Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0593-25 T.W., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Q.T., Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ Submitted September 29, 2026 – Decided October 21, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FD-04-0740-19. Guzzo Law Firm, attorneys for appellant (Eric R. Foley, on the briefs). T.W., self-represented respondent. PER CURIAM In this post-judgment non-dissolution matter, defendant Q.T. appeals from a September 8, 2025 Family Part order allowing plaintiff T.W. overnight parenting time with the parties' minor child. For the reasons that follow, we affirm. I. We recount the facts relevant to our disposition of this appeal . Plaintiff and defendant are the biological parents of A.T., 1 born on February 22, 2018. The parties share joint legal custody; defendant is the parent of primary residence (PPR) and plaintiff is the parent of alternate residence (PAR). The parties have had substantial discord, continuing to litigate parenting time issues throughout A.T.'s childhood. On December 10, 2018, the court ordered plaintiff to provide his "last drug and physical test records" within seven days and "release the last two years of medical records that would typically identify any mental health issues" to defense counsel. The parties were to schedule segmented hair follicle tests, among other provisions. After plaintiff tested positive for THC, on June 4, 2019, the court ordered plaintiff to produce the medical records set forth in the December 10, 2018 order before moving for any parenting time modifications. 1 Because of the privacy issues involved with this parenting time dispute over a minor child, we use initials. See R. 1:38-3(d). A-0593-25 2 On May 3, 2022, the parties were ordered to use the OurFamilyWizard application for all communications, continue Monday through Friday parenting time, and refrain from using corporal punishment. On July 28, 2022, the court entered an order directing the parties to cooperate with any Department of Human Services (DHS) or Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) investigations and denying defendant's application to modify plaintiff's parenting time based on alleged danger to A.T. On February 25, 2023, plaintiff and defendant had an altercation at A.T.'s birthday party, which resulted in defendant obtaining a temporary restraining order (TRO) against plaintiff. A few months later, plaintiff filed a motion to modify his parenting time asserting that, before the February 25, 2023 incident, he had not seen A.T. since July 2022. After the TRO was dismissed, the parties appeared before the court on January 4, 2024 for proceedings on plaintiff's parenting time modification motion. Defendant objected to plaintiff's request, asserting there was a previous court order that prohibited plaintiff from moving for any parenting time modification until he produced the specified medical and mental health records. The court did not dismiss plaintiff's application but, instead, permitted defendant to conduct discovery on her allegations that plaintiff had been diagnosed with A-0593-25 3 bipolar disorder. The court also found there were changed circumstances warranting reconsideration of the prior parenting time order because plaintiff had not seen A.T. in almost a year, plaintiff moved farther away from A.T., and the Monday to Friday parenting time schedule was not working. On January 23, 2024, the court directed the parties to attend mediation and temporarily ordered plaintiff's parenting time to occur every other Saturday beginning January 6, 2024, from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., and beginning in February, every other weekend from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. on both Saturdays and Sundays. The court also ordered the parenting time exchanges of A.T. to take place at the Camden County Police Administration Building, required plaintiff to ensure A.T. attended her Sunday dance classes, and required fifteen minute video calls between A.T. and plaintiff every Tuesday and Thursday at 7:00 p.m. and on Sundays when plaintiff did not have parenting time. Defendant was ordered not to interfere with these calls and the parties were directed to use OurFamilyWizard for their communication regarding A.T. only. After mediation was unsuccessful, the parties returned to court. On March 14, 2024, the court ordered plaintiff to disclose the name of his therapist to defendant and continued the temporary parenting time arrangement. On July 11, 2024, the court scheduled a plenary hearing to begin the following week. A-0593-25 4 At the outset of the plenary hearing, defendant's counsel sought to adjourn the hearing because they had not received plaintiff's mental health records. Defense counsel alleged plaintiff told defendant he had bipolar disorder, but that he did not provide the name of the medical provider who rendered the diagnosis. The court found that because discovery had been ongoing since March, defendant's counsel had ample opportunity to subpoena witnesses to testify on this issue—but had not. Thus, the court proceeded with the plenary hearing. Plaintiff testified he had anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) resulting from his job as a firefighter, but had never been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Plaintiff asserted he was subject to work-related random drug tests, he had never been disciplined based on any test results and he had no mental, physical, or psychological conditions that would prevent him from being able to parent A.T. (plaintiff's fiancé), also testified that she had no knowledge of plaintiff ever having been diagnosed with bipolar disorder. Plaintiff explained he now lives in Hatboro, Pennsylvania, which is about an hour away from Camden, and has two other children with whom A.T. has a loving relationship. Plaintiff explained that his time with A.T. was "wonderful," but not enough—there are times when defendant did not allow him scheduled parenting time and at other times his work schedule interfered with his parenting A-0593-25 5 time. Plaintiff also testified that he would be able to handle any medical needs A.T. has. Plaintiff's fiancé corroborated plaintiff's testimony, stating she has never seen plaintiff place any of his children in danger. Defendant testified there were many times plaintiff did not show up for parenting time, there were days when he claimed to be at the pick-up location when he was not and from February 25, 2023 until August 2023 plaintiff made no attempt to have any parenting time at all. Defendant also testified that A.T. does not want to speak with plaintiff's fiancé, is not comfortable with plaintiff and is bullied by his other children. Defendant asserted she does not feel comfortable with plaintiff applying cream to A.T.'s genital area for her skin condition, which would be required if he were to have overnight parenting time. Defendant also contended that when A.T. was with plaintiff she did not follow her required diet and became sick. Defendant also relayed concerns about plaintiff being under the influence of drugs and alcohol, claiming there were times in the past when he came to her house smelling of these substances. Defendant referenced an incident where plaintiff's oldest child ingested a marijuana brownie and had to be taken to the hospital, resulting in a DHS investigation. A-0593-25 6 Defendant reiterated that one reason she is opposed to plaintiff having overnight parenting time is her concerns about plaintiff's mental health. After the first two days of the plenary hearing, the court ordered production of the notes from plaintiff's therapist, Brittney Momah. Momah indicated that she had no notes but provided a letter stating she treats plaintiff for PTSD and anxiety. Defendant testified there was an August 30, 2024 incident at plaintiff's house involving A.T. that resulted in a call to DCPP in New Jersey and DHS in Pennsylvania. A.T. told her that plaintiff yelled at her, pulled on her arm, and smacked her arm twice. Later that night, defendant took A.T. to the hospital for pain, where she was administered Tylenol. Defendant testified that A.T. sees plaintiff as a threat to her and she does not feel safe around him. Plaintiff testified to a different version of the August 30, 2024 incident. He stated that A.T. and the family were having a good day, but she missed her mother, leading plaintiff to call defendant. After the phone call, they had a peaceful visit and he was unaware of the claims of abuse until 10:30 p.m. that evening. Plaintiff testified that after the DCPP and DHS interviews and investigations, he was not charged with child abuse. His fiancé also testified she had never seen plaintiff engage in corporal punishment and that she was A-0593-25 7 confused about where those allegations stemmed from. The court and both counsel reviewed the DCPP records from the August 2024 incident. After the conclusion of the proofs and written closing arguments, the court entered a September 8, 2025 order directing the parties to continue joint legal custody, maintained defendant as the PPR and plaintiff as the PAR and granted plaintiff overnight parenting time, predicated on its oral analysis of the statutory best-interest factors in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. The court reasoned that because there is evidence the parties cannot put their differences aside and cannot communicate or cooperate in matters relating to A.T., consideration of the parents' ability to cooperate did not weigh in favor of either party. Because the parties disagreed as to who was at fault for non- appearances at parenting time, the record supports the court's finding. In weighing the parent's willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse, the court found this factor does not favor either party. The court reviewed evidence of multiple parenting time exchange incidents, including missing pickups, weather- related cancellations, and occasions when defendant would not make A.T. available or objected to plaintiff's fiancée participating in the exchange. The court also addressed defendant's allegations of the August 30, 2024 abuse A-0593-25 8 inflicted by plaintiff on A.T., finding plaintiff's testimony that he did not hit A.T. credible. The court found DHS and DCPP also concluded plaintiff did not abuse A.T. The court also found the interaction or relationship of the child with her parents or siblings did not favor either party—defendant testified that A.T. is afraid of plaintiff and scared to visit him, while plaintiff and his fiancée testified credibly that A.T. enjoys spending time with plaintiff and his family. The court then again addressed the allegations of abuse, noting that although A.T. told DCPP she did not want to go on any more visits and claimed plaintiff hit her, the evidence did not demonstrate plaintiff physically abused A.T. When considering the domestic violence factor, the court made no finding because there was no restraining order between the parties. The court addressed the February 25, 2023 TRO, finding it did not affect parenting time between plaintiff and A.T. The court also noted that at the conclusion of the final restraining order hearing, the allegation was found to be unsubstantiated. As to the safety of the child and safety of either parent from physical abuse, the court found A.T. was not in physical danger of abuse by plaintiff. The court came to this conclusion because there was no finding made by the A-0593-25 9 DCPP or DHS against plaintiff. Because of this conclusion, the court found "to the extent [this factor] has to favor anyone," it favored plaintiff. The court found the child's preference when of sufficient age and capacity as to form an intelligent decision factor inapplicable. The court reasoned A.T. was six years old when she told DCPP during a limited interview she did not want to visit plaintiff anymore and that he may have grabbed her arm or touched her on another occasion, which is insufficient evidence to favor either party. The court found plaintiff capable of meeting A.T.'s dietary, allergy and medical needs because plaintiff is a first responder, trained in CPR and testified credibly. The court rejected defendant's position that plaintiff could not care for A.T. overnight because he would need to apply cream to A.T.'s genital area. The court also found the stability of the home environment offered favored both parties equally. The court found there were no issues with A.T. living with plaintiff, his fiancé and his other children. The court determined the quality and continuity of the child's education was not an issue in this case. The court weighed defendant's allegations as to plaintiff's lack of parental fitness. The court noted that it gave defendant "ample opportunity to take discovery" to prove the allegations plaintiff has a drug problem and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. The court found that although plaintiff tested A-0593-25 10 positive for marijuana in 2019, there was no evidence in the record establishing he still uses it now, and in any event, marijuana is legal in New Jersey. Thus, the court found plaintiff's 2019 positive THC test did not impact its analysis. The court ultimately found there was no evidence supporting defendant’s position plaintiff had untreated bipolar disorder, and credited plaintiff's testimony on that issue. The court noted there is no evidence in the record beyond defendant's claim plaintiff told her in 2019 he had bipolar disorder, despite giving defendant the opportunity to conduct discovery regarding her allegation. The only documents in the record established plaintiff sees a therapist who treats him for PTSD and anxiety—there were no records establishing he was diagnosed as bipolar or stating plaintiff was not capable of caring for A.T. In considering the geographical proximity of the parents' homes, the court found plaintiff lives forty-nine minutes away from defendant, which has resulted in logistical difficulties with the previous parenting time arrangement. The court considered the extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation, noting the parties had been litigating parenting time issues since June 2019, when A.T. was about one year old. Plaintiff claims that he wants to spend time with A.T. but defendant interferes. While the court A-0593-25 11 found some evidence supporting this assertion, the court pointed out there is also proof that plaintiff does not participate in video calls with A.T. when he is supposed to. Despite these inconsistencies, the court found whether plaintiff should have overnight parenting time is a separate issue. The court acknowledged both parties are employed—plaintiff is a firefighter for the City of Philadelphia and defendant works for the DCPP. As a firefighter, plaintiff's work schedule varies, and because of that issue he proposed a specific parenting time schedule. Finally, with regard to the age and number of the children, the court noted A.T. was seven at the time of the decision, plaintiff has other children, and his fiancée has another child. The court stated that it believed A.T. would have the ability to spend time with her siblings and strengthen those relationships through parenting time at plaintiff's home. Based on its analysis of the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors, the court concluded it was in A.T.'s best interest for plaintiff to have overnight visits in accordance with the schedule plaintiff proposed. The court reasoned plaintiff has parented A.T. every other weekend, mostly without incident, and the court did not find plaintiff has placed A.T. in danger. A-0593-25 12 The September 8, 2025 order required the parenting time exchange to take place at the Camden County Police Administration Building and permitted plaintiff's fiancé to conduct pick-up and drop-off. The court also ordered defendant to provide plaintiff all information and instructions regarding A.T.'s medical issues and recommended methods of care in writing. The court ordered plaintiff to provide proposed parenting time for the following year by a date certain. Plaintiff was ordered to continue the video calls with A.T. under the January 4, 2024 order. The court denied plaintiff's request for holiday and summer vacation parenting time without prejudice, with leave to refile in a year, and denied all other requested relief, including the demand for attorney's fees. This appeal followed. Defendant argues the court erred in finding a change in circumstances because plaintiff never produced the court-ordered medical and mental health records. She further contends the court improperly shifted the burden of obtaining those records to her. Plaintiff argues the court properly considered the issue regarding the records, allowed discovery, and properly found no evidentiary support for defendant's claims he had bipolar disorder. Plaintiff requests affirmance of the court's post-hearing order as predicated on the credible testimony in the record. We examine the parties' contentions in turn. A-0593-25 13 II. Our review of a family court order is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998). This is "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters." Id.; N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012). The trial court's findings "are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411- 12 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). We give "great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges." Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197 (App. Div. 2012). Deference is accorded to a trial judge's credibility determinations because the judge "hears the case, sees and observes the witnesses [and] hears them testify," affording them "a better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of witnesses." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (alterations in original) (first quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988); and then quoting Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). If we conclude there is satisfactory evidentiary support for the judge's findings, our "task is complete and [we] should not disturb the result." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 497 (1981). We will only "disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge [if] we are convinced that they are so A-0593-25 14 manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 484 (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div. 1963)). "In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317 (1997)); see also Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017) (citing Beck, 86 N.J. at 496 n.8) ("A custody arrangement adopted by the trial court, whether based on the parties' agreement or imposed by the court, is subject to modification based on a showing of changed circumstances, with the court determining custody in accordance with the best interests standard of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4."). "The court must focus on the 'safety, happiness, physical, mental and moral welfare' of the children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (quoting Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956)). A trial court's decisions on matters of discovery are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Conn v. Rebustillo, 445 N.J. Super. 349, 352-53 (App. Div. 2016). "An abuse of discretion arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an A-0593-25 15 impermissible basis." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)) (internal quotations omitted). III. As a threshold issue, we discern no error in the court's finding that there was a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification of plaintiff's parenting time. A party seeking to modify a parenting time schedule "bear[s] the threshold burden of showing changed circumstances which would affect the welfare of the children." Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan, 51 N.J. Super. 276, 287 (App. Div. 1958)). Changed circumstances are evaluated based on those existing at the time the prior parenting order was entered. See Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127-28 (App. Div. 2009). The record supports the court's determination there was a change in circumstances affecting plaintiff's relationship with A.T. because the existing schedule had become unworkable due to disagreements between the parties, plaintiff moving an hour away to Hatboro, his work schedule, and because plaintiff had gone a substantial period without seeing the child. A-0593-25 16 Defendant's argument the court erred in finding a change in circumstances simply because plaintiff did not first submit the records he was ordered to produce in 2018 and 2019 is not supported by our jurisprudence. The court aptly treated defendant's medical-record objections as discovery issues, rather than an issue that should automatically prevent plaintiff from being able to expand his time with A.T. We discern no abuse of discretion in the court's orders allowing defendant to obtain proofs to support her allegations plaintiff was diagnosed with bipolar disorder through discovery, for consideration along with the evidence on the remainder of the factors under the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 best-interest analysis. To the extent the court found the requirement for plaintiff to produce certain medical and mental health records before seeking modification of the parenting time orders was no longer necessary, it was permitted to revisit the prior interlocutory orders in the interest of justice. See, e.g., Sadeeshkumar v. Venugopal, 478 N.J. Super. 25, 33 (App. Div. 2024). IV. We decline to disturb the court's post-hearing parenting time order based on its thorough analysis of the statutory best-interest factors as grounded in the credible evidence in the record. A-0593-25 17 In determining custody and parenting time issues, a court must consider the statutory best-interest factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. V.C. v. M.J.B., 163 N.J. 200, 227-28 (2000). N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) consists of fourteen factors: In making an award of custody, the court shall consider, but not be limited to, the following factors: the parents’ ability to agree, communicate, and cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents’ willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of the child with the child’s parents and siblings; the history of domestic violence and child abuse, if any; the safety of the child and the child’s siblings, if any, and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; the input and supporting documentation of a State-licensed mental health professional, if any, providing private therapy or other services to the child to the extent allowed under the professional’s State licensure; the needs of the child; the stability of the home environment offered; the quality and continuity of the child’s education; the fitness of the parents, taking into account assessments administered by court-appointed professionals; the geographical proximity of the parents’ homes; the extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; the parents’ employment responsibilities; and the age and number of the children. A parent shall not be deemed unfit unless that parent’s conduct has a substantial adverse effect on the child. [N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).] A-0593-25 18 The court must weigh these factors after a plenary hearing and reach a decision on custody or parenting time that is in the best interest of the child. D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 450 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Faucett v. Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 119 (App. Div. 2009)). Because the court applied the correct statutory framework, and its findings were supported by the record, we decline to disturb the September 8, 2025 order. The court held a full three-day plenary hearing before conducting its fourteen- factor analysis and deciding to modify plaintiff's parenting time. The court found there was no substantiated abuse finding and the record lacked competent evidence establishing plaintiff had ever been diagnosed with bipolar disorder or was otherwise unfit for overnight parenting with A.T. The court instead found the record demonstrated plaintiff was capable of caring for A.T. and that continued parenting time would strengthen plaintiff and A.T.'s relationship. The court's thorough analysis reflects a proper exercise of discretion under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4. To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining arguments, we deem them without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0593-25 19