Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1115-24 S.M.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. A.S., Defendant-Appellant. ____________________________ Submitted September 22, 2026 – Decided October 21, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-1983-14. A.S., self-represented appellant (August J. Landi, on the brief). Rutgers Law Associates, attorneys for respondent (Andrew J. Rothman, Supervising Attorney, and Hillary Yao, J.D., appearing pursuant to Rule 1:21- 3(a), on the brief). 1 We refer to the parties by initials and their children by fictitious names to preserve their privacy interests. R. 1:38-3(d)(11). PER CURIAM In this appeal, defendant A.S. challenges a November 8, 2024 Family Part order that denied his application to reopen the proceedings concerning parenting time with the parties' son, A.S. ("Alex"), and denied his request to recalculate his child support obligation. For the following reasons, we affirm the November 8, 2024 order denying defendant's application to reopen the parenting-time proceedings. We also affirm the order as to support on the present record, but we do so without prejudice to defendant's filing a future, properly supported application in the Family Part concerning support. I. The parties married on October 13, 1996, and have four children: S .S. ("Samantha") (born in May 1998), J.S. ("James") (born in June 1999), B.S. ("Bianca") (born in May 2003), and Alex (born in July 2008). After extensive, contested matrimonial litigation, a New York court entered a divorce judgment in September 2012 awarding plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the children. The judgment provided that visitation with the three older children would occur as arranged through a parenting coordinator, and defendant would have parenting time with Alex on alternating Saturdays and Sundays, together with liberal telephone contact. The judgment also established defendant 's A-1115-24 2 support obligations, including weekly child support and a share of the children 's unreimbursed medical, dental, and educational expenses. After plaintiff relocated to New Jersey, she registered the New York judgment in New Jersey, and the parties thereafter litigated post-judgment issues in the New Jersey Family Part. Alex turned eighteen during the pendency of this appeal. 2 In May 2016, the parties entered a consent order that vacated defendant's then-existing arrears, reset his support obligations, and terminated alimony. Approximately two years later, in 2018, the court addressed several applications concerning parenting time and support. First, in August 2018, it granted defendant expanded parenting time with Alex by adding an overnight on alternating weekends, finding that Alex's visits with defendant had been appropriate and that a modest expansion of parenting time was warranted. Next, in November of that same year, the court further expanded defendant's parenting time with Alex and ordered reunification therapy between defendant and Bianca. 2 We do not adopt the categorical view that Alex's attainment of age eighteen automatically extinguished all judicial authority to address visitation or related issues while he remains unemancipated. New Jersey law recognizes limited continuing jurisdiction with respect to persons under twenty-one. N.J.S.A. 9:17B-3; see also A.E.C. v. P.S.C., 453 N.J. Super. 19, 29-31 (App. Div. 2018); O.Y.P.C. v. J.C.P., 442 N.J. Super. 635, 641-42 (App. Div. 2015); Quinn v. Johnson, 247 N.J. Super. 572, 580 (Ch. Div. 1991). A-1115-24 3 The court also reduced defendant's then-existing support arrears to a civil judgment in the amount of $50,642.16, directed probation to reflect a zero balance because the arrears had been reduced to judgment, and continued a weekly payment of $225 through wage garnishment. A subsequent November 7, 2018 order, entered to correct what it described as a clerical error in paragraph 9 of the earlier order, clarified that the $225 weekly amount consisted of $200 in current child support and $25 attributable to arrears, and further provided that if there were no arrears, probation should not collect the additional $25. In February 2021, the court later enforced payment of the $50,642.16 judgment and ordered specific payments toward that judgment, including two lump-sum payments of $3,500, and monthly payments of $500 beginning June 1, 2021. The parenting time issues raised before us have their genesis in subsequent New York criminal proceedings. Specifically, in April 2021, defendant was arrested and indicted by a grand jury after Samantha reported that defendant had sexually abused her as a child. In an affirmation contained in the record and submitted in defendant's separate suit for injuries allegedly arising from the criminal prosecution, the prosecutor stated that the criminal case was dismissed because continued participation in a criminal trial would be detrimental to the complaining witness's mental health. Defendant, however, maintains the court A-1115-24 4 dismissed the charges against him on speedy-trial grounds. In any event, it is not disputed that the criminal case was dismissed in April 2023. Following defendant's 2021 arrest, New York child-protective authorities opened an investigation and plaintiff sought emergent relief in New Jersey. Although the appellate record does not include the 2021 orders governing Alex's parenting time, the record indicates that defendant's parenting time with Alex was temporarily suspended pending completion of that investigation and receipt of recommendations concerning Alex's safety. A month after the dismissal of the New York criminal case, in May 2023, defendant sought post-judgment relief in the Family Part to restore his parenting time with Alex and to reduce his child support obligations. Plaintiff opposed restoration of defendant's parenting time and sought enforcement of his prior financial obligations, including reimbursement of orthodontic expenses and payments toward arrears. The court conducted an in-camera interview of Alex in August 2023 and later held a plenary hearing. While that hearing was pending, in February 2024 defendant lost his job. The plenary hearing commenced in March 2024 and continued on non-consecutive days in May and July. In April, defendant filed a separate application motion to modify child support based on his unemployment. A-1115-24 5 On the third day of the plenary hearing, plaintiff's counsel informed the court that Alex wished to update his testimony. Defendant objected and argued that having Alex testify would be harmful and akin to "child abuse" and unnecessary as the court already heard Alex's views. After meeting with counsel in chambers, the court decided to permit Alex to testify in open court and allowed each party and their counsel to watch the testimony through Zoom from a different room and to address any questions for Alex with counsel if they wished. As a direct result of this decision, defendant withdrew his application to restore his parenting time. That did not end the visitation dispute, however. On August 5, defendant filed another application to reopen the parenting-time hearing and have Alex interviewed in-camera rather than in open court. Defendant also requested the trial judge require plaintiff to submit a Case Information Statement. 3 Defendant moved to reopen the hearing for good cause shown, however, the record does not reflect any new factual development beyond defendant's request that the 3 We note a discrepancy in the record regarding whether plaintiff filed the required Case Information Statement. Although defendant states plaintiff failed to file a CIS, the record indicates plaintiff did so on August 13, 2024. Further, at the November 8 hearing, defendant's counsel acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's CIS. We note this factual inconsistency only to clarify the record and need not further address the issue in order to resolve the arguments raised by the parties. A-1115-24 6 court conduct a second in-camera interview of Alex without examination by counsel. Based on the transcript of proceedings regarding the parenting time issues, it appears the court conducted a separate hearing for child support in June where the parties presented testimony and argument. The trial judge "held off" on issuing a final order because the parties had expressed a desire to mediate a resolution. Although the record refers to an August 15 order maintaining the current child support amount, that order is not included in the record. The record does show, however, that, on August 20, defendant moved to vacate the August 15 order as improvidently entered. The November 8 challenged order denied or dismissed all of defendant's then-pending applications, including the August 5 request to reopen the parenting-time proceedings and defendant's support- related applications. Before us, defendant challenges the denial of his request to reopen the parenting-time proceedings and the denial of his request to modify his support obligations. He maintains the court effectively terminated his parental rights, abdicated its parens patriae responsibilities, acted outside the scope of the state Rules by providing for Alex to be cross-examined by counsels, inadequately A-1115-24 7 explained its rulings, improperly concluded the plenary hearing, and committed error by declining to recalculate support in light of the ages of the parties' older children. II. Family courts maintain "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," so "appellate courts should accord deference to family court fact finding." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). "Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017). Legal issues, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. at 565. Our standard of review is that we will not disturb factual findings and legal conclusions unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974) (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). We first address defendant's arguments that the trial court effectively terminated his parental rights, abdicated its parens patriae responsibility, A-1115-24 8 inadequately explained its ruling, and improperly handled Alex's testimony. We are unpersuaded by his arguments. We reject defendant's characterization that the November 8 order effectively terminated his parental rights or that it failed to properly address the parenting time issues. To the contrary, the court conducted an in-camera interview of Alex in August 2023 and later presided over a plenary hearing over multiple dates in 2024 to address defendant's request to restore parenting time after the dismissal of the New York criminal charges. A party seeking to modify custody or parenting time bears the burden of demonstrating changed circumstances and that the requested relief is in the child's best interests. Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 361 N.J. Super. 135, 152 (App. Div. 2003); Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 287-88 (App. Div. 1958). Although we agree with defendant that the dismissal of the New York criminal case constituted a changed circumstance that required the Family Part to address defendant's original request to restore parenting time, the court did precisely that. As noted, the court did not deny that initial request without a hearing; it actually conducted one. The proceedings did not proceed to conclusion solely because defendant voluntarily withdrew his application after the court ruled Alex could testify in A-1115-24 9 open court with certain protections in place. As such, the November 8 order did not dispose of a still-pending request for parenting time on procedural grounds. Instead, it denied defendant's later effort to reopen proceedings he elected to end. Our review of the visitation-related issues is therefore limited to whether the court erred in declining to reopen the withdrawn proceedings and we do not decide on this record whether defendant was substantively entitled to restored parenting time. On that question, nothing in the record established a new, material development affecting Alex's welfare. See Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (explaining the trial court must hold a plenary hearing "when the submissions show there is a genuine and substantial factual dispute regarding the welfare of the children, and the trial judge determines that a plenary hearing is necessary to resolve the factual dispute"). Defendant's later request was based principally on a change in litigation position—specifically, that he would now accept a second in-camera interview if Alex were not subject to examination by counsel. That was not a changed circumstance bearing on Alex's best interests. It was, at most, defendant's revised view of how the hearing should proceed. A-1115-24 10 For similar reasons, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court abdicated its parens patriae responsibility. The court interviewed Alex, conducted a plenary hearing, and fashioned a procedure it viewed as protective of Alex's best interests, while preserving the parties' ability to challenge his testimony. Defendant objected to that procedure and chose to withdraw his application rather than complete the proceeding. The court was not obligated to reopen the matter later simply because defendant reconsidered his earlier decision. Defendant's challenge to the court's decision to permit Alex to testify in open court is equally unpersuasive. Rule 5:8-6 provides that, as part of a custody hearing, the court may on its own motion or at the request of a litigant conduct an in-camera interview with a child. The Rule leaves to the court's discretion whether to interview the child and how best to manage the child's participation in a contested custody matter. While an in-camera interview before trial is the default, the court may decide to conduct an interview at any time "for good cause." R. 5:8-6. Additionally, the court may invoke Rule 5:3-2(a) to permit necessary testimony "under such protective orders as the court may provide." Here, the court had already interviewed Alex. When plaintiff's counsel advised that Alex wished to address the court again, it detailed a procedure under A-1115-24 11 which Alex could testify in open court without either plaintiff or defendant physically present, while permitting counsel and the parties to observe remotely. We have previously explained that children whom the trial court deems capable "should be afforded the opportunity to make [their] views known." Lavene v. Lavene, 148 N.J. Super. 267, 272 (App. Div. 1977). Consistent with that principle, the court did not err by allowing Alex to address the court again on an issue directly affecting him. Nothing in Rule 5:8-6 required the court to proceed only by means of a second in-camera interview given the protections the court announced, and nothing in the court's ruling compelled defendant to abandon his application rather than conclude the hearing. Nor are we persuaded by defendant's argument that the court's statement of reasons was inadequate for appellate review under Rule 1:7-4(a). We acknowledge that when parents cannot agree on a custody or parenting time arrangement, "[t]he court shall specifically place on the record the factors which justify" the decision it reached. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(f). The contested November 8, order, however, did not modify or alter the parenting time determination. It denied defendant's request to reopen proceedings he had voluntarily withdrawn during an already-conducted hearing on parenting time and visitation. In that setting, the governing requirement was that the court explain, under Rule 1:7- A-1115-24 12 4(a), why it was denying the motion before it. The court's explanation, though concise, was sufficient to permit our review: defendant withdrew his application, and his later motion to reopen did not present any new factual development affecting Alex's welfare that required the court to restart the proceedings. To that end, defendant argues he had a meritorious claim to restore his parenting time and seeks a remand to permit the court to complete the hearing and decide that issue on the merits. Nothing in the record, however, indicates a final decision granting or denying restored parenting time was ever entered. Instead, defendant withdrew that application before the plenary hearing concluded, and the November 8 order addressed only his subsequent request to reopen those proceedings. Our review of the visitation-related issues is therefore appropriately limited to whether the court erred in declining to reopen the withdrawn proceedings and we do not determine on this incomplete record whether defendant was substantively entitled to restored parenting time. We thus discern no abuse of the court's discretion and accordingly affirm the November 8 order to the extent it denied defendant's application to reopen the custody and parenting-time proceedings. Our decision does not address whether defendant may seek such future relief, if any, as may be available in the A-1115-24 13 appropriate court based on Alex's age, wishes, and any other pertinent facts. We express no view on the timeliness, cognizability, or merits of any such future application. We note Alex has since reached majority. Whatever limited post-majority visitation authority may exist in an appropriate case, see note 1, defendant has not presented that issue to us in the procedural posture contemplated by Rule 4:3-1(a)(4)(D), nor has he developed a record bearing on the circumstances that would now govern such relief, including Alex's current wishes, circumstances, or the practical feasibility of prospective relief. On this record, no useful purpose would be served by remanding to resume the 2024 Family Part hearing. Any such remand would risk an advisory ruling on a materially diff erent controversy. Accordingly, although defendant's current arguments are without merit on the present record, our holding is narrow. We conclude only that the November 8, 2024 order does not warrant reversal or remand on the record before us, and we do not address the outer limits of any post-majority visitation or parenting- time authority in a different procedural posture. III. A-1115-24 14 Next, we address defendant's argument that the court should have recalculated child support because the parties' three older children are now adults and their circumstances raise emancipation issues. We decline to disturb the order on the present record, but again we stress we do so without prejudice to defendant filing a renewed application. Similarly, we do not take a position on the merits of any filing nor do we, if such an application were filed, express any opinion as to its outcome. A party seeking modification of support bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of changed circumstances. Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 157-59 (1980); Dorfman v. Dorfman, 315 N.J. Super. 511 (App. Div. 1998). Emancipation may constitute such a changed circumstance. J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013). There is a presumption of emancipation at eighteen, however, it is not determined by age alone, and the court must have an adequate factual record to determine whether and when the dependent relationship has ended. See Filippone v. Lee, 304 N.J. Super. 301, 308 (App. Div. 1997). Beyond eighteen years of age, a parent's "child support obligation shall terminate by operation of law without order by the court when a child reaches 19 years of age unless" certain requirements are met and "shall not extend beyond the date the child reaches 23 years of age." N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.67(a). A-1115-24 15 Here, the record is simply deficient to grant defendant the relief requested. Indeed, the appendix does not include the August 15 support order, the transcript of the June hearing at which the court apparently addressed the support issues, or a developed factual record concerning the present status of the parties ' older children beyond their ages. Thus, while the record strongly suggests that emancipation questions may exist as to Samantha, James, and Bianca, it provides little information concerning whether, when, and on what basis support may have continued for any of them. Nor does the record adequately address how any recalculation would interact with defendant's existing arrears or the prior judgment reducing arrears to a civil judgment. Although the supplemented record now clarifies that the November 2018 weekly payment was structured as $200 in current support plus $25 toward arrears and reflects that the arrears judgment was later enforced in February 2021, the record does not permit final resolution of any credit defendant claims against the judgment or any claimed credits would affect the recalculation he seeks. We therefore affirm the support order but we do so without prejudice to defendant's filing a renewed properly supported application in the Family Part supported by competent proofs addressing: (1) the emancipation status of each A-1115-24 16 of the older children and the dates of emancipation, if any; (2) whether continued support was sought or required for any child; (3) Alex's status; and (4) the relationship, if any, between any recalculation and defendant's arrears or prior civil judgment. Affirmed. A-1115-24 17