A-3181-24/a-3747-24 β T.K. v. J.A v. III
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
Date FiledNovember 16, 2026
DocketA-3181-24/A-3747-24
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-3181-24
A-3747-24
T.K.,1
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.A.V. III,
Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________
Argued October 14, 2026 β Decided November 16, 2026
Before Judges Firko and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County,
Docket No. FM-09-1357-18.
Vincent J. Stevens Jr. argued the cause for appellant
(Siragusa Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Vincent J. Stevens
Jr., of counsel and on the briefs; Lynette Siragusa, on
the briefs).
1
We use initials for the parties and the children to protect their privacy. R.
1:38-3(d)(12).
Harriet E. Raghnal argued the cause for respondent
(Raghnal Burroughs LLC, attorneys; Harriet E.
Raghnal, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant J.A.V. III, appeals
from various provisions of the Family Part's June 6, 2025 and July 22, 2025
orders. We have consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm both orders but reverse and remand for
the judge to make findings on the issue of counsel fees pursuant to Rule 5:3-
5(c).
Factual Background
The parties divorced in 2019. They entered into a marital settlement
agreement (MSA), which was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce.
Three children were born of the marriage: J.V.,2 born in 2009; C.V., born in
2011; and S.V., born in 2013. The MSA provided the parties would share joint
legal custody of the children. The MSA states plaintiff T.K. shall have primary
residential custody, and the parties would confer on matters regarding the health,
education, and well-being of the children. Each party had an affirmative duty
to notify the other of any illness or other significant matters affecting the
2
We use initials to protect the identity of the children. R. 1:38-3(d).
A-3181-24
2
children's health, safety, education, religious upbringing, welfare, and vacation
or travel plans.
The MSA provided that once defendant established his own residence, he
was to have parenting time every other weekend. Once the school year ended
in June 2019, the parties would have 50/50 parenting time. On February 8, 2021,
the parties entered into a consent order addressing parenting time with the
children on their birthdays, winter, and spring break. Since the consent order
was entered, the parties engaged in contentious litigation pertaining to the
children. On September 18, 2023, plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC)
regarding parenting time issues. In response, the judge stated he would appoint
a parent coordinator (PC) and asked each party to propose three individuals. On
October 13, 2023, the judge entered an order appointing a PC, who was agreed
to by the parties, and other relief. Defendant later moved to terminate the PC,
which was denied.
On January 23, 2025, the PC wrote a letter of recommendation, which
addressed some of the previous issues between the parties and made
recommendations. In the letter, the PC recommended defendant deposit the
children's passports with the court by February 15, 2025, confirmed the parties
should only communicate through OurFamilyWizard App, and the parties
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should be prohibited from discussing legal issues, court proceedings, or sharing
legal documents with the children.
The PC also denied plaintiff's request to make all medical decisions for
the children and informed the parties that they should advise the other parent of
medical appointment changes via the OurFamilyWizard App. In addition, the
PC directed plaintiff to provide both the PC and defendant with her medical
insurance information for the children and directed defendant to terminate his
medical insurance for the children once he received plaintiff's information.
The PC addressed birthday and holiday parenting time and recommended
that plaintiff should not be forced to move the children into separate rooms
despite defendant's request, as S.V. and C.V. sharing a room did not present a
health or safety concern. The PC stated both parents should be ready for timely
pick ups and drop offs. The PC recommended that the "Right of First Refusal"
in the MSA should not prohibit the children from going to the other party's home
if they chose to do so instead of being home alone.
In regard to therapy, the PC directed the parties to provide continued proof
of therapy each year by January 31 and stated that either parent can engage in
family therapy with the children without consent of the other parent. Finally,
the PC recommended that J.V. no longer needed to attend a termination session
A-3181-24
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with his therapists, the PC set forth a way for a therapist to be chosen for each
child and stated that a request for termination of a therapist must be brought to
her first before termination.
On March 25, 2025, an incident occurred where defendant's current wife
"stepped up" to J.V. and allegedly called him names. According to defendant,
when J.V. left his home on March 25, 2025, J.V. disclosed to defendant that he
had attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on prescription medication
while in plaintiff's custody. According to defendant, J.V. left his home that day,
and he took defendant's wife's laptop and an iPhone home with him without
permission.
In early April 2025, defendant alleged that plaintiff ignored an infection
on S.V.'s face, which he categorized as "MRSA," a type of staph bacteria that is
immune to common antibiotics. Defendant claimed he urged plaintiff to take
S.V. to a dermatologist but instead, plaintiff applied expired dermatological eye
cream. On April 6, 2025, defendant took S.V. to urgent care where she was
prescribed antibiotics for a "serious skin infection." Defendant informed
plaintiff that S.V. was diagnosed with "Impetigo Strep," and lab cultures were
positive for a "staph infection."
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Motion Practice
On April 17, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights.
Plaintiff argued defendant failed to abide by the November 22, 2024 order
requiring him to pay her $1,607.80. In addition, plaintiff sought an order
directing defendant to comply with the June 28, 2024, PC recommendation and
immediately cancel the children's health insurance. Plaintiff requested J.V.
remain in her custody; the right to secure the children's passports; and to direct
defendant to provide proof of ongoing therapy and comply with the PC's
recommendations regarding medical decisions in non-emergent situations.
Finally, plaintiff asked the court to direct defendant to pay the PC her retainer
fee and, going forward, to pay an increased percentage of the PC's fees, and for
an award of counsel fees.
On May 22, 2025, defendant filed a cross-motion opposing plaintiff's
motion and requesting the judge enforce the parenting time provision of the
MSA between himself and J.V. In defendant's cross-moving certification, he
alleged that plaintiff "intentionally alienated" J.V. from him and claimed he was
concerned about "child abuse and child neglect" relating to the children.
Defendant referenced the March incident with J.V. and plaintiff's firearm, C.V.'s
football injury, and S.V.'s rash, as evidence of child abuse and neglect.
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In addition, defendant certified that plaintiff does not supervise the
children. Defendant requested appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) to
investigate plaintiff's purported abusive and neglectful conduct, establish an
"FF"[3] docket to address J.V.'s "mental health crisis," and for a protective order.
Defendant requested the court order plaintiff to return the laptop and iPhone that
J.V. took from defendant's home and an award of counsel fees and costs.
Plaintiff filed a reply certification opposing defendant's cross-motion and
in further support of her motion. Plaintiff reiterated defendant was not in
compliance with the previous court order and claimed that she does not share
her feelings about defendant with the children. In addition, plaintiff certified
defendant was "circumventing" the use of the PC and contacted the Division of
Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) for a third time, despite the PC's
recommendation to the contrary. Plaintiff stated she had done her part to obtain
the children's passports and defendant had brought the children into the matter .
Plaintiff certified that there was a substantial change of circumstances
regarding J.V. and parenting time since he refused to return to defendant's home
following the March 25, 2025 incident. Plaintiff stated that defendant continued
3
An "FF" docket is also known as the "Juvenile-Family Crisis" docket, pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-86.
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to reach out to J.V. regarding the laptop and iPhone but never made any attempt
to mend their relationship. In addition, plaintiff claimed that J.V. never
"blocked" defendant, his current wife began contacting J.V. about the laptop and
iPhone and claimed she would never need to communicate with J.V. again.
Plaintiff certified that on May 20, 2025, defendant "berated" J.V. on a baseball
field in front of his friends, which resulted in J.V. quitting baseball and locking
himself in his room.
Plaintiff stated that defendant did not inform J.V. of his great-aunt's
passing even though the two were close and claimed J.V. was not invited to the
funeral. Plaintiff certified J.V. was not invited to his childhood friend's birthday
party because defendant had a conversation with the friend's mother stating J.V.
"stole" from defendant. Plaintiff stated on May 7, 2025, J.V. was caught with a
vape in his bookbag, which resulted in a two-day suspension from school and
drug screening. Plaintiff certified defendant and the Division manager were
made aware of this incident. Plaintiff claimed that J.V.'s school attendance
while in her custody as opposed to defendant's custody is similar. Plaintiff stated
she provided J.V. with a gym membership to manage his stress, he had started a
successful photography business, was taking honors classes, and his grades had
improved.
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Plaintiff also certified that she had encouraged J.V. to re-engage in
therapy but defendant had played a substantial role in the termination of multiple
therapists, including Monica Gray and Catherine Amsellem, which resulted in
J.V. refusing to attend further therapy. Plaintiff represented J.V.'s therapy with
Gray ended on April 18, 2024, because of defendant's "agitation and conflict"
with her. Plaintiff claimed defendant "verbally accosted" Amsellem around
November 28, 2024, which caused J.V.'s therapy with her to end. Plaintiff
denied J.V. tried to commit suicide by overdosing on prescription pills but
acknowledged J.V. had suicide ideation resulting in her calling Perform Care.
Plaintiff denied S.V. had "MRSA," and instead asserted it was a skin rash
that was healing when she left plaintiff's home. Plaintiff asserted defendant did
not seek her consent before taking S.V. to the dermatologist. Plaintiff certified
defendant failed to return the children the previous Memorial Day weekend as
per the parenting time agreement because S.V. did not want to return to
plaintiff's home, which resulted in an "emotional implosion" by J.V. Plaintiff
requested the judge order defendant to adhere to the PC's recommendations and
not force J.V. to return to his home because it would worsen J.V.'s mental health.
The PC's Recommendations
On June 5, 2025, the PC issued her recommendations. The PC
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recommended defendant's parenting time with J.V. be placed on hold pending
J.V.'s individual therapy sessions, parenting time be reviewed upon defendant's
request, for J.V. to undergo three individual therapy sessions, for defendant to
continue individual therapy sessions, and at least three reunification therapy
sessions between J.V. and defendant. The PC directed plaintiff to encourage
therapy with J.V., to take him to therapy, and for plaintiff to continue her
individual therapy. The PC stated defendant can contact J.V. once a day but not
to discuss the laptop or iPhone.
The PC recommended S.V. attend therapy with plaintiff, and after three
sessions, an additional session with S.V., J.V., and plaintiff should occur.
Thereafter, the PC recommended parenting time should be reinstated to plaintiff.
The PC also recommended there be no make-up time for missed parenting time
and advised the parties that continued violations of her recommendations could
result in a shift of payment of her fees.
In response to the PC's recommendations, defendant's attorney sent a letter
to the PC in which he objected to her recommendations. Defendant's counsel
asserted that pursuant to Administrative Directive #16-23, the PC did not have
the authority to modify legal or physical custody between the parties.
Defendant's counsel claimed portions of the recommendation violated the
A-3181-24
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judge's June 6, 2025, order. Defendant's counsel also asserted that the PC
exceeded her scope of authority by forbidding defendant from contacting J.V.
about the alleged stolen property. Following this exchange, the parties had a
conference call with the PC where she refused to rescind her recommendation.
On June 6, 2025, the judge granted plaintiff's motion to adjudicate
defendant in violation of litigant's rights for his failure to comply with paragraph
one of the November 22, 2024, order on the papers. The judge directed
defendant to pay plaintiff the $1,607.80 amount previously ordered within three
days of the order, and if defendant remained noncompliant, a $25 per diem
sanction would be imposed until paid.
The judge granted plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to comply with
the June 28, 2024 order and the PC's recommendations to cancel health
insurance and permit plaintiff's health insurance to be primary. The judge
granted plaintiff's motions to compel proof of ongoing therapy from defendant,
to compel him to comply with the PC's recommendations, to compel defendant
to pay the PC $1,253.50, and to advance the new retainer. The judge denied
plaintiff's motion to suspend defendant's parenting time with J.V, and to secure
the children's passports.
The judge denied defendant's motion in its entirety, ruling the requested
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relief under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A:86, was misplaced, nothing
warranted appointment of a GAL, and denied his request for the Division files
to be produced on the grounds the Division had not been placed on notice. The
judge also denied both parties' applications for attorney's fees.
J.V.
On June 8, 2025, J.V. and defendant had a recorded phone call. J.V. told
defendant it was "now or never" if they were going to talk, while defendant
preferred to discuss their issues in person. In the call, J.V. raised several issues,
such as the accusations of stealing, a confrontation at the baseball field, not
being told about his great aunt's death, not being invited to her funeral, and being
excluded from his friend's birthday celebration. In response, defendant focused
on the March 25 incident where J.V. left his home, cursed at him and his current
wife, allegedly stole property, and blocked him. J.V. denied blocking defendant
and instead informing defendant he put him on "do not disturb." J.V. tried to
get defendant to acknowledge how those incidents affected him, but the call
ended without resolution after J.V. continued to ask if defendant wanted to see
him again. Defendant stated he wanted to talk in person rather than over the
phone.
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The PC's Amended Recommendation
On June 9, 2025, the PC issued an amended recommendation. The PC
stated forcing J.V. to see defendant was not in the child's best interests, and it
was not beneficial for the father/son relationship. The PC again directed J.V. to
attend individual therapy, defendant to continue his therapy, and for the two of
them to attend reunification therapy. Also similar to the original
recommendation, the PC stated defendant could contact J.V. once a day, but
only to inquire about how he was doing. The PC noted regular parenting time
had commenced between S.V. and plaintiff and recommended she and S.V.
attend three therapy sessions together and one with J.V.
On June 11, 2025, defendant filed his notice of appeal under A-3181-24.
On June 20, 2025, defendant filed a motion to stay paragraph one of the June 6,
2025 order. On June 26, 2025, defendant filed a motion to strike the PC's
recommendation because his attorney had requested the PC not to release her
recommendations, which defendant claimed exceeded the scope of her authority
in violation of the June 6, 2025 order.
Further Court Proceedings
The June 6, 2025 order resulted in an appeal from paragraphs one and nine
filed by defendant on June 11, 2025. On June 20, 2025, defendant filed a motion
A-3181-24
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to stay paragraph one of the June 6, 2025, order. On June 26, 2025, defendant
filed a motion to strike the PC's recommendations, arguing his attorney had
requested the PC not release the recommendations, and the recommendations
exceeded the scope of her authority.
On July 1, 2025, defendant filed an emergent OTSC, which alleged that
during plaintiff's parenting time on a camping trip in western Pennsylvania, she
"neglectfully" allowed S.V. to gain access to an "unsecure and loaded firearm,"
thereby placing the children at risk of irreparable harm. Defendant requested
indefinite custody of the children, for plaintiff to provide proof of implemented
safeguards for the firearm and to submit to a psychological evaluation or risk
assessment.
Plaintiff disputed defendant's account, asserting the firearm is usually kept
in a locked gun safe that can only be opened with her fingerprint. Plaintiff later
certified she brought the firearm with her on the camping trip, placed it unloaded
in the manufacturer's box, and secured it with a child resistant trigger lock.
Plaintiff further asserted that the trigger lock made the gun inoperable without
a key, which she kept on her person. On the same day as the OTSC was filed,
the judge granted defendant's application ex parte and ordered the three children
to reside with him with no in-person parenting time with plaintiff. The order
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also permitted plaintiff to have FaceTime with the children for no more than
fifteen minutes each day.
On the evening of July 1, 2025, police were dispatched to plaintiff's
residence to enforce the order. After police arrived, J.V. was summoned from
the basement and stated he did not want to leave. Police officers explained to
J.V. he did not have a choice, leading plaintiff to advise him he could make his
own decision. The police then confirmed with the Division that J.V. would not
be placed at risk if he was returned to defendant's home. Plaintiff was then
advised the issue could rise to the level of criminality if she did not comply with
the order, but she did not comply, which later resulted in her arrest for contempt
in front of J.V.
In a July 7, 2025 letter from plaintiff to the judge, she claimed that after
J.V. was removed from her home on July 1, 2025, and returned to defendant's
custody he endured questioning from defendant, which kept him awake until
4:00 a.m. Separately, Hoboken University Medical Center's (HUMC) record
states that, upon returning to defendant's residence, J.V. was "screaming and
saying delusional things," after which defendant called emergency medical
services, and J.V. was admitted to HUMC for a psychiatric evaluation.
On July 2, 2025, after receiving letters from each party's counsel and
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holding a remote hearing, the judge issued a briefing schedule, directed plaintiff
to turn over all firearms and ammunition to her counsel by 11:00 a.m., on July
3, 2025, and directed both counsel to review the HUMC discharge summary and
confer on J.V.'s placement upon his release. The judge noted that if the
discharge summary stated J.V. should be returned to plaintiff rather than
defendant, then J.V. should be returned to plaintiff.
Defendant informed the judge that plaintiff did not turn over her weapons
or ammunition. The same day, plaintiff's counsel was in possession of plaintiff's
weapons and ammunition and was directed to cooperate with the police
department on what to do with them. On July 7, 2025, defendant's counsel wrote
a letter to the judge claiming plaintiff went to HUMC to visit J.V. in violation
of the July 1, 2025 order. Defendant alleged plaintiff gave documents to the
hospital staff suggesting J.V. be released to her custody. In a response letter ,
plaintiff's counsel denied the allegations.
The judge discussed with HUMC staff whether J.V. should be placed with
plaintiff or defendant upon his release. The hospital staff was of the "firm
opinion" that J.V. should be placed with plaintiff based on their observations of
J.V.'s interaction with defendant and J.V. informing the social worker that he
felt emotionally safe with plaintiff while defendant invalidated his feelings. In
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addition, J.V. informed the social worker that he had a very poor relationship
with defendant's current wife. Based on this information, the judge issued an
order on July 7, 2025, directing J.V. to be turned over to plaintiff at the police
station, the parenting schedule for the other two children revert to what was in
existence prior to the first OTSC, and that plaintiff ensure all recommendations
set forth in the discharge summary be adhered to.
In a second July 7, 2025 order, the judge addressed the allegations
regarding plaintiff appearing at HUMC in violation of the court's previous
orders. The judge directed plaintiff to explain those allegations and to admit to
the violation if it did occur because if she challenged the allegations , and the
judge determined that she did, defendant would be subject to a litany of
remedies.
On July 9, 2025, defendant filed an OTSC alleging plaintiff did not
comply with the July 2, 2025 and July 3, 2025 orders directing her to surrender
all ammunition to law enforcement. In his supporting certification, defendant
stated he was in the process of applying for a Temporary Extreme Risk
Protective Order (TERPO), and that plaintiff "intentionally" retained the
firearms and ammunition. As a consequence, defendant requested that plaintiff's
parenting time be suspended indefinitely and physical custody of the children
A-3181-24
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be given to him. Defendant also requested sanctions issue against plaintiff for
violating the July 2, 2025 and July 3, 2025 orders. The judge denied defendant's
OTSC in its entirety.
On July 14, 2025, plaintiff filed a notice of "cross-motion," seeking to
deny defendant's OTSC in its entirety, directing the parties to abide by the PC's
recommendations for J.V.'s parenting time, and for the judge to conduct an in
camera interview of J.V. prior to parenting time resuming with defendant.
Plaintiff also sought an order finding defendant in violation of the November
22, 2024, and June 6, 2025 orders, to direct him to comply with the previous
orders, provide proof the children's passports had been submitted, and that
medical insurance was cancelled. In addition, plaintiff requested the judge
direct defendant to comply with the PC's recommendations, direct the PC to
verify defendant is seeing a therapist as required by the MSA, and for an award
of counsel fees. Plaintiff requested oral argument.
On July 17, 2025, defendant filed a reply certification in opposition to
plaintiff's cross-motion and in further support of his OTSC and made
supplemental requests for relief on July 1, 2025 and July 7, 2025. Defendant
asserted that "none" of plaintiff's representations set forth in her certification
should be accepted as true. In addition, he renewed his request to suspend
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plaintiff's parenting time, for the appointment of a GAL, psychological and risk
assessments, and counsel fees, and argued that plaintiff had violated prior court
orders, engaged in parental alienation, and unsafe firearm practices.
On July 22, 2025, the judge held a hearing at which he reviewed the
history of the case, the pending applications, and issued a decision. Defendant
argued the pending issues should not be resolved on the papers because there
were disputed issues of material fact requiring a plenary hearing. The judge
held the firearm issue that prompted the July 1 emergent relief had been
addressed. Regarding the custody and parenting time issues, the judge set
deadlines for written discovery and depositions and directed counsel to confer
regarding appointment of a joint or separate best-interests evaluator.
On the same day, the judge also issued an order arising out of the emergent
OTSC proceedings. The judge denied defendant's motion to stay paragraph one
of the June 6, 2025 order regarding the $1,607.80 amount, and paragraph three
to compel compliance with the June 28, 2024 order regarding the PC's
recommendations. The judge denied defendant's motion to strike the PC's June
6, 2025 recommendation and her amended June 9, 2025 recommendation. The
judge sua sponte directed the parties to engage in co-parenting and reunification
therapy for defendant and J.V., denied defendant's motion for a credit against
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the PC's future invoices, and denied his motion to enforce paragraph four of the
June 6, 2025, order.
Further, the judge determined that the emergency surrounding S.V.'s
access to a firearm and bullets had been abated. The judge denied defendant's
requests for appointment of a GAL, to suspend plaintiff's parenting time pending
a psychological evaluation and risk assessment, for sanctions and attorney's fees.
The judge then addressed plaintiff's cross-motion and granted her request
for the parties to abide by the PC's recommendations. The judge ordered the
production of J.V.'s discharge summary from HUMC before ruling on whether
there was a need to interview J.V. The judge also granted plaintiff's cross-
motion to enforce the November 22, 2024, and June 6, 2025 orders, and denied
the passport, medical insurance, and verification of defendant's therapy issues
as moot. The judge granted plaintiff's cross-motion to compel compliance with
the June 6, 2025 PC recommendations and directed counsel to confer and advise
on a best-interests evaluator.
On July 28, 2025, defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the July 22,
2025, order under docket number A-3747-24. On September 18, 2025,
defendant moved to consolidate the appeals, which we granted.
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Before us, defendant argues the judge erred and abused his discretion by:
(1) denying defendant's request twice to appoint a GAL
pursuant to Rule 5:8B;
(2) failing to establish an FF docket for J.V.;
(3) twice failing to adjudicate plaintiff in violation of
N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, for committing abuse and neglect;
(4) twice denying defendant's request to undergo a
psychological, evaluation or a formal risk assessment;
(5) denying defendant's request to strike the PC's
recommendations by endowing the PC with the power
to alter custody and parenting time regarding J.V.;
(6) denying defendant's request to enforce the MSA
against plaintiff for denying his parenting time with
J.V. and not ordering sanctions pursuant to Rules 5:3-
7(a), and 1:10-3;
(7) ordering sua sponte that post-judgment discovery
and best interest[s] evaluations be conducted and by
issuing inconsistent and inaccurate rulings, which
prejudiced the proceedings, himself, and the children;
(8) granting plaintiff's request to be reimbursed
$1,607.80, and compelling defendant to cancel health
insurance coverage for the children in contravention of
the MSA;
(9) failing to conduct oral argument prior to rendering
the June 6, 2025 order; and
(10) denying defendant's request for counsel fees
pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c).
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I.
Our review of a Family Part order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154
N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). A Family Part judge "possess[es] special expertise in
the field of domestic relations." Id. at 412. Additionally, a Family Part judge
has jurisdiction over "[a]ll actions in which the principal claim is unique to and
arises out of a family or family-type relationship." R. 5:1-2(a). "Because of the
family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate
courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Cesare, 154 N.J. at
413.
Accordingly, a Family Part judge's factual findings are reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard. Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super.
340, 354 (App. Div. 2009). Abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made
without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies,
or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J.
561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv.,
779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). However, we review a Family Part judge's
interpretation of the law de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).
A Family Part judge "possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish
substantial justice" and may tailor an appropriate remedy for violation of its
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orders. Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446 (App. Div. 2000). An order
to enforce litigant's rights under Rule 1:10-3 is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 458-59 (App. Div. 2018) (citing
Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011)). Likewise, an award of
attorney's fees "will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only
because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier,
167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317
(1995)).
II.
A.
Defendant argues the judge abused his discretion by denying his request
to appoint a GAL. Pursuant to Rule 5:8B(a), the judge has discretion to appoint
a GAL in a dispute between parties regarding custody and parenting time .
Isaacson v. Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. 560, 573 (App. Div. 2002). Rule 5:8B(a)
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Appointment. In all cases in which custody or
parenting time/visitation is an issue, a [GAL] may be
appointed by court order to represent the best interest[s]
of the child or children if the circumstances warrant
such an appointment. The services rendered by a
[GAL] shall be to the court on behalf of the child. A
[GAL] may be appointed by the court on its own motion
or on application of either or both of the parents. The
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[GAL] shall file a written report with the court setting
forth findings and recommendations and the basis
thereof, and shall be available to testify and shall be
subject to cross-examination thereon.
[R. 5:8B(a).]
In J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 333 (2013), our Court explained that the
appointment of a GAL lies in the discretion of the judge because they are
informed by the experience they gain by sitting through a daily docket of
matters. J.B., 215 N.J. at 333. Defendant, relying on our decision Milne v.
Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2012), argues the GAL would act
"as an independent fact finder, investigator, and evaluator as to what furthers
the best interest[s] of the child." Ibid. (quoting In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 173
(1994)).
Defendant maintains the judge abused his discretion because the record
contained ample evidence warranting an independent investigation into the
children's best interests by a GAL. Defendant asserts the judge misstated the
role and purpose of a GAL by stating that the GAL can perform the same
function as a best interests evaluator, but not other tasks, such as a risk
assessment of the homes or reviewing the Division's records. Finally, defendant
contends that the judge failed to assign the proper weight to the evidence
presented. We disagree.
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Here, the judge acted well-within his purview to deny the appointment of
a GAL. Our Court made it clear that the appointment of a GAL is in the
discretion of the judge because they are well-informed through their experience
to determine if a GAL is appropriate. J.B., 215 N.J. at 333. Moreover, Rule
5:8B(a) specifically states that a GAL "may" be appointed. R. 5:8B(a). The
decision is clearly discretionary, and the judge is under no obligation to grant
the motion. Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. at 573.
In addition, in his June 6, 2025 order, the judge specifically noted that
nothing was presented warranting the appointment of a GAL. The judge
reasoned that defendant did not identify what was sought by way of a GAL,
which rendered the request meritless. The judge was well within his discretion
to deny appointment of a GAL and order a best interests evaluation instead.
Therefore, we reject defendant's argument.
B.
Next, defendant asserts that the judge abused his discretion by denying his
request to establish an "FF" docket. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-86 provides:
Whenever the court receives a petition from court
intake services stating that a juvenile-family crisis may
exist the court shall hold a hearing and consider the
facts and recommendations submitted by intake
services in order to determine the appropriate
disposition to be made. The court shall notify the
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juvenile, his parent or guardian or other family member
alleged in the petition as contributing to the family
crisis that a juvenile-family crisis may exist. The
juvenile, parent, guardian, or other family member may
present witnesses and evidence to rebut the
determination. If the court finds that there is not
enough information to make a disposition it may
continue the matter and hold one or more additional
hearings. The court shall enter an order of disposition
if it finds that a juvenile-family crisis exists as provided
in section 27 of P.L. 1982, c. 77 (C. 2A:4A-46). In
support of any such order, the court may require the
juvenile, parent, guardian or family member
contributing to the crisis, to participate in appropriate
programs and services consistent with the disposition.
The court may dismiss the petition upon a finding that
based upon the preponderance of the evidence
presented the petition is not sufficient to establish that
a juvenile-family crisis exists. The court shall state the
grounds for any disposition made pursuant to this
section. In the case of failure of any person to comply
with any orders entered pursuant to this section, the
court may proceed against such person for the
enforcement