Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1123-25 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. N.M.,1 Defendant, and T.B., Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF Y.M. and N.A.M., minors. _________________________ 1 We refer to the parties and the children by initials and fictitious names to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). Submitted October 13, 2026 โ€“ Decided November 17, 2026 Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Perez Friscia. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Atlantic County, Docket No. FG-01-0009-25. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (John A. Albright, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Lakshmi Barot, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor Y.M. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; David B. Valentin, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant T.B. ("Tim") appeals from the November 12, 2025 judgment terminating his parental rights to Y.M. ("Yuri") and granting guardianship to the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division"). The Law Guardian argues the Division has proven each of the best interests prongs to terminate Tim's parental rights and that the court's judgment should be affirmed. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, A-1123-25 2 we affirm the judgment because the court correctly applied the best interests of the child test, and substantial credible evidence supports its findings. I. We summarize the salient procedural history and facts established during the three-day guardianship trial. N.M. ("Nan") is the mother of Yuri, born in April 2015, and N.A.M. 2 ("Neil"), born in April 2023. Tim is Yuri's biological father and has approximately "eight or nine other children." On April 7, 2022, the Division filed a verified complaint and order to show cause ("OTSC") for custody of Yuri. The trial court granted the Division care, custody, and supervision of Yuri. The Division thereafter placed Yuri with a relative. Nan did not appear at the hearing, but Tim appeared with counsel and the court granted Tim parenting time at South Woods State Prison. While the Division sought to provide Nan with services to facilitate reunification, Tim was serving a term of imprisonment and unable to care for Yuri. Tim has multiple criminal convictions, including sexual offenses. He was determined to be a tier two sex offender subject to Megan's Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -23, and parole supervision for life ("PSL"). Tim was prohibited under PSL from "residing with any minor," including his own child unless he received "approval of the District 2 The Division was unable to identify Neil's biological father. A-1123-25 3 Parole Supervisor." N.J.A.C. 10A:72-2.5(c). To seek an exception from parole to reside with a child, Tim had to apply for and complete a Living with Children Assessment ("LWCA"), including a psychological evaluation, which would be reviewed by his parole officer and a supervisor for a determination. N.J.A.C. 10A:72-2.5(c)-(e). In May 2022, at the OTSC return hearing, the court granted Tim supervised parenting time in prison twice a month for two-hour sessions. The court ordered Tim to undergo a psychological evaluation, and the Division advised him about parenting programs offered to inmates. The Division thereafter arranged for Dr. Gregory C. Gambone to conduct an evaluation at the prison. On February 20, 2025, the Division filed a guardianship complaint seeking the termination of Nan and Tim's parental rights. In seeking to terminate Tim's parental rights to Yuri, the Division claimed he had failed to make a permanent plan for Yuri, abandoned the child in the care of others, and substantially failed to perform the regular expected functions of care and support for his child. The Division noted it had provided Tim "with access to a psychological evaluation, substance abuse evaluations and recommended treatment, random drug screens, individual counseling, and parenting skills A-1123-25 4 training." The Division also highlighted Tim's prior criminal convictions and that Tim was incarcerated for much of Yuri's life. The Division's complaint also asserted that Yuri did not wish to be reunified with and placed in Tim's care. Additionally, the Division posited that Tim failed to make sufficient progress with the Division's recommended services. In May 2025, Nan surrendered her parental rights to both children. The court presided over the guardianship trial on September 29, October 17, and October 20, 2025. The Division presented the testimony of Dr. Allen Lee, caseworker Jonna Horvath, resource parents C.F. and R.F., and caseworker supervisor Bianca Dozier. Yuri's Law Guardian presented testimony from Dr. Karen Wells, and Tim offered testimony from parole officer Tara Wuko. Dr. Lee, a clinical psychologist, testified that he had conducted bonding evaluations of Yuri and Neil with their resource parents. Dr. Lee had also attempted to schedule psychological and bonding evaluations for Tim, but Tim, who was no longer incarcerated, failed to attend the dates offered. Regarding the purpose of a bonding evaluation, Dr. Lee explained they were conducted to assess the nature and quality of the psychological and emotional attachment existing between a child and an adult. Dr. Lee testified that Yuri was about ten years old at the time of the bonding evaluations with his resource parents. Yuri A-1123-25 5 expressed to Dr. Lee that he felt happy and safe, wanted to remain in his current home, enjoyed being with his resource parents and brother, and wanted to be adopted by the resource parents. After completion of the bonding evaluations, Dr. Lee concluded that Yuri had formed a significant and positive psychological attachment to his resource parents. He also found there was a significant risk Yuri would suffer severe and enduring harm if the attachment and relationship with his resource parents ended. Dr. Lee highlighted Yuri needed the permanency of a consistent and stable environment, which included protection, nurturance, and support. Regarding the resource parents, Dr. Lee determined they afforded such stability. His opinions were all within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty. During Dr. Lee's cross-examination, he explained there was no evidence that anyone had coached Yuri on how to respond. He explained it was not unusual that Yuri expressed a desire to be adopted. Dr. Lee acknowledged Yuri had previously been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder ("ADHD"). Division caseworker Horvath testified that she was an adoption caseworker. She had worked for the Division for approximately thirteen years and was the custodian of records familiar with the Division's documents in this A-1123-25 6 case. Horvath explained that the Division first became involved with the family in October 2017, after receiving a referral from a hospital regarding allegations of neglect. Nan had taken Yuri to the emergency room for suspected burns to his left buttock that were sustained while in the care of a babysitter. During the investigation, the Division learned Tim was in prison and had been incarcerated for approximately thirty-five months. The case was investigated and closed. Horvath explained the Division received six additional referrals regarding the family. In 2022, after Nan went into an inpatient treatment program, the Division placed Yuri with S.N. by consent. S.N. later obtained sole legal custody under a non-dissolution ("FD") docket. After Neil was born, the Division placed him with resource parents. Around July 2023, the Division placed both children with the resource parents who were caring for Neil so they could be together. Horvath stated that Tim had a substantial history of incarceration. Tim had been in prison since Yuri was about a month old. He had a history of substance abuse and had received treatment prior to his 2019 incarceration. After Tim was released from incarceration in 2019, he returned to prison in January 2022 for CDS charges. Horvath understood that no parenting time occurred between Tim's release from prison and his return to prison in about A-1123-25 7 2022. Tim also served a prison sentence for a violation of probation. He was incarcerated until approximately February 2024. During his incarceration, Tim consistently had supervised parenting time with Yuri approximately twice a month between 2022 and 2024. He generally engaged in supervised parenting time with Yuri in prison, except for the limited occasions when he ignored Yuri or when Yuri refused to attend. Regarding services offered to Tim, Horvath explained the Division offered parenting classes, skills training, and individual therapy. The Division also offered Tim transportation to some services. Tim "declined" individual therapy and did not complete parenting classes. Horvath expressed that he did not meaningfully participate in the "services offered." No supervised parenting time occurred between October 2024 and September 2025, largely due to Yuri's refusal. The Division made efforts to foster virtual parenting time. Because Tim tested positive for CDS, he was referred to substance abuse treatment, which he completed. Horvath also recalled Tim failed to attend any of the psychological or bonding evaluations scheduled in 2025. At the time, Tim was residing with his aunt. Horvath explained that the Division met with Tim regarding the steps to complete the LWCA. Tim was advised to contact his probation officer to A-1123-25 8 confirm the necessary tasks to complete the LWCA. Horvath asserted Tim failed to do so, and the Division contacted him multiple times regarding his completion status, but he "provided . . . [no] additional information." The Division had concerns based on Tim's criminal history consisting of fifteen arrests, three municipal convictions, seven criminal convictions, four violations of probation, driver's license revocation, and parole violations. Horvath further cited to Tim's judgment of conviction for "theft by deception, false imprisonment, endangering, abuse, and neglect of a child, and sexual assault. " Regarding Tim's criminal proceedings, Horvath asserted he had pending charges for "[d]omestic violence and theft." The Division had also received a referral regarding Tim's newest child with "his paramour," based on alleged domestic violence. She expressed that he had not removed the harm posed to Yuri. Regarding placement with a relative, Horvath explained the Division contacted and assessed a paternal relative who later reported she did not "wish to take either of the children." She testified that Yuri had resided with the resource parents since April 2023, and they were aware of his ADHD diagnosis. The Division discussed with the resource parents the differences between "kinship legal guardianship [("KLG")] and adoption," and both resource parents expressed a preference for adoption. A-1123-25 9 On cross-examination by Yuri's Law Guardian, Horvath confirmed that for the initial seven years of Yuri's life, he had no relationship with Tim. She also confirmed that to the Division's knowledge, Tim had never resided with any of his children, nor been a "primary caretaker[]." Horvath also confirmed the court had ordered therapy that Tim declined, and he had failed to engage in "random urine drug screens" the Division offered. Regarding Yuri's placements, Horvath explained he had resided in three separate homes and wished to "remain" with his current resource parents, staying "with his brother." On cross-examination by Tim's counsel, Horvath explained she had been in direct contact with parole officer Tara Wuko regarding an LWCA. She had asked Wuko "what was needed" and learned Tim had been provided a list of evaluators. The resource parents separately testified that the Division explained the difference between KLG and adoption. They wished to adopt both children to offer greater stability, believing it was in the children's best interests. On redirect, Horvath recounted that Tim had failed to comply with court-ordered services and had outstanding parental deficits, including his failure to attend individual therapy and parenting skills training. Additionally, Tim's status as to A-1123-25 10 the pending charges and whether there would be another violation of parole was unknown. Dr. Wells, a licensed clinical psychologist, testified she had worked in the field for over forty years. She completed a psychological evaluation of Tim and a bonding evaluation of Yuri and his resource parents. Dr. Wells explained Tim's psychological evaluation did not include testing because he "became distressed during the clinical interview" and "stated that he really did not want to complete the evaluation." Tim acknowledged he had nine other children, was incarcerated for most of Yuri's life, was living with his aunt, and was sleeping on the couch. Dr. Wells testified that Tim acknowledged he had to complete the LWCA and that Yuri could not reside at his aunt's residence. Dr. Wells opined Tim had no custodial plan for Yuri, but Tim maintained he should be given custody, and they could see "where things go." Dr. Wells determined Tim's judgment was concerning and he lacked an understanding and "empathy" for the negative impact another change would have on Yuri if separated from his brother. She explained within a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that reunification could not occur with Tim because he could not rectify his inability to provide Yuri with "permanency and stability." A-1123-25 11 Regarding the bonding evaluation, Dr. Wells opined that Yuri's resource parents are his psychological parents, as they provide for the full spectrum of the children's needs. She also stated that they wished to adopt both children with an understanding of the commitment. Dr. Wells explained that Yuri firmly wished to remain in the care of his resource parents and be adopted because he felt safe, was living with his brother, and held "grave reservations" about being with his father. On cross-examination, Dr. Wells highlighted that over the prior three years, Tim failed to obtain the capacity to be the primary parent for Yuri and failed to attend individual therapy, parenting training, and drug screenings. She confirmed Yuri's experiencing "uncertainty ha[d] resulted in emotional and behavioral difficulties" and harm such as school issues, bed wetting, and nightmares. Dr. Wells believed Tim "love[d Yuri,]" but had no "solid plan" and could not provide Yuri "stability and the continuity of care." Further, Dr. Wells noted that Tim blamed others for his inability to complete the LWCA, but he did not have housing for Yuri, his employment did not provide flexibility, he was currently on parole, and he did not demonstrate an ability to "tak[e] care of a child." Based on Tim's history with Yuri, Dr. Wells did not believe Yuri would be harmed if there was no contact between them going forward. She also found Tim expressed valid sentiments that Caucasian parents adopting an African A-1123-25 12 American child should always be "sensitive to the[ different] cultural" and "ethnic concerns." Dozier testified that she had worked with the Division as a caseworker supervisor for five years. She managed the adoption unit and supervised the guardianship involving Yuri. She confirmed that from the Division's initial involvement with the family, the Division learned Tim was a Megan's Law offender. Dozier recounted that Tim was "a dispositional defendant" as he was in prison and not accused of abusing or neglecting Yuri, who was in Nan's custody. Regarding the completion of the LWCA, Dozier explained that initially the other parent must agree, and that when the Division provided Nan with the paperwork, she refused to sign it. She explained that while the Division had custody of Yuri and Tim's "parole officer was aware that the Division had custody," the Division did not take the position that it could sign the application because parole advised the Division that it "could not do that" and the other "parent had to sign." She confirmed that the Division learned Tim resided with his aunt, had a vehicle, had not seen Yuri for a significant period, and wanted to take custody of Yuri. On cross-examination, Dozier recounted the Division's concerns regarding Tim's criminal history, possible substance abuse, recent domestic A-1123-25 13 violence allegations, lack of relationship with Yuri prior to his incarceration, lack of appropriate housing for Yuri, failure to complete services, and lack of interest in reaching out to Yuri through email or other opportunities. Dozier discussed that on October 16, 2025, the Division discovered Tim had posted a video on Facebook of a man that appeared to be Tim "shaking a pill bottle and dancing" to a song titled "I[t is] Time for the Percolator." She also stated that a meeting with Tim occurred and the steps to complete the LWCA were established, which he did not fulfill. Further, Tim did not follow up with the caseworker. The Division ensured Tim was provided with names of potential evaluators he could use on his own and discussed contributing to the cost. Wuko testified that she was Tim's parole officer. She recalled Tim's "most recent term of supervision started in February . . . 2024," he was "fairly compliant," and he had a couple of minor violations. In processing an LWCA, she explained parole requires the other parent, the Division, or the foster parents to sign the form. After completion of the form, Tim would be referred for "an evaluation with a psychiatrist." Upon completion, the parole officer and a supervisor would review the information to decide whether an exception was appropriate. The process usually would "take a few months." Wuko asserted the Division could have signed the form, and the court had the authority to A-1123-25 14 "override anything [p]arole does." She explained "if [Tim] wanted to . . . , he could go through a private counselor, but he would have [had] to pay for it ." On cross-examination, Wuko explained that if Tim was convicted of his pending charge, it would be a violation of parole, and a determination would be made whether cause existed for his supervision to be revoked. She confirmed Tim was arrested in June 2024 after a domestic violence incident with his girlfriend, later placed on a Global Positioning System bracelet for ninety days, and prohibited from contacting the victim. She also expressed his continued police activity and domestic violence allegations were "very concerning." Wuko recalled Tim first raised applying for an LWCA in 2024. On November 12, 2025, the court issued an order accompanied by a comprehensive thirty-nine-page oral decision granting the Division a judgment of guardianship and terminating Tim's parental rights to Yuri. The court found the Division had satisfied by clear and convincing evidence the four best interests factors under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(1) to (4). The court found prong one was satisfied, noting Tim was incarcerated when the Division was awarded care, custody, and supervision of Yuri. Regarding Yuri's placement, the court noted Yuri was placed in 2022 because there were concerns for his health, safety, and development that were based on A-1123-25 15 his parents' endangerment. The court found prong one of the best interests test was satisfied because Tim could not provide a safe and stable home for Yuri. It noted a delay in a permanent placement would cause additional harm. Specifically, the court credited Horvath's testimony regarding the substantiated concerns surrounding Tim's substance abuse, parenting capacity, and lack of adequate housing. Due to Tim's failure to progress in addressing these and other concerns, Tim's status continued to endanger Yuri's well-being. The court recounted Tim's undisputed failure to complete the bonding evaluation that Dr. Lee had scheduled multiple times and the lack of evidence supporting Tim's ability to parent Yuri in a permanent and stable manner. The court also found it relevant that based on Tim's criminal history and PSL, he could not reside with Yuri without an exception granted by parole after completing an LWCA. Regarding prong two, the court determined Tim was unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm presented to Yuri. The court found it highly relevant that while Tim was incarcerated in 2022, the Division expressed concerns regarding his ability to parent and take custody of Yuri, yet he failed to complete the services offered. While Tim had obtained employment, attended some parenting classes, and completed a drug program, the court noted he had failed to complete necessary services and address the continued concerns with his substance abuse A-1123-25 16 and ability to parent. The court reasoned that Tim's social media post holding a pill bottle, failure to comply with drug screenings, and living situation demonstrated his failure to address the perceived risk and continuing harm to Yuri. The court further noted Tim had failed to engage in individual therapy. Regarding the LWCA, the court found the Division established Tim did not timely complete the application. The court was unpersuaded that the Division had the responsibility to sign the form and highlighted that getting an evaluation would not guarantee a successful application. Regardless of the LWCA, the court found the ongoing concerns with Tim's ability to parent, criminal activity, and possible recidivism established harm. The court found the Division had met its burden of establishing the best interests test warranted termination. The court was unpersuaded by Tim's contention that it should ignore Yuri's desire to be adopted by the resource parents, need for permanency, and wish to stay with his brother. In addressing prong three, the court recited the services the Division offered, including parenting classes, a referral for individual therapy, facilitated parenting time, attempts to have Nan sign the LWCA, and other programs. The court also highlighted the Division's effort to find alternatives to termination. A-1123-25 17 The Division investigated placement with relatives and sent "rule-out letters" to Tim's relative. Additionally, the Division discussed KLG with the resource parents, but they wanted to adopt to provide a more stable home. As to prong four, the court found termination of Tim's parental rights would not do more harm than good because the experts credibly established Yuri had a secure attachment to his resource parents. The experts further proved that Yuri would suffer severe and enduring harm if the bond with his resource parents was terminated. The court again noted Yuri's clear wish for permanency and to be adopted by his resource parents. Tim's lack of progress, absenteeism for the initial seven years of Yuri's life, and current inability to parent established that his parental relationship did not outweigh the harm that Yuri would suffer if the relationship with his resource parents was severed. The court highlighted that "at no point ha[d] [Tim] been there for any of his children" and that parenting time "[was] different" than being a custodial parent. Finally, the court noted Tim's new domestic violence charges that were unresolved further demonstrated his risk of recidivism and instability. This appeal followed. On appeal, Tim argues reversal is warranted because the court erroneously: (1) concluded that his incarceration, criminal conviction, and failure to obtain an LWCA harmed Yuri and that their strong, loving relationship A-1123-25 18 while he was incarcerated and later released contradicted the court's finding; (2) found under the second prong of the best interests test that Tim's failure to obtain an LWCA proved his "unwillingness or inability to eliminate the harm" and that he failed to prove completion of services, his continuing sobriety, and his home's appropriateness; (3) determined the Division's "efforts" under the third prong were sufficient despite the Division's failure to provide the consent necessary to secure an LWCA; and (4) found under the fourth prong that termination will not do more harm than good, because it considered inappropriate factors and failed to provide the requisite consideration of the relationship between father and son formed and nurtured through parenting time over the course of years. II. We review a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights with deference when its factual findings are "grounded in substantial and credible evidence in the record." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 19 (2023). "We invest the family court with broad discretion because of its specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of children." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.P.-Z., 483 N.J. Super. 549, 565 (App. Div. 2026) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012)). "[D]eference A-1123-25 19 is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" C.R. v. M.T., 257 N.J. 126, 139 (2024) (quoting MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007)). "We accord deference to factfindings of the family court because it has the superior ability to gauge the credibility of the witnesses who testify before it and because it possesses special expertise in matters related to the family." F.M., 211 N.J. at 448. A "trial court's factual findings 'should not be disturbed unless they are so wholly unsupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.H., 469 N.J. Super. 107, 116 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 472 (2002)). We owe no deference to a court's legal conclusions, which are reviewed de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. A.B., 231 N.J. 354, 369 (2017). "[P]arents have a constitutionally protected right to maintain a relationship with their children." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007). That right, however, "is not absolute" and is limited "by the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447 (italicization omitted). Thus, a parent's interest must, at times, yield to the A-1123-25 20 State's obligation to protect children from harm. See N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. R.L.M., 236 N.J. 123, 145 (2018). When terminating parental rights, the trial court applies the statutory best interests test, which requires the Division to prove four prongs: (1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship; (2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; (3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the child's placement outside the home and the court has considered alternatives to termination of parental rights; and (4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm than good. [N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] The Division must prove each prong "by clear and convincing evidence." D.H., 469 N.J. Super. at 115. The prongs "are not discrete and separate; they relate to and overlap with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's best interests." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.A., 477 N.J. Super. 63, 83 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting In re Guardianship of A-1123-25 21 K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999)). "The question ultimately is not whether a biological mother or father is a worthy parent, but whether a child's interest will best be served by completely terminating the child's relationship with that parent." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 474 N.J. Super. 11, 26 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 108 (2008)), aff'd, 256 N.J. 4 (2023). "[P]arental fitness is the key to determining the best interests of the child." I.S., 202 N.J. at 170 (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348). In 2021, the Legislature amended Title 30, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-1 to -40, which governs guardianship proceedings and contains the best interests test, and Title 3B, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, which concerns KLG proceedings. L. 2021, c. 154. The Legislature amended only prong two of the best interests test under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a) by deleting the sentence: "[s]uch harm may include evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." Compare L. 2021, c. 154, ยง 9 (current version of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2)), with L. 2015, c. 82, ยง 3 (prior version). The amendment did not preclude a court's consideration of a child's bond to a resource parent under prong four. The Supreme Court elucidated that "[t]he Legislature acted to preclude trial courts A-1123-25 22 from considering harm resulting from the termination of a child's relationship with resource parents when they assess parental fitness under the second prong, but not to generally bar such evidence from any aspect of the trial court 's inquiry." D.C.A., 256 N.J. at 26 (citing L. 2021, c. 154). III. A. Prong One We first address Tim's argument that the court erred in finding that the Division established Yuri had suffered harm and would continue to suffer harm under prong one of the best interests test based on Tim's incarceration, criminal convictions, and failure to obtain an LWCA. Tim posits that the court failed to consider his strong bond and loving relationship with Yuri in terminating his parental rights. A review of the court's opinion demonstrates these contentions are unsupported. It is well established that to satisfy prong one, the Division must demonstrate that the "child's safety, health, or development has been or will continue to be endangered by the parental relationship." N.J.S.A. 30:4C- 15.1(a)(1). "[T]he Division must prove harm that 'threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious effects on the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 25 (2013) (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. A-1123-25 23 at 352). "Although a particularly egregious single harm" can suffice, "the focus is on the effect of harms arising from the parent-child relationship over time on the child's health and development." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. The court is not required to wait to intercede "until a child is actually irreparably impaired by parental inattention or neglect." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.R.A.G., 479 N.J. Super. 504, 536 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting In re Guardianship of DMH, 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999)). Thus, it is sufficient to prove the risk or danger of harm. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 440 (App. Div. 2001) (emphasizing that "[Title 30] speaks not merely of whether the child's safety, health[,] or development has been endangered . . . , but rather, whether the child's safety, health[,] or development will be endangered in the future"). In evaluating harm that threatens a child's health and well-being, the court's "primary focus . . . should be upon harm for which there is 'unambiguous and universal social condemnation.'" In re Guardianship of J.E.D., 217 N.J. Super. 1, 13 (App. Div. 1987) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 519, 604 (1986)). A "trial court should be careful not to decide a case because of a cultural bias or because of the parents['] economic or social circumstances." Id. at 12-13. Parents who are "not present to protect" their A-1123-25 24 children from being raised in "a dangerous and destabilizing environment" create a risk of harm. F.M., 211 N.J. at 449. Further, a "parent's withdrawal of . . . solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in itself a harm that endangers the health and development of the child." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. P.D., 452 N.J. Super. 98, 119 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting DMH, 161 N.J. at 379); see also In re Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992) ("Serious and lasting emotional or psychological harm to children as the result of the action or inaction of their biological parents can constitute injury sufficient to authorize the termination of parental rights."). We begin by reviewing the court's findings of harm, which are far greater than Tim acknowledges. The court found the Division established Tim failed to provide for Yuri's permanency needs, stability, and safety with specific references to the facts established by the Division's witnesses. It determined the credible evidence showed Tim failed to progress in his parental capacity after his release from prison and was unable to capably parent Yuri. The court explained Tim did not "avail himself of the parenting" services the Division offered, which were necessary to address his parenting skills and abilities. Tim also failed to participate in individual therapy, which Dr. Gambone recommended after conducting the psychological evaluation. The court noted A-1123-25 25 Tim demonstrated an unwillingness to eliminate the harm to Yuri by failing to address the LWCA, having not obtained the necessary signatures for the form or an independent evaluation. In addressing Tim's housing with his aunt, the court noted there was no evidence that Tim could provide a "safe and stable home" for Yuri. While recognizing Tim had successfully taken some parenting classes and had consistent parenting time in prison and thereafter, the court determined substantial evidence showed he had not obtained the parental capacity to take custody of Yuri. The court further reasoned that Tim presented a continued risk of harm based on the ongoing concerns regarding his criminal activity, criminal recidivism, substance abuse, pending domestic violence criminal charges, and lack of any parenting plan. While the court noted Tim's prior incarceration, criminal history, and PSL status barred him from residing with Yuri without an LWCA exception, it focused on his demonstrated inability at the time of trial to provide for Yuri and the minimal efforts made to eliminate the harm. The court's determination that Tim failed to complete services and lacked the capacity to safely parent Yuri are amply supported. Tim mistakenly relies on N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527 (2014), to support his argument that the court erred in finding harm based