Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2068-24 JENNIFER DAVENPORT,[1] Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, Acting Director of the New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. MERLIN'S KIDS, INC., a NJ nonprofit corporation, UNITED K9 PROFESSIONALS INC., and JANICE WOLFE, Defendants-Appellants. ___________________________ Argued October 27, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 1 The parties names have been updated to reflect the current officials in office, pursuant to R. 4:34-4. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County, Docket No. C-000247-20. Scott Piekarsky argued the cause for appellants (Offit Kurman, attorneys; Scott Piekarsky, on the briefs). Leslie Faith Prentice, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Sookie Bae-Park, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Sara J. Koste and Amanda McElfresh, Deputy Attorneys General, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendants Merlin's Kids, Inc. (Merlin's Kids), United K9 Professionals Inc. (United K9), and Janice Wolfe appeal from a Chancery Division judgment finding they violated the Charitable Registration and Investigations Act (CRIA or the Act), N.J.S.A. 45:17A-1 to -40, and accompanying regulations; the New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 15A:1-1 to -16.2; and the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -233. The judgment also imposed fines associated with those violations, ordered disgorgement, and barred Wolfe from operating a charity in New Jersey. We affirm. I. Factual Background A-2068-24 2 Wolfe is an animal behaviorist who has worked with animals for most of her life. She started the nonprofit Merlin's Kids in October 2008. According to its website, Merlin's Kids was "a nonprofit organization dedicated to providing individually trained service dogs to those in need." Its mission was to "rescue and rehabilitate shelter dogs and change their lives by turning them into service dogs" and then place the dogs with individuals with a variety of needs. At times, the Merlin's Kids' website stated that "all services and animals are provided free of charge to those in need." Merlin's Kids was incorporated in 2008. In 2011, it was granted nonprofit status under § 501(c)(3) 2 of the Internal Revenue Code, retroactive to 2008. Beginning in 2011 and every year until at least 2016, Wolfe filed 990 forms with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). The form listed total contributions of $391,245 in 2011, $825,868 in 2012, $902,407 in 2013, $1,001,672 in 2014, $1,107,633 in 2015, and $1,095,827 in 2016. Merlin's Kids had a website promoting its cause, which included a direct - donation link and links for commercial co-ventures between Merlin's Kids and other companies, where a portion of an individual's purchase at the other 2 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code exempts nonprofits and other organizations from taxation. A-2068-24 3 company would be donated to Merlin's Kids. Under Merlin's Kids, Wolfe worked with families who had children with disabilities ranging from anxiety to deafness and blindness or other medical needs. For individuals seeking a dog through Merlin's Kids, Wolfe would go meet with the family either in New Jersey or Missouri to conduct an evaluation. Upon deciding whether the family was a right fit for a dog to be placed, the family would be placed on a waiting list and provided with a memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlining the responsibilities of Merlin's Kids as well as the family. Part of the MOU outlined the family's financial obligation for the dog, its care, and its training, which all needed to be addressed before the dog could be placed with a family. This financial obligation was framed as a fundraising commitment, the cost of which varied depending on the type of dog and the length of training required. For example, one family was required to fundraise $20,500, while another family was only required to fundraise $17,000. The MOU included a provision stating that, "[i]f at any point in the process, it is determined that the applicant is not able to accept the dog or the responsibilities of handling and caring for the dog, then any money raised will be allocated to another family. Money raised cannot be refunded." A-2068-24 4 In 2012, Wolfe incorporated her for-profit business, United K9, with the State of New Jersey, and made the $50 annual report payment beginning in 2015 and continuing through 2018. United K9's website described the business as one that offered "private dog behaviorist services, local dog training group classes, shelter and rescue partnerships, and education and outreach." United K9 described itself as "encompass[ing] multiple companies and programs ," including "Wyatt's List" and "Merlin's Kids." United K9 never had a bank account, but its website indicated that it partnered with Merlin's Kids and that "[a] portion of our proceeds supports Merlin's Kids." Under United K9, Wolfe offered services to help resolve individuals' dogs' behavioral issues and a lifetime guarantee policy. Despite United K9 being for profit, Wolfe instructed most consumers of United K9 to pay the training fee or class fee directly to Merlin's Kids because it was tax deductible. Wolfe had multiple volunteers work with Merlin's Kids, including Dawn Orr, who maintained the Merlin's Kids' website for a period of time, and Melissa Gibson, who started as a volunteer but became an independent contractor around 2017. Jennifer Kruse was also a volunteer at the Missouri facility but at some point was paid "just to keep her coming in and showing up." A-2068-24 5 Apart from Wolfe's involvement with Merlin's Kids and United K9, she bred dogs and volunteered in an advisory capacity to work with the Fire Fighter Cancer Foundation3 (the Foundation) as it explored the potential for canines to detect diseases. The Director of the Foundation, Cindy Ell, confirmed that though Wolfe "was a non-paid consultant with her expertise in canine behavior" for the foundation, Ell and the Foundation had no relationship with Merlin's Kids. On March 25, 2014, the Charities Registration Section of defendant New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs (Division) sent, by regular and certified mail, a letter informing Merlin's Kids that it may be required to register with the office, unless it met one of the exemptions listed in the letter. Three exemptions were listed in the letter: (1) a religious corporation, trust, foundation, association, or organization; (2) certain educational institutions; and (3) any charitable organization that did not receive gross contributions in excess of $10,000. On March 30, 2014, Wolfe signed the certified mail receipt. She continued to operate her charity and did not register with the office, despite claiming gross contributions over $10,000 for 2014, 2015, and 2016. 3 At one point, the Foundation was also called "The International Firefighter Foundation." A-2068-24 6 On October 10, 2018, the Division's Office of Consumer Protection began an official investigation into Merlin's Kids. On February 12, 2019, Merlin's Kids was registered as a charity in New Jersey. However, the registration was deficient for not providing 990s, articles of incorporation, and the charity's bylaws. On May 13, 2019, the Division served a subpoena on Merlin's Kids, requesting documentation. On September 3, 2019, the Division sent a follow - up letter to defendants' counsel noting deficiencies in their responses. Approximately five months later, the Division sent a second follow-up letter with an extensive list of deficiencies in defendants' response to the initial subpoena. Defendants provided documents, including records of Merlin's Kids' online payments, 990s, and a response to requests for admissions. In their response, defendants admitted that they made purchases from Adora Bella Salon and Meaningful Beauty through Merlin's Kids accounts but that those purchases were mistakes, and Wolfe reimbursed the accounts, though it was not clear reimbursements actually occurred. The Division received a complaint against Merlin's Kids from one of its former clients, Kelly Fitzgerald, who alleged the service dog her family received from Merlin's Kids was not trained, and that it offered a second dog which was A-2068-24 7 also not trained. Fitzgerald's complaint included allegations that both service dogs were poorly trained, one was aggressive and lunged at other animals, and that the other urinated all over the home. During its investigation, the Division sent out consumer questionnaires to multiple individuals who had either received a dog through Merlin's Kids or obtained training services through United K9. Individuals returned the questionnaires, and their responses were primarily unfavorable relating to the services received by Wolfe, Merlin's Kids, and United K9. Laura Calabro's questionnaire stated that she engaged Wolfe's services for assistance training one of her rescue dogs through United K9. However, Calabro alleged that the training was only four hours long and mostly consisted of Wolfe talking about herself. Calabro alleged that Wolfe gave only limited training instruction, and, when the dog seemed to get worse, Wolfe's solution was for the dog to go to the Missouri location for further training, though there would be additional costs, despite the lifetime guarantee of Wolfe's training with United K9. Lacey Stange sought a service dog through Merlin's Kids for her son, who had multiple medical issues, in addition to being deaf and blind. Stange and her family traveled to Missouri to meet Wolfe at her facility for an evaluation to determine what dog, if any, would be appropriate. Wolfe advised Stange that A-2068-24 8 she and her family would have to fundraise $15,000 for the dog, as well as attend virtual trainings and read Wolfe's book, SHHH Happens. Two years later, when Stange and her family received the dog, he failed to do things Wolfe advised he would, such as blocking Stange's son from walking out the door and getting on the school bus with Stange's son. Wolfe went to the family's home about eight months later and performed a quick training. Despite her reaching out to Wolfe, Stange's concerns were not resolved, to the point where the dog nipped and bit others. Eventually, the dog was returned to Wolfe at her Missouri location . The Litigation Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Wolfe, Merlin's Kids, and United K9 alleging violations of the CRIA and Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48- 3.1(a), based on defendants failure to file a registration statement (count one); violations of the CRIA and the Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-13.2(a), alleging defendants' untruthful statements, misrepresentations, and expending contributions in a manner inconsistent with charitable purpose (count two); violation of the New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, N.J.S.A. 15A:12-11(a), (11), based on defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation and conducting activities prejudicial to the public (count three); violation of the CRIA by defendants' failure to cooperate with the Attorney General's investigation (count A-2068-24 9 four); violation of CRIA and Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-10.1(a)-(b), based on defendants failure to maintain accurate books and records (count five); violation of the CRIA and the Charities Regulations, N.J.A.C. 13:48-11.2(b), by Wolfe (count six); and violations of the CFA by all defendants based on unconscionable commercial practices and deceptions (count seven). Pre-Trial Discovery Plaintiffs subpoenaed Unity Bank and received bank records for the Merlin's Kids' account, which had since been closed by Wolfe. Plaintiffs also subpoenaed Bank of America and Providence Bank for records. Plaintiffs retained forensic expert Matthew Estersohn, CPA, and defendants retained Gary B. Rosen, CPA. The judge appointed R. Joseph Gunteski, CPA as a neutral expert to conduct an analysis of defendants' finances to determine their compliance with the relevant statutes and regulations. The experts reviewed many records from defendants' accounts, including those with PNC Bank, American Express, Capital One, Chase Ink, CashApp, PayPal, and Venmo. Those records showed many transactions in and out of Merlin's Kids' accounts, including expenses for dog show entries and equestrian stables, as well as purchases at Glow Skin and Laser, Adora Bella Salon, and personal money transfers through Venmo, CashApp, and PayPal. Plaintiffs sent multiple letters A-2068-24 10 to defendants regarding their discovery response deficiencies and ultimately filed a motion to compel discovery. Eventually, defendants alleged that documents were destroyed in two separate floods that occurred at Wolfe's home in 2021 and 2022, and that other documents were destroyed by mice in Missouri. Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment on the ground that defendants failed to file a registration statement, as alleged in count one. The judge granted the motion. The Trial At trial, all three experts testified as to the finances of Merlin's Kids and United K9 and offered their respective opinions as to whether there was any misappropriation or commingling of funds, whether any purchases made were outside the scope of the charitable purpose, and whether there were internal controls. Rosen was essentially proffered by defendants as a rebuttal expert and completed reports primarily to undermine the findings in Estersohn's and Gunteski's reports. Estersohn outlined his review of Merlin's Kids' financial records and noted that those which his office and defendants could not obtain supporting documentation for totaled approximately $1,300,000. Estersohn then divided the transactions into two categories, "generally suspicious" and "highly A-2068-24 11 suspicious." Estersohn explained the "generally suspicious" transactions were those that lacked documentation to support Merlin's Kids' charitable purpose but possibly could be connected. Estersohn then explained that the "highly suspicious transactions" were not, in his opinion, connected to Merlin's Kids at all. Estersohn also opined that there "were limited internal controls in place over the cash disbursement process." Based on Estersohn's review, he opined that there "was co-mingling of funds between Merlin's Kids and . . . Wolfe's other ventures, other businesses and private accounts." Gunteski reviewed both Estersohn's and Rosen's reports, as well as documents he received regarding Merlin's Kids' financials. As ordered, Gunteski, as the neutral court expert, was to review all documents and determine whether defendants "spent, used, misappropriated, and/or diverted funds that were donated and/or paid to Merlin's Kids by donors and/or the public in a manner inconsistent with Merlin's Kids stated charitable purpose." Gunteski was also to determine whether "Wolfe failed to properly monitor, segregate, and account for Merlin's Kids' funds" and if there was commingling of funds between Merlin's Kids and United K9. Gunteski ultimately opined that "Wolfe and Merlin's Kids did not keep [an] accurate, detailed record . . . of all of their income and . . . expenditures, A-2068-24 12 [and] that at times they co-mingled both their revenues for Merlin's Kids as well as for the for-profit business [United K9]." Gunteski found there was a total of $797,280 in expenditures that "lacked documentation, [which] would show they were related to Merlin's Kids." He also discussed Estersohn's and Rosen's reports, noting that Estersohn found $196,217 paid "to questionable or unknown individuals," while Rosen found only $78,505 in payments made "to questionable or unknown individuals that lack documentation." As to Rosen, he opined first that Gunteski based his report on Estersohn's report, and for that reason, Gunteski's report was "unusable for its intended purpose." Rosen explained there were missing documents, but he conducted interviews with Wolfe to reconstruct those missing documents, accepting Wolfe's verbal explanations. Rosen opined that, based on his review, Merlin's Kids did not mislead the public or donors and did not commit fraud or theft. In discussing Estersohn's report, Rosen noted that determining whether transactions were "not related to the charitable purpose" was difficult to do because "the records weren't available." Rosen elaborated that transactions relating to travel, lodging, dining, supplies, refreshments, vehicles, mortgages, concert tickets, supermarkets, dog shows, dog breeding, and horse boarding could be appropriate expenses for a A-2068-24 13 non-profit entity such as Merlin's Kids. Rosen also explained that giving money to volunteers who did work for the charity would be an acceptable expense. He concluded that there was no commingling of funds because he could trace transactions back and forth between two Merlin's Kids' accounts. The Judge's Decision The judge rendered an oral decision that spanned forty transcript pages. The judge acknowledged the parties' respective positions and noted that while he did not think Merlin's Kids was one "big scam," as plaintiffs alleged, the judge did not agree with defendants' position that the entire entity was run properly. The judge declined to draw an adverse inference against defendants on the ground that they had failed to preserve or produce evidence, reasoning "drawing such an inference" was not necessary. The judge explained that the burden of proof was by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge observed that while he thought Wolfe did not intend to scheme or scam anyone when she created Merlin's Kids and United K9, ultimately, it became a scheme or scam, albeit "unwittingly." The judge determined the premise of Merlin's Kids was "exaggerated" and highlighted that Merlin's Kids was not affiliated with the Foundation, and the animals were not "free" for the families in need. Based on those findings, the A-2068-24 14 judge concluded that defendants violated the CRIA under count two for making, "untruthful statements, misrepresentations and expending contributions in a manner inconsistent with a charitable purpose," and count four for "fail[ing] to cooperate with the Attorney General's investigation." The judge also held that defendants violated the Nonprofit Corporation Act, count three of plaintiffs' complaint, due to "fraudulent misrepresentation and conducting activities [that are] prejudicial to the public." The judge emphasized that "there were misrepresentations to the public" through the Merlin's Kids' and United K9's websites. Based on the evidence, the judge determined "there was . . . misreporting of non-cash contributions, including unreported time as revenue on Merlin's Kids['] 990[s]." The judge also found defendants liable on count five because they failed "to maintain accurate books and records." In support of his decision, the judge reasoned that all three experts essentially said the same thing, that there was "[a] lack of books and records ." Finding Wolfe committed violations under the CRIA and the charities regulations under count six, the judge explained that Wolfe ran the nonprofit "like it's [her] own personal little kingdom, [her] little fiefdom, where what [she] buy[s], what [she] spend[s], who [she] give[s] it to, what [she] pay[s] with it or whatever, [she] makes the rules." The judge ruled that, "on the [c]ounts [two], A-2068-24 15 [three], and [six], there are clearly violations of the CRIA, the regulations, the charities regulations and the Nonprofit Act." The judge added that "there was a failure to cooperate" when defendants failed to provide records or make any good faith attempt to address the lack of books and records. As to the CFA violations pled in count seven, the judge found there were misrepresentations directly from United K9's website, specifically the website's contention that "Wolfe has personally rehabilitated more than 30,000 dogs with behavioral issues ranging from pulling on a leas[h] and marking territory in the home to full-blown severe aggression with virtually 100 percent success rate." The judge did not find that the purported "100 percent success rate" was true. The judge found United K9's actions did "rise to unconscionable commercial practices, because there was commingling," noting that "[t]here w[ere] mon[ies] going back and forth, and there w[ere] embellishments on what they did ." The judge ordered that Wolfe "be permanently enjoined from registering or operating any charitable nonprofit organization and/or independent fundraiser in New Jersey." In addition, the judge ordered that any websites or social media accounts for Merlin's Kids and United K9 "be permanently shut down within ten days." The judge dismissed defendants' counterclaim, dissolved Merlin's Kids, ordered that each party pay their own attorney's fees and costs, and imposed A-2068-24 16 penalties. The judge granted the State's request for disgorgement. The judge ordered $349,335 be disgorged, finding that number represented the total amount of misappropriated funds, consistent with Estersohn's finding $349,335 of "highly suspicious transactions" in comparison to the $950,360 in "generally suspicious transactions." In ordering civil penalties, the judge stated: In addition to [disgorgement], with regard to the civil penalties, it's [$]10,000 for the first, [$]20,000 for the second and subsequent. So under the CRIA, I'm going to impose—because I think the counts relating under that, in my mind, require a little more, so I'm going to impose the [$]10,000. [$]20,000 on the second. And [$]30 and the fourth on that one, for a total of $70,000 for violations of CRIA. Civil penalties under the charities regulations will be [$]10,000 for the first violation, [$]20 for the second. And [$]20 for the third, for a total of [$]50. And on the [CFA] violations, [$]10,000 for the first, [$]20 for the second, for a total of [$]30. So that adds up to $150,000 in civil penalties and disgorgement of [$]349,335. A memorializing order was entered on January 31, 2025. This appeal followed. Before us, defendants argue: (1) the judge did not make proper findings of fact and conclusions of law; (2) the judge improperly and unfairly disregarded all the expert testimony that internal controls were not A-2068-24 17 required for defendants and concluded sua sponte that internal controls were required; (3) the judge reversibly erred when he permitted plaintiffs to use a Zillow screenshot at trial, which was highly prejudicial and sanctionable conduct; and (4) the judge improperly ignored substantial portions of defendants' evidence presented, neglecting to discuss them at all in the judgment or on the record. II. The scope of review of a judgment from a non-jury trial is limited, and an appellate court should not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless they "are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Township of North Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). "The general rule is that findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). Appellate courts apply a deferential standard because "an appellate court's review of a cold record is no substitute for the trial court's opportunity to hear and see the witnesses who testified on the stand." Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020). However, "[c]onclusions of law are subjected to the normal de A-2068-24 18 novo review on appeal." Griepenburg v. Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). The Judge's Oral Decision Defendants argue the judge failed to make a formal record when he gave an oral decision and erred by not making proper findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants maintain the judge failed to make a formal record and failed to issue a written decision, constituting reversible error. Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury." It is well settled that "an articulation of reasons is essential to the fair resolution of a case." Schwarz v. Schwarz, 328 N.J. Super. 275, 282 (App. Div. 2000). The court has a duty to state clearly its findings of facts and conclusions of law, because "[n]aked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of R[ule] 1:7-4." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980). "Failure to perform that duty 'constitutes a disservice to the litigants, the attorneys and the appellate court.'" Id. at 570-71 (quoting Kenwood Assocs. v. Bd. of Adj. of Englewood, 141 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 1976)). A trial court is required to "state clearly its factual findings and correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Id. at 570. A-2068-24 19 Courts have been constrained to reverse and remand matters to the trial court when there is no explanation as to how the trial court reached its determination, particularly when awarding financial penalties. Id. at 570-71. In Curtis, the trial court failed to set forth its methodology for estimating the projected earnings of a decedent in a wrongful death action. Id. at 570. We reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, explaining that the trial court had made multiple mistakes when considering what to consider when calculating a judgment award. Id. 570-71. The Court reversed for a new trial on damages, but explained that, generally, a trial court in a non-jury case has discretion to admit and accept an expert's "bottom line figure," especially when subject to "vigorous cross-examination," though such figure was not relied on there. Id. at 571. Here, defendants argue that the judge's oral decision was not enough to comply with the court rules, and that he was obligated to issue a written decision along with the order for judgment. In his oral decision, the judge reviewed the evidence, addressed each count of the complaint, and explained his resolution of each of them with reference to the evidence. The judge followed up with a written order that distinctly referenced the oral decision, summarized every A-2068-24 20 request for relief, and referenced every finding of fact and conclusion of law placed on the record. Defendants fail to specify which provision of the order is not supported by the judge's oral findings of fact and conclusions of law. It is only in their reply brief that defendants argue the judge failed to tie his findings of fact with his conclusions of law. Notably, defendants' reply brief fails to identify what evidence the judge ignored that would undermine the decision. Defendants misconstrue the requirement under Rule 1:7-4, contending that a formal written decision is required. Rule 1:7-4 only requires a decision, whether written or oral, that explains the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Defendants' brief is devoid of any specific example where the judge failed to support his conclusion with a finding of fact. Even in defendants' reply brief, they do not point to a specific conclusion that did not have a sufficient finding of fact to support it. Moreover, from their initial merits brief to their reply brief, defendants pivot from challenging the formality of the judge's decision to arguing it did not sufficiently tie its findings of fact with conclusions of law. The judge did not abuse his discretion when he issued an oral decision and followed up with a written judgment, which did not run afoul of Rule 1:7-4. A-2068-24 21 While defendants rely on Curtis, 83 N.J. at 570, this matter is distinguishable. Reversal was required in Curtis because the trial court failed to explain its methodology when it estimated the projected earnings of a decedent in a wrongful death action. Ibid. In contrast, the judge here ultimately adopted Estersohn's calculations and his determination that "$349,335 of Merlin's Kids['] charitable funds [were used] for transactions unrelated to Merlin's Kids' charitable purpose" or used for purposes other than specified by Merlin's Kids. That figure was not arbitrary but based on Estersohn's report finding $349,335 of highly suspicious transactions. The judge made specific findings as to each count of the complaint. Some findings overlapped since counts two, three, and six all involved untruthful statements and misrepresentations. Since Rule 1:7-4 plainly allows for a court's decision to be oral or written, we reject defendants' argument. The judge's decision was not merely a recitation of the parties' positions, but analyzed all the evidence presented during trial, particularly as it pertained to the experts' opinions. Each finding was supported by evidence presented throughout the trial and explained thoroughly during the judge's extensive oral decision. A-2068-24 22 III. Next, defendants argue that the judge disregarded much of their evidence. A judgment in a non-jury case is subject to deference, as a lower court's findings "should not be disturbed unless '. . . they are so wholly insupportable as to result in a denial of justice,' and . . . the appellate court should exercise its original fact finding jurisdiction sparingly and in none but a clear case where there is no doubt about the matter." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484 (quoting Greenfield v. Dusseault, 60 N.J. Super. 436, 444 (App. Div. 1960)). For it is "[f]indings by the trial judge [that] are considered binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence." Ibid. (citing N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Sisselman, 106 N.J. Super. 358 (App. Div. 1969)). An appellate court is not called upon to "weigh the evidence, assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence." State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997). The question on appeal is "whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). Charities and charitable organizations must comply with a variety of laws and regulations in order to operate, one of which, the CRIA, requires that all statements made by or on behalf of a charitable organization be truthful. A-2068-24 23 N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32(a). In addition to the CRIA, charities and charitable organizations must comply with charities regulations, the New Jersey Nonprofit Corporation Act, and the CFA. Each law or regulation addresses a variety of compliance measures and explains violations. Those violations range from untruthful statements, misrepresentation, misappropriation of funds, expending contributions in a manner not consistent with the charitable purpose, fraudulent misrepresentation, failure to cooperate with the Division, failure to maintain books and records, unconscionable commercial practices, and deception. N.J.A.C. 13:48-13.2; N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32; N.J.S.A. 15A:12-11; N.J.S.A. 56:8- 2. Under the CRIA, violations include the following: (1) To misrepresent the purpose or nature of the charitable institution or the purpose or beneficiary of a solicitation; to solicit contributions for a purpose other than the charitable purpose expressed in the statement of the charitable organization or expend contributions in a manner inconsistent with that purpose, or to fail to disclose any material fact. A misrepresentation may be accomplished by words or conduct; (2) To violate or fail to comply with any of the applicable provisions of this act or the rules adopted under authority of this act; [or] (3) To violate or fail to comply with any of the applicable provisions of the consumer fraud law, P.L. A-2068-24 24 1960, c. 39 [N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -233] or the regulations adopted pursuant to that act . . . . [N.J.S.A. 45:17A-32(c).] The CRIA gives the Attorney General authority to conduct investigations, including "the power to issue subpoenas for the compulsory attendance of witnesses and the production of pertinent documents, books, records, accounts, computer data, papers, or records." N.J.S.A. 45:17A-21(c). The CRIA also establishes that a registration may be revoked or suspended "upon a finding that the registrant or any officer, director, trustee or principal salaried executive staff employee of a registrant or any other person subject to the provisions of P.L. 1994, c. 16 [(N.J.S.A. 45:17A-1 to -40)]" engaged in one of seven actions, including "violat[ing] or fail[ing] to comply with any of the provisions of this act or the rules adopted under authority of this act." N.J.S.A. 45:17-33(b); N.J.S.A. 45:17A-33(b)(2). The CRIA also requires that every charitable organization "keep complete and accurate records of its activities in this [s]tate as may be required by this act, in such form as will enable them to accurately provide the information required by this act or regulations promulgated under the authority of this act." N.J.S.A. 45:17A-31(a). A-2068-24 25 According to the charities regulations, "[a]ny oral or written statement made by a charitable organization or on behalf of a charitable organization by persons including, but not limited to, commercial co-venturers, fund raising counsels, independent paid fund raisers, or solicitors shall be truthful." N.J.A.C. 13:48-11.2(b). Within the charities regulations, provisions include requirements for a charitable organization to "keep complete and accurate records of its activities in this State as required by the Act." N.J.A.C. 13:48-10.1(a). The charities regulations list twelve types of unlawful conduct, among them, as relevant here: 1. To misrepresent by words or conduct any material fact to any person including, but not limited to, the purpose or nature of the charitable institution or the purpose or beneficiary of a solicitation; to solicit contributions for a purpose other than the charitable purpose expressed in the statement of the charitable organization or expend contributions in a manner inconsistent with that purpose, or to fail to disclose any material fact; 2. To violate or fail to comply with any of the applicable provisions of the Act or the rules adopted under authority of the Act; 3. To violate o