E.T. v. the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County

SYLLABUS This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion. E.T. v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (A-69-24) (089237) Argued November 17, 2025 -- Decided August 19, 2026 JUSTICE WAINER APTER, writing for the Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether New Jersey courts can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA) as to plaintiffs’ allegations that they were sexually abused by a part-time counselor at the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGCHC) between 1976 and 1984. After the Legislature amended the Child Sexual Abuse Act in 2019 to allow “survivors of child sexual abuse” to bring certain actions for redress “any time before reaching” age 55, nine plaintiffs sued BGCHC, BGCA, and others for damages resulting from child sexual abuse that they allege took place between 1976 and 1984. Plaintiffs allege that a part-time counselor at BGCHC sexually abused them both at BGCHC-sponsored activities and at his apartment. BGCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion court determined that there was no general jurisdiction over BGCA in New Jersey but denied the motion to dismiss as to specific personal jurisdiction. Jurisdictional discovery followed. Discovery revealed that BGCHC, which remains a defendant in this case, is a nonprofit corporation headquartered and incorporated in New Jersey. It is subject to personal jurisdiction here. BGCA, however, was federally chartered by Congress in the District of Columbia and is headquartered in Georgia. It is governed by a Board of Directors with “powers, duties, and responsibilities . . . as provided in the constitution and bylaws of the corporation.” 36 U.S.C. § 31104. Congress explicitly provided that “[t]he corporation is liable for the acts of its officers and agents acting within the scope of their authority.” Id. § 31110. It did not provide that BGCA is liable for the acts of its Member Organizations or their officers, employees, or agents. The Court reviews provisions of the BGCA constitution that governed the relationship between BGCA and BGCHC at the relevant times, as well as testimony about organizational structure, on pages 8 to 14 of its opinion. The motion judge determined that BGCA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey. The Appellate Division reversed. 478 N.J. Super. 102, 106 (App. Div. 2024). The Court granted leave to appeal. 260 N.J. 589 (2025). 1 HELD: There is no specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in this case because plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to any act that BGCA affirmatively took in or directed toward New Jersey. 1. Rule 4:4-4(b)(1) has been construed as vesting New Jersey’s courts with jurisdiction over non-residents to the outer limits permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and New Jersey courts are bound by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting those limits. The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. General or all-purpose jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation for any and all claims against it if the corporation’s contacts with the forum State are so constant and pervasive, so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum State. In contrast, under Supreme Court case law, specific jurisdiction permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation if (1) the defendant takes some act to purposefully avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of that State’s laws; and (2) the claim arises out of or relates to the defendant’s purposeful availment of the forum State. If both requirements are met, courts then consider whether exercising jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Under the first part of that test, the defendant must have deliberately reached into the forum State; in other words, absent a duty to act, “purposeful availment” of the privileges of a forum State cannot normally include what a nonresident defendant has failed to do. Under the second part, there must be a strong connection between the defendant’s affirmative acts directed toward the forum State and the plaintiff’s lawsuit. The Court discusses in detail Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), which plaintiffs argue to support specific personal jurisdiction as to their claims. (pp. 18-23) 2. The Court agrees with plaintiffs that the evidence uncovered during jurisdictional discovery establishes that BGCA maintained contacts with New Jersey during the relevant time period, as by: providing BGCHC with template and sample activities and programming; providing support in other areas, including resource development, budgeting, and working with volunteers, including BGCHC’s board; and making professional development and training opportunities available to BGCHC employees. BGCHC in turn paid annual membership dues to BGCA. And BGCHC was required to use, and did use, BGCA’s name and logo on “everything.” But plaintiffs’ claims do not “arise out of or relate to” those contacts. This is not a lawsuit brought by BGCHC against BGCA for breach of contract, reimbursement of overpaid dues, or any problem related to the sample activities and programming, support, professional development, or training opportunities that BGCA made available to BGCHC. It is not a trademark or intellectual property suit related to BGCHC’s use of BGCA’s name or logo. And it is not a suit by a person alleging 2 that an employee or agent of BGCA sexually abused them at a BGCA-sponsored event in New Jersey or that BGCA purposefully sent a known sexual abuser, who worked as its employee or agent, to New Jersey. And they do not allege that their abuse took place during a BGCA trip or an event that BGCA purposefully planned in New Jersey. (pp. 23-28) 3. Instead, according to plaintiffs, their claims “focus[] on a theory that BGCA established youth serving organizations in New Jersey through its local clubs but failed to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent against child sexual abuse against minors that were members of the clubs.” The Court explains that neither it nor the United States Supreme Court has ever held that a failure to promulgate policies or procedures can constitute purposeful availment, and it notes that the cases relied on by the dissent do not do so, either. The Court finds the cases cited by the dissent distinguishable and disagrees that the record shows BGCA controls BGCHC or “came into New Jersey to establish” “place[s] of safe recreation,” noting that only local member clubs like BGCHC did that. (pp. 28-40) 4. Despite plaintiffs’ argument that the “the uniqueness of this case is that the claim is so intertwined with the contact,” plaintiffs’ counsel explicitly conceded at oral argument that under their theory, specific personal jurisdiction against BGCA would be appropriate in any State in a negligence suit brought by the victim of a motor vehicle crash if the vehicle were driven by an employee or agent of any local Boys and Girls Club, and the victim alleged that BGCA had failed to promulgate safe driving regulations that could have averted the crash. Specific jurisdiction is supposed to be different from general jurisdiction in a key way: it is supposed to “cover[] defendants less intimately connected with a State, but only as to a narrower class of claims.” - Ford, - - 592 U.S. at 359. Here, plaintiffs’ theory would subject BGCA to specific personal jurisdiction in all fifty States, on any claim in which an agent or employee of a local club was alleged to cause some harm, as long as the plaintiff alleged that the harm could have been avoided had BGCA promulgated some kind of policy or procedure. That is the opposite of specific personal jurisdiction. It is far more expansive than even general jurisdiction. A court does not weigh considerations of fair play and substantial justice until it has found that the defendant has experienced sufficient minimum contacts. Because that threshold is not met in this case, the Court does not reach the question of fair play and substantial justice, which the dissent discusses, but it notes that plaintiffs’ claims will still be heard in New Jersey, though not against BGCA. (pp. 40-45) AFFIRMED. JUSTICE HOFFMAN, dissenting, expresses the view that this case is not about haling national organizations into court for any conceivable harm caused by their local affiliates, but rather the particular failure of an organization that promotes 3 its Member Organizations as “safe haven[s]” for New Jersey children to keep those children safe from sexual abuse. Justice Hoffman writes that BGCA purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum through significant affirmative acts, including its promotion, control over, and support of BGCHC and other New Jersey Member Organizations. Justice Hoffman also asserts that, similar to - Ford, -- plaintiffs’ claims both “arise out of” and “relate to” BGCA’s promotion, control over, and support of BGCHC -- specifically through BGCA’s (i) branding, (ii) membership requirements, and (iii) proffered trainings and programming. Finally, Justice Hoffman explains why, in the dissent’s view, “fair play and substantial justice” necessitate a finding of specific jurisdiction in New Jersey -- plaintiffs’ place of residence at the time of their alleged childhood sexual abuse, the location of the alleged abuse, and the only forum in which plaintiffs’ claims can be heard. CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, and NORIEGA join in JUSTICE WAINER APTER’s opinion. JUSTICE HOFFMAN filed a dissent, in which JUSTICE FASCIALE joins. 4 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-69 September Term 2024 089237 E.T., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County, f/k/a, The Jersey City Boys Club, Defendant, and Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Defendant-Respondent. A.M., Plaintiff, v. Boys and Girls Clubs of Hudson County, Defendant, and Boys and Girls Clubs of 1  America, Defendant. A.R., Plaintiff, v. Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Defendant, and Boys and Girls Clubs of Hudson County f/k/a Jersey City Boys’ Club, and Arthur Freudenberg, Defendants. A.R.2, Plaintiff, v. Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Defendant, and Boys and Girls Club of 2 Hudson County f/k/a Jersey City Boys Club, and Arthur Freudenberg, Defendants. E.R., and R.R., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County, f/k/a The Jersey City Boys Club, Defendant, and Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Defendant-Respondent. J.A., A.M., and G.M., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County, f/k/a, The Jersey City Boys Club, Defendant, and 3  Boys and Girls Clubs of America, Defendant-Respondent. On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 478 N.J. Super. 102 (App. Div. 2024). Argued Decided November 17, 2025 August 19, 2026 J. Silvio Mascolo argued the cause for appellants (Rebenack Aronow & Mascolo, attorneys; J. Silvio Mascolo, of counsel and on the brief). Michael L. Eber (Caplan Cobb) a member of the Georgia bar, admitted pro hac vice, argued the cause for respondent (Fishman McIntyre Levine Samansky, attorneys; Mitchell B. Levine, on the brief). JUSTICE WAINER APTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This case tests the limits of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs allege that they were sexually abused by a part-time counselor at the Boys and Girls Club of Hudson County (BGCHC) between 1976 and 1984. They sued BGCHC, the Boys and Girls Clubs of America (BGCA or the Corporation), and others for damages. 4  BGCHC is headquartered and incorporated in New Jersey. All accept that it is subject to personal jurisdiction in New Jersey courts, and it remains a defendant in this case. BGCA, however, was federally chartered by Congress in the District of Columbia and is headquartered in Georgia. Plaintiffs claim that specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA is proper in New Jersey because BGCA “established youth serving organizations in New Jersey through its local clubs but failed to implement policies and procedures to safeguard and prevent against child sexual abuse against minors that were members of the clubs.” We find that the facts elicited during jurisdictional discovery do not show that plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate to any act that BGCA took to purposefully avail itself of the laws of New Jersey. We therefore hold that New Jersey courts cannot exercise specific personal jurisdiction over BGCA in this case. I. In 2019, the Legislature amended the Child Sexual Abuse Act to allow “survivors of child sexual abuse” to bring certain civil actions for redress “any time before reaching the age of fifty-five.” W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J. 506, 511 (2023); N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2a(a)(1). The amendment expressly “reviv[ed] 5 claims that would have been barred under the prior two-year statute of limitations.” W.S., 252 N.J. at 511. Nine plaintiffs, in what became six consolidated lawsuits, then sued BGCHC, BGCA, and others for damages resulting from child sexual abuse that they allege took place between 1976 and 1984. Plaintiffs allege that Arthur Freudenberg, a part-time counselor at BGCHC, used his position to gain their trust and then sexually abused them both at BGCHC-sponsored activities and at his apartment. In the 1980s, Freudenberg was charged with 493 counts of aggravated sexual assault of boys ages 11 to 13. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. BGCA moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The motion court initially relied on Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014), to hold that BGCA was not subject to general jurisdiction in New Jersey because it was not incorporated here, had no principal place of business here, and did not maintain “continuous and systematic contacts with New Jersey.” Plaintiffs alleged that the court could “exercise general jurisdiction over BGCA because the local clubs serve as alter ego[s] or agents of BGCA.” The motion court disagreed, holding that plaintiffs’ theory “would render BGCA at home in every state where it has a local affiliated member,” which would violate Daimler. The motion court also cited BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 6 402, 414 (2017), for the proposition that general jurisdiction did not exist over BNSF in Montana even though BNSF had “over 2,000 miles of railroad track and more than 2,000 employees in Montana.” However, the court denied the motion to dismiss as to specific personal jurisdiction, finding that “[f]actual disputes exist regarding BGCA’s involvement in the operations of BGCH[C].” The court therefore ordered that all six cases be consolidated for limited jurisdictional discovery. That discovery revealed the following facts. BGCHC is a New Jersey nonprofit corporation. Its principal place of business is in New Jersey. BGCA is a “federally chartered corporation” that was incorporated by Congress in 1956. 36 U.S.C. § 31101. It is “incorporated and domiciled in the District of Columbia.” Ibid. Its principal place of business was originally in New York, id. § 31107, but is now in Georgia. The purpose of BGCA is “to promote the health, social, educational, vocational, and character development of youth throughout the United States.” Id. § 31102(1). BGCA is governed by a Board of Directors with “powers, duties, and responsibilities . . . as provided in the constitution and bylaws of the corporation.” Id. § 31104. “[E]ligibility for membership in the corporation” is likewise provided for in the constitution 7 and bylaws, although Congress prescribed that “[e]ach member has one vote on each matter submitted to a vote at a meeting of the members.” Id. § 31103. Congress explicitly provided that “[t]he corporation is liable for the acts of its officers and agents acting within the scope of their authority.” Id. § 31110. It did not provide that BGCA is liable for the acts of its Member Organizations or their officers, employees, or agents. This case is governed by BGCA’s 1971 constitution, which was in effect until 1990. Because the constitution governed the relationship between BGCA and BGCHC, we discuss its provisions in detail. Article III provided that “[t]he membership of the Corporation shall consist of organizations which operate one or more Boys’ Clubs in accordance with requirements and standards established by the National Council of the Corporation.” These are known as Member Organizations. Article IV provided: The policies of the Corporation shall be determined by a National Council which shall also, as provided in this Constitution, establish requirements and standards for membership in the Corporation; elect directors and officers of the Corporation and members-at-large of the National Council; determine annual membership dues to be paid by Member Organizations; and act on all matters which may properly come before it. [(emphasis added).] 8  The National Council consisted of two delegates from each Member Organization. All decisions of the National Council required a “majority vote of the Member Organizations present.” Pursuant to Article VII, the day-to-day “business, property and affairs of the Corporation shall be managed by a Board of Directors . . . elected at the annual meeting of the National Council.” Although officers and members of the Corporation’s Board of Directors were permitted to attend National Council meetings, they were not permitted to vote; only the two delegates chosen by each Member Organization were permitted to vote. Similarly, although “[e]ach professional member of the National Staff of the Corporation shall be entitled to be present at any meeting of the National Council,” none shall “be entitled to vote.” The Board had “the power to establish policies not inconsistent with those established by the National Council.” It also had the authority to “cancel the membership of [a] Member Organization and withdraw the privileges of membership” if, in its judgment, the Member Organization did not “meet the established requirements and standards” set by the National Council.1 1 The dissent asserts that the Board could also enact membership requirements. See post at ___ (slip op. at 40-44). Pursuant to Articles IV and VII of the 1971 constitution, that is incorrect. Only the National Council had authority to “establish requirements and standards for membership in the Corporation.” Although the constitution granted the Board no fewer than ten 9  Pursuant to Article IX, “[t]he officers of the Corporation shall be a Chairman of the Board, a President, one or more Vice-Presidents,” etc., “all of whom shall be elected by the National Council at its annual meeting.” Pursuant to Article X, the Board “shall appoint a National Director of the Corporation” who “shall direct the work and employees of the Corporation subject to, and in accordance with, the instructions of the Board.” Pursuant to Article XV, the constitution could be “amended upon a two- thirds (2/3) affirmative vote of the Member Organizations present . . . at any meeting of the National Council.” Membership requirements set by the National Council provided that each local Member Organization was required to have a “board of directors, executive committee, administrative committee or otherwise named governing body of responsible citizens” known as a “local governing body.” The local governing body shall have control of the Boys’ Club buildings or designated Boys’ Club rooms; shall have control of the expenditures of the Boys’ Club within an established budget; shall have the authority to determine policies and establish programs; shall have the authority to appoint the executive, fix his compensation and different powers, including the power to “adopt the annual budget of the Corporation; borrow money; raise and disburse funds; invest and reinvest funds of the Corporation; sell, buy and exchange properties and securities of the Corporation; make contracts” and more, not one involved setting membership requirements. 10  prescribe his duties and the terms of his employment; shall have the authority to fix the compensation of other employees; and shall have the authority, or delegate the authority to the executive, to hire and discharge employees and prescribe their duties. Each local Member Organization was also required to employ “a full- time Executive Director who shall have executive and administrative control of activities and personnel . . . in accordance with policies and procedures established by the local governing body.” While the Executive Director “shall be acceptable to Boys’ Clubs of America,” the person “shall be responsible directly to the local governing body,” not to BGCA. Member Organizations were required to “display the emblem of Boys’ Clubs of America on the outside of their buildings” and on printed materials. There were also minimum requirements for each individual club, including: (1) “sufficient floor area and room spaces, suitably equipped for carrying on a diversified and constructive program of activities which must be approved by Boys’ Clubs of America”; (2) “sufficient full-time, part-time and volunteer workers who are qualified in personality, character, experience, education and training for the leadership and guidance of boys”; and (3) “at least one hundred boy members enrolled in any twelve-month period.” Individual clubs were also required to “be maintained in a satisfactory state of cleanliness and 11 sanitation,” “comply with state laws and local ordinances for protection and safety,” and “be adequately heated and lighted.” Member Organizations were required to pay dues “to the Corporation in such amounts and on such terms and conditions” as the National Council determined. Beginning in 1971, Member Organizations were required to pay up to 1.5% of their total annual operating expenses to the Corporation in dues. Annual dues from all Member Organizations across the country accounted for approximately 17% of BGCA’s budget. Gary Greenberg, a former Executive Director of BGCHC, testified that he used BGCA “as a resource” to help oversee and improve existing programs and initiate new programs at BGCHC. He testified that between 1977 and 1983, BGCA provided BGCHC with “template and sample activities and programming” on topics including “physical education, social recreation, leadership and character development, alcohol abuse and prevention” and more. BGCA also provided support in other areas, including resource development, budgeting, and working with BGCHC’s board. And BGCA made professional development and training opportunities available to BGCHC staff. BGCHC, Greenberg stated, paid annual membership dues to BGCA. BGCHC was also required to use, and did use, BGCA’s name and logo on “everything,” from the building to letterhead to information sent to 12 parents and the community, in order “to create a brand . . . that people can rely on, that people feel confident in.” John Miller, BGCA’s senior vice president of field relations, testified that, as set forth in the provisions of the 1971 constitution quoted above, the National Council, not BGCA, set all membership requirements for local Member Organizations. According to Miller, the National Council was made up of Member Organizations and was supported -- not controlled -- by BGCA: Miller testified that the National Council had the “sole authority to set” membership requirements by majority vote, so all membership requirements had to be agreed upon by “the majority of member organizations.” BGCA was then responsible for managing and enforcing “the membership requirements as they [were] passed by the national council,” but it did not have authority to “make membership requirements on [its] own” or “force” local Member Organizations “to meet any other requirement other than those . . . passed by the national council.”2 Miller additionally testified that local Member 2 Plaintiffs assert that Miller “conceded that BGCA could have imposed a requirement that would have prevented employees and volunteers from using their position with its clubs to invite its child members to their home without another adult present.” That is incorrect. Rather, in response to a series of questions about whether the National Council could have passed a membership requirement preventing employees or volunteers from inviting child members to their homes, Miller stated that the National Council -- not BGCA -- could have done so: “The local organization, independent and autonomous, is a member of the national council, so the majority of those organizations will 13 Organizations had “the responsibility and the authority” to hire, evaluate, and train all staff. Miller also testified that, between 1978 and 1983, even if BGCA “learned that a local club was employing a convicted sex offender,” it “did not have the authority” “to require the local club to remove that person” from their position. This was so because BGCA could not “control what [a local Member] [O]rganization does outside of the membership requirements which they have agreed to abide by.” After jurisdictional discovery was complete, a different motion judge held that BGCA was subject to specific personal jurisdiction in New Jersey because BGCA “purposefully availed itself of the New Jersey forum” and “that availment relates to the claims by Plaintiffs.” The motion court found that BGCA provided local Member Organizations “marketing support, strategic planning support, leadership development and training, facility, [and] consultations,” and Member Organizations in turn paid dues to BGCA. Member Organizations also used “the BGCA logo and branding” to “benefit from . . . name recognition and public trust.” The motion court held: “BGCA determine the membership requirements that Boys and Girls [Clubs] of America, the corporate office, can manage and enforce.” 14 marketed its youth clubs in New Jersey, and an employee abused a patron. Accordingly, BGCA is subject to personal jurisdiction.” In a published opinion, the Appellate Division reversed. E.T. v. Boys & Girls Club of Hudson Cnty., 478 N.J. Super. 102, 106 (App. Div. 2024). The Appellate Division agreed with the motion court that “BGCA had contacts with New Jersey through its relationship with” BGCHC, including receiving dues from BGCHC and providing support, training, and leadership development to BGCHC. Id. at 112. It also acknowledged that BGCHC used “the BGCA brand to market its services to the local community” and accessed “BGCA’s programmatic and financial guidance.” Id. at 113. According to the Appellate Division, however, these contacts did not mean “that BGCA availed itself to New Jersey with respect to specific personal jurisdiction regarding plaintiffs’ allegations of Freudenberg’s sexual abuse,” because BGCA’s support of BGCHC did not “relate to Freudenberg’s alleged sexual abuse.” Id. at 112, 114. The Appellate Division emphasized that there was no evidence “BGCA maintained control over the hiring, training, supervising, or termination of any [BGCHC] employee,” including Freudenberg. Id. at 113. Instead, local Member Organizations “solely hire, evaluate, and train their employees without the oversight of BGCA.” Ibid. In addition, BGCHC’s “executive 15 director managed the local club’s operations and reported to the club’s trustees, not to BGCA.” Ibid. The appellate court therefore concluded that New Jersey could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction. Id. at 115. We granted plaintiffs’ motion for leave to appeal. 260 N.J. 589 (2025). II. Plaintiffs argue that the Appellate Division misconstrued “[t]he gravamen” of their claim. According to plaintiffs, the Appellate Division’s conclusion that BGCA had no control over Freudenberg “is a red herring.” Instead, “[t]he gravamen of plaintiffs’ claim . . . [and] the argument here that the Boys and Girls Club of America has purposefully availed itself” of New Jersey “is . . . essentially: You, Boys and Girls Club of America, have oversight, have control, over these local clubs. And you, Boys and Girls Club of America, failed to have policies and procedures in place to prevent the harm here. This entire specific jurisdiction issue that’s before this court depends on this.”3 In plaintiffs’ view, BGCA “has used local Boys and Girls of America clubs to market, sell, and maintain its product throughout the country, 3 The dissent accuses us of mischaracterizing “plaintiffs’ ‘theory,’” and “conflat[ing] the basis of plaintiffs’ tort claims with their argument regarding purposeful availment.” Post at ___ (slip op. at 16-17). Every one of plaintiffs’ arguments discussed in this opinion is quoted directly from their brief in support of their Motion for Leave to Appeal or the oral argument that plaintiffs’ counsel presented to the Court. 16 including in New Jersey, since 1956,” and has “profited from the operation of its local clubs in New Jersey and the sale of its product to the children of New Jersey.” “Just as Ford touted its brand across Montana and Minnesota” in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court, 592 U.S. 351 (2021), plaintiffs maintain that BGCA required all local Boys and Girls Clubs “to use BGCA’s name and logo ‘on everything’” so that parents would believe the clubs were “safe for their minor children to attend because of the very safety standards, policies, and procedures” that parents “assumed BGCA required [the clubs] to follow.” BGCA argues this case bears no resemblance to Ford Motor Co. because, unlike Ford, BGCA does not manufacture, market, or sell any “products” and earns no profits at all. More fundamentally, BGCA maintains, an “alleged failure to adopt policies on sexual abuse does not amount to purposeful availment” of the laws of any particular State. According to BGCA, “a contrary holding would eviscerate the distinction between general and specific jurisdiction” and would subject it to jurisdiction “in any forum where any of its affiliates own and operate a local club -- regardless of the claim.” And even if the failure to adopt a policy could constitute purposeful availment, BGCA contends, it had no ability to adopt the policies plaintiffs allege could have prevented the abuse here, because “only the local clubs 17 themselves, working collectively and democratically through the National Council -- and not BGCA -- could pass membership requirements.” III. Personal jurisdiction “presents a mixed question of law and fact that must be resolved at the outset, before the matter may proceed.” D.T. v. Archdiocese of Phila., 260 N.J. 27, 41 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zahl v. Eastland, 465 N.J. Super. 79, 92 (App. Div. 2020)). We review a trial court’s legal determinations de novo. Ibid. Our review of a “court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction,” however, “is limited to determining whether those findings are supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record.” Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rippon v. Smigel, 449 N.J. Super. 344, 358 (App. Div. 2017)). Under Rule 4:4-4(b)(1), a New Jersey court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant “consistent with due process of law.” “That Rule ‘effects the so-called long-arm jurisdiction of the State and has been construed as vesting New Jersey’s courts with jurisdiction over non- residents to the outer limits permitted by due process.’” D.T., 260 N.J. at 41 (quoting Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1.1 on R. 4:4-4 (2024)). 18  The United States Supreme Court’s modern personal jurisdiction cases have “grappled . . . with the limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment on state courts.” Fuld v. Pal. Liberation Org., 606 U.S. 1, 11 (2025) (emphases omitted). The reason the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause constrains when state courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over out- of-state defendants is “a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). It “ensure[s] that the States[,] through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). In other words, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevents States “from transcending the limits of their authority.” Fuld, 606 U.S. at 15 (quoting United States v. Bennett, 232 U.S. 299, 306 (1914)). Because we exercise personal jurisdiction to the outer limits permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, we are bound by United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting those limits. “The Supreme Court has recognized two forms of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.” D.T., 260 N.J. at 42. The two are distinct and should not be “[c]onfus[ed] or blend[ed].” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 19  “[G]eneral or all-purpose jurisdiction” permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation for “‘any and all claims against [it]’” if the corporation’s contacts with the forum State “are so constant and pervasive,” “‘so continuous and systematic as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State.’” Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122, 127 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). A corporation’s “place of incorporation and principal place of business,” each of which is “easily ascertainable,” “are paradig[m] . . . bases for general jurisdiction.” Id. at 137 (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). In contrast, specific jurisdiction, or “case-linked” jurisdiction, permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation if (1) the defendant takes “some act” to “purposefully avail[] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of [that State’s] laws,” Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253; and (2) the claim “‘arise[s] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s’” purposeful availment of the forum State, Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (alterations in original) (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)). If both of these requirements are met, courts then consider whether exercising jurisdiction “would offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 20 102, 113 (1987) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Under the first part of that test, “[t]he ‘substantial connection’ between the defendant and the forum State . . . must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). The defendant must have “deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its home” and into the forum State in order to purposely avail itself of that State’s laws. Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 359 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). In other words, “absent a duty to act, ‘purposeful availment’ of the privileges of a forum state cannot normally include what a nonresident defendant has failed to do.” Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 138 N.J. 106, 127 (1994) (emphasis omitted). Under the second part of the test for specific personal jurisdiction, there must be a strong connection between the defendant’s affirmative acts directed toward the forum State and the plaintiff’s lawsuit. See Ford Motor Co., 592 U.S. at 365, 371. Plaintiffs rely heavily on Ford Motor Co., so we discuss that case in detail. Ford is a “a global auto company . . . incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in Michigan.” Id. at 355. The plaintiffs brought products 21 liability suits against Ford in Montana and Minnesota after accidents that occurred in those States in a Ford Explorer and a Ford Crown Victoria, respectively, caused death and serious injury. Id. at 356. Ford argued that it could only be subject to specific personal jurisdiction in Montana and Minnesota if it had “designed, manufactured, or . . . sold in the State the particular vehicle involved in the accident” -- which it had not. Ibid. The Supreme Court rejected “Ford’s causation-only approach.” Id. at 361. It quoted the “arise out of or relate to” language discussed above and held that although the “first half of that standard asks about causation .