Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-3181-24 A-3747-24 T.K.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.A.V. III, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 14, 2026 – Decided November 16, 2026 Before Judges Firko and Vanek. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, Docket No. FM-09-1357-18. Vincent J. Stevens Jr. argued the cause for appellant (Siragusa Law Firm LLC, attorneys; Vincent J. Stevens Jr., of counsel and on the briefs; Lynette Siragusa, on the briefs). 1 We use initials for the parties and the children to protect their privacy. R. 1:38-3(d)(12). Harriet E. Raghnal argued the cause for respondent (Raghnal Burroughs LLC, attorneys; Harriet E. Raghnal, on the brief). PER CURIAM In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant J.A.V. III, appeals from various provisions of the Family Part's June 6, 2025 and July 22, 2025 orders. We have consolidated the appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion. For the reasons that follow, we affirm both orders but reverse and remand for the judge to make findings on the issue of counsel fees pursuant to Rule 5:3- 5(c). Factual Background The parties divorced in 2019. They entered into a marital settlement agreement (MSA), which was incorporated into the final judgment of divorce. Three children were born of the marriage: J.V.,2 born in 2009; C.V., born in 2011; and S.V., born in 2013. The MSA provided the parties would share joint legal custody of the children. The MSA states plaintiff T.K. shall have primary residential custody, and the parties would confer on matters regarding the health, education, and well-being of the children. Each party had an affirmative duty to notify the other of any illness or other significant matters affecting the 2 We use initials to protect the identity of the children. R. 1:38-3(d). A-3181-24 2 children's health, safety, education, religious upbringing, welfare, and vacation or travel plans. The MSA provided that once defendant established his own residence, he was to have parenting time every other weekend. Once the school year ended in June 2019, the parties would have 50/50 parenting time. On February 8, 2021, the parties entered into a consent order addressing parenting time with the children on their birthdays, winter, and spring break. Since the consent order was entered, the parties engaged in contentious litigation pertaining to the children. On September 18, 2023, plaintiff filed an order to show cause (OTSC) regarding parenting time issues. In response, the judge stated he would appoint a parent coordinator (PC) and asked each party to propose three individuals. On October 13, 2023, the judge entered an order appointing a PC, who was agreed to by the parties, and other relief. Defendant later moved to terminate the PC, which was denied. On January 23, 2025, the PC wrote a letter of recommendation, which addressed some of the previous issues between the parties and made recommendations. In the letter, the PC recommended defendant deposit the children's passports with the court by February 15, 2025, confirmed the parties should only communicate through OurFamilyWizard App, and the parties A-3181-24 3 should be prohibited from discussing legal issues, court proceedings, or sharing legal documents with the children. The PC also denied plaintiff's request to make all medical decisions for the children and informed the parties that they should advise the other parent of medical appointment changes via the OurFamilyWizard App. In addition, the PC directed plaintiff to provide both the PC and defendant with her medical insurance information for the children and directed defendant to terminate his medical insurance for the children once he received plaintiff's information. The PC addressed birthday and holiday parenting time and recommended that plaintiff should not be forced to move the children into separate rooms despite defendant's request, as S.V. and C.V. sharing a room did not present a health or safety concern. The PC stated both parents should be ready for timely pick ups and drop offs. The PC recommended that the "Right of First Refusal" in the MSA should not prohibit the children from going to the other party's home if they chose to do so instead of being home alone. In regard to therapy, the PC directed the parties to provide continued proof of therapy each year by January 31 and stated that either parent can engage in family therapy with the children without consent of the other parent. Finally, the PC recommended that J.V. no longer needed to attend a termination session A-3181-24 4 with his therapists, the PC set forth a way for a therapist to be chosen for each child and stated that a request for termination of a therapist must be brought to her first before termination. On March 25, 2025, an incident occurred where defendant's current wife "stepped up" to J.V. and allegedly called him names. According to defendant, when J.V. left his home on March 25, 2025, J.V. disclosed to defendant that he had attempted to commit suicide by overdosing on prescription medication while in plaintiff's custody. According to defendant, J.V. left his home that day, and he took defendant's wife's laptop and an iPhone home with him without permission. In early April 2025, defendant alleged that plaintiff ignored an infection on S.V.'s face, which he categorized as "MRSA," a type of staph bacteria that is immune to common antibiotics. Defendant claimed he urged plaintiff to take S.V. to a dermatologist but instead, plaintiff applied expired dermatological eye cream. On April 6, 2025, defendant took S.V. to urgent care where she was prescribed antibiotics for a "serious skin infection." Defendant informed plaintiff that S.V. was diagnosed with "Impetigo Strep," and lab cultures were positive for a "staph infection." A-3181-24 5 Motion Practice On April 17, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights. Plaintiff argued defendant failed to abide by the November 22, 2024 order requiring him to pay her $1,607.80. In addition, plaintiff sought an order directing defendant to comply with the June 28, 2024, PC recommendation and immediately cancel the children's health insurance. Plaintiff requested J.V. remain in her custody; the right to secure the children's passports; and to direct defendant to provide proof of ongoing therapy and comply with the PC's recommendations regarding medical decisions in non-emergent situations. Finally, plaintiff asked the court to direct defendant to pay the PC her retainer fee and, going forward, to pay an increased percentage of the PC's fees, and for an award of counsel fees. On May 22, 2025, defendant filed a cross-motion opposing plaintiff's motion and requesting the judge enforce the parenting time provision of the MSA between himself and J.V. In defendant's cross-moving certification, he alleged that plaintiff "intentionally alienated" J.V. from him and claimed he was concerned about "child abuse and child neglect" relating to the children. Defendant referenced the March incident with J.V. and plaintiff's firearm, C.V.'s football injury, and S.V.'s rash, as evidence of child abuse and neglect. A-3181-24 6 In addition, defendant certified that plaintiff does not supervise the children. Defendant requested appointment of a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) to investigate plaintiff's purported abusive and neglectful conduct, establish an "FF"[3] docket to address J.V.'s "mental health crisis," and for a protective order. Defendant requested the court order plaintiff to return the laptop and iPhone that J.V. took from defendant's home and an award of counsel fees and costs. Plaintiff filed a reply certification opposing defendant's cross-motion and in further support of her motion. Plaintiff reiterated defendant was not in compliance with the previous court order and claimed that she does not share her feelings about defendant with the children. In addition, plaintiff certified defendant was "circumventing" the use of the PC and contacted the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) for a third time, despite the PC's recommendation to the contrary. Plaintiff stated she had done her part to obtain the children's passports and defendant had brought the children into the matter . Plaintiff certified that there was a substantial change of circumstances regarding J.V. and parenting time since he refused to return to defendant's home following the March 25, 2025 incident. Plaintiff stated that defendant continued 3 An "FF" docket is also known as the "Juvenile-Family Crisis" docket, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-86. A-3181-24 7 to reach out to J.V. regarding the laptop and iPhone but never made any attempt to mend their relationship. In addition, plaintiff claimed that J.V. never "blocked" defendant, his current wife began contacting J.V. about the laptop and iPhone and claimed she would never need to communicate with J.V. again. Plaintiff certified that on May 20, 2025, defendant "berated" J.V. on a baseball field in front of his friends, which resulted in J.V. quitting baseball and locking himself in his room. Plaintiff stated that defendant did not inform J.V. of his great-aunt's passing even though the two were close and claimed J.V. was not invited to the funeral. Plaintiff certified J.V. was not invited to his childhood friend's birthday party because defendant had a conversation with the friend's mother stating J.V. "stole" from defendant. Plaintiff stated on May 7, 2025, J.V. was caught with a vape in his bookbag, which resulted in a two-day suspension from school and drug screening. Plaintiff certified defendant and the Division manager were made aware of this incident. Plaintiff claimed that J.V.'s school attendance while in her custody as opposed to defendant's custody is similar. Plaintiff stated she provided J.V. with a gym membership to manage his stress, he had started a successful photography business, was taking honors classes, and his grades had improved. A-3181-24 8 Plaintiff also certified that she had encouraged J.V. to re-engage in therapy but defendant had played a substantial role in the termination of multiple therapists, including Monica Gray and Catherine Amsellem, which resulted in J.V. refusing to attend further therapy. Plaintiff represented J.V.'s therapy with Gray ended on April 18, 2024, because of defendant's "agitation and conflict" with her. Plaintiff claimed defendant "verbally accosted" Amsellem around November 28, 2024, which caused J.V.'s therapy with her to end. Plaintiff denied J.V. tried to commit suicide by overdosing on prescription pills but acknowledged J.V. had suicide ideation resulting in her calling Perform Care. Plaintiff denied S.V. had "MRSA," and instead asserted it was a skin rash that was healing when she left plaintiff's home. Plaintiff asserted defendant did not seek her consent before taking S.V. to the dermatologist. Plaintiff certified defendant failed to return the children the previous Memorial Day weekend as per the parenting time agreement because S.V. did not want to return to plaintiff's home, which resulted in an "emotional implosion" by J.V. Plaintiff requested the judge order defendant to adhere to the PC's recommendations and not force J.V. to return to his home because it would worsen J.V.'s mental health. The PC's Recommendations On June 5, 2025, the PC issued her recommendations. The PC A-3181-24 9 recommended defendant's parenting time with J.V. be placed on hold pending J.V.'s individual therapy sessions, parenting time be reviewed upon defendant's request, for J.V. to undergo three individual therapy sessions, for defendant to continue individual therapy sessions, and at least three reunification therapy sessions between J.V. and defendant. The PC directed plaintiff to encourage therapy with J.V., to take him to therapy, and for plaintiff to continue her individual therapy. The PC stated defendant can contact J.V. once a day but not to discuss the laptop or iPhone. The PC recommended S.V. attend therapy with plaintiff, and after three sessions, an additional session with S.V., J.V., and plaintiff should occur. Thereafter, the PC recommended parenting time should be reinstated to plaintiff. The PC also recommended there be no make-up time for missed parenting time and advised the parties that continued violations of her recommendations could result in a shift of payment of her fees. In response to the PC's recommendations, defendant's attorney sent a letter to the PC in which he objected to her recommendations. Defendant's counsel asserted that pursuant to Administrative Directive #16-23, the PC did not have the authority to modify legal or physical custody between the parties. Defendant's counsel claimed portions of the recommendation violated the A-3181-24 10 judge's June 6, 2025, order. Defendant's counsel also asserted that the PC exceeded her scope of authority by forbidding defendant from contacting J.V. about the alleged stolen property. Following this exchange, the parties had a conference call with the PC where she refused to rescind her recommendation. On June 6, 2025, the judge granted plaintiff's motion to adjudicate defendant in violation of litigant's rights for his failure to comply with paragraph one of the November 22, 2024, order on the papers. The judge directed defendant to pay plaintiff the $1,607.80 amount previously ordered within three days of the order, and if defendant remained noncompliant, a $25 per diem sanction would be imposed until paid. The judge granted plaintiff's motion to compel defendant to comply with the June 28, 2024 order and the PC's recommendations to cancel health insurance and permit plaintiff's health insurance to be primary. The judge granted plaintiff's motions to compel proof of ongoing therapy from defendant, to compel him to comply with the PC's recommendations, to compel defendant to pay the PC $1,253.50, and to advance the new retainer. The judge denied plaintiff's motion to suspend defendant's parenting time with J.V, and to secure the children's passports. The judge denied defendant's motion in its entirety, ruling the requested A-3181-24 11 relief under N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, and N.J.S.A. 2A:4A:86, was misplaced, nothing warranted appointment of a GAL, and denied his request for the Division files to be produced on the grounds the Division had not been placed on notice. The judge also denied both parties' applications for attorney's fees. J.V. On June 8, 2025, J.V. and defendant had a recorded phone call. J.V. told defendant it was "now or never" if they were going to talk, while defendant preferred to discuss their issues in person. In the call, J.V. raised several issues, such as the accusations of stealing, a confrontation at the baseball field, not being told about his great aunt's death, not being invited to her funeral, and being excluded from his friend's birthday celebration. In response, defendant focused on the March 25 incident where J.V. left his home, cursed at him and his current wife, allegedly stole property, and blocked him. J.V. denied blocking defendant and instead informing defendant he put him on "do not disturb." J.V. tried to get defendant to acknowledge how those incidents affected him, but the call ended without resolution after J.V. continued to ask if defendant wanted to see him again. Defendant stated he wanted to talk in person rather than over the phone. A-3181-24 12 The PC's Amended Recommendation On June 9, 2025, the PC issued an amended recommendation. The PC stated forcing J.V. to see defendant was not in the child's best interests, and it was not beneficial for the father/son relationship. The PC again directed J.V. to attend individual therapy, defendant to continue his therapy, and for the two of them to attend reunification therapy. Also similar to the original recommendation, the PC stated defendant could contact J.V. once a day, but only to inquire about how he was doing. The PC noted regular parenting time had commenced between S.V. and plaintiff and recommended she and S.V. attend three therapy sessions together and one with J.V. On June 11, 2025, defendant filed his notice of appeal under A-3181-24. On June 20, 2025, defendant filed a motion to stay paragraph one of the June 6, 2025 order. On June 26, 2025, defendant filed a motion to strike the PC's recommendation because his attorney had requested the PC not to release her recommendations, which defendant claimed exceeded the scope of her authority in violation of the June 6, 2025 order. Further Court Proceedings The June 6, 2025 order resulted in an appeal from paragraphs one and nine filed by defendant on June 11, 2025. On June 20, 2025, defendant filed a motion A-3181-24 13 to stay paragraph one of the June 6, 2025, order. On June 26, 2025, defendant filed a motion to strike the PC's recommendations, arguing his attorney had requested the PC not release the recommendations, and the recommendations exceeded the scope of her authority. On July 1, 2025, defendant filed an emergent OTSC, which alleged that during plaintiff's parenting time on a camping trip in western Pennsylvania, she "neglectfully" allowed S.V. to gain access to an "unsecure and loaded firearm," thereby placing the children at risk of irreparable harm. Defendant requested indefinite custody of the children, for plaintiff to provide proof of implemented safeguards for the firearm and to submit to a psychological evaluation or risk assessment. Plaintiff disputed defendant's account, asserting the firearm is usually kept in a locked gun safe that can only be opened with her fingerprint. Plaintiff later certified she brought the firearm with her on the camping trip, placed it unloaded in the manufacturer's box, and secured it with a child resistant trigger lock. Plaintiff further asserted that the trigger lock made the gun inoperable without a key, which she kept on her person. On the same day as the OTSC was filed, the judge granted defendant's application ex parte and ordered the three children to reside with him with no in-person parenting time with plaintiff. The order A-3181-24 14 also permitted plaintiff to have FaceTime with the children for no more than fifteen minutes each day. On the evening of July 1, 2025, police were dispatched to plaintiff's residence to enforce the order. After police arrived, J.V. was summoned from the basement and stated he did not want to leave. Police officers explained to J.V. he did not have a choice, leading plaintiff to advise him he could make his own decision. The police then confirmed with the Division that J.V. would not be placed at risk if he was returned to defendant's home. Plaintiff was then advised the issue could rise to the level of criminality if she did not comply with the order, but she did not comply, which later resulted in her arrest for contempt in front of J.V. In a July 7, 2025 letter from plaintiff to the judge, she claimed that after J.V. was removed from her home on July 1, 2025, and returned to defendant's custody he endured questioning from defendant, which kept him awake until 4:00 a.m. Separately, Hoboken University Medical Center's (HUMC) record states that, upon returning to defendant's residence, J.V. was "screaming and saying delusional things," after which defendant called emergency medical services, and J.V. was admitted to HUMC for a psychiatric evaluation. On July 2, 2025, after receiving letters from each party's counsel and A-3181-24 15 holding a remote hearing, the judge issued a briefing schedule, directed plaintiff to turn over all firearms and ammunition to her counsel by 11:00 a.m., on July 3, 2025, and directed both counsel to review the HUMC discharge summary and confer on J.V.'s placement upon his release. The judge noted that if the discharge summary stated J.V. should be returned to plaintiff rather than defendant, then J.V. should be returned to plaintiff. Defendant informed the judge that plaintiff did not turn over her weapons or ammunition. The same day, plaintiff's counsel was in possession of plaintiff's weapons and ammunition and was directed to cooperate with the police department on what to do with them. On July 7, 2025, defendant's counsel wrote a letter to the judge claiming plaintiff went to HUMC to visit J.V. in violation of the July 1, 2025 order. Defendant alleged plaintiff gave documents to the hospital staff suggesting J.V. be released to her custody. In a response letter , plaintiff's counsel denied the allegations. The judge discussed with HUMC staff whether J.V. should be placed with plaintiff or defendant upon his release. The hospital staff was of the "firm opinion" that J.V. should be placed with plaintiff based on their observations of J.V.'s interaction with defendant and J.V. informing the social worker that he felt emotionally safe with plaintiff while defendant invalidated his feelings. In A-3181-24 16 addition, J.V. informed the social worker that he had a very poor relationship with defendant's current wife. Based on this information, the judge issued an order on July 7, 2025, directing J.V. to be turned over to plaintiff at the police station, the parenting schedule for the other two children revert to what was in existence prior to the first OTSC, and that plaintiff ensure all recommendations set forth in the discharge summary be adhered to. In a second July 7, 2025 order, the judge addressed the allegations regarding plaintiff appearing at HUMC in violation of the court's previous orders. The judge directed plaintiff to explain those allegations and to admit to the violation if it did occur because if she challenged the allegations , and the judge determined that she did, defendant would be subject to a litany of remedies. On July 9, 2025, defendant filed an OTSC alleging plaintiff did not comply with the July 2, 2025 and July 3, 2025 orders directing her to surrender all ammunition to law enforcement. In his supporting certification, defendant stated he was in the process of applying for a Temporary Extreme Risk Protective Order (TERPO), and that plaintiff "intentionally" retained the firearms and ammunition. As a consequence, defendant requested that plaintiff's parenting time be suspended indefinitely and physical custody of the children A-3181-24 17 be given to him. Defendant also requested sanctions issue against plaintiff for violating the July 2, 2025 and July 3, 2025 orders. The judge denied defendant's OTSC in its entirety. On July 14, 2025, plaintiff filed a notice of "cross-motion," seeking to deny defendant's OTSC in its entirety, directing the parties to abide by the PC's recommendations for J.V.'s parenting time, and for the judge to conduct an in camera interview of J.V. prior to parenting time resuming with defendant. Plaintiff also sought an order finding defendant in violation of the November 22, 2024, and June 6, 2025 orders, to direct him to comply with the previous orders, provide proof the children's passports had been submitted, and that medical insurance was cancelled. In addition, plaintiff requested the judge direct defendant to comply with the PC's recommendations, direct the PC to verify defendant is seeing a therapist as required by the MSA, and for an award of counsel fees. Plaintiff requested oral argument. On July 17, 2025, defendant filed a reply certification in opposition to plaintiff's cross-motion and in further support of his OTSC and made supplemental requests for relief on July 1, 2025 and July 7, 2025. Defendant asserted that "none" of plaintiff's representations set forth in her certification should be accepted as true. In addition, he renewed his request to suspend A-3181-24 18 plaintiff's parenting time, for the appointment of a GAL, psychological and risk assessments, and counsel fees, and argued that plaintiff had violated prior court orders, engaged in parental alienation, and unsafe firearm practices. On July 22, 2025, the judge held a hearing at which he reviewed the history of the case, the pending applications, and issued a decision. Defendant argued the pending issues should not be resolved on the papers because there were disputed issues of material fact requiring a plenary hearing. The judge held the firearm issue that prompted the July 1 emergent relief had been addressed. Regarding the custody and parenting time issues, the judge set deadlines for written discovery and depositions and directed counsel to confer regarding appointment of a joint or separate best-interests evaluator. On the same day, the judge also issued an order arising out of the emergent OTSC proceedings. The judge denied defendant's motion to stay paragraph one of the June 6, 2025 order regarding the $1,607.80 amount, and paragraph three to compel compliance with the June 28, 2024 order regarding the PC's recommendations. The judge denied defendant's motion to strike the PC's June 6, 2025 recommendation and her amended June 9, 2025 recommendation. The judge sua sponte directed the parties to engage in co-parenting and reunification therapy for defendant and J.V., denied defendant's motion for a credit against A-3181-24 19 the PC's future invoices, and denied his motion to enforce paragraph four of the June 6, 2025, order. Further, the judge determined that the emergency surrounding S.V.'s access to a firearm and bullets had been abated. The judge denied defendant's requests for appointment of a GAL, to suspend plaintiff's parenting time pending a psychological evaluation and risk assessment, for sanctions and attorney's fees. The judge then addressed plaintiff's cross-motion and granted her request for the parties to abide by the PC's recommendations. The judge ordered the production of J.V.'s discharge summary from HUMC before ruling on whether there was a need to interview J.V. The judge also granted plaintiff's cross- motion to enforce the November 22, 2024, and June 6, 2025 orders, and denied the passport, medical insurance, and verification of defendant's therapy issues as moot. The judge granted plaintiff's cross-motion to compel compliance with the June 6, 2025 PC recommendations and directed counsel to confer and advise on a best-interests evaluator. On July 28, 2025, defendant filed a notice of appeal based on the July 22, 2025, order under docket number A-3747-24. On September 18, 2025, defendant moved to consolidate the appeals, which we granted. A-3181-24 20 Before us, defendant argues the judge erred and abused his discretion by: (1) denying defendant's request twice to appoint a GAL pursuant to Rule 5:8B; (2) failing to establish an FF docket for J.V.; (3) twice failing to adjudicate plaintiff in violation of N.J.S.A. 9:6-1, for committing abuse and neglect; (4) twice denying defendant's request to undergo a psychological, evaluation or a formal risk assessment; (5) denying defendant's request to strike the PC's recommendations by endowing the PC with the power to alter custody and parenting time regarding J.V.; (6) denying defendant's request to enforce the MSA against plaintiff for denying his parenting time with J.V. and not ordering sanctions pursuant to Rules 5:3- 7(a), and 1:10-3; (7) ordering sua sponte that post-judgment discovery and best interest[s] evaluations be conducted and by issuing inconsistent and inaccurate rulings, which prejudiced the proceedings, himself, and the children; (8) granting plaintiff's request to be reimbursed $1,607.80, and compelling defendant to cancel health insurance coverage for the children in contravention of the MSA; (9) failing to conduct oral argument prior to rendering the June 6, 2025 order; and (10) denying defendant's request for counsel fees pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c). A-3181-24 21 I. Our review of a Family Part order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). A Family Part judge "possess[es] special expertise in the field of domestic relations." Id. at 412. Additionally, a Family Part judge has jurisdiction over "[a]ll actions in which the principal claim is unique to and arises out of a family or family-type relationship." R. 5:1-2(a). "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413. Accordingly, a Family Part judge's factual findings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Gonzalez-Posse v. Ricciardulli, 410 N.J. Super. 340, 354 (App. Div. 2009). Abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). However, we review a Family Part judge's interpretation of the law de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012). A Family Part judge "possesses broad equitable powers to accomplish substantial justice" and may tailor an appropriate remedy for violation of its A-3181-24 22 orders. Finger v. Zenn, 335 N.J. Super. 438, 446 (App. Div. 2000). An order to enforce litigant's rights under Rule 1:10-3 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wear v. Selective Ins. Co., 455 N.J. Super. 440, 458-59 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011)). Likewise, an award of attorney's fees "will be disturbed only on the rarest of occasions, and then only because of a clear abuse of discretion." Packard-Bamberger & Co. v. Collier, 167 N.J. 427, 444 (2001) (quoting Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292, 317 (1995)). II. A. Defendant argues the judge abused his discretion by denying his request to appoint a GAL. Pursuant to Rule 5:8B(a), the judge has discretion to appoint a GAL in a dispute between parties regarding custody and parenting time . Isaacson v. Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. 560, 573 (App. Div. 2002). Rule 5:8B(a) provides in pertinent part: (a) Appointment. In all cases in which custody or parenting time/visitation is an issue, a [GAL] may be appointed by court order to represent the best interest[s] of the child or children if the circumstances warrant such an appointment. The services rendered by a [GAL] shall be to the court on behalf of the child. A [GAL] may be appointed by the court on its own motion or on application of either or both of the parents. The A-3181-24 23 [GAL] shall file a written report with the court setting forth findings and recommendations and the basis thereof, and shall be available to testify and shall be subject to cross-examination thereon. [R. 5:8B(a).] In J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 333 (2013), our Court explained that the appointment of a GAL lies in the discretion of the judge because they are informed by the experience they gain by sitting through a daily docket of matters. J.B., 215 N.J. at 333. Defendant, relying on our decision Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184 (App. Div. 2012), argues the GAL would act "as an independent fact finder, investigator, and evaluator as to what furthers the best interest[s] of the child." Ibid. (quoting In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 173 (1994)). Defendant maintains the judge abused his discretion because the record contained ample evidence warranting an independent investigation into the children's best interests by a GAL. Defendant asserts the judge misstated the role and purpose of a GAL by stating that the GAL can perform the same function as a best interests evaluator, but not other tasks, such as a risk assessment of the homes or reviewing the Division's records. Finally, defendant contends that the judge failed to assign the proper weight to the evidence presented. We disagree. A-3181-24 24 Here, the judge acted well-within his purview to deny the appointment of a GAL. Our Court made it clear that the appointment of a GAL is in the discretion of the judge because they are well-informed through their experience to determine if a GAL is appropriate. J.B., 215 N.J. at 333. Moreover, Rule 5:8B(a) specifically states that a GAL "may" be appointed. R. 5:8B(a). The decision is clearly discretionary, and the judge is under no obligation to grant the motion. Isaacson, 348 N.J. Super. at 573. In addition, in his June 6, 2025 order, the judge specifically noted that nothing was presented warranting the appointment of a GAL. The judge reasoned that defendant did not identify what was sought by way of a GAL, which rendered the request meritless. The judge was well within his discretion to deny appointment of a GAL and order a best interests evaluation instead. Therefore, we reject defendant's argument. B. Next, defendant asserts that the judge abused his discretion by denying his request to establish an "FF" docket. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-86 provides: Whenever the court receives a petition from court intake services stating that a juvenile-family crisis may exist the court shall hold a hearing and consider the facts and recommendations submitted by intake services in order to determine the appropriate disposition to be made. The court shall notify the A-3181-24 25 juvenile, his parent or guardian or other family member alleged in the petition as contributing to the family crisis that a juvenile-family crisis may exist. The juvenile, parent, guardian, or other family member may present witnesses and evidence to rebut the determination. If the court finds that there is not enough information to make a disposition it may continue the matter and hold one or more additional hearings. The court shall enter an order of disposition if it finds that a juvenile-family crisis exists as provided in section 27 of P.L. 1982, c. 77 (C. 2A:4A-46). In support of any such order, the court may require the juvenile, parent, guardian or family member contributing to the crisis, to participate in appropriate programs and services consistent with the disposition. The court may dismiss the petition upon a finding that based upon the preponderance of the evidence presented the petition is not sufficient to establish that a juvenile-family crisis exists. The court shall state the grounds for any disposition made pursuant to this section. In the case of failure of any person to comply with any orders entered pursuant to this section, the court may proceed against such person for the enforcement