highway
Department, 14 feet 6 inches.” 136 N.J. Super. at 522-23 (emphasis added).
Spin thus did not involve a low-clearance bridge. The Law Division held that
N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 immunized the Highway Authority’s “failure to post the height
of a [14-foot-6-inch] bridge” because the height of a bridge that met minimum-
clearance requirements did not constitute an “emergent situation” under 59:4-4
and, under 59:4-5, a “public entity would not be liable for its decision whether
or not to post [such] a traffic signal.” Id. at 523, 525.
Because Spin did not involve a low-clearance bridge, it has no bearing
on whether 59:4-5 immunizes a municipality’s failure to post the signs
mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 -- eleven years after Spin -- for a “bridge or
20
overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches.” Pursuant to Spin,
a sign is “ordinary” under 59:4-5 if the public entity has discretion over
“whether or not” to post it. Id. at 525. In 1975, as today, public entities had a
choice regarding whether to post clearance signs on bridges that met “the
minimum clearance standards of . . . 14 feet 6 inches.” Id. at 523, 525. Since
1986, however, they no longer have that choice as to signs on a “bridge or
overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches.” Those signs are
now mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4. Spin thus does not support the argument
that 59:4-5 immunizes a violation of 27:5G-4.
Immunizing a public ent