Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2424-25 PHILLIPSBURG HOUSING AUTHORITY, Plaintiff-Respondent, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION July 23, 2026 v. APPELLATE DIVISION ZALAYAH HUNT, Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________ Argued June 8, 2026 – Decided July 23, 2026 Before Judges Sumners, Susswein and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Warren County, Docket No. LT-000666-25. Zalayah Hunt, appellant, argued the cause on appellant's behalf. David Fiori, III argued the cause for respondent (Florio, Perrucci, Steinhardt, Cappelli & Tipton, LLC, attorneys; David Fiori, III, of counsel and on the brief). The opinion of the court was delivered by SUSSWEIN, J.A.D. This case raises novel questions under the New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act (the Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12, concerning the enforceability of a settlement agreement that purports to place a tenant "on probation." By leave granted on her emergent application, self-represented defendant Zalayah Hunt appeals the March 19, 2026 1 Special Civil Part order enforcing a previously issued judgment for possession to plaintiff Phillipsburg Housing Authority (PHA) and a warrant for her removal from the apartment she shares with her four-year-old daughter. The dispute between PHA and Ms. Hunt has been simmering for several years. It culminated in PHA's September 2025 dispossess action to address its longstanding frustration with what it deemed to be her recurring procrastination and lack of cooperation with its efforts to conduct annual and interim reexaminations of her eligibility for federal housing assistance. In November 2025, the parties executed a settlement that incorporated a "probation agreement" (Probation Agreement). The legal efficacy and enforceability of that agreement is at the heart of this appeal. 1 The order was initially issued on March 18 but the court sua sponte issued a revised order on March 19 to correct the erroneous inclusion of inapposite text. A-2424-25 2 Ms. Hunt has been a tenant with PHA since December 2021, and has been on "zero-income" status2 since at least October 1, 2023. The federal subsidy program requires annual recertification of a tenant's eligibility based on income and other financial documentation. As part of that process, a public housing authority is required under federal law to convene periodic interviews during which a subsidized tenant provides information and supporting documentation. The record shows that over the course of the five-and-a-half- year-old tenancy, there have been a number of disputes between PHA and Ms. Hunt regarding her obligation—under the lease and PHA rules—to meet in person with PHA staff to provide information and documents. The dispossess complaint alleges that in 2025, as in prior years, she failed to keep interview appointments and provide certain documents PHA needed to confirm that she was still eligible for zero-income assistance. That was the straw that broke the camel's back, prompting PHA to file an eviction complaint in September 2025. In November 2025, the parties agreed to a settlement that placed Ms. Hunt "on probation" for a six-month term. The Probation Agreement provides in pertinent part that during the probationary term, she must, as a condition of 2 The zero-income subsidy program is administered by the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and provides financial assistance to eligible low-income tenants. HUD provides federal aid to local housing authorities, like PHA, which use those funds to manage the housing for low-income tenants. A-2424-25 3 probation, "attend all required [PHA] meetings" and "provide a reason" if she needs to reschedule. The agreement further provides that "[i]f tenant fails to comply with the above provisions," PHA "may file a certification of breach with the court, on notice to the Tenant. The court may then enter a [j]udgment for [p]ossession and a [w]arrant of [r]emoval may issue." The agreement additionally states that "[n]o [j]udgment for possession shall enter in this matter, unless and until the tenant fails to comply with the probationary terms of this agreement," suggesting that failure to comply would be a basis upon which the court might order her removal. The agreement makes no mention of Ms. Hunt's alleged prior failures to attend meetings and provide required documents, or whether those failures constitute good cause for eviction under the Act. A threshold question before us is whether and in what circumstances a landlord and tenant can agree that noncompliance with the terms of a probation agreement constitutes sufficient grounds and good cause to evict under the Act. This question raises important policy considerations because a so -called probation agreement can be beneficial to both parties; it serves a housing authority's interests by inducing the tenant to henceforward comply with its rules, while providing a tenant who otherwise might be subject to immediate eviction a last chance to salvage the tenancy. We must address these policy A-2424-25 4 considerations, however, without the benefit of explicit legislative instruction. Other than a reference to criminal law probation not relevant here, 3 the text of the Act makes no mention of "probation" or a "probationary term." Nor do any published cases expressly address the validity and enforceability of a landlord- tenant probation agreement. PHA contends that Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement through what it characterizes as a pattern of noncompliance. The trial court agreed, and on that basis entered a judgment for possession and warrant for removal, as purportedly authorized by the agreement. After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, on these distinctive facts, we reverse and vacate the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. We do so for two independent reasons. First, we emphasize that while a landlord and tenant are free to enter into a settlement that imposes conditions regarding future conduct, as a matter of law and public policy, any such probation agreement cannot authorize an eviction unless that remedy is authorized by the Act. The Act contains two features that are critical to our analysis. First, it provides that a landlord cannot remove a residential tenant "except upon establishment of one of the [statutorily enumerated] grounds as good cause." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1. 3 See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 (n), (p). A-2424-25 5 Second, and to underscore the importance of the good cause prerequisite, the Act expressly precludes a landlord and tenant from agreeing to waive the good cause standard, stating, "Any provision in a lease whereby [a covered tenant] agrees that [their] tenancy may be terminated or not renewed for other than good cause as defined in [the Act] . . . shall be deemed against public policy and unenforceable." N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4. We read these two provisions together as establishing an absolute rule that precludes a court from entering a judgment for possession or issuing a warrant for removal unless there has been a judicial finding of good cause based on one of the enumerated grounds for eviction set forth in the Act. In a contested case, that critical finding can be established in either of two ways: the court may find grounds for eviction after a trial, or the tenant may admit to the ground(s) for eviction and good cause as part of a consent judgment or settlement agreement. See Pine Ridge Realty Assocs., LLC v. A.O., 483 N.J. Super. 487, 493 (App. Div. 2026) (reaffirming that a judgment for possession "may only be entered in three ways:" (1) "by default judgment, [R.] 6:6- 3[(b)];" (2) "by consent, [R.] 6:6-4;" or (3) "by the court after a trial, [R.] 6:6- 5"). Stated another way, while the good cause requirement is unalienable and cannot be waived by agreement, the parties can agree that the good cause threshold has been satisfied. At bottom, the Act guarantees that in a contested A-2424-25 6 landlord-tenant case, at some point before a Sheriff comes knocking to execute a court-issued warrant of removal, a neutral and detached judge must find by competent evidence, or by accepting a voluntary admission by the tenant, that the tenant committed the violation(s) alleged by the landlord and that those violation(s) are eviction-worthy under the Act. In this instance, there has been no such judicial finding or acknowledgement by the tenant of good cause as to authorize an eviction. So far as the record before us shows, 4 the trial court never found that Ms. Hunt's violations were "substantial"—a required element of both statutory grounds for eviction cited in PHA's eviction complaint. Indeed, PHA acknowledged at oral argument that the issue of whether the alleged breaches were substantial for purposes of the Act was not raised before the trial court. As to the alternate means for establishing the lawful basis for eviction— a voluntary admission by the tenant that good cause exists—it is clear that Ms. Hunt never agreed or admitted that her conduct amounted to a substantial violation of the lease or that there was good cause to evict by reason of any such substantial violation. Notably, the parties' settlement agreement did not include an affidavit by PHA "stat[ing] the facts establishing the jurisdictional 4 A hearing was held on March 18, but the hearing transcript is not in the record on appeal because Ms. Hunt's request for the transcript at public expense was denied. See R. 2:5-3(d)(3). A-2424-25 7 good cause for eviction" as required by Rules 6:6-4 and 6:6-3(b). Nor does it include an admission by Ms. Hunt that good cause exists to justify her eviction. We hold as a matter of law that in the absence of either a judicial finding or a tenant's voluntary admission that the alleged conduct constitutes a violation that amounts to good cause to evict, a settlement agreement, regardless of its label, cannot enlarge the list of authorized grounds for eviction, excuse the need for the landlord to establish all of the material elements of at least one such enumerated ground, shift the burden of proof from the landlord to the tenant, delegate to the landlord the unilateral authority to decide whether a breach of the settlement agreement occurred that warrants the remedy of eviction, or otherwise weaken or displace the good cause and substantial violation prerequisites set forth in the Act. The point simply is that when, as in this case, the parties dispute the enforceability of a probation agreement, a tenant's post-agreement noncompliance cannot support an eviction unless the trial court finds, based on the totality of relevant circumstances—i.e., the tenant's conduct before and/or after the agreement— that the landlord has established a statutory ground for eviction and good cause. That did not happen here. A-2424-25 8 Our second reason for vacating the eviction is that even were we to assume for the sake of argument that Ms. Hunt substantially violated her obligations under the lease and/or Probation Agreement with respect to the latest round of reexamination interview appointments and document requests, she was denied an opportunity to cure the noncompliance prior to enforcement of the judgment for possession and warrant of removal. As we explain, this is not one of those situations recognized in the case law where a cure is unavailing because it comes too late and the harm is done. While the circumstances in this case are not directly addressed in any published precedent cited to us, applying the spirit if not the letter of the limitations on what a landlord and tenant can agree to, set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.4, we do not accept the notion that Ms. Hunt impliedly waived the opportunity afforded under the Act to cure a violation just because she entered into the Probation Agreement and a violation occurred thereafter. Here, the record indicates that she was prepared to meet with PHA staff and provide the documents it requested as of February 18, 2026—a month before the March 18, 2026 order to show cause hearing. But PHA declined to meet with her and refused to accept her outstanding documents. Although we do not agree with Ms. Hunt's contention that PHA acted in bad faith, we conclude that in these distinctive circumstances, she should have been permitted to cure the violation. A-2424-25 9 I. Facts and Procedural History We discern the following pertinent facts and procedural history from the record. The Lease and Applicable Policies Ms. Hunt has been a "zero-income" tenant with PHA since at least October 1, 2023, paying the minimum PHA rent of $50 per month. Her zero - income housing is subsidized by HUD, and PHA administers the public housing through its contractual relationship with HUD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(b)(1). Ms. Hunt's lease requires her to recertify her zero-income status each year. Specifically, the lease provides that once a year, the tenant will "submit a signed application for continued occupancy [and] furnish accurate information to [PHA] as to family income, employment and composition, for use by [PHA] in determining whether . . . [the] tenant is still eligible for low rent housing." The lease also requires Ms. Hunt to report "[a]ny increase or decrease in family income" to PHA "immediately (within 10 days)." The lease provides: If . . . the tenant has misrepresented to [PHA] the facts upon which his rent is based or it is found that the tenant has failed to report to [PHA] any specified change in family circumstances which would warrant A-2424-25 10 a rental increase in accordance with [f]ederal rules and regulations so that the rent he is paying is less than he should have been charged . . . [PHA] may institute dispossess proceeding[s] because of said misrepresentation. In the same section, the lease also incorporates by reference applicable federal rules and regulations, 5 as well as PHA's "Admission and Continued Occupancy Policy" (ACOP). The ACOP, in turn, contains requirements governing both annual and interim reexaminations for tenants paying income - based rent. Section 9-I.B of the ACOP ("Scheduling Annual Reexaminations") provides, in relevant part: Families generally are required to participate in an annual reexamination interview. .... If the family is unable to attend a scheduled interview, the family should contact the PHA in advance of the interview to schedule a new appointment. In all circumstances, if a family does not attend the scheduled interview the PHA will send a second notification with a new interview appointment time. 5 24 C.F.R. § 960.259(a)(2) states, "[t]he family must supply any information requested by the PHA or HUD for use in a regularly scheduled reexamination or an interim reexamination of family income and composition in accordance with HUD requirements." 24 C.F.R. § 960.257 requires PHA to conduct an annual income reexamination, as well as an interim reexamination if PHA "becomes aware that the family's adjusted income . . . has changed by an amount that [PHA] estimates will result in an increase of ten percent or more in annual adjusted income." A-2424-25 11 If a family fails to attend two scheduled interviews without PHA approval, the family will be in violation of their lease and may be terminated in accordance with the policies in Chapter 13. A different section of the ACOP—Section 9-III.C ("Changes Affecting Income or Expenses")—provides for interim reexaminations. Specifically, if a family has reported zero income, "the PHA will conduct an interim reexamination every three months as long as the family continues to report that they have no income." ACOP also provides: Generally, the family will not be required to attend an interview for an interim reexamination. However, if the PHA determines that an interview is warranted, the family may be required to attend. Pursuant to this provision, Ms. Hunt was required to attend a "zero-income review appointment" every ninety days and to submit documentation supporting her continued zero-income status. Additionally, Section 13-III.C ("Other Authorized Reasons for Termination") provides that the PHA will terminate the lease for the following reasons. .... Failure to furnish such information and certifications regarding family composition and income as may be necessary for the PHA to make determinations with respect to rent, eligibility, and the appropriateness of the dwelling unit size. A-2424-25 12 Alleged Lease Violations PHA asserts that throughout the course of her tenancy, Ms. Hunt has repeatedly failed to report changes in income, provide required income documentation, and attend scheduled reexamination meetings. PHA issued various notices to cease and quit to her in 2022, 2024, and 2025 before filing an eviction complaint in September 2025. Sometime around November 2022, Ms. Hunt allegedly "failed to report [her] employment at Ulta Salon Cosmetics Fragrance/Ulta Beauty," as required under the lease. PHA issued a November 29, 2022 notice to cease and a December 21, 2022 notice to quit. The record does not indicate how or whether this issue was resolved. It is not disputed, however, that PHA renewed the tenancy. The record does not indicate there were any problems in 2023. Problems relating to missed or rescheduled appointments resurfaced in 2024. According to PHA's certifications submitted to the trial court, Ms. Hunt was scheduled for an appointment on February 14, 2024, and after several rescheduled and missed meetings, she eventually attended on March 25, 2024. She was scheduled for another appointment on April 29, 2024, which was rescheduled several times, missed once, and eventually occurred on May 9, 2024. On July 15, 2024, PHA issued a notice to cease, alleging that Ms. Hunt "failed to A-2424-25 13 appear on three different occasions for [her] [ninety]-day [z]ero [i]ncome review appointment and provide copies of the required documents as requested by July 10, 2024, with extensions given to July 11, 2024, and July 15, 2024." PHA's certifications state that "this pattern of behavior has been continuous throughout [Ms. Hunt]'s tenancy," but do not provide further specific examples. However, once again, the record indicates that she remained a tenant with PHA, and it is not disputed that PHA continued to receive subsidy payments from HUD. That brings us to 2025. In February and March 2025, Ms. Hunt allegedly failed to provide several requested documents: (1) verification that she "did not work at Ralph Lauren," which was allegedly requested by February 10, 2025 and extended several times until April 1, 2025; (2) a notarized statement describing a period in which she was not living in her unit and the reason for her absence; and (3) two recent financial statements. PHA issued a February 26, 2025 notice to cease, a March 11, 2025 notice to quit, a March 18, 2025 notice to cease, an April 17, 2025 notice to quit, and a May 6, 2025 notice to quit. Grievance Hearings, Eviction Action, and Settlement/Probation Agreement Ms. Hunt challenged the May 6, 2025 notice to quit, and in accordance with PHA policy, an informal grievance hearing was held on June 19, 2025. A-2424-25 14 PHA's summary of that hearing stated: "[Ms. Hunt] stated no excuse for why she did not provide [the requested documents] as required per PHA policy. A lot of times it was because she was procrastinating, and it caused more problems than she thought it would." PHA decided to uphold the notice to quit. Ms. Hunt then requested a formal grievance hearing, which was held on July 16, 2025. PHA's summary of that hearing stated that she "continued to provide no valid excuse" for not providing the requested documentation. The summary also noted that Ms. Hunt "has claimed that she has not been able to check her mail for notices because she has been in Newark helping her ill aunt." Finally, the summary stated that as of the date of the hearing, she "has failed to provide information required to fulfill her zero income certification requirement (every 90 days)." PHA again decided to uphold the notice to quit, and provided the following additional statement of reasons: While the current [n]otice to [q]uit dated May 6, 2025, reflects a limited scope, there is a four-and-a-half-year history of failure to provide and/or report required information in a timely manner. The amount of time it takes the PHA to process changes for the account is drastically longer than the average due to the number of requests and [l]ease actions trying to gather the information needed for the change. On September 3, 2025, PHA filed an eviction complaint against Ms. Hunt, citing two grounds for eviction specified in the Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18 - A-2424-25 15 61.1(d) (continued, substantial violation of landlord's rules and regulations) and N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61-1(e) (continued, substantial violation of covenants or agreements in the lease). A hearing was scheduled for November 14, 2025. That day, PHA and Ms. Hunt, represented by counsel, entered into a settlement agreement and the Probation Agreement attached to it which is at the crux of this appeal. The settlement agreement provided: No [j]udgment for [p]ossession is entered. The parties understand that if the tenant breaches this agreement, the landlord may file a certification of breach with the court, on notice to the [t]enant. The court may then enter a [j]udgment for [p]ossession and a [w]arrant of [r]emoval may issue. The settlement agreement further provided that it would remain in force until tenant "satisfied the terms set forth" in the attached Probation Agreement. The Probation Agreement provided, in relevant part: Tenant shall be placed on probation with the PHA for a period of six months from 11/14/2025 to 5/14/2026. During this probationary period, [t]enant agrees to comply with and attend all required meetings. In the event tenant needs to reschedule any meetings with the PHA required under tenant's lease, tenant must 1) communicate the fact that she must reschedule the appointment; 2) provide a reason for rescheduling, and 3) when possible, provide documentation supporting the reason given for the need to reschedule, which tenant shall make a good faith effort to attain. A-2424-25 16 If tenant fails to comply with the above provisions, the PHA may take steps to allege there was a breach of this agreement. Before filing any court paperwork, the PHA shall provide tenant with seven days['] notice of the alleged breach, in writing. Upon the conclusion of the probationary period, this agreement shall no longer be enforceable, and the complaint shall be automatically dismissed on 5/31/2026. No [j]udgment for possession shall enter in this matter, unless and until the tenant fails to comply with the probationary terms of this agreement. While the settlement agreement—which used the model agreement found in an appendix to the Court Rules 6—stated that a "Certification by Landlord and the Certification of Landlord's Attorney (if the Landlord has an attorney) are attached hereto," the record indicates that no such certifications were attached to the agreement. Alleged Breaches of Probation Agreement PHA claims that Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement five times, by either failing to attend a required meeting or failing to provide a reason for rescheduling a meeting. Ms. Hunt contends that each alleged breach was either "manufactured" by PHA, de minimis, or not actually a breach based on her substantive, good faith compliance with the Probation Agreement. 6 See Settlement Agreement (Tenant Remains), Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix XI-V (2026). A-2424-25 17 Ms. Hunt's first alleged breach was her failure to contact PHA by January 16, 2026, in order to schedule a meeting to provide her "Zero Income Checklist & Worksheet." The parties agree that she did not schedule this meeting by January 16, but dispute whether she had received a January 12 letter instructing her to schedule it. PHA contends that this letter was hand delivered to her apartment on January 12, and it submitted to the trial court: (1) a copy of the letter, (2) an affidavit from PHA employee Kashmir Beaton in which Beaton states that he delivered "Housing Authority mail" to Ms. Hunt on January 12 and (3) a copy of a completed PHA work order indicating that Beaton "[d]elivered all mail" that day. In her appeal brief, Ms. Hunt maintains that she was home all day on January 12, and the letter was never delivered. On January 29, PHA sent Ms. Hunt a letter stating that she had failed to contact PHA by January 16, and also failed to return a signed and dated lease amendment that was due on January 19. The January 29 letter stated that if she failed to arrange and attend a meeting within seven days, PHA would file a certification of breach with the court. Ms. Hunt promptly contacted PHA and scheduled an appointment for January 30, at 3:00 p.m. In the second alleged breach, Ms. Hunt contacted PHA at 1:13 p.m. on January 30 and asked to reschedule her 3:00 p.m. appointment to 4:00 p.m. Both parties agree that she ultimately appeared for this meeting at 4:30 p.m. A-2424-25 18 Before the January 30 meeting, Ms. Hunt emailed PHA and stated that she would be in Newark beginning on February 2 and most likely would not be back in Phillipsburg until February 16. At the January 30 meeting, however, she signed a form indicating that she would call PHA on February 2 to schedule an appointment for that same day. Then, immediately after the meeting, Ms. Hunt stated she was "not able to confirm [February 2] as an appointment." According to PHA, Ms. Hunt breached the Probation Agreement because she "failed to provide a reason for rescheduling" her presumptive February 2 appointment. PHA then advised Ms. Hunt that she was required to schedule an appointment for February 3, 4, or 5, and she replied that she could meet on February 16, as indicated in her January 30 email. PHA contends that this response was a "failure to comply with required meetings" in breach of the Probation Agreement. In response to her request for a February 16 meeting, PHA told Ms. Hunt that it could not meet that day (Presidents' Day) and informed her that her meeting would be February 17, at 8:30 a.m., ostensibly without confirming that this day and time was acceptable to her. Ms. Hunt failed to appear at this time, although she emailed and called PHA several times that day to try to A-2424-25 19 schedule a time to meet and complete her zero-income form. PHA contends her failure to appear at 8:30 a.m. was a breach of the Probation Agreement. Certification of Breach, Order to Show Cause, and this Appeal On February 18, 2026, PHA notified Ms. Hunt that it intended to certify her breach with the court and seek a judgment for possession. On February 27, PHA sent a letter and certification of breach to the court, requesting entry of a judgment for possession and warrant of removal. The court granted a judgment for possession on February 27, and a warrant of removal on March 3. On March 6, before the warrant of removal was executed, Ms. Hunt filed an application for an order to show cause. PHA filed opposition on March 9, and Ms. Hunt replied on March 10. On March 11, the court granted Ms. Hunt's application for an order to show cause and scheduled a return hearing for March 18. A hearing was held on March 18, but the hearing transcript is not in the record on appeal because Ms. Hunt's request for the transcript at public expense was denied. See R. 2:5-3(d)(3).7 7 The Court Rules restrict the provision of transcripts at public expense to criminal or quasi-criminal appeals, Division of Child Protection and Permanency termination of parental rights cases, Title 9 abuse and neglect cases, certain adoptions, and involuntary civil commitments. R. 2:5-3(d)(3). Indigent appellants facing potential eviction do not qualify. A-2424-25 20 At the conclusion of the March 18 hearing, the court entered an order denying Ms. Hunt's application for an order to show cause and ordering enforcement of the judgment for possession and warrant of removal on March 30 at 9:00 a.m., "unless [Ms. Hunt] is able to post the entire amount of rent arrears due," in which case "[she] may stay the eviction." On March 19, the court entered an amended order that omitted the inapposite provision allowing her to stay the eviction by paying her rent arrears. 8 On March 20, we granted permission for Ms. Hunt to file an emergent motion for leave to appeal, seeking an interim stay of the warrant of removal. She filed her motion on March 24 and PHA filed opposition on March 26. On March 30, we granted Ms. Hunt's motion for leave to appeal, specifically directing the parties to address the following question: "Is the breach of a 'probationary' settlement agreement a lawful basis for eviction under the Anti - Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1, where the tenant purports to have cured the lease violations originally giving rise to the eviction action under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d)?" 8 The record indicates that there are no rent arrearages in this case. A-2424-25 21 II. Parties' Arguments Because the parties raise numerous arguments and counterarguments in their appellate submissions, we reproduce verbatim the point headings from their respective briefs. Ms. Hunt raises the following contentions for our consideration in her initial appeal brief: POINT I THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO ENTER JUDGMENT BECAUSE [PHA] WAIVED THE ALLEGED BREACH BY RETAINING MARCH RENT FOR EIGHTEEN DAYS. POINT II THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS BY ISSUING AN AMENDED ORDER SUA SPONTE WITHOUT NOTICE OR HEARING. POINT III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADOPTING [PHA]'S SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND OVERLOOKING DOCUMENTED ACTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SABOTAGE. POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO SCRUTINIZE [PHA]'S A-2424-25 22 ADMITTED OBSTRUCTION OF APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO CURE. POINT V THE TRIAL COURT'S RELIANCE ON "PUBLIC POLICY" TO UPHOLD A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT REACHED THROUGH BAD-FAITH CONDUCT IS MISPLACED. POINT VI THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR REGARDING STATUTORY PROTECTIONS. POINT VII THE JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION CONSTITUTES A MANIFEST MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE, CAUSING IRREPARABLE HARM TO A VULNERABLE MINOR. PHA responds: POINT I THE QUESTION POSED BY THE HONORABLE RONALD SUSSWEIN, J.A.D. A. Appellant's Attempts to Comply After-The- Fact Were Not a Cure of the Underlying Lease Violations. B. Appellant Was Required to Cure a Pattern of Non-Compliance and Failed. C. Repeated Non-Compliance with Substantial Terms of a Landlord's Rules and Regulations Is a Lawful Basis for Eviction Under the Anti- Eviction Act. A-2424-25 23 POINT II APPELLANT'S EVICTION IS PROPER UNDER THE ENFORCEABLE PROBATION AGREEMENT AND THE ANTI-EVICTION ACT. A. The Probationary Agreement Is a Binding Agreement. B. Appellant Agreed to the Entry of a Judgment for Possession if She Breached the Agreement. C. Enforcement of the Settlement Agreement is Supported by the Anti-Eviction Act. D. The Trial Court Rejected Appellant's Purported Cure. E. The Trial Court was Not Required to Validate Appellant's Purported Cure. POINT III THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LACK JURISDICTION UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER. POINT IV THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT VIOLATE ANY OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS BY AMENDING ITS MARCH 18 ORDER. POINT V THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED BOTH PARTIES' ACTIONS. A-2424-25 24 POINT VI WHAT THE TRIAL COURT RELIED UPON IS NOT PRESENTLY UNDER REVIEW. POINT VII APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS REGARDING "STATUTORY PROTECTIONS" ARE NOT UNDER REVIEW. POINT VIII THE INSTANT EVICTION IS NOT FOR "BUREAUCRATIC CONVENIENCE" IT IS TO ENFORCE COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL MANDATES. Ms. Hunt asserts the following additional contentions in her reply brief: POINT I [PHA]'S RELIANCE ON MAYO9 IS A FRAUD UPON THE RECORD AS THE PHA INTENTIONALLY OBSTRUCTED APPELLANT'S ATTEMPTS TO CURE PRIOR TO THE CERTIFICATION OF BREACH. POINT II THE DOCTRINE OF WAIVER APPLIES REGARDLESS OF THE LANDLORD'S INTENT; THE EIGHTEEN-DAY RETENTION OF MARCH RENT STRIPPED THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION. 9 Housing and Redevelopment Authority of the Township of Franklin v. Mayo, 390 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2007). A-2424-25 25 POINT III THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO CURE UNDER N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(d) IS ABSOLUTE AND CANNOT BE CONTRACTED AWAY BY A PROBATIONARY AGREEMENT. III. General Principles We begin our analysis by acknowledging certain basic legal principles that govern this appeal. As a general proposition, we apply a deferential standard in reviewing a trial court's factual findings in a bench trial. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019). In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts "give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015). Accordingly, reviewing courts "do not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [the reviewing courts] are convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011) (quoting In re Tr. Created By Agreement Dated Dec. 20, 1961, ex rel. Johnson, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the deference we accord to a trial court's findings in a bench trial presupposes the A-2424-25 26 court made factual findings t