Jennifer Davenport v. Merlin's Kids, Inc.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketA-2068-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2068-24
JENNIFER DAVENPORT,[1]
Attorney General of the
State of New Jersey, and
CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON,
Acting Director of the New Jersey
Division of Consumer Affairs,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
MERLIN'S KIDS, INC., a NJ
nonprofit corporation, UNITED
K9 PROFESSIONALS INC.,
and JANICE WOLFE,
Defendants-Appellants.
___________________________
Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Vanek.
1
The parties names have been updated to reflect the current officials in office,
pursuant to R. 4:34-4.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No.
C-000247-20.
Scott Piekarsky argued the cause for appellants (Offit
Kurman, attorneys; Scott Piekarsky, on the briefs).
Leslie Faith Prentice, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport,
Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Sara J. Koste and
Amanda McElfresh, Deputy Attorneys General, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendants Merlin's Kids, Inc. (Merlin's Kids), United K9 Professionals
Inc. (United K9), and Janice Wolfe appeal from a Chancery Division judgment
finding they violated the Charitable Registration and Investigations Act (CRIA
or the Act), N.J.S.A. 45:17A-1 to -40, and accompanying regulations; the New
Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 15A:1-1 to -16.2; and the New
Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -233. The judgment also
imposed fines associated with those violations, ordered disgorgement, and
barred Wolfe from operating a charity in New Jersey. We affirm.
I.
Factual Background
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Wolfe is an animal behaviorist who has worked with animals for most of
her life. She started the nonprofit Merlin's Kids in October 2008. According to
its website, Merlin's Kids was "a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing
individually trained service dogs to those in need." Its mission was to "rescue
and rehabilitate shelter dogs and change their lives by turning them into service
dogs" and then place the dogs with individuals with a variety of needs. At times,
the Merlin's Kids' website stated that "all services and animals are provided free
of charge to those in need."
Merlin's Kids was incorporated in 2008. In 2011, it was granted nonprofit
status under § 501(c)(3) 2 of the Internal Revenue Code, retroactive to 2008.
Beginning in 2011 and every year until at least 2016, Wolfe filed 990 forms with
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The form listed total contributions of
$391,245 in 2011, $825,868 in 2012, $902,407 in 2013, $1,001,672 in 2014,
$1,107,633 in 2015, and $1,095,827 in 2016.
Merlin's Kids had a website promoting its cause, which included a direct -
donation link and links for commercial co-ventures between Merlin's Kids and
other companies, where a portion of an individual's purchase at the other
2
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts nonprofits and
other organizations from taxation.
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company would be donated to Merlin's Kids. Under Merlin's Kids, Wolfe
worked with families who had children with disabilities ranging from anxiety to
deafness and blindness or other medical needs. For individuals seeking a dog
through Merlin's Kids, Wolfe would go meet with the family either in New
Jersey or Missouri to conduct an evaluation. Upon deciding whether the family
was a right fit for a dog to be placed, the family would be placed on a waiting
list and provided with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlining the
responsibilities of Merlin's Kids as well as the family.
Part of the MOU outlined the family's financial obligation for the dog, its
care, and its training, which all needed to be addressed before the dog could be
placed with a family. This financial obligation was framed as a fundraising
commitment, the cost of which varied depending on the type of dog and the
length of training required. For example, one family was required to fundraise
$20,500, while another family was only required to fundraise $17,000. The
MOU included a provision stating that, "[i]f at any point in the process, it is
determined that the applicant is not able to accept the dog or the responsibilities
of handling and caring for the dog, then any money raised will be allocated to
another family. Money raised cannot be refunded."
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In 2012, Wolfe incorporated her for-profit business, United K9, with the
State of New Jersey, and made the $50 annual report payment beginning in 2015
and continuing through 2018. United K9's website described the business as
one that offered "private dog behaviorist services, local dog training group
classes, shelter and rescue partnerships, and education and outreach." United
K9 described itself as "encompass[ing] multiple companies and programs ,"
including "Wyatt's List" and "Merlin's Kids." United K9 never had a bank
account, but its website indicated that it partnered with Merlin's Kids and that
"[a] portion of our proceeds supports Merlin's Kids." Under United K9, Wolfe
offered services to help resolve individuals' dogs' behavioral issues and a
lifetime guarantee policy. Despite United K9 being for profit, Wolfe instructed
most consumers of United K9 to pay the training fee or class fee directly to
Merlin's Kids because it was tax deductible.
Wolfe had multiple volunteers work with Merlin's Kids, including Dawn
Orr, who maintained the Merlin's Kids' website for a period of time, and Melissa
Gibson, who started as a volunteer but became an independent contractor around
2017. Jennifer Kruse was also a volunteer at the Missouri facility but at some
point was paid "just to keep her coming in and showing up."
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Apart from Wolfe's involvement with Merlin's Kids and United K9, she
bred dogs and volunteered in an advisory capacity to work with the Fire Fighter
Cancer Foundation3 (the Foundation) as it explored the potential for canines to
detect diseases. The Director of the Foundation, Cindy Ell, confirmed that
though Wolfe "was a non-paid consultant with her expertise in canine behavior"
for the foundation, Ell and the Foundation had no relationship with Merlin's
Kids.
On March 25, 2014, the Charities Registration Section of defendant New
Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) sent, by regular and certified
mail, a letter informing Merlin's Kids that it may be required to register with the
office, unless it met one of the exemptions listed in the letter. Three exemptions
were listed in the letter: (1) a religious corporation, trust, foundation,
association, or organization; (2) certain educational institutions; and (3) any
charitable organization that did not receive gross contributions in excess of
$10,000. On March 30, 2014, Wolfe signed the certified mail receipt. She
continued to operate her charity and did not register with the office, despite
claiming gross contributions over $10,000 for 2014, 2015, and 2016.
3
At one point, the Foundation was also called "The International Firefighter
Foundation."
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On October 10, 2018, the Division's Office of Consumer Protection began
an official investigation into Merlin's Kids. On February 12, 2019, Merlin's
Kids was registered as a charity in New Jersey. However, the registration was
deficient for not providing 990s, articles of incorporation, and the charity's
bylaws.
On May 13, 2019, the Division served a subpoena on Merlin's Kids,
requesting documentation. On September 3, 2019, the Division sent a follow -
up letter to defendants' counsel noting deficiencies in their responses.
Approximately five months later, the Division sent a second follow-up letter
with an extensive list of deficiencies in defendants' response to the initial
subpoena. Defendants provided documents, including records of Merlin's Kids'
online payments, 990s, and a response to requests for admissions. In their
response, defendants admitted that they made purchases from Adora Bella Salon
and Meaningful Beauty through Merlin's Kids accounts but that those purchases
were mistakes, and Wolfe reimbursed the accounts, though it was not clear
reimbursements actually occurred.
The Division received a complaint against Merlin's Kids from one of its
former clients, Kelly Fitzgerald, who alleged the service dog her family received
from Merlin's Kids was not trained, and that it offered a second dog which was
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also not trained. Fitzgerald's complaint included allegations that both service
dogs were poorly trained, one was aggressive and lunged at other animals, and
that the other urinated all over the home.
During its investigation, the Division sent out consumer questionnaires to
multiple individuals who had either received a dog through Merlin's Kids or
obtained training services through United K9. Individuals returned the
questionnaires, and their responses were primarily unfavorable relating to the
services received by Wolfe, Merlin's Kids, and United K9. Laura Calabro's
questionnaire stated that she engaged Wolfe's services for assistance training
one of her rescue dogs through United K9. However, Calabro alleged that the
training was only four hours long and mostly consisted of Wolfe talking about
herself. Calabro alleged that Wolfe gave only limited training instruction, and,
when the dog seemed to get worse, Wolfe's solution was for the dog to go to the
Missouri location for further training, though there would be additional costs,
despite the lifetime guarantee of Wolfe's training with United K9.
Lacey Stange sought a service dog through Merlin's Kids for her son, who
had multiple medical issues, in addition to being deaf and blind. Stange and her
family traveled to Missouri to meet Wolfe at her facility for an evaluation to
determine what dog, if any, would be appropriate. Wolfe advised Stange that
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she and her family would have to fundraise $15,000 for the dog, as well as attend
virtual trainings and read Wolfe's book, SHHH Happens. Two years later, when
Stange and her family received the dog, he failed to do things Wolfe advised he
would, such as blocking Stange's son from walking out the door and getting on
the school bus with Stange's son. Wolfe went to the family's home about eight
months later and performed a quick training. Despite her reaching out to Wolfe,
Stange's concerns were not resolved, to the point where the dog nipped and bit
others. Eventually, the dog was returned to Wolfe at her Missouri location .
The Litigation
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Wolfe, Merlin's Kids, and United K9
alleging violations of the CRIA and Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-
3.1(a), based on defendants failure to file a registration statement (count one);
violations of the CRIA and the Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-13.2(a),
alleging defendants' untruthful statements, misrepresentations, and expending
contributions in a manner inconsistent with charitable purpose (count two);
violation of the New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 15A:12-11(a),
(11), based on defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation and conducting
activities prejudicial to the public (count three); violation of the CRIA by
defendants' failure to cooperate with the Attorney General's investigation (count
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four); violation of CRIA and Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-10.1(a)-(b),
based on defendants failure to maintain accurate books and records (count five);
violation of the CRIA and the Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-11.2(b), by
Wolfe (count six); and violations of the CFA by all defendants based on
unconscionable commercial practices and deceptions (count seven).
Pre-Trial Discovery
Plaintiffs subpoenaed Unity Bank and received bank records for the
Merlin's Kids' account, which had since been closed by Wolfe. Plaintiffs also
subpoenaed Bank of America and Providence Bank for records. Plaintiffs
retained forensic expert Matthew Estersohn, CPA, and defendants retained Gary
B. Rosen, CPA. The judge appointed R. Joseph Gunteski, CPA as a neutral
expert to conduct an analysis of defendants' finances to determine their
compliance with the relevant statutes and regulations. The experts reviewed
many records from defendants' accounts, including those with PNC Bank,
American Express, Capital One, Chase Ink, CashApp, PayPal, and Venmo.
Those records showed many transactions in and out of Merlin's Kids'
accounts, including expenses for dog show entries and equestrian stables, as well
as purchases at Glow Skin and Laser, Adora Bella Salon, and personal money
transfers through Venmo, CashApp, and PayPal. Plaintiffs sent multiple letters
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to defendants regarding their discovery response deficiencies and ultimately
filed a motion to compel discovery. Eventually, defendants alleged that
documents were destroyed in two separate floods that occurred at Wolfe's home
in 2021 and 2022, and that other documents were destroyed by mice in Missouri.
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that
defendants failed to file a registration statement, as alleged in count one. The
judge granted the motion.
The Trial
At trial, all three experts testified as to the finances of Merlin's Kids and
United K9 and offered their respective opinions as to whether there was any
misappropriation or commingling of funds, whether any purchases made were
outside the scope of the charitable purpose, and whether there were internal
controls. Rosen was essentially proffered by defendants as a rebuttal expert and
completed reports primarily to undermine the findings in Estersohn's and
Gunteski's reports.
Estersohn outlined his review of Merlin's Kids' financial records and noted
that those which his office and defendants could not obtain supporting
documentation for totaled approximately $1,300,000. Estersohn then divided
the transactions into two categories, "generally suspicious" and "highly
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suspicious." Estersohn explained the "generally suspicious" transactions were
those that lacked documentation to support Merlin's Kids' charitable purpose but
possibly could be connected. Estersohn then explained that the "highly
suspicious transactions" were not, in his opinion, connected to Merlin's Kids at
all. Estersohn also opined that there "were limited internal controls in place
over the cash disbursement process." Based on Estersohn's review, he opined
that there "was co-mingling of funds between Merlin's Kids and . . . Wolfe's
other ventures, other businesses and private accounts."
Gunteski reviewed both Estersohn's and Rosen's reports, as well as
documents he received regarding Merlin's Kids' financials. As ordered,
Gunteski, as the neutral court expert, was to review all documents and determine
whether defendants "spent, used, misappropriated, and/or diverted funds that
were donated and/or paid to Merlin's Kids by donors and/or the public in a
manner inconsistent with Merlin's Kids stated charitable purpose." Gunteski
was also to determine whether "Wolfe failed to properly monitor, segregate, and
account for Merlin's Kids' funds" and if there was commingling of funds
between Merlin's Kids and United K9.
Gunteski ultimately opined that "Wolfe and Merlin's Kids did not keep
[an] accurate, detailed record . . . of all of their income and . . . expenditures,
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[and] that at times they co-mingled both their revenues for Merlin's Kids as well
as for the for-profit business [United K9]." Gunteski found there was a total of
$797,280 in expenditures that "lacked documentation, [which] would show they
were related to Merlin's Kids." He also discussed Estersohn's and Rosen's
reports, noting that Estersohn found $196,217 paid "to questionable or unknown
individuals," while Rosen found only $78,505 in payments made "to
questionable or unknown individuals that lack documentation."
As to Rosen, he opined first that Gunteski based his report on Estersohn's
report, and for that reason, Gunteski's report was "unusable for its intended
purpose." Rosen explained there were missing documents, but he conducted
interviews with Wolfe to reconstruct those missing documents, accepting
Wolfe's verbal explanations. Rosen opined that, based on his review, Merlin's
Kids did not mislead the public or donors and did not commit fraud or theft. In
discussing Estersohn's report, Rosen noted that determining whether
transactions were "not related to the charitable purpose" was difficult to do
because "the records weren't available."
Rosen elaborated that transactions relating to travel, lodging, dining,
supplies, refreshments, vehicles, mortgages, concert tickets, supermarkets, dog
shows, dog breeding, and horse boarding could be appropriate expenses for a
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non-profit entity such as Merlin's Kids. Rosen also explained that giving money
to volunteers who did work for the charity would be an acceptable expense. He
concluded that there was no commingling of funds because he could trace
transactions back and forth between two Merlin's Kids' accounts.
The Judge's Decision
The judge rendered an oral decision that spanned forty transcript pages.
The judge acknowledged the parties' respective positions and noted that while
he did not think Merlin's Kids was one "big scam," as plaintiffs alleged, the
judge did not agree with defendants' position that the entire entity was run
properly. The judge declined to draw an adverse inference against defendants
on the ground that they had failed to preserve or produce evidence, reasoning
"drawing such an inference" was not necessary. The judge explained that the
burden of proof was by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge observed
that while he thought Wolfe did not intend to scheme or scam anyone when she
created Merlin's Kids and United K9, ultimately, it became a scheme or scam,
albeit "unwittingly."
The judge determined the premise of Merlin's Kids was "exaggerated" and
highlighted that Merlin's Kids was not affiliated with the Foundation, and the
animals were not "free" for the families in need. Based on those findings, the
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judge concluded that defendants violated the CRIA under count two for making,
"untruthful statements, misrepresentations and expending contributions in a
manner inconsistent with a charitable purpose," and count four for "fail[ing] to
cooperate with the Attorney General's investigation."
The judge also held that defendants violated the Nonprofit Corporation
Act, count three of plaintiffs' complaint, due to "fraudulent misrepresentation
and conducting activities [that are] prejudicial to the public." The judge
emphasized that "there were misrepresentations to the public" through the
Merlin's Kids' and United K9's websites. Based on the evidence, the judge
determined "there was . . . misreporting of non-cash contributions, including
unreported time as revenue on Merlin's Kids['] 990[s]." The judge also found
defendants liable on count five because they failed "to maintain accurate books
and records." In support of his decision, the judge reasoned that all three experts
essentially said the same thing, that there was "[a] lack of books and records ."
Finding Wolfe committed violations under the CRIA and the charities
regulations under count six, the judge explained that Wolfe ran the nonprofit
"like it's [her] own personal little kingdom, [her] little fiefdom, where what [she]
buy[s], what [she] spend[s], who [she] give[s] it to, what [she] pay[s] with it or
whatever, [she] makes the rules." The judge ruled that, "on the [c]ounts [two],
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[three], and [six], there are clearly violations of the CRIA, the regulations, the
charities regulations and the Nonprofit Act." The judge added that "there was a
failure to cooperate" when defendants failed to provide records or make any
good faith attempt to address the lack of books and records.
As to the CFA violations pled in count seven, the judge found there were
misrepresentations directly from United K9's website, specifically the website's
contention that "Wolfe has personally rehabilitated more than 30,000 dogs with
behavioral issues ranging from pulling on a leas[h] and marking territory in the
home to full-blown severe aggression with virtually 100 percent success rate."
The judge did not find that the purported "100 percent success rate" was true.
The judge found United K9's actions did "rise to unconscionable commercial
practices, because there was commingling," noting that "[t]here w[ere] mon[ies]
going back and forth, and there w[ere] embellishments on what they did ."
The judge ordered that Wolfe "be permanently enjoined from registering
or operating any charitable nonprofit organization and/or independent fundraiser
in New Jersey." In addition, the judge ordered that any websites or social media
accounts for Merlin's Kids and United K9 "be permanently shut down within ten
days." The judge dismissed defendants' counterclaim, dissolved Merlin's Kids,
ordered that each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs, and imposed
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penalties. The judge granted the State's request for disgorgement. The judge
ordered $349,335 be disgorged, finding that number represented the total
amount of misappropriated funds, consistent with Estersohn's finding $349,335
of "highly suspicious transactions" in comparison to the $950,360 in "generally
suspicious transactions." In ordering civil penalties, the judge stated:
In addition to [disgorgement], with regard to the
civil penalties, it's [$]10,000 for the first,
[$]20,000 for the second and subsequent. So
under the CRIA, I'm going to impose—because I
think the counts relating under that, in my mind,
require a little more, so I'm going to impose the
[$]10,000. [$]20,000 on the second. And [$]30
and the fourth on that one, for a total of $70,000
for violations of CRIA. Civil penalties under the
charities regulations will be [$]10,000 for the
first violation, [$]20 for the second. And [$]20
for the third, for a total of [$]50.
And on the [CFA] violations, [$]10,000 for the
first, [$]20 for the second, for a total of [$]30. So
that adds up to $150,000 in civil penalties and
disgorgement of [$]349,335.
A memorializing order was entered on January 31, 2025. This appeal followed.
Before us, defendants argue:
(1) the judge did not make proper findings of fact and
conclusions of law;
(2) the judge improperly and unfairly disregarded all
the expert testimony that internal controls were not
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required for defendants and concluded sua sponte that
internal controls were required;
(3) the judge reversibly erred when he permitted
plaintiffs to use a Zillow screenshot at trial, which was
highly prejudicial and sanctionable conduct; and
(4) the judge improperly ignored substantial portions of
defendants' evidence presented, neglecting to discuss
them at all in the judgment or on the record.
II.
The scope of review of a judgment from a non-jury trial is limited, and an
appellate court should not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they
"are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting
Fagliarone v. Township of North Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.
1963)). "The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal
when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall,
222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).
Appellate courts apply a deferential standard because "an appellate court's
review of a cold record is no substitute for the trial court's opportunity to hear
and see the witnesses who testified on the stand." Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J.
574, 595 (2020). However, "[c]onclusions of law are subjected to the normal de
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novo review on appeal." Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254
(2015).
The Judge's Oral Decision
Defendants argue the judge failed to make a formal record when he gave
an oral decision and erred by not making proper findings of fact and conclusions
of law. Defendants maintain the judge failed to make a formal record and failed
to issue a written decision, constituting reversible error.
Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or
memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its
conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury." It is well settled
that "an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case."
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000). The court has
a duty to state clearly its findings of facts and conclusions of law, because
"[n]aked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Curtis v.
Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). "Failure to perform that duty 'constitutes a
disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Id. at 570-71
(quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4
(App. Div. 1976)). A trial court is required to "state clearly its factual findings
and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Id. at 570.
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Courts have been constrained to reverse and remand matters to the trial
court when there is no explanation as to how the trial court reached its
determination, particularly when awarding financial penalties. Id. at 570-71. In
Curtis, the trial court failed to set forth its methodology for estimating the
projected earnings of a decedent in a wrongful death action. Id. at 570. We
reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, explaining that the trial court had
made multiple mistakes when considering what to consider when calculating a
judgment award. Id. 570-71. The Court reversed for a new trial on damages,
but explained that, generally, a trial court in a non-jury case has discretion to
admit and accept an expert's "bottom line figure," especially when subject to
"vigorous cross-examination," though such figure was not relied on there. Id.
at 571.
Here, defendants argue that the judge's oral decision was not enough to
comply with the court rules, and that he was obligated to issue a written decision
along with the order for judgment. In his oral decision, the judge reviewed the
evidence, addressed each count of the complaint, and explained his resolution
of each of them with reference to the evidence. The judge followed up with a
written order that distinctly referenced the oral decision, summarized every
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request for relief, and referenced every finding of fact and conclusion of law
placed on the record.
Defendants fail to specify which provision of the order is not supported
by the judge's oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is only in their
reply brief that defendants argue the judge failed to tie his findings of fact with
his conclusions of law. Notably, defendants' reply brief fails to identify what
evidence the judge ignored that would undermine the decision.
Defendants misconstrue the requirement under Rule 1:7-4, contending
that a formal written decision is required. Rule 1:7-4 only requires a decision,
whether written or oral, that explains the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Defendants' brief is devoid of any specific example where
the judge failed to support his conclusion with a finding of fact. Even in
defendants' reply brief, they do not point to a specific conclusion that did not
have a sufficient finding of fact to support it. Moreover, from their initial merits
brief to their reply brief, defendants pivot from challenging the formality of the
judge's decision to arguing it did not sufficiently tie its findings of fact with
conclusions of law.
The judge did not abuse his discretion when he issued an oral decision and
followed up with a written judgment, which did not run afoul of Rule 1:7-4.
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While defendants rely on Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570, this matter is distinguishable.
Reversal was required in Curtis because the trial court failed to explain its
methodology when it estimated the projected earnings of a decedent in a
wrongful death action. Ibid.
In contrast, the judge here ultimately adopted Estersohn's calculations and
his determination that "$349,335 of Merlin's Kids['] charitable funds [were used]
for transactions unrelated to Merlin's Kids' charitable purpose" or used for
purposes other than specified by Merlin's Kids. That figure was not arbitrary
but based on Estersohn's report finding $349,335 of highly suspicious
transactions. The judge made specific findings as to each count of the
complaint. Some findings overlapped since counts two, three, and six all
involved untruthful statements and misrepresentations. Since Rule 1:7-4 plainly
allows for a court's decision to be oral or written, we reject defendants'
argument.
The judge's decision was not merely a recitation of the parties' positions,
but analyzed all the evidence presented during trial, particularly as it pertained
to the experts' opinions. Each finding was supported by evidence presented
throughout the trial and explained thoroughly during the judge's extensive oral
decision.
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III.
Next, defendants argue that the judge disregarded much of their evidence.
A judgment in a non-jury case is subject to deference, as a lower court's findings
"should not be disturbed unless '. . . they are so wholly insupportable as to result
in a denial of justice,' and . . . the appellate court should exercise its original fact
finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no
doubt about the matter." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484 (quoting Greenfield v.
Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960)). For it is "[f]indings by
the trial judge [that] are considered binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Ibid. (citing N.J. Tpk. Auth. v.
Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969)). An appellate court is not
called upon to "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make
conclusions about the evidence." State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997).
The question on appeal is "whether the findings made could reasonably have
been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Ibid.
(quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)).
Charities and charitable organizations must comply with a variety of laws
and regulations in order to operate, one of which, the CRIA, requires that all
statements made by or on behalf of a charitable organization be truthful.
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N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32(a). In addition to the CRIA, charities and charitable
organizations must comply with charities regulations, the New Jersey Nonprofit
Corporation Act, and the CFA. Each law or regulation addresses a variety of
compliance measures and explains violations. Those violations range from
untruthful statements, misrepresentation, misappropriation of funds, expending
contributions in a manner not consistent with the charitable purpose, fraudulent
misrepresentation, failure to cooperate with the Division, failure to maintain
books and records, unconscionable commercial practices, and deception.
N.J.A.C. 13:48-13.2; N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32; N.J.S.A. 15A:12-11; N.J.S.A. 56:8-
2.
Under the CRIA, violations include the following:
(1) To misrepresent the purpose or nature of the
charitable institution or the purpose or beneficiary of a
solicitation; to solicit contributions for a purpose other
than the charitable purpose expressed in the statement
of the charitable organization or expend contributions
in a manner inconsistent with that purpose, or to fail to
disclose any material fact. A misrepresentation may be
accomplished by words or conduct;
(2) To violate or fail to comply with any of the
applicable provisions of this act or the rules adopted
under authority of this act; [or]
(3) To violate or fail to comply with any of the
applicable provisions of the consumer fraud law, P.L.
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1960, c. 39 [N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -233] or the regulations
adopted pursuant to that act . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32(c).]
The CRIA gives the Attorney General authority to conduct investigations,
including "the power to issue subpoenas for the compulsory attendance of
witnesses and the production of pertinent documents, books, records, accounts,
computer data, papers, or records." N.J.S.A. 45:17A-21(c). The CRIA also
establishes that a registration may be revoked or suspended "upon a finding that
the registrant or any officer, director, trustee or principal salaried executive staff
employee of a registrant or any other person subject to the provisions of P.L.
1994, c. 16 [(N.J.S.A. 45:17A-1 to -40)]" engaged in one of seven actions,
including "violat[ing] or fail[ing] to comply with any of the provisions of this
act or the rules adopted under authority of this act." N.J.S.A. 45:17-33(b);
N.J.S.A. 45:17A-33(b)(2).
The CRIA also requires that every charitable organization "keep complete
and accurate records of its activities in this [s]tate as may be required by this
act, in such form as will enable them to accurately provide the information
required by this act or regulations promulgated under the authority of this act."
N.J.S.A. 45:17A-31(a).
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According to the charities regulations, "[a]ny oral or written statement
made by a charitable organization or on behalf of a charitable organization by
persons including, but not limited to, commercial co-venturers, fund raising
counsels, independent paid fund raisers, or solicitors shall be truthful." N.J.A.C.
13:48-11.2(b). Within the charities regulations, provisions include requirements
for a charitable organization to "keep complete and accurate records of its
activities in this State as required by the Act." N.J.A.C. 13:48-10.1(a). The
charities regulations list twelve types of unlawful conduct, among them, as
relevant here:
1. To misrepresent by words or conduct any
material fact to any person including, but not limited to,
the purpose or nature of the charitable institution or the
purpose or beneficiary of a solicitation; to solicit
contributions for a purpose other than the charitable
purpose expressed in the statement of the charitable
organization or expend contributions in a manner
inconsistent with that purpose, or to fail to disclose any
material fact;
2. To violate or fail to comply with any of the
applicable provisions of the Act or the rules adopted
under authority of the Act;
3. To violate o