Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3409-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. MARK SHER, Defendant-Appellant. __________________________ Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided November 19, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal No. 21-2024. Borrus Goldin Foley Vignuolo Hyman & Stahl, attorneys for appellant (James E. Stahl and Jay Holub, of counsel; Jeremy D. Smith, of counsel and on the briefs). Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Elizabeth K. Gibbons, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Mark Sher was convicted of four motor vehicle offenses and two disorderly persons offenses arising from his conduct in pursuing, passing, and stopping a school bus after it failed to pick up his daughter. He now appeals from the June 10, 2025, memorializing order, principally challenging the admission and consideration of testimony of two witnesses who were not placed under oath in the municipal court. Having considered the record and the governing legal principles, we are satisfied the oath defect does not warrant reversal, and the Law Division's findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence. Therefore, we affirm. I. We derive the following facts from the record developed in the municipal court and the trial de novo conducted in the Law Division. On February 25, 2022, defendant followed the school bus assigned to transport his daughter after the bus proceeded past her stop without picking her up. Video recordings admitted into evidence depict the bus leaving the stop without defendant's daughter aboard. After a brief exchange with his daughter, who then ran after the bus, defendant followed the bus in his vehicle. The recordings further show defendant flashing his headlights and sounding his A-3409-24 2 horn as he pursued the bus until it stopped to pick up another student. At that point, defendant drove around the right side of the bus, driving onto the cobblestone in the process, while another student attempted to board. Defendant then stopped his vehicle in front of the bus, exited, and spoke with the driver, Audrey Maxwell, about why his daughter had not been picked up. After a brief exchange, defendant returned to his vehicle and departed. Maxwell resumed her route. In March 2022, Joyce Forsberg, the senior transportation manager for East Brunswick Public Schools, filed four traffic complaints against defendant : obstructing the passage of other vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; passing a stopped school bus, N.J.S.A. 39:4-128.1; and improper passing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-85. Detective Brian Adams investigated the incident and later charged defendant with disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33 - 2(a)(2), and interference with transportation, N.J.S.A. 2C:33 -14(a)(5). The matters were tried in July 2024. The State first called Maxwell, who testified she observed blinking lights in her rearview mirror as she was stopping to pick up students. As she closed the bus door after the last student boarded, she saw a car proceeding up the right side of her bus. According to Maxwell, the car came alongside the bus, stopped directly in front of it, and A-3409-24 3 defendant exited his vehicle. The incident left her shaken and alarmed. Defense counsel cross-examined Maxwell about her driving history, whether the bus's stop arm and amber lights were activated, her speed, and whether she had been using her phone while driving. The municipal court also reviewed video footage of the incident. The State next called Forsberg then Adams. Neither witness, however, was placed under oath or affirmation before testifying. Forsberg testified she did not witness the incident, but interviewed Maxwell, reviewed the video recording, and consequently decided to issue the four traffic summonses. Her decision, as she noted on cross-examination, was based on Maxwell's account, her review of the video, and her knowledge of school bus operations and procedures. Adams similarly testified he was not present during the incident and his investigation relied on the video recording and statements obtained from Maxwell and Forsberg. Defendant testified on his own behalf. Because of cold, rainy weather and a delayed school opening, he drove his eleven-year-old daughter, who has a sensory processing disorder that causes anxiety and heightened sensitivity to noise and stress, to the bus stop. Defendant remained with her in the car, observed the bus stop approximately 125 to 150 feet ahead on Falcon Road, A-3409-24 4 and believed the bus departed without picking her up after she exited the vehicle and moved toward it. After his daughter returned upset and ran through neighboring yards towards the bus, defendant followed, believing something was wrong with the driver and fearing for the children 's safety. He asserted he slowly passed the bus on the right, driving partially onto the cobblestone. He did not observe flashing red lights, a deployed stop arm, or children on that side of the bus, and stopped in front of the bus only to speak with the driver and assess her condition. Defendant was convicted of all four motor vehicle charges and both disorderly persons offenses. The municipal judge found Maxwell, Forsberg, and Adams credible, but rejected defendant's account as not. The judge reasoned it was not believable defendant was acting reasonably because, "[i]nstead of locating his child who suffers from a sensory processing disorder and is sensitive to loud noises, he flashed his lights and honked his horn." The judge further found it implausible a parent would affirmatively choose to follow and stop a school bus rather than locate and ensure the safety of his daughter. The judge relied on Maxwell's testimony, the video evidence, and, in part, defendant's own testimony. The judge imposed the fines and costs statutorily authorized for these offenses. A-3409-24 5 Defendant appealed to the Law Division. A trial de novo was conducted in March 2025 before Judge Robert J. Jones, Jr. Judge Jones reviewed the video evidence specifically. Defense counsel argued the testimony of Forsberg and Adams should be stricken because neither witness had been sworn. Rejecting that argument, the judge observed issues not raised in the municipal court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal and further noted the video recordings constituted the most objective evidence in the record. On April 17, 2025, Judge Jones entered an order denying defendant's appeal in a written opinion. The judge found Maxwell credible and defendant not credible. The judge also noted Forsberg and Adams were not present at the scene and, therefore, their testimony was of lesser probative value, but nonetheless found both witnesses believable. Relying on federal and out-of- state authority, the judge concluded defendant waived any objection to the oath defect by failing to raise it in municipal court. Judge Jones found defendant guilty of all charged offenses, placing substantial weight on the videos admitted into evidence. At sentencing, the judge imposed the minimum fines on all charges and denied defendant's application for a stay. On appeal, defendant raises the following points: A-3409-24 6 [Point I.] THE STATE IS UNABLE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AND VIOLATIONS WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED. A. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS GUILTY OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT. B. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS GUILTY OF INTERFERENCE WITH TRANSPORTATION. C. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-128.1 (PASSING A SCHOOL BUS WHILE PICKING UP OR DISCHARGING) WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. D. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-96 (RECKLESS DRIVING) WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. E. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-85 (IMPROPER PASSING) WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. F. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-67 (OBSTRUCTING PASSAGE OF OTHER VEHICLES) WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. [Point II.] THE FAILURE TO ADMINISTER THE OATH REQUIRED BY N.J.R.E. 603 CONSTITUTES PLAIN ERROR. A-3409-24 7 [Point III.] THE ISSUE WAS NOT WAIVED ON APPEAL BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO SWEAR WITNESSES SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLICATES THE PUBLIC INTEREST. II. On appeal from a municipal court conviction, the Law Division judge must review the matter de novo on the record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). The Law Division judge must make independent "findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings." State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017). Our review of a de novo conviction following a municipal court appeal is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). The "standard of review of a de novo verdict after a municipal court trial is to 'determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering the proofs as a whole." State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). "Our review is limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to support the findings of the Law Division judge, not the municipal court." State v. A-3409-24 8 Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). Appellate review of a trial court's legal conclusions is plenary. See State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J. 368, 383 (2015). Where both the municipal judge and the Law Division judge have found a witness credible, we owe particularly strong deference to the Law Division judge's credibility findings. Robertson, 228 N.J. at 147. The rule of deference is more compelling where, as here, the municipal and Law Division judges made concurrent findings. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474. Under the "two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of error." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474). We may make independent factual findings only "if the appellate tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-62). A. We affirm defendant's convictions on the motor vehicle and disorderly persons charges substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Jo nes's A-3409-24 9 thorough and well-reasoned written opinion. Judge Jones carefully addressed each charged offense, identified the governing legal principles, and, applying those principles to the facts he found credible, concluded the State had proven each offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following brief comment regarding defendant's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:4 -85. Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-85, "[t]he driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass another vehicle upon the right . . . only under conditions permitting such movement in safety." Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him guilty of improper passing because the school bus was not "proceeding" within the meaning of the statute, but was instead stopped while picking up students. We are unpersuaded. We have previously held "a vehicle temporarily stopped on the highway does not lose its character as a 'vehicle proceeding in the same direction' merely by the fact that it is not in motion." April v. Collings Lakes Ambulance Ass'n, 109 N.J. Super. 392, 398 (App. Div. 1970). The video evidence plainly shows defendant drove past the school bus on its right while the bus was temporarily stopped. Under that precedent, sufficient credible A-3409-24 10 evidence in the record supports Judge Jones's conclusion that defendant violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-85. B. We are also unpersuaded by defendant's contention the municipal court's failure to place Forsberg and Adams under oath, or to obtain an affirmation from them to tell the truth, renders the judgment infirm. It is well settled "[b]efore testifying a witness shall be required to take an oath or make an affirmation or declaration to tell the truth under the penalty provided by law." N.J.R.E. 603. Thus, all witnesses must be "sworn or affirmed" before testifying. State v. Caraballo, 330 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App. Div. 2000). An error occurred when the municipal court judge did not do so. That error, however, does not compel reversal. As Judge Jones correctly found, defendant did not raise this issue before the municipal court. Accordingly, the argument was unpreserved for his review. We are satisfied the failure to administer an oath to Forsberg and Adams was waived before the Law Division judge. U.S. v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 556 (5th Cir. 1996). As Judge Jones correctly determined, had defendant's counsel objected before the municipal court, the witnesses could have been placed under oath before they testified. A-3409-24 11 In any event, their testimony was cumulative and not essential to the State's proofs. The operative facts underlying the charged offenses were established through Maxwell's sworn testimony, defendant's testimony, and the video evidence. Forsberg and Adams did not supply material firsthand evidence concerning the events at issue. Rather, they testified their decisions to file complaints were based on their review of the video evidence and their interviews with Maxwell. Their testimony was, therefore, only derivative of, and cumulative to, evidence otherwise properly admitted through Maxwell's sworn testimony and the video evidence. Moreover, their credibility was not central to the adjudication of defendant's guilt. Although credibility generally was at issue, the court's findings did not materially depend on the veracity of Forsberg or Adams. Instead, Judge Jones principally relied on Maxwell's sworn account, defendant's testimony, and the video recording. Because neither Forsberg nor Adams provided the essential firsthand proof of the charged conduct, the failure to place these witnesses under oath did not undermine the fairness of the proceeding or the reliability of the result. Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the judgment on this ground. Affirmed. A-3409-24 12