State of New Jersey v. Mark Sher
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
DocketA-3409-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3409-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MARK SHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided November 19, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Municipal Appeal
No. 21-2024.
Borrus Goldin Foley Vignuolo Hyman & Stahl,
attorneys for appellant (James E. Stahl and Jay Holub,
of counsel; Jeremy D. Smith, of counsel and on the
briefs).
Linda Estremera, Middlesex County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Elizabeth K. Gibbons,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following a trial de novo in the Law Division, defendant Mark Sher was
convicted of four motor vehicle offenses and two disorderly persons offenses
arising from his conduct in pursuing, passing, and stopping a school bus after
it failed to pick up his daughter. He now appeals from the June 10, 2025,
memorializing order, principally challenging the admission and consideration
of testimony of two witnesses who were not placed under oath in the municipal
court.
Having considered the record and the governing legal principles, we are
satisfied the oath defect does not warrant reversal, and the Law Division's
findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence. Therefore, we affirm.
I.
We derive the following facts from the record developed in the
municipal court and the trial de novo conducted in the Law Division.
On February 25, 2022, defendant followed the school bus assigned to
transport his daughter after the bus proceeded past her stop without picking her
up. Video recordings admitted into evidence depict the bus leaving the stop
without defendant's daughter aboard. After a brief exchange with his daughter,
who then ran after the bus, defendant followed the bus in his vehicle. The
recordings further show defendant flashing his headlights and sounding his
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horn as he pursued the bus until it stopped to pick up another student. At that
point, defendant drove around the right side of the bus, driving onto the
cobblestone in the process, while another student attempted to board.
Defendant then stopped his vehicle in front of the bus, exited, and spoke with
the driver, Audrey Maxwell, about why his daughter had not been picked up.
After a brief exchange, defendant returned to his vehicle and departed.
Maxwell resumed her route.
In March 2022, Joyce Forsberg, the senior transportation manager for
East Brunswick Public Schools, filed four traffic complaints against defendant :
obstructing the passage of other vehicles, N.J.S.A. 39:4-67; reckless driving,
N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; passing a stopped school bus, N.J.S.A. 39:4-128.1; and
improper passing, N.J.S.A. 39:4-85. Detective Brian Adams investigated the
incident and later charged defendant with disorderly conduct, N.J.S.A. 2C:33 -
2(a)(2), and interference with transportation, N.J.S.A. 2C:33 -14(a)(5).
The matters were tried in July 2024. The State first called Maxwell,
who testified she observed blinking lights in her rearview mirror as she was
stopping to pick up students. As she closed the bus door after the last student
boarded, she saw a car proceeding up the right side of her bus. According to
Maxwell, the car came alongside the bus, stopped directly in front of it, and
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defendant exited his vehicle. The incident left her shaken and alarmed.
Defense counsel cross-examined Maxwell about her driving history, whether
the bus's stop arm and amber lights were activated, her speed, and whether she
had been using her phone while driving. The municipal court also reviewed
video footage of the incident.
The State next called Forsberg then Adams. Neither witness, however,
was placed under oath or affirmation before testifying. Forsberg testified she
did not witness the incident, but interviewed Maxwell, reviewed the video
recording, and consequently decided to issue the four traffic summonses. Her
decision, as she noted on cross-examination, was based on Maxwell's account,
her review of the video, and her knowledge of school bus operations and
procedures. Adams similarly testified he was not present during the incident
and his investigation relied on the video recording and statements obtained
from Maxwell and Forsberg.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. Because of cold, rainy weather
and a delayed school opening, he drove his eleven-year-old daughter, who has
a sensory processing disorder that causes anxiety and heightened sensitivity to
noise and stress, to the bus stop. Defendant remained with her in the car,
observed the bus stop approximately 125 to 150 feet ahead on Falcon Road,
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and believed the bus departed without picking her up after she exited the
vehicle and moved toward it. After his daughter returned upset and ran
through neighboring yards towards the bus, defendant followed, believing
something was wrong with the driver and fearing for the children 's safety. He
asserted he slowly passed the bus on the right, driving partially onto the
cobblestone. He did not observe flashing red lights, a deployed stop arm, or
children on that side of the bus, and stopped in front of the bus only to speak
with the driver and assess her condition.
Defendant was convicted of all four motor vehicle charges and both
disorderly persons offenses. The municipal judge found Maxwell, Forsberg,
and Adams credible, but rejected defendant's account as not. The judge
reasoned it was not believable defendant was acting reasonably because,
"[i]nstead of locating his child who suffers from a sensory processing disorder
and is sensitive to loud noises, he flashed his lights and honked his horn." The
judge further found it implausible a parent would affirmatively choose to
follow and stop a school bus rather than locate and ensure the safety of his
daughter. The judge relied on Maxwell's testimony, the video evidence, and,
in part, defendant's own testimony. The judge imposed the fines and costs
statutorily authorized for these offenses.
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Defendant appealed to the Law Division. A trial de novo was conducted
in March 2025 before Judge Robert J. Jones, Jr. Judge Jones reviewed the
video evidence specifically. Defense counsel argued the testimony of Forsberg
and Adams should be stricken because neither witness had been sworn.
Rejecting that argument, the judge observed issues not raised in the municipal
court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal and further noted the video
recordings constituted the most objective evidence in the record.
On April 17, 2025, Judge Jones entered an order denying defendant's
appeal in a written opinion. The judge found Maxwell credible and defendant
not credible. The judge also noted Forsberg and Adams were not present at the
scene and, therefore, their testimony was of lesser probative value, but
nonetheless found both witnesses believable. Relying on federal and out-of-
state authority, the judge concluded defendant waived any objection to the oath
defect by failing to raise it in municipal court. Judge Jones found defendant
guilty of all charged offenses, placing substantial weight on the videos
admitted into evidence. At sentencing, the judge imposed the minimum fines
on all charges and denied defendant's application for a stay.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points:
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[Point I.]
THE STATE IS UNABLE TO PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS
GUILTY OF THE CHARGES AND VIOLATIONS
WHICH HE HAS BEEN CHARGED.
A. THE STATE IS UNABLE TO PROVE BEYOND
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS
GUILTY OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT.
B. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT MR. SHER IS
GUILTY OF INTERFERENCE WITH
TRANSPORTATION.
C. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-128.1 (PASSING A SCHOOL BUS
WHILE PICKING UP OR DISCHARGING) WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
D. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-96 (RECKLESS DRIVING) WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
E. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-85 (IMPROPER PASSING) WAS
NOT PROVEN BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT.
F. [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-67 (OBSTRUCTING PASSAGE
OF OTHER VEHICLES) WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.
[Point II.]
THE FAILURE TO ADMINISTER THE OATH
REQUIRED BY N.J.R.E. 603 CONSTITUTES
PLAIN ERROR.
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[Point III.]
THE ISSUE WAS NOT WAIVED ON APPEAL
BECAUSE THE FAILURE TO SWEAR WITNESSES
SUBSTANTIALLY IMPLICATES THE PUBLIC
INTEREST.
II.
On appeal from a municipal court conviction, the Law Division judge
must review the matter de novo on the record. R. 3:23-8(a)(2). The Law
Division judge must make independent "findings of fact and conclusions of
law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings." State v.
Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017).
Our review of a de novo conviction following a municipal court appeal
is "exceedingly narrow." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999). The
"standard of review of a de novo verdict after a municipal court trial is to
'determine whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on
sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' considering the proofs as a
whole." State v. Ebert, 377 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964)). "Our review is limited to determining
whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to support
the findings of the Law Division judge, not the municipal court." State v.
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Clarksburg Inn, 375 N.J. Super. 624, 639 (App. Div. 2005). Appellate review
of a trial court's legal conclusions is plenary. See State v. Kuropchak, 221 N.J.
368, 383 (2015).
Where both the municipal judge and the Law Division judge have found
a witness credible, we owe particularly strong deference to the Law Division
judge's credibility findings. Robertson, 228 N.J. at 147. The rule of deference
is more compelling where, as here, the municipal and Law Division judges
made concurrent findings. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474.
Under the "two-court rule, appellate courts ordinarily should not
undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and credibility determinations
made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and exceptional showing of
error." State v. Reece, 222 N.J. 154, 166 (2015) (quoting Locurto, 157 N.J. at
474). We may make independent factual findings only "if the appellate
tribunal is thoroughly satisfied that the finding is clearly a mistaken one and so
plainly unwarranted that the interests of justice demand intervention and
correction." Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471 (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 161-62).
A.
We affirm defendant's convictions on the motor vehicle and disorderly
persons charges substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Jo nes's
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thorough and well-reasoned written opinion. Judge Jones carefully addressed
each charged offense, identified the governing legal principles, and, applying
those principles to the facts he found credible, concluded the State had proven
each offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only the following
brief comment regarding defendant's interpretation of N.J.S.A. 39:4 -85.
Under N.J.S.A. 39:4-85, "[t]he driver of a vehicle may overtake and pass
another vehicle upon the right . . . only under conditions permitting such
movement in safety." Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding him
guilty of improper passing because the school bus was not "proceeding" within
the meaning of the statute, but was instead stopped while picking up students.
We are unpersuaded.
We have previously held "a vehicle temporarily stopped on the highway
does not lose its character as a 'vehicle proceeding in the same direction'
merely by the fact that it is not in motion." April v. Collings Lakes
Ambulance Ass'n, 109 N.J. Super. 392, 398 (App. Div. 1970). The video
evidence plainly shows defendant drove past the school bus on its right while
the bus was temporarily stopped. Under that precedent, sufficient credible
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evidence in the record supports Judge Jones's conclusion that defendant
violated N.J.S.A. 39:4-85.
B.
We are also unpersuaded by defendant's contention the municipal court's
failure to place Forsberg and Adams under oath, or to obtain an affirmation
from them to tell the truth, renders the judgment infirm. It is well settled
"[b]efore testifying a witness shall be required to take an oath or make an
affirmation or declaration to tell the truth under the penalty provided by law."
N.J.R.E. 603. Thus, all witnesses must be "sworn or affirmed" before
testifying. State v. Caraballo, 330 N.J. Super. 545, 554 (App. Div. 2000). An
error occurred when the municipal court judge did not do so. That error,
however, does not compel reversal. As Judge Jones correctly found, defendant
did not raise this issue before the municipal court. Accordingly, the argument
was unpreserved for his review.
We are satisfied the failure to administer an oath to Forsberg and Adams
was waived before the Law Division judge. U.S. v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 556
(5th Cir. 1996). As Judge Jones correctly determined, had defendant's counsel
objected before the municipal court, the witnesses could have been placed
under oath before they testified.
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In any event, their testimony was cumulative and not essential to the
State's proofs. The operative facts underlying the charged offenses were
established through Maxwell's sworn testimony, defendant's testimony, and the
video evidence. Forsberg and Adams did not supply material firsthand
evidence concerning the events at issue. Rather, they testified their decisions
to file complaints were based on their review of the video evidence and their
interviews with Maxwell.
Their testimony was, therefore, only derivative of, and cumulative to,
evidence otherwise properly admitted through Maxwell's sworn testimony and
the video evidence. Moreover, their credibility was not central to the
adjudication of defendant's guilt. Although credibility generally was at issue,
the court's findings did not materially depend on the veracity of Forsberg or
Adams. Instead, Judge Jones principally relied on Maxwell's sworn account,
defendant's testimony, and the video recording. Because neither Forsberg nor
Adams provided the essential firsthand proof of the charged conduct, the
failure to place these witnesses under oath did not undermine the fairness of
the proceeding or the reliability of the result. Therefore, we discern no basis
to disturb the judgment on this ground.
Affirmed.
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