Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0031-25 AARON KREISWIRTH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PLANNING BOARD OF THE TOWNSHIP OF LAKEWOOD and SUNSET ROAD SEPHARDIC CONGREGATION, INC., Defendants-Respondents. _____________________________ Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Mayer, Smith and Zazzali-Hogan. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Docket No. L-0935-24. Jonathan L. Leitman argued the cause for appellant (Jan Meyer & Associates, PC, attorneys; Jonathan L. Leitman and Jan Meyer, on the briefs). John J. Jackson argued the cause for respondent Planning Board of the Township of Lakewood (John J. Jackson III & Associates, Attorneys at Law, LLC, attorneys; John J. Jackson, III, of counsel and on the brief; Jilian McLeer, on the brief). Adam D. Pfeffer argued the cause for respondent Sunset Road Sephardic Congregation, Inc. (Levin Shea Pfeffer & Goldman, PA, attorneys; Adam D. Pfeffer, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Plaintiff Aaron Kreiswirth appeals from a September 4, 2025 final judgment dismissing with prejudice his complaint in lieu of prerogative writs against defendants Planning Board of the Township of Lakewood (Board) and Sunset Road Sephardic Congregation, Inc. (Sunset). We affirm. In April 2022, Sunset applied to the Board for preliminary and final major site plan approval of a two-story synagogue in Lakewood. Sunset's application sought variances for setbacks to the front, side, and rear yards of the property and the number of parking spaces. Sunset's proposed a building footprint of 4,800 square feet foot, including a main sanctuary consisting of 2,900 square feet. The Board held the first public hearing on Sunset's application on May 23, 2023. Plaintiff attended that hearing represented by counsel. In addition to the bulk variances, Sunset requested a variance for less than the thirty-seven parking spaces required by Lakewood Zoning Ordinance 18-905 (Ordinance). Plaintiff's A-0031-25 2 attorney argued seventy-three parking spaces were required based on the total square footage of the proposed structure rather than the square footage of the main sanctuary. The Board heard testimony from Sunset's professional engineer and planner, Brian Flannery. He testified the main sanctuary would total 2,900 square feet. The Board's engineer, Terence Vogt, calculated the main sanctuary would be 2,937 square feet. Flannery explained the parking would be the main issue with Sunset's application. Regarding Sunset's requested parking variance, the Board's chairman advised that the discrepancy between the applicant's proposed number of parking spaces and the required number of parking spaces under the Ordinance was significant and Sunset would "have to do a little better." In response, Flannery told the Board that Sunset initially proposed more than six parking spaces on-site, but neighborhood residents requested a reduction in the number of parking spaces Flannery also addressed the other variances sought by Sunset, including a nine-foot rather than ten-foot side yard setback, a nineteen-foot rather than twenty-five-foot side yard setback, a five-foot rather than twenty-foot rear yard setback, 48% rather than 25% building coverage, and elimination of the twenty- A-0031-25 3 foot buffer requirement. Flannery testified these bulk variances could "be granted without substantial detriment to the public good." On cross-examination by plaintiff's attorney, Flannery did not know the number of congregants expected to attend services at Sunset. Flannery maintained that "[a] 2,900 square foot main sanctuary requires [thirty-seven] parking spaces per the . . . [O]rdinance" but was unaware of "any definition [of a main sanctuary] in the [O]rdinance." Plaintiff's attorney then asked Flannery "[i]f you have a property where there's a main sanctuary for men and a main sanctuary for women, how do you calculate the square footage for the purpose of main sanctuary related to parking requirements?" Flannery responded that he used "the same interpretation that has been applied for [forty] years." The Board's chairman suggested Sunset may have to return to the Board with a plan for additional parking. The Board's attorney explained "[t]he applicant has the right to put their case on and make all their proofs and the Board can decide the final. The Chairman certainly has the right, though, to limit the testimony and limit the cross examination, get to the point ." Based on counsel's statement, the Board's chairman precluded further cross-examination of Sunset's planner related to parking. A-0031-25 4 The hearing proceeded with testimony from plaintiff. Plaintiff, who lived next to the proposed synagogue, testified the area lacked adequate parking, and the application would result in "parking across the sidewalk" daily. Plaintiff stated he observed six cars "on a regular basis that frequent this property." Plaintiff's attorney introduced photographs taken by plaintiff showing cars parked on the road near the proposed synagogue. However, plaintiff could not confirm the cars in the photographs belonged to members of the synagogue. Sunset next called Rabbi Moshe Waddische to testify in favor of the application. The rabbi told the Board members the congregation consistently had sixty-six members paying members who attended services. Regarding parking, the rabbi stated Sunset presently had three or four cars parking on the existing driveway. The rabbi testified "we have about [fifteen] people coming and they're, basically, from the area and they park. That's not an issue. Now, in the evening we have some more people there, sometimes [twenty] or [thirty] people. They live closer. They're able to park. When it's [thirty] people, they take up . . . the entire Sunset [Road]." A-0031-25 5 On cross-examination, plaintiff's attorney asked the rabbi about the use of a back room to be connected to the main sanctuary. The rabbi responded the back room could be used as an overflow room for men attending services.1 The rabbi confirmed the upstairs section of the proposed synagogue served "as a women's sanctuary" and only about three or four women attended services on the Sabbath. He further explained the upstairs sanctuary could accommodate about twenty women. A Board member then asked the rabbi if Sunset could acquire additional parking spaces from local businesses. The rabbi explained Sunset could do so if necessary. The Board continued the public hearing on September 19, 2023. Before this meeting, Sunset submitted revised plans based on comments during the previous hearing. Sunset's attorney told the Board members that Sunset had "an agreement in place" with the nearby shopping center if the Board voted in favor of the new synagogue. Flannery presented additional parking testimony at this hearing. He explained the main sanctuary would be 2,362 square feet, which required thirty parking spaces under the Ordinance. According to Flannery, Sunset's revised 1 At Sunset, men and women sit separately for prayer. A-0031-25 6 plan provided two parking spaces on-site, and the remaining twenty-eight parking spaces would be provided off-site pursuant to an agreement with the shopping center. A Board member asked if there was a signed agreement with the shopping center. Sunset's attorney stated: So, it's not signed. It's subject to, obviously, approval. I have no problem providing, as we've done in the past on other applications, should the Board vote in favor we'll be subject to the Board and the Board's counsel reviewing the agreement. There is a draft of it. There is an easement agreement. I have no problem sharing it with you. Flannery testified the Township's off-site parking ordinance allows applicants to "provide the parking on another parcel which may or may not be contiguous to the parcel provided the parking lot is within a thousand feet . . . and [where the applicant] provides assurances acceptable to the appropriate Board that the parking will remain available in the future." Sunset's attorney explained the schedule of religious services did not conflict with the shopping center's retail hours. He further told the Board members that the draft easement agreement provided parking spaces for Sunset's "exclusive use during the morning, during nonbusiness hours, so as not to affect businesses, as well as joint uses during all other hours." A-0031-25 7 Plaintiff's attorney challenged the required number of parking spaces, arguing the calculation should have included the main sanctuary and the women's sanctuary, which would "require[] [fifty-nine] spaces." Plaintiff's attorney argued "[y]ou cannot provide and say that it only goes to the spaces and the sanctuary where it's men are sitting. That's . . . discriminatory." In response, the Board's chairman replied, "[t]he reason why Lakewood is like that is because the women's sanctuary usually is used only on Shabbos and we have a thing in Lakewood we don't drive on Shabbos . . . . That's probably why we don't calculate the women's sanctuary." Plaintiff's attorney then argued the shopping center was encumbered by a Zoning Board resolution requiring it to maintain 250 parking spaces. Plaintiff's counsel further asserted the Board could not give away parking spaces at the shopping center which were previously pledged for use by a nearby yeshiva. The Board's chairman responded the Township's engineer would "look[] at these old resolutions and mak[e] sure that those parking spots were not given away once before, making sure that there are still 250 spots there." The Board held a final public hearing on December 5, 2023. At this hearing, Sunset revised its proposal. The revised proposal reflected a main A-0031-25 8 sanctuary of 2,362 square feet which, according to Sunset, required thirty off- site parking spaces. Sunset presented testimony from Scott Kennel, a traffic expert. Kennel reviewed the parking at the shopping center. He estimated fifty parking spaces would be available around peak times for the synagogue's use. On cross- examination, plaintiff's attorney asked Kennel, "if there's more than one sanctuary that can be used at the same time, such as maybe for a person who wants to sit [in the] balcony, [would] each seat [] count for the parking?" Sunset's counsel objected, stating: [W]e went through this at length. The ordinance in Lakewood for a shul, for a synagogue, or any house of worship go by the main sanctuary. We [addressed] in detail each room previously. So, now to ask . . . how the calculation should be, I have an objection. If the Board would like him to answer, he can answer. After this objection, the following exchange took place: [Board's attorney]: Mr. Chairman, the objection is does this help the case? [Plaintiff's attorney]: Yes, it helps. [Board's chairman]: Based on the ordinance, based on the way the town ordinance is written, they only need [thirty] spots. Whether we agree with it or not, that's a legal thing. [Plaintiff's attorney]: I disagree. . . . A-0031-25 9 [Plaintiff's attorney]: [A]re you saying I can't finish? [Board's attorney]: Yes. [Plaintiff's attorney]: Then I'm done. The Board took additional testimony from the rabbi regarding parking. The rabbi discussed Sunset's desire to accommodate the neighbors' concerns related to parking. The Board also heard additional testimony from plaintiff and members of the public. Plaintiff then called Joe Vince, a professional planner, engineer, and land surveyor. Vince opined that "if you were to divide the first and second story and excluding that room on the first floor, you would need about [fifty -nine parking] spaces." However, if Sunset excluded the upstairs section but included the "back room" as part of the main sanctuary, Vince calculated forty-seven parking spaces would be required. Vince further testified that if the Board only counted the square footage for the main sanctuary and back room thirty parking spots would be required. The Board's chairman then asked if Vince had anything further to present related to the parking issue. The following exchange occurred: [Plaintiff's attorney]: I want to get it on the record, please. A-0031-25 10 [Board secretary]: He's repeating and the Chairman has the right to limit this. [Board chairman]: We've heard this. We went through the calculations, [fifty-nine], [sixty-three], . . . Let's go. Next. What else do you want to discuss besides parking? .... MR. VINCE: So, the Institute of Transportation Engineers, they put out a publication called the parking generation. I looked at the fifth edition. What that does is it takes studies nationally for different types of uses. If I was to apply the (inaudible) standard, this goes by attendees. So, with the revised plans I was unable to conclude. .... [Plaintiff's attorney]: Mr. [chairman]. [Board chairman]: No. . . . you're using your . . . theatrical tactics. We got the parking. We realize we are not sufficient with the parking. Let's move to something else. . . . So, . . . we're done with parking. Talk about the next. How about buffers? Talk about side yard variances. Thank you. After Vince completed his testimony, plaintiff's attorney told the Board "I think you cannot close this matter until the lease is [provided], this parking agreement that [Sunset's attorney] promised us months ago has not showed up . . . I want to have an opportunity to see the document, make some objections. " The Board's chairman replied, "[w]e asked for it and it's not here." A-0031-25 11 A Board member asked, "if we were to say, propose to take out the buffer, the building from the buffer zone and require more parking on site, do we make that as a resolution or do we say show it to us, this is our recommendation and come back and show us how it's going to work?" The Board's attorney replied, "[t]here's case law that says the Board can grant some of the relief, all of the relief or none of the relief and you could take a practical approach and limit it to a point . . . ." Another Board member moved "to approve [the application] with no buffer relief, [however] they must show us an easement on that property . . . during resolution compliance and it must go with the property." A different Board member asked the inquiring Board member if he "want[ed] to see those plans?" The Board member stated "[n]o. We are leaving that to our . . . engineer. They will review the plans to make sure they are compliant. We are moving on." On February 20, 2024, the Board adopted a written memorializing resolution granting preliminary and final site plan approval to Sunset but denied any bulk variance relief. 2 The resolution provided "[t]he proposed place of 2 Based on the Board's denial of Sunset's requested bulk variances, the Board's resolution reflected the proposed synagogue was conditionally approved subject A-0031-25 12 worship will contain a main sanctuary of more than 2,90 [square feet] on the first floor." The resolution required "[Sunset] . . . resubmit this entire proposal for re-approval should there be any material deviation from the terms and conditions of this resolution or the documents submitted as part of this application, all of which are made a part hereof and shall be binding on the applicant." As a condition of approval, the resolution provided "[Sunset] shall provide a non-revocable easement agreement for parking at the nearby shopping center to the satisfaction of the [B]oard engineer and [B]oard attorney during resolution compliance." Plaintiff filed a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs challenging Sunset's preliminary and final site plan approval for a synagogue. Sunset and the Board filed answers. The judge heard the parties' legal arguments. Plaintiff argued approving preliminary and final site plan while denying the requested variance relief was "nonsensical" and constituted "an abrogation of the duties of the Board." Plaintiff claimed that a redrawing of the site plan and resubmission to the Board to compliance with all setback, coverage, and other bulk requirements under the municipality's ordinances. Because the proposed synagogue was a permitted use in the zone, the resolution essentially approved construction of the structure "as of right" provided Sunset complied with the Township's zoning ordinances, including the off-site parking provision. A-0031-25 13 was required and that review of the application should not have been delegated to the Board's engineer. He also asserted the Board's resolution failed to resolve the required number of parking spaces. Plaintiff further challenged the absence of any final written agreement between Sunset and the shopping center for the additional parking. He also argued the shopping center lacked authority to grant a parking easement to Sunset due to prior restrictions imposed by Lakewood's Zoning Board for other approved developments and the shopping center's mortgage agreement with its bank. The judge found administrative approvals, as granted here, have been accepted where "there are changes that reduce the size or the non-conforming nature" and "are not the types of things that are going to expand the use and that would be subject to scrutiny by the community." The judge concluded the Board's decision to grant site plan approval while denying the requested variances "f[ell] squarely within [its] lawful authority" and "d[id] not reflect the sort of substantial plan alteration [that] would require fresh preliminary review, as the essential projects scope and use remained unchanged and the conditions imposed pertain to fine tuning compliance that is making them smaller, making them more compliant, not to the core project alteration." A-0031-25 14 The judge further found the Board "undertook a rigorous examination" of the parking requirements regarding main sanctuary square footage, including "[t]estimony of professional experts for both applicant and objector" which "culminat[ed] in the Board's clear determination that only [thirty] parking spaces were required." Moreover, the judge concluded the Board did not act discriminatorily in applying the ordinance which "expressly excludes secondary sanctuary space and ancillary rooms from the parking calculation." He explained "there are certain cultural aspects that are applied to the zoning laws and land use laws in Lakewood that may not be reflected throughout the State." The judge recognized "observant Jews walk to [synagogue] on certain days" and "people . . . will be coming as a family." He further explained that "to address the appropriate amount of parking they count the men as the person that will reflect the family. And since they pray differently in different places, they count the square footage of the main sanctuary." The judge concluded "it [wa]s not inappropriate for a Board in interpreting an [o]rdinance to take into account it 's cultural understanding of the community." The judge rejected any challenge to the Ordinance's "fundamental validity or discriminatory effect" because the Township's governing body was not a party to the litigation. A-0031-25 15 Additionally, the judge found the Board's acceptance of a draft easement agreement and Sunset's commitment to obtaining a signed document constituted a reasonable condition of approval. The judge explained "any potential issues related to the shopping center's own parking obligation or mortgage encumbrances, are [an] explicit [B]oard condition . . . to be fully resolved before [Sunset] can proceed." The judge also rejected plaintiff's arguments he was "improperly precluded from full cross-examination and from making arguments o[r] presenting evidence at the hearing," because "[t]he transcripts conclusively refute[d] this charge." As the judge stated, under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10, the Board's chairman "exercised reasonable and lawful discretion to limit duplicative and relevant testimony without undermining plaintiff 's substantive right to be heard." Based on his findings, the judge found plaintiff failed to prove "the Board's actions were arbitrary capricious or unreasonable." The judge entered a September 4, 2025 order dismissing plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. On appeal, plaintiff argues the Board should not have granted site plan approval in the absence of Sunset's requested variance relief. Further, plaintiff challenges the Board's conclusions regarding the number of parking spaces as A-0031-25 16 "unduly vague and contrary to law." Additionally, he claims the resolution should be vacated because the Board limited his attorney's questioning during the public hearings. We reject these arguments. When considering "an appeal of a trial court's review of a municipal board's action, we are bound by the same standard as the trial court." Cohen v. Bd. of Adjustment of Rumson, 396 N.J. Super. 608, 614-15 (App. Div. 2007). Our review of a municipal board's action "is limited." Smart SMR of N.Y., Inc. v. Borough of Fair Lawn Bd. of Adjustment, 152 N.J. 309, 327 (1998). "[C]ourts ordinarily should not disturb the discretionary decisions of local boards that are supported by substantial evidence in the record and reflect a correct application of the relevant principles of land use law." Lang v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of N. Caldwell, 160 N.J. 41, 58-59 (1999). In reviewing decisions by local boards, courts are mindful that the Legislature vested boards with discretion related to decisions reflecting the character and level of development within their community. See Booth v. Bd. of Adjustment, 50 N.J. 302, 306 (1967). A board's decision is accorded a rebuttable presumption of validity. Harvard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 56 N.J. 362, 368 (1970). A board's decision "may be set aside only when it is 'arbitrary, capricious[,] or unreasonable.'" Cell S. of N.J., Inc. v. A-0031-25 17 Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 172 N.J. 75, 81 (2002) (quoting Medici v. BPR Co., 107 N.J. 1, 15 (1987)). "[P]ublic bodies, because of their peculiar knowledge of local conditions, must be allowed wide latitude in their delegated discretion." Jock v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Wall, 184 N.J. 562, 597 (2005). "The proper scope of judicial review is not to suggest a decision that may be better than the one made by the board, but to determine whether the board could reasonably have reached its decision on the record." Ibid. (citations omitted). "[W]hen a party challenges a . . . board's decision through an action in lieu of prerogative writs, the . . . board's decision is entitled to deference." Kane Properties, LLC v. City of Hoboken, 214 N.J. 199, 229 (2013). The burden is on the challenging party to overcome this highly deferential standard of review. Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 284 (2013). The court may not substitute its judgment over the judgment of the local board absent a clear abuse of discretion. Cell S. of N.J., 172 N.J. at 81-82 (citing Medical Realty Assocs. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Summit, 228 N.J. Super. 226, 233 (App. Div. 1988)). "Even were [the court] to harbor reservations as to the good judgment of a local land use agency's decision, 'there can be no judicial declaration of invalidity in the absence of clear abuse of discretion by the public A-0031-25 18 agencies involved.'" CBS Outdoor, Inc. v. Borough of Lebanon Plan. Bd./Bd. of Adjustment, 414 N.J. Super. 563, 577 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Kramer v. Bd. of Adjustment, Sea Girt, 45 N.J. 268, 296-97 (1965)). "[H]owever, a board's decision regarding a question of law . . . is subject to a de novo review by the courts, and is entitled to no deference." Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018) (quoting Chicalese v. Monroe Twp. Planning Bd., 334 N.J. Super. 413, 419 (Law Div. 2000)). We first consider plaintiff's argument that the Board could not grant preliminary and final site plan approval to construct the synagogue while denying Sunset's requested bulk variance relief. We disagree. The intent and purpose of the Municipal Land Use Law (MLUL), N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to -171, is "to encourage coordination of the various public and private procedures and activities shaping land development with a view of lessening the cost of such development and to the more efficient use of land." Levin v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Twp., 82 N.J. 174, 179 (1980). N.J.S.A. 40:55D-50 provides planning boards "shall grant final approval if the detailed drawings, specifications and estimates of the application for final approval conform to the standards established by ordinance for final approval." A-0031-25 19 Accordingly, courts distinguish between "preliminary approval granted subject to subsequent approval by appropriate public agencies and preliminary approval granted subject to later submission of additional information fundamental to an essential element of the development plan." Field v. Mayor & Council of Franklin Twp., 190 N.J. Super. 326, 332 (App. Div. 1983). "If the applicant fails to provide sufficient information on the fundamental elements of his plan, preliminary approval should be denied." Id. at 333. When variances are requested, the board's discretionary power is not limited to "either grant[ing] or deny[ing] [t]he variance as applied for." Home Builder's Ass'n of Northern N.J. v. Borough of Paramus, 7 N.J. 335, 341 (1951). Rather, the board is vested with "the discretion to grant such relief as it may deem proper under all the circumstances of the matter before it." Id. at 342. Municipal boards have "the inherent power to tailor [their] grant of an exception or variance by appropriate conditions and safeguards." Borough of N. Plainfield v. Perone, 54 N.J. Super. 1, 8-9 (App. Div. 1959). Plaintiff claims the Board's approval of Sunset's plans subject to review and approval of any subsequently modified plans by the Board's engineer was "internally contradictory" and required the Board to review any new plans. Plaintiff, citing Davis v. Planning Bd. of Somers Point, 327 N.J. Super. 535, 541 A-0031-25 20 (App. Div. 2000), asserts that when a final site plan proposal contains "significant or substantial" changes from the preliminary site plan proposal, the applicant may need to "seek preliminary site approval again." Under Davis, "the 'significant or substantial revision' standard must be illustrated on a case-by- case basis." Id. at 542. Davis involved an applicant who applied for preliminary site plan approval initially and subsequently applied for final site plan approval relying on different plans. Id. at 541. Here, unlike the applicant in Davis, Sunset applied for preliminary and final major site plan approval at the same time. The MLUL allows "combin[ing] this two-step process into a single proceeding." Price v. Martinetti, 421 N.J. Super. 290, 297 (App. Div. 2011). Even assuming Davis applied, plaintiff failed to show how the Board's conditional approval of Sunset's site plan without the requested variance relief constituted a "significant or substantial revision." If Sunset reduces the size of the building to obviate the need for any variance relief, rendering the structure wholly conforming with the municipality's zoning requirements, it is unlikely plaintiff will be able to demonstrate any changes that are so substantial as to "constitute simultaneous abandonment of an earlier plan." Davis, 327 N.J. A-0031-25 21 Super. at 542 (quoting William M. Cox, New Jersey Zoning and Land Use Administration, § 15-5.2 at 310 (1999)). In Davis, because "th[e] project got smaller," we concluded there were no significant or substantial revisions. Ibid. Similarly, the judge here acknowledged the Board's rejection of Sunset's requested bulk variances would result in "changes that reduce the size" of the project. Notwithstanding the reduction in the size of the building, the judge concluded "fundamental elements" of the project, including a main sanctuary of 2,900 square feet, remained the same. Contrary to plaintiff's argument, Sunset's application absent any bulk variance relief did not fundamentally alter the application. Planning boards need not grant all or any requested relief, nor must they begin the process anew every time they deny a variance. See Cox & Koenig, New Jersey Zoning & Land Use Administration, § 15-1.5 at 214 (2026) (explaining planning boards have the "the inherent power, and even duty, to lay down adequate protective conditions and safeguards in the granting of variances" as well as "the power to grant partial relief"). Applying this deferential standard, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the Board abused its discretion in granting preliminary and final site plan approval while denying Sunset's requested bulk variances. A-0031-25 22 We next consider plaintiff's arguments related to the proposed parking spaces for Sunset's congregants. Plaintiff contends the Board's resolution failed to make adequate findings regarding the number of parking spots. He claims the total square footage of the synagogue, not just the square footage of the main sanctuary, must be used in calculating the number of required parking spaces. We disagree. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) requires the Board to state its "findings of fact and conclusions based thereon in each decision on any application for development." A review of record contradicts plaintiff's assertion that the Board failed to satisfy N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g). The Board's resolution found "[t]he proposed place of worship will contain a main sanctuary of more than 2,900 [square feet] on the first floor." The Ordinance clearly states the required number of parking spaces for a synagogue shall be calculated based on the size of the main sanctuary. The Board's resolution stated Sunset's synagogue would provide two on-site parking spaces with "an additional [twenty-eight] parking spaces to be provided offsite at a shopping center." Consistent with the Ordinance, the judge correctly concluded the resolution stated the Board's "clear determination that only [thirty] parking spaces were required." The resolution regarding the required number of parking A-0031-25 23 spaces set forth the Board's relevant factual findings and conclusions under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g). Additionally, we reject plaintiff's argument that the parking space calculation was "an error of law and discriminatory." Plaintiff argues the Board should have included the women's sanctuary, the ancillary backroom, and the main sanctuary square footages to calculate the required number of parking spaces. Plaintiff claims the Board's refusal to do so was impermissibly discriminatory on the bases of sex and religion. The Ordinance explicitly excludes "secondary sanctuary space" and "ancillary" rooms from the parking space calculation. Further, the Board viewed the Ordinance consistent with its experience and the recognized customs of synagogues throughout Lakewood. The Board also heard testimony from Rabbi Waddische stating only about three or four women attend religious services at a time, and the women's sanctuary, at most, would accommodate twenty women. We are satisfied the Board properly considered the actual practice and customs of Sunset's congregants in interpreting and applying the Ordinance. "[B]oards of adjustment do not function in a vacuum." Baghdikian v. Bd. of Adjustment of Ramsey, 247 N.J. Super. 45, 49 (App. Div. 1991) (citing Kramer, 45 N.J. at 284). "It is firmly settled that a board may and indeed is expected to A-0031-25 24 bring to bear in its deliberations the general knowledge of the local conditions and experiences of its individual members." Id. at 49-50 (citing Reinauer Realty Corp. v. Nucera, 59 N.J. Super. 189, 201 (App. Div. 1960)). Nor is there any merit to plaintiff's contention that an easement agreement with the nearby shopping center to satisfy the required number of parking spaces was unlawful. Plaintiff asserts such an agreement would be unlawful based on a Zoning Board resolution previously requiring the shopping center to "maintain at least 235 parking spaces" and another Zoning Board resolution pledging parking spaces at the shopping center to a nearby school. According to plaintiff, the shopping center's obligation under these Zoning Board resolutions conflicted with the shopping center's ability to allocate twenty-eight parking spaces to Sunset. Lakewood's off-site parking ordinance permits parking spaces on other property within a thousand feet of a development project so long as the applicant "provides assurance acceptable to the appropriate Board that the parking will remain available in the future." The off-site parking ordinance accords discretion to the Board to determine the sufficiency of the assurances to satisfy the necessary off-site parking. A-0031-25 25 If the shopping center is precluded from granting a parking easement to Sunset based on Zoning Board resolutions or other agreements, the issue need not be resolved at this time. If Sunset is unable to provide a valid and signed easement agreement with the shopping center, the conditions in the Board's resolution would remain unsatisfied, and the Board could withhold final site plan approval. We next address plaintiff's argument the Board's resolution was arbitrary and capricious because plaintiff's attorney was not permitted to argue or present expert testimony and was denied the ability to cross-examine Sunset's expert witness. The Municipal Land Use Law gives interested parties a "right of cross- examination" at board hearings, "subject to the discretion of the presiding officer and to reasonable limitations as to time and number of witnesses." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(d). A board "may exclude irrelevant, immaterial or unduly repetitious evidence." N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(e). A municipal board's decision to limit testimony on irrelevant matters is entitled to deference. "[I]t is well established that a planning board has broad discretion in conducting its hearings, provided that any applicable statutory requirements are observed." Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor & A-0031-25 26 Council of Princeton, 370 N.J. Super. 429, 463 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Lyons v. City of Camden, 48 N.J. 524, 530 (1967)). Plaintiff's allegation that the Board's chairman abused his discretion in limiting questioning and testimony during the public hearing is belied by the record. Plaintiff's attorney cross-examined Sunset's professional engineer and planner, traffic expert, and the rabbi about main sanctuary square footage and parking issue. Further, plaintiff's counsel argued before the Board that the main sanctuary, the ancillary backroom, and the women's sa