Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2712-24 A-2742-24 JONATHAN ADDO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. NEWREZ LLC d/b/a SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ NEWREZ LLC d/b/a SHELLPOINT MORTGAGE SERVICING, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JONATHAN ADDO, Defendant-Appellant, and NEW JERSEY MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE, Defendant. _______________________________ Submitted October 28, 2026 – Decided November 13, 2026 Before Judges Mayer and Smith. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division and Chancery Division, Burlington County, Docket Nos. L-1339-24 and F-003750-23. Jonathan Addo, self-represented appellant. Husch Blackwell LLP, attorneys for respondent in A- 2712-24 (Laura K. Conroy, of counsel and on the brief). Hladik Onorato & Federman, LLP, attorneys for respondent in A-2742-24 (Robert W. Williams, on the brief). PER CURIAM These appeals are calendared back-to-back and consolidated for the purpose of issuing a single opinion. The appeal in Docket No. A-2742-24 relates to the foreclosure of real property at 45 Hopewell Lane in Willingboro (property) by Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing (Shellpoint) (foreclosure action). The appeal in Docket No. A-2712-24 involves a claim for damages by the former property owner, Jonathan Addo, against Shellpoint. We A-2712-24 2 dismiss the appeal in the foreclosure action and affirm the orders on appeal in the Addo action. Starting with the foreclosure action, on November 28, 2023, Shellpoint obtained a default judgment of foreclosure related to the property. On April 25, 2024, Shellpoint sold the property at a sheriff's sale. Six months later, an innocent third party acquired title to the property. On March 18, 2025, well after the sale of the property to the innocent third party and sixteen months after entry of the foreclosure judgment, Addo moved to set aside the foreclosure judgment and regain possession of the property. He argued the foreclosure judgment should be vacated because there was no personal jurisdiction, no subject matter jurisdiction, no enforceable lien, and Shellpoint violated the New Jersey Court Rules. On April 21, 2025, citing Rule 4:50-1, the judge denied the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. The judge found Addo failed to satisfy any of the requirements under Rule 4:50 to justify relief from the foreclosure judgment. He concluded Addo was "improperly attempting to get another chance to contest the validity of the [f]oreclosure [a]ction by asserting a challenge to Shellpoint's standing, which is an essential and 'germane' claim in [f]oreclosure." A-2712-24 3 In June 2024, after the property had been sold at a sheriff's sale, Addo filed an action against Shellpoint (Addo action). The Addo action asserted the following defenses to the foreclosure judgment: (1) "Validation of Debt; Accounting"; (2) "Breach of Contract"; (3) "Holder in Due Course"; and (4) "Commencement of Foreclosure; Violation of Due Process." Addo also sought damages against Shellpoint based on the alleged improper foreclosure judgment. In lieu of filing an answer, Shellpoint moved to dismiss the Addo action . It argued Addo improperly sought to relitigate the foreclosure action, and the claims in the Addo action were precluded by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine. Shellpoint asserted the claims in the Addo action regarding standing, the mortgage, and right to due process were germane to the foreclosure action and had already been fully adjudicated. In opposing dismissal of the Addo action, Addo renewed many of the same arguments he previously raised, which the judge rejected in the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment. He further asserted the Addo action was separate and distinct from the foreclosure action. The judge granted Shellpoint's motion and dismissed the Addo action with prejudice. The judge explained the allegations in the Addo action were "either redundant to or issues that should have been and could have been raised in the A-2712-24 4 context of the foreclosure action." The judge concluded the Addo action sought to "re-litigate" the same issues adjudicated in the foreclosure action and, therefore, the claims in the Addo action were barred by res judicata, collateral estoppel, and the entire controversy doctrine. Addo filed two separate appeals. In Docket No. A-2712-24, Addo appealed the order denying his motion to vacate the judgment in the foreclosure action. In Docket No. A-2742-24, Addo appealed all orders leading to the dismissal of the Addo action. The Foreclosure Action We first address whether Addo's appeal in the foreclosure action should be dismissed as moot. "A case is moot if the disputed issue has been resolved, at least with respect to the parties who instituted the litigation." Caput Mortuum L.L.C. v. S & S Crown Servs., Ltd., 366 N.J. Super. 323, 330 (App. Div. 2004). Dismissal is appropriate when "a judgment cannot grant effective relief, or there is no concrete adversity of interest between the parties." Ibid. "An issue is 'moot when our decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy." Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) (quoting Deutsch Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011)). A-2712-24 5 Having reviewed the record, Addo's appeal in the foreclosure action is moot. This court cannot undue the foreclosure action because an innocent third party now owns the property. Moreover, this court is unable to grant Addo the right to regain the property under the present circumstances. Because this court cannot effectively grant relief to Addo, the foreclosure action is moot and we dismiss that appeal. Additionally, we dismiss Addo's appeal in the foreclosure action for failure to comply with the New Jersey Court Rules. Appellants are required to reference the record on appeal. See R. 2:6-8. Further, submission of an inadequate appellate brief, requiring the appellate court "independent[ly] examin[e]" the record or research the law, violates Rule 2:6-9. In both appeals, Addo repeatedly referenced factual assertions without support or citation to the record as required by the Court Rules. Addo also violated his duty to this court by citing non-existent case law along with cases that failed to support his legal arguments. Although Addo is a self-represented litigant, he is held to the same standard of compliance with the Court Rules as an attorney. See Mims v. City of Gloucester, 479 N.J. Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2024). These deficiencies in Addo's appellate submissions provide an alternative basis for dismissal of both appeals. A-2712-24 6 Regarding the merits of Addo's appeal in the foreclosure action, we are satisfied the judge properly denied the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment as untimely under Rule 4:50-2. Motions to vacate judgment must be "made within a reasonable time." R. 4:50-2. Motions based on Rule 4:50-1(a) (mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect), (b) (newly discovered evidence), or (c) (fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct) impose a strict one-year time limit for filing for relief from a judgment. See Romero v. Gold Star Distribution, 468 N.J. Super. 274, 296 (App. Div. 2021). Here, Addo failed to file the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment until sixteen months after the entry of that judgment and after the sale of the property to an innocent third party purchaser. Addo offers no reasonable explanation for the sixteen-month delay in moving to vacate the foreclosure judgment. Thus, the judge correctly denied the motion to vacate the foreclosure judgment as untimely. Additionally, Addo raised arguments for the first time related to his appeal in the foreclosure action. His newly asserted arguments were not presented to the trial court. We "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial A-2712-24 7 court or concern matters of great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973) (quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App. Div. 1959)). Addo's new arguments do not address the trial court's jurisdiction nor concern matters of significant public interest. Thus, we decline to consider Addo's newly asserted arguments on appeal. The Addo Action We next consider Addo's appeal from dismissal of the Addo action. Addo argues the judge erred in granting Shellpoint's dismissal motion based on the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Addo raises the same arguments presented in his appeal from the foreclosure action. We review de novo a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss a complaint under Rule 4:6-2(e) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Baskin v. P.C. Richard & Son, LLC, 246 N.J. 157, 171 (2021). On review, we examine the motion "by the same standard applied by the trial court; thus, considering and accepting as true the facts alleged in the complaint, [and] determin[ing] whether they set forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. " Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 379 N.J. Super. 100, 106 (App. Div. 2005). We review dismissal of an action applying preclusive doctrines such as the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel de novo. A-2712-24 8 Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 173 (App. Div. 2000). After reviewing the record, we are satisfied all three preclusive doctrines barred the claims in the Addo action. The entire controversy doctrine "embodies the principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one litigation in only one court." Wadeer v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 220 N.J. 591, 605 (2015) (quoting Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass'n v. Nicastro, 201 N.J. 123, 125 (2009)). Rule 4:30A provides that "[n]on-joinder of claims required to be joined by the entire controversy doctrine shall result in the preclusion of the omitted claims to the extent required by the entire controversy doctrine." The entire controversy doctrine requires joinder of claims that "'arise from related facts or the same transaction or series of transactions' but need not share common legal theories." Bank Leumi USA v. Kloss, 243 N.J. 218, 226 (2020) (quoting Dimitrakopoulos v. Borrus, Goldin, Foley, Vignuolo, Hyman and Stahl, PC, 237 N.J. 91, 119 (2019)). "The doctrine may be applied even against a party which defaults in the first proceeding." Joan Ryno, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of S. Jersey, 208 N.J. Super. 562, 569 (App. Div. 1986) (citing Mori v. Hartz Mountain Development Corp., 193 N.J. Super. 47, 55-56 (App. Div. 1983)). A-2712-24 9 "Res judicata, like the entire controversy doctrine, serves the purpose of providing 'finality and repose; prevention of needless litigation; avoidance of duplication; reduction of unnecessary burdens of time and expenses; elimination of conflicts, confusion and uncertainty; and basic fairness[.]'" Wadeer, 220 N.J. at 606 (alterations in original) (quoting First Union Nat'l Bank v. Penn Salem Marina, Inc., 190 N.J. 342, 352 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Res judicata "'contemplates that when a controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer open to relitigation.'" Ibid. (quoting Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960)). "Application of res judicata 'requires substantially similar or identical causes of action and issues, parties, and relief sought,' as well as a final judgment." Ibid. (quoting Culver v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 115 N.J. 451, 460 (1989)). Courts assess the similarity of causes of action by considering: (1) whether the acts complained of and the demand for relief are the same (that is, whether the wrong for which redress is sought is the same in both actions); (2) whether the theory of recovery is the same; (3) whether the witnesses and documents necessary at trial are the same (that is, whether the same evidence necessary to maintain the second action would have been sufficient to support the first); and (4) whether the material facts alleged are the same. [Id. at 606-07 (quoting Culver, 115 N.J. at 461-62).] A-2712-24 10 "Collateral estoppel bars 'the relitigation of an issue that has already been litigated and resolved in a prior proceeding.'" In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co./Celotex Asbestos Tr., 214 N.J. 51, 67 (2013) (quoting Pleming v. Universal- Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998)). "[T]he application of collateral estoppel is an issue of law to be determined by a judge in the second proceeding after giving appropriate weight to the factors bearing upon the issues." Selective Ins. Co., 327 N.J. Super. at 173 (citing Colucci v. Thomas Nicol Asphalt Co., 194 N.J. Super. 510, 518 (App Div. 1984)). To invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude subsequent litigation, a party must demonstrate: (1) the issue to be precluded is identical to the issue decided in the prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior proceeding; (3) the court in the prior proceeding issued a final judgment on the merits; (4) the determination of the issue was essential to the prior judgment; and (5) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to or in privity with a party to the earlier proceeding. [Penn Salem Marina, 190 N.J. at 352 (quoting Henessey v. Winslow Twp., 183 N.J. 593, 599 (2005)).] We have applied the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel in foreclosure actions to prevent needless relitigating of the same issues. See Adelman v. BSI Fin. Servs., Inc., 453 N.J. Super. 31 (App. Div. 2018). In Adelman, we considered a claim by a borrower whose home was A-2712-24 11 foreclosed, failed to timely pursue a germane defense, and then sued the lender in a separate suit. Id. at 34. We affirmed the dismissal of the borrower's complaint under the entire controversy doctrine, res judicata, and collateral estoppel because the borrower improperly attempted to relitigate the same claim related to that foreclosure action and the issues in the borrower's separate suit could have been fully litigated had the borrower raised the issues in a timely fashion. Id. at 40-41. Addo contends these preclusive doctrines are inapplicable because his complaint in the Addo action seeks different relief from the relief he requested in the foreclosure action. We disagree. The judge correctly dismissed the Addo action under the entire controversy doctrine. Addo cannot pursue a separate action asserting the same facts or underlying transaction. The claims in the Addo action were germane to the foreclosure action as defenses to foreclosure, including validation of debt, breach of the mortgage contract, lack of standing, and improper service of process. These defenses could and should have been asserted by Addo in the foreclosure action but were not timely raised. Additionally, the judge correctly held the Addo action was barred by res judicata. The foreclosure action resulted in a final judgment against Addo. The foreclosure action and the Addo action concerned the final foreclosure judgment and Addo's objection to the foreclosure. Both actions concern the same A-2712-24 12 underlying theory that Shellpoint's foreclosure was invalid. Further, the same evidence is needed for both matters because Addo challenges the validity of Shellpoint's mortgage and its standing to pursue foreclosure. Moreover, the material facts in both actions are the same—Shellpoint's alleged failure to properly serve the foreclosure action resulting in a purported violation of Addo's right to due process. Further, the judge properly dismissed the Addo action as barred by collateral estoppel. Addo is a party in both the foreclosure action and the Addo action. The issues of proper service of the foreclosure complaint and the validity of Shellpoint's mortgage and standing to pursue foreclosure were fully litigated in the foreclosure action. The foreclosure action resulted in a final judgment against Addo. The judge in the foreclosure action determined the foreclosure was lawful and upheld Shellpoint's right to pursue foreclosure. To the extent we have not addressed Addo's remaining arguments in either appeal, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Dismissed in the foreclosure action, Docket No. A-002712-24. Affirmed in the Addo action, Docket No. A-002742-24. A-2712-24 13