Full Opinion

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. David B. Wilson v. City of Newark (A-21-25) (090835) Argued September 22, 2026 -- Decided November 19, 2026 JUSTICE WAINER APTER, writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, a provision of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), immunizes a public entity from liability for a violation of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which mandates that municipalities mark the height of “[e]very bridge or overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches” and post a separate sign “warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are approaching” such a low-clearance bridge at the “last safe exit or detour.” At approximately 5 a.m. on March 26, 2015, plaintiff David Wilson was driving a 13-foot-6-inch tractor trailer through the City of Newark. At the intersection of Foundry Street and Avenue P, Wilson saw a sign with the words “TRUCK ROUTE” above an arrow pointing toward both the right and left on Avenue P. Because the sign indicated a “truck route to the right,” Wilson “made a right” onto Avenue P. While looking down to avoid potholes, Wilson crashed into a 12-foot-2-inch railroad overpass. The trailer became wedged beneath the bridge, and Wilson injured his neck. According to the police report, there was no sign posted on the railroad overpass marking its height at the time of the accident. There was also no sign posted at the last safe exit or detour before the overpass warning drivers that they were approaching a low-clearance bridge. Wilson and his wife (plaintiffs) sued the City. The jury ultimately awarded plaintiffs $562,500 in damages. The jury explicitly found that: (1) the City’s “actions or failure to act create[d] a dangerous condition”; (2) the City had “actual or constructive notice that a dangerous condition existed”; (3) the City was negligent and its “negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”; and (4) the City’s “actions or non-actions [were] palpably unreasonable.” The Appellate Division reversed, finding that the City “has discretion concerning where it places” low-clearance-bridge signs and that Wilson’s claim was barred by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, which immunizes a public entity “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” Finally, the Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs “provided no 1 expert testimony to contend that the City had exercised its discretion in a manner that was palpably unreasonable.” The Court granted certification. 262 N.J. 427 (2026). HELD: A municipality’s failure to post the low-clearance signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is not immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. Here, plaintiffs presented evidence at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the City of Newark acted palpably unreasonably in creating a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a). 1. The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 in 1986 to correct the situation in which motor vehicles get wedged between the road surface and a bridge or overpass because of inadequate posting of height restrictions. Together with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways, which the statute references, N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 requires that, for any bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches of clearance, the municipality that has jurisdiction over the road beneath the bridge must post both: (a) a sign on or in advance of the bridge alerting drivers of the bridge’s maximum clearance; and (b) a sign at the “last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge” warning drivers that they are approaching a low- clearance bridge and indicating the bridge’s maximum clearance. (pp. 11-12) 2. To prevail on a claim under TCA provision N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a) by alleging that a public entity “created the dangerous condition,” the plaintiff need not prove that the public entity had “actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” under subsection (b) but must prove that the public entity’s actions or inaction were “palpably unreasonable.” Actions are palpably unreasonable if it is obvious that no prudent person would approve of the course of action or inaction. TCA provisions N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and 4-5 set forth specific rules of liability and immunity for failure to provide traffic signals. N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 identifies circumstances under which “a public entity shall be liable for injury proximately caused by its failure to provide emergency . . . signs,” whereas N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 provides that “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” In Civalier by Civalier v. Estate of Trancucci, the Court held that public entities are immune from liability for “their initial discretionary decision” about whether or “not to post a [traffic] sign at all,” noting the many considerations that underlie decisions about traffic control devices. 138 N.J. 52, 62, 64 (1994). However, when “the absence of a traffic signal that had been at [an] intersection” and then disappeared “was actively deceptive or lulled at least one of the drivers into a false sense of security,” it “constitut[ed] a trap under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4,” and the municipality was not immune under 59:4-5. Id. at 64, 66. (pp. 12-17) 2 3. The Court holds here that signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 are not “ordinary” within the meaning of 59:4-5 because public entities do not have discretion over whether or not to post them. In Civalier, the Court explained that a public entity’s immunity for failure to place an ordinary traffic signal “is directly related to the discretionary nature of the subject matter.” Id. at 62-63 (quotation omitted). N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, however, leaves the City no discretion regarding whether to place low-clearance or last-safe-exit signs. Instead, 27:5G-4 and the Manual referenced in 27:5G-4(a) mandate that municipalities with jurisdiction over a road beneath a low- clearance bridge post two signs. Here, the City concedes that it posted no sign warning drivers that they were “approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches clearance” at the “last safe exit or detour.” N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b). The Court explains why Spin Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 136 N.J. Super. 520 (Law Div. 1975), does not support the proposition that the failure to post signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is immunized under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. (pp. 17-21) 4. The City’s violation of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b) does not on its own create liability. For plaintiffs to prevail, they must have presented sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to find the City liable under 59:4-2. The jury specifically found that the City’s “actions or failure to act create[d] a dangerous condition” and its “actions or non- actions [were] palpably unreasonable.” Those conclusions were amply supported by the evidence presented at trial. Both the City and the Appellate Division faulted plaintiffs for not calling an expert to testify about how the City’s actions were palpably unreasonable. But the question of whether the City acted palpably unreasonably by creating a dangerous condition through the combination of the absence of a last-safe-exit sign before unmarked low-clearance bridge and the actively deceptive “truck route” sign was not beyond the ken of an ordinary juror, and New Jersey courts have recognized that the need for safety measures to protect the public from a dangerous condition ordinarily can be determined by a jury without the aid of expert testimony. Here, both the City and the Appellate Division emphasized that plaintiffs “provided no expert testimony . . . that the City had exercised its discretion in a manner that was palpably unreasonable.” (emphasis added). But, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b), the City had no discretion regarding whether to place the required sign at the last safe exit before the low-clearance overpass. And it had no discretion to post an “actively deceptive” truck-route sign on the corner of Foundry and Avenue P that “lulled [Wilson] into a false sense of security” that he could safely turn right without immediately crashing into an unmarked, low-clearance bridge. See Civalier, 138 N.J. at 64. (pp. 21-26) REVERSED. The jury’s verdict is REINSTATED. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, FASCIALE, NORIEGA, and HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s opinion. 3 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-21 September Term 2025 090835 David B. Wilson and Cheryl Wilson, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. City of Newark, Defendant-Respondent, and State of New Jersey and Norfolk Southern Corporation, Defendants. On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Argued Decided September 22, 2026 November 19, 2026 Anthony Granato argued the cause for appellants (Jarve Granato Starr, attorneys; Anthony Granato, on the brief). Christian R. Martinez argued the cause for respondent (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Christian R. Martinez and Raymond M. Brown, on the brief). 1 Justine M. Longa, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Attorney General of New Jersey (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and Elizabeth Merrill, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court. A provision of the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, immunizes a public entity from liability for failure to post ordinary traffic signals. In this case, we decide whether that provision immunizes a violation of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which mandates that municipalities mark the height of “[e]very bridge or overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches,” and post a separate sign “warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are approaching” such a low-clearance bridge at the “last safe exit or detour.” We hold that it does not. We also hold that plaintiffs presented evidence at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the City of Newark created a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a) and acted palpably unreasonably. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division overturning the jury’s verdict. I. At approximately 5 a.m. on March 26, 2015, plaintiff David Wilson was driving a 13-foot-6-inch tractor trailer through the City of Newark. The sun 2 had not yet risen, and it was dark. Wilson drove down Foundry Street and approached the intersection of Foundry and Avenue P. He testified at trial that at the intersection, he saw a sign with the words “TRUCK ROUTE” above an arrow pointing toward both the right and left on Avenue P. Because the sign indicated a “truck route to the right,” Wilson “made a right” onto Avenue P. While looking down to avoid potholes, Wilson crashed into a 12-foot-2-inch railroad overpass. The trailer became wedged beneath the bridge, and Wilson injured his neck. According to the police report, there was no sign posted on the railroad overpass marking its height at the time of the accident. There was also no sign posted at the last safe exit or detour before the overpass warning drivers that they were approaching a low-clearance bridge. Wilson and his wife (plaintiffs) sued the City. During discovery, the City produced evidence that, prior to the accident, it had posted a 12’2” low- clearance sign along the side of Avenue P approaching the bridge from Foundry Street. That sign was reported missing and replaced at least four times between 2011 and 2015. The last work order before the accident indicates that the City replaced the sign thirty-seven days before Wilson struck the bridge, on February 17, 2015. At the time of Wilson’s accident, all that remained of the sign was the pole to which it had been attached. 3 The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no evidence as to when the 12’2” sign disappeared during the thirty-seven-day period, and there was “nothing in the record to indicate when the City had notice, or if the City . . . had notice” that the sign was missing. It also argued that there was no “issue of fact as to the palpable unreasonableness” of the City’s actions or inaction because Wilson had not retained a “traffic and signals expert” to testify that sign inspections were required at certain times “[o]r that replacement of a fallen sign should be reasonably” completed in a specific number of days. The trial judge denied the motion. At trial, plaintiffs submitted evidence that, on the day of the accident, there was neither a sign on the railroad overpass marking its height nor a sign at the intersection of Avenue P and Foundry -- the last safe exit before the overpass -- alerting truck drivers to detour. Wilson testified that under federal law, bridges or overpasses less than 14 feet 6 inches from the ground must be marked, so “if you don’t see a sign saying the height of the bridge or the overpass, almost every truck driver will assume it’s over 14’6”.” Wilson narrated a video that he had taken a week after the accident showing the “truck route” sign with the bidirectional arrow pointing to the right and left on Avenue P. He also narrated a portion of the video that showed a 12’2” low-clearance sign along Avenue P approaching the bridge 4 from the opposite direction and testified that the approach from Foundry Steet had no such sign. Plaintiffs did not call any expert witnesses regarding sign installation or maintenance. At the conclusion of plaintiffs’ evidence, the City moved for a directed verdict. The City argued that plaintiffs had failed to prove either that the City had actual or constructive notice of the missing 12’2” low-clearance sign or that the City’s actions were palpably unreasonable. Plaintiffs responded that the City ignored N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which required the City to post a sign both on the bridge itself and “at the last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge or overpass.” The trial judge denied the City’s motion. A maintenance worker then testified for the City that Newark’s road system spans approximately 350 miles, with tens of thousands of traffic signs. A three-person maintenance team is responsible for the signs, relying on reports from drivers and their own observations to determine if a sign is missing. The maintenance worker also testified that the City could not install a sign directly on the Avenue P overpass because the City did not own the overpass, and when he “approached [the railroad company] . . . about putting signs on their bridges,” “[t]hey just never answered.” According to the maintenance worker, the City therefore placed the 12’2” sign on the side of Avenue P within the City’s right-of-way. 5 At the close of the evidence, the City renewed its motion for a directed verdict. The trial judge again denied the motion. Plaintiffs requested the jury be charged that “if [it] find[s] that Newark created the [dangerous] condition, [actual or constructive] notice is not required.” The court refused, concluding “there has to be notice of some kind.” The jury ultimately awarded plaintiffs $562,500 in damages. The jury explicitly found that: (1) the City’s “actions or failure to act create[d] a dangerous condition”; (2) the City had “actual or constructive notice that a dangerous condition existed”; (3) the City was negligent and its “negligence was a proximate cause of the accident”; and (4) the City’s “actions or non- actions [were] palpably unreasonable.” The City appealed the trial judge’s orders denying its motion for summary judgment and denying its motions for a directed verdict. The Appellate Division reversed. The appellate court first concluded that “there was no evidence presented on the summary judgment motion or at trial establishing that the City created the dangerous condition” by violating N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 because “the City did not violate the statute.” Instead, the City “has discretion concerning where it places” low-clearance-bridge signs. And the City acted 6 within “its discretion, in accordance with the Manual [on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways],” when it placed the low-clearance sign “near the overpass at a location within the City’s right-of-way.” Moreover, “to the extent that plaintiff argues that the City should have placed more than one sign, or should have placed the existing sign in a different location, that argument is precluded by the TCA as a matter of law.” Specifically, the Appellate Division found that Wilson’s claim was barred by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, which immunizes a public entity “for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” Finally, the Appellate Division determined that plaintiffs “provided no expert testimony to contend that the City had exercised its discretion in a manner that was palpably unreasonable.” The appellate court emphasized that plaintiffs “presented no . . . expert testimony that the City should have performed routine inspections of its signs, or that, even if the City had performed routine inspections, it deviated from a standard of care by not discovering the missing sign in a reasonable period of time.” We granted plaintiffs’ petition for certification. 262 N.J. 427 (2026). We also granted leave to the Attorney General to appear as amicus curiae. 7 II. Plaintiffs urge us to reverse the Appellate Division’s conclusion that N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 immunizes the City’s failure to place signs required by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4. They argue that signs required by 27:5G-4 are not “ordinary” traffic signals under 59:4-5. Plaintiffs also challenge the Appellate Division’s conclusion that the City had discretion under 27:5G-4. According to plaintiffs, 27:5G-4 “requires that the height of a low overpass be placed on the overpass and that there needs to be a sign at the last exit point to allow a driver to avoid the low overpass. . . . There is no discretion.” Plaintiffs also contend that the jury heard sufficient evidence to conclude that the City created the dangerous condition and its actions were palpably unreasonable. According to plaintiffs, where the public entity creates the dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a), “notice is inapplicable and not required.” They therefore ask us to reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment. The City counters that the Appellate Division correctly concluded that signs required by 27:5G-4 are “ordinary traffic signals” under 59:4-5 and that the City is therefore immune from liability for failure to provide them. The Legislature, the City asserts, adopted 27:5G-4 after New Jersey courts had already interpreted 59:4-5 to immunize a municipality’s failure to place signs indicating the height of an overpass. (citing Spin Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 136 8 N.J. Super. 520, 523-25 (Law Div. 1975)). “If the Legislature did not intend for the signs required by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 to be considered ordinary traffic signs under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5,” the City contends, it would have said so expressly. The City also maintains that it properly “exercised its discretion to post a sign on Avenue P near the overpass.” And, the City asserts, “even assuming” it “created the dangerous condition or had notice of that condition, Wilson did not present any evidence showing the City acted palpably unreasonably.” The City therefore asks us to affirm the Appellate Division. The Attorney General agrees with the City that a “sign prescribed by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is ‘ordinary’” under 59:4-5. The Attorney General relies on both dictionary definitions of the word “ordinary” and prior New Jersey cases it contends interpreted “‘ordinary traffic signs’ to include signs indicating the height clearance for an overpass.” (citing Civalier by Civalier v. Est. of Trancucci, 138 N.J. 52, 60 (1994); Spin, 136 N.J. Super. at 524-25). Moreover, the Attorney General emphasizes that the Legislature adopted 27:5G-4 fourteen years after 59:4-5, and “[n]othing in the statute or legislative history [of 27:5G-4] indicates that the Legislature intended to classify overpass-clearance signage as something other than ‘ordinary.’” The Attorney General also asks us to confirm that not only did plaintiffs need to present expert testimony to show that the City’s actions were palpably unreasonable in 9 this case, but any plaintiff bringing a dangerous condition claim must present expert evidence if “a public entity’s discretionary actions are at issue.” III. We review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, “applying the same standard that governed the trial court’s determination.” Padilla v. Young Il An, 257 N.J. 540, 547 (2024). Summary judgment must be entered if the evidence shows “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party is entitled to” judgment “as a matter of law.” R. 4:46-2(c). Similarly, when reviewing a grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict, we “apply the same standard that governs the trial courts” and determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Frugis v. Bracigliano, 177 N.J. 250, 269 (2003) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 536 (1995)). “If, giving the [non-moving party] the benefit of the most favorable evidence and inferences . . . , reasonable minds could differ as to the outcome,” the case “must be submitted to a jury.” Ibid. (quotation omitted). 10 A. The Legislature enacted N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 in 1986 “to correct the . . . situation wherein because of inadequate posting of height restrictions certain commercial motor vehicles get wedged between the road surface and a bridge or overpass.” S. Transp. & Commc’ns Comm. Statement to S. 396 with S. Comm. Amends. 1 (Mar. 6, 1986). The statute became effective on September 5, 1986, and public entities had two years to comply. L. 1986, c. 104, § 5. The statute does not require public entities to post any signs for bridges or overpasses that are at least 14-feet-6-inches tall. For bridges or overpasses that are not, it requires two separate signs: a. Every bridge or overpass carrying a railroad, with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches from the roadway beneath, shall have the maximum clearance marked or posted thereon in accordance with the current standards prescribed by the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways. b. Signs warning persons driving motor vehicles that they are approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches clearance shall be posted at the last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge or overpass and the maximum clearance of the bridge or overpass shall be indicated on these signs. c. The signs or markings required by this section shall be posted or marked, as appropriate, by, and shall be maintained by the governmental entity, be it the State or the political subdivision, which has jurisdiction over the roadway underneath the bridge or overpass. . . . 11 [N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4.] The Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways referenced in subsection (a) provides that the “Low Clearance sign may be installed on or in advance of the structure.” U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Fed. Highway Admin., Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (Manual) 120 (2009).1 Thus, pursuant to the statute and the Manual, for any bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches of clearance, the municipality that has jurisdiction over the road beneath the bridge must post both: (a) a sign on or in advance of the bridge alerting drivers of the bridge’s maximum clearance; and (b) a sign at the “last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge” warning drivers that they are approaching a low-clearance bridge and indicating the bridge’s maximum clearance. B. In 1972, fourteen years before the enactment of N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, the Legislature enacted the TCA to ensure that “public entities shall only be liable for their negligence within the limitations of this act.” N.J.S.A. 59:1-2; L. 1972, c. 45. “When both liability and immunity appear to exist” in the TCA or 1 This accident occurred in 2015. We cite the version of the Manual in effect at that time. 12 at common law, “the latter trumps the former.” Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 356 (1993). N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 sets forth what a plaintiff must establish to hold a public entity “liable for injury caused by a condition of its property”: A public entity is liable for injury caused by a condition of its property if the plaintiff establishes that the property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury, that the injury was proximately caused by the dangerous condition, that the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred, and that either: a. a negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the public entity within the scope of his employment created the dangerous condition; or b. a public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition under section 59:4-3 a sufficient time prior to the injury to have taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition. Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose liability upon a public entity for a dangerous condition of its public property if the action the entity took to protect against the condition or the failure to take such action was not palpably unreasonable. [N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 (emphasis added).] Because the statute uses the word “or,” if the public entity “created the dangerous condition” under subsection (a), the plaintiff need not prove that the public entity had “actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition” under subsection (b). To prevail on a claim under either subsection (a) or (b), 13 however, a plaintiff must prove that the public entity’s actions or inaction were “palpably unreasonable.” Actions are palpably unreasonable if it is “obvious that no prudent person would approve of [the] course of action or inaction.” Polzo v. County of Essex, 209 N.J. 51, 76 (2012) (quotation omitted); see also Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485, 493 (1985) (explaining that the term “palpably unreasonable” “implies behavior that is patently unacceptable under any given circumstance”). That standard “differs in degree” from ordinary negligence and “implies a more obvious and manifest breach of duty.” Kolitch, 100 N.J. at 493 (quotation omitted). “[O]rdinarily the question of whether a public entity acted in a palpably unreasonable manner” is one for the jury. Polzo, 209 N.J. at 75 n.12. N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 and 4-5 then set forth specific rules of liability and immunity for failure to provide traffic signals. N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 provides: Subject to section 59:4-2 of this act, a public entity shall be liable for injury proximately caused by its failure to provide emergency signals, signs, markings or other devices if such devices were necessary to warn of a dangerous condition which endangered the safe movement of traffic and which would not be reasonably apparent to, and would not have been anticipated by, a person exercising due care. 14 The Legislature did not define the word “emergency” in this section. We have construed it to mean “conditions that are sudden [or] unexpected.” Weiss v. N.J. Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 383 (1992) (quotation omitted). Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, on the other hand, “[n]either a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” Section 4-5 codified New Jersey courts’ “uniform[] hold[ing]” prior to the TCA “that a governmental determination to install or not to install traffic control devices cannot ground a cause of action.” Hoy v. Capelli, 48 N.J. 81, 91 (1966); see also Att’y Gen.’s Task Force on Sovereign Immunity, Report, cmt. on N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 at 222 (1972) (referencing Hoy and stating that “[t]his section is consistent with existing New Jersey law”). Nearly 30 years ago, the Appellate Division explained why: “The determination as to the advisability or necessity of a traffic sign or warning device at any particular place requires the exercise of discretion, and hence N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 simply specifies one particular type of discretionary activity to which immunity attaches” under the TCA. Aebi v. Monmouth Cnty. Highway Dep’t, 148 N.J. Super. 430, 433 (App. Div. 1977). We reached the same conclusion in Civalier, in which we considered whether Section 4-5 immunized a public entity when the disappearance of an 15 existing stop sign “actively dec[eived]” a driver. 138 N.J. at 57, 64, 66-67. We first noted that “New Jersey patterned its Tort Claims Act largely on the California Tort Claims Act,” id. at 61, and that the Legislature “intended, in the absence of other express intent, that we follow the California courts’ interpretations of the [California] Act,” id. at 67. We then held that under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, public entities are immune from liability for “their initial discretionary decision” about whether or “not to post a [traffic] sign at all.” Id. at 64. Relying on a California treatise, we explained: Whether or not to install regulatory traffic devices in particular locations requires an evaluation of a large variety of technical data and policy criteria, including traffic volume frequency and peak load factors, physical layout and terrain, visibility hazards and obstructions, prevailing weather conditions, nature of vehicular use, normal traffic speed in the area, volume of pedestrian traffic, alignment and curvature, need for similar precautionary measures at other like places, alternative methods of control, and availability of funds to do the job. Decisions not to adopt control devices, when based on premises of this order, do not appear to be readily susceptible to intelligent and rational reexamination by untrained juries or judges sitting as triers of fact. [Id. at 62 (quoting Arvo Van Alstyne, California Government Tort Liability 197 (1964)).] However, when “the absence of a traffic signal that had been at [an] intersection” and then disappeared “was actively deceptive or lulled at least 16 one of the drivers into a false sense of security,” it “constitut[ed] a trap under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4,” and the municipality was not immune under 59:4-5. Id. at 64, 66 (cleaned up). IV. We hold that a municipality’s failure to post the low-clearance signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 is not immunized by N.J.S.A. 59:4-5. We also hold that plaintiffs presented evidence at trial from which the jury could have reasonably concluded that the City acted palpably unreasonably in creating a dangerous condition under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2(a). We therefore reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment. A. Recall that 59:4-5 immunizes public entities from liability only for “an injury caused by the failure to provide ordinary traffic signals, signs, markings or other similar devices.” We hold that signs mandated by 27:5G-4 are not “ordinary” within the meaning of 59:4-5 because public entities do not have discretion over whether or not to post them. That conclusion flows directly from Civalier, the text of 27:5G-4, and the other case cited by the City and the Attorney General, Spin. In Civalier, we explained that a public entity’s immunity for failure to place an ordinary traffic signal “is directly related to the discretionary nature of the subject 17 matter” because a decision regarding whether or not to install specific “traffic devices in particular locations requires an evaluation of a large variety of technical data and policy criteria” that are not “readily susceptible to intelligent and rational reexamination by untrained juries or judges.” 138 N.J. at 62-63 (quotation omitted). The Attorney General agrees that “the very purpose of the TCA is to shield the government from suit when it exercises . . . discretion.” See also Polzo, 209 N.J. at 76 (“[A] public entity’s discretionary decisions to act or not to act in the face of competing demands should generally be free from the second guessing of a coordinate branch of Government.” (quotation omitted)). N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, however, leaves the City no discretion regarding whether to place low-clearance or last-safe-exit signs. Instead, 27:5G-4 and the Manual referenced in 27:5G-4(a) mandate that municipalities with jurisdiction over a road beneath a low-clearance bridge post two signs: one on or in advance of the bridge alerting drivers of the bridge’s maximum clearance; and the second at the “last safe exit or detour preceding the bridge” warning drivers that they are approaching a low-clearance bridge and indicating the bridge’s maximum clearance. As Wilson correctly points out: “The statute dictates what needs to be done. There is no discretion.” 18 The Attorney General argues that, because “N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 directly references the Manual . . . , which describes ‘options’ as to the placement of overpass clearance signage,” the Legislature intended to give public entities “discretion over where to place signs” and therefore immunize violations of 27:5G-4. But any discretion over where to place a sign is not the same as discretion over whether to place the signs at all, and the Manual provides no such thing. As earlier noted, only 27:5G-4(a) (requiring a sign on or in advance of the bridge) references the Manual; 27:5G-4(b) (requiring a sign at the last safe exit or detour) does not mention the Manual at all. And even if 27:5G-4(b) did reference the Manual, the portion of the Manual relevant to the signs mandated by subsection (b) grants municipalities no discretion as to whether these signs are posted, stating only that they “should be placed at the nearest intersecting road or wide point in the road at which a vehicle can detour or turn around.” Manual 120. Here, the City concedes that it posted no sign warning drivers that they were “approaching a bridge or overpass with less than 14 feet 6 inches clearance” at the “last safe exit or detour.” N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4(b). It also admits that it posted no such sign “at the nearest intersecting road or wide point in the road at which a vehicle can detour or turn around.” Manual 120. 19 The Appellate Division therefore erred in concluding that “the City did not violate” 27:5G-4(b). The City and the Attorney General cite Spin as support for their argument that the low-clearance signs mandated by 27:5G-4 are “ordinary,” and the Legislature therefore intended N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 to immunize a failure to post them. But a cursory read of Spin shows this argument fails. In Spin, which predated N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 by more than ten years, the owner of a backhoe sued the New Jersey Highway Authority when the boom of the backhoe hit an overpass of the Garden State Parkway that “was erected in accordance with the minimum clearance standards of the State Highway Department, 14 feet 6 inches.” 136 N.J. Super. at 522-23 (emphasis added). Spin thus did not involve a low-clearance bridge. The Law Division held that N.J.S.A. 59:4-5 immunized the Highway Authority’s “failure to post the height of a [14-foot-6-inch] bridge” because the height of a bridge that met minimum- clearance requirements did not constitute an “emergent situation” under 59:4-4 and, under 59:4-5, a “public entity would not be liable for its decision whether or not to post [such] a traffic signal.” Id. at 523, 525. Because Spin did not involve a low-clearance bridge, it has no bearing on whether 59:4-5 immunizes a municipality’s failure to post the signs mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4 -- eleven years after Spin -- for a “bridge or 20 overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches.” Pursuant to Spin, a sign is “ordinary” under 59:4-5 if the public entity has discretion over “whether or not” to post it. Id. at 525. In 1975, as today, public entities had a choice regarding whether to post clearance signs on bridges that met “the minimum clearance standards of . . . 14 feet 6 inches.” Id. at 523, 525. Since 1986, however, they no longer have that choice as to signs on a “bridge or overpass . . . with a clearance of less than 14 feet 6 inches.” Those signs are now mandated by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4. Spin thus does not support the argument that 59:4-5 immunizes a violation of 27:5G-4. Immunizing a public ent