Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0911-25 A-1462-25 L.K.A.,1 Plaintiff-Appellant, v. M.B.K., Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Argued September 30, 2026 – Decided October 23, 2026 Before Judges Marczyk and Puglisi. On appeal from interlocutory orders of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FM-16-1280-23. John D. McCarthy argued the cause for appellant (Schenck Price Smith & King, LLP, attorneys; John D. McCarthy, of counsel and on the briefs). Seth R. Parker argued the cause for respondent (Moskowitz Law Group, attorneys; Seth R. Parker and Galit Moskowitz, on the briefs). 1 We use initials to protect the identities of the parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). PER CURIAM In these two appeals, calendared back-to-back for the purpose of issuing a single opinion, we granted plaintiff L.K.A. leave to appeal from two interlocutory orders entered by the Family Part on September 19 and December 18, 2025, denying plaintiff's motion for recusal, and an order dated October 28, 2025, denying plaintiff's reconsideration of her request for attorney's fees. We reverse the orders denying plaintiff's recusal motions. We also vacate the October 28, 2025 order regarding attorney's fees related to the litigation fund and remand for that issue to be addressed by another judge. I. Plaintiff and defendant M.B.K. married in Syria in 2011 and moved to New Jersey in 2013. They have two children, ages eight and eleven. Plaintiff filed for divorce in March 2023. A. Temporary Restraining Orders and Related Proceedings. In May 2023, plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant. Defendant then obtained a TRO against plaintiff. Both parties also filed complaints against each other in municipal court. On July 5, 2023, both parties agreed to dismiss their TROs and entered into a consent order providing for civil restraints. The civil restraints required A-0911-25 2 the parties to have "no contact or communications with one another other than non-harassing, businesslike communications regarding the children . . . ." Plaintiff alleges the day the civil restraints were entered, defendant followed her and N.A.,2 plaintiff's close friend, from the courthouse to the parties' children's summer camp. She claims defendant forced himself into her car despite requests from both plaintiff and N.A. that he leave. In November 2023, defendant filed a civil complaint against plaintiff for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, defamation, tortious interference with contract, as well as other causes of action. Plaintiff unsuccessfully moved to consolidate the civil and matrimonial cases. Plaintiff obtained a second TRO in February 2024. After a seven-day trial, the court dismissed the TRO and denied entry of a final restraining order. Plaintiff later obtained a third TRO, which was dismissed. B. The Parties' Finances, Motion for Pendente Lite Support and Remand Proceedings. Plaintiff alleges defendant is a high earner with significant assets. She maintains he owns an international company that owns the rights to several television programs in Syria. She asserts his company reported $13,383,090 in 2 We anonymize this witness to preserve her privacy. A-0911-25 3 gross receipts and, as of July 2024, defendant's Citigold Private Client account had a balance of $3,120,813.09. According to plaintiff, defendant owns real estate in New Jersey and outside of the country estimated to be worth over $2 million, which defendant acquired during the marriage. Defendant claims his income is only $100,000. Plaintiff is an online influencer who promotes products on social media. In addition, she works part-time as a Zumba instructor. Plaintiff claims her 2023 tax returns indicate she earned $29,750. In June 2023, plaintiff moved for pendente lite support, including a litigation fund. A prior judge attempted to resolve the matter without success and later retired. The case was eventually assigned to the trial judge whose orders are the subject of this appeal. The judge entertained oral argument and, on August 19, 2024, ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $5,000 per month in child support and $25,000 for attorney's fees as part of a preliminary litigation fund. In September 2024, plaintiff moved for reconsideration regarding the attorney's fee aspect of the August 19 order related to the litigation fund. She also asserted she incurred extensive fees in the matrimonial, domestic violence, municipal court, and civil cases. On December 23, 2024, the trial court denied the reconsideration motion. A-0911-25 4 On January 30, 2025, this court granted plaintiff leave to appeal from the trial court's order denying the reconsideration motion. We vacated the court's order and remanded for further proceedings because the court did not analyze each of the factors set forth under Rule 5:3-5, nor did it determine how the facts applied to its legal conclusions. Alassil v. Khair, No. A-1573-24 (App. Div. Sep. 29, 2025) (slip op. at 7). Additionally, we noted plaintiff was not entitled to request attorney's fees under the Family Part docket for the costs she incurred to defend the separate civil, criminal, and domestic violence cases. Ibid. At the remand hearing on October 28, 2025, the court found both parties lacked credibility regarding their respective incomes. Previously, the trial court ordered the parties to retain forensic accountants, but plaintiff indicated she had not done so because she did not have the funds. Defendant retained a forensic accountant who had not yet valued plaintiff's income. The trial court again denied plaintiff's application for counsel fees and reaffirmed its December 23, 2024 order, declaring the parties may move to replenish the litigation fund as discovery was exchanged. A-0911-25 5 C. Plaintiff's Recusal Motion and Remand Proceedings. In October 2024, N.A. informed plaintiff the trial judge in this case had recused herself in a Family Part matter involving N.A. and her husband, A.M.3 Plaintiff later learned the judge's relatives knew plaintiff and defendant. Specifically, the judge's brother attended plaintiff and defendant's son's birthday party in 2019, where he and defendant were photographed together. Plaintiff was also a close friend of the trial judge's sister-in-law, who stopped speaking to plaintiff after she filed for divorce but still followed plaintiff on Instagram. In addition, another sister-in-law of the judge follows plaintiff on Instagram. Plaintiff further contends the judge's aunt, who lives in the same apartment complex as defendant, also follows her on Instagram. On January 6, 2025, plaintiff's counsel wrote to the trial judge seeking her disqualification because of various connections between the parties in the present case and the judge's family members and friends. Counsel noted the judge had previously recused herself from N.A.'s case, and N.A. had "actively participated" in plaintiff's matrimonial case and appeared in court with plaintiff before the prior judge. Counsel was directed to file a motion. 3 We anonymize this witness to preserve his privacy. A-0911-25 6 On January 22, 2025, plaintiff moved to disqualify the trial judge and submitted a supplemental certification highlighting additional potential conflicts. Plaintiff recounted she spoke with the judge's aunt, the aunt's daughter, and the judge's sister-in-law and asserted they all followed plaintiff on social media. Furthermore, plaintiff and defendant belong to the same mosque as the judge. Plaintiff noted the judge recently attended the funeral for the mother of defendant's close friend. Plaintiff also again referenced the judge previously recusing herself from N.A.'s case, although plaintiff did not clearly state that N.A. would be a witness at trial. On September 19, 2025, the trial judge heard oral argument on plaintiff 's recusal motion. The court denied the application, finding no close relationship existed between the judge's family and either plaintiff or defendant sufficient to call the judge's impartiality into question. She acknowledged her family and N.A.'s family had known each other for many years. She characterized the relationship with N.A.'s family as a "close and personal relationship." She further noted "there was a legitimate reason for me to recuse myself in her particular case." The judge did not, however, address plaintiff's letter to the court advising N.A. was "actively participating" in this case. A-0911-25 7 Moreover, the judge determined plaintiff's other arguments lacked merit. In particular, the judge found unpersuasive the fact her aunt lived in the same apartment complex as defendant. Because plaintiff and the judge's sister-in-law no longer had a close relationship, the court found recusal was not warranted. Likewise, the judge concluded the photo of her brother with defendant at the parties' son's birthday party in 2019 does not demonstrate a close and personal relationship. Regarding the judge belonging to the same mosque as the parties and attending the funeral of the mother of defendant's friend, the judge stated: Am I precluded . . . from presiding over cases [for] any . . . members [who] attend there? It's a little discriminatory. It's a little bit racist to accuse me of that. That would mean that a Jewish judge would not be able to have any Jewish litigants in front of them, because they may attend the same community center or . . . synagogue. I'll take it a step further. It may also mean that an Italian judge couldn't have Italian litigants in front of them and . . . I do find that offensive. The trial judge also highlighted plaintiff sought recusal only after receiving an unfavorable ruling in the attorney's fee order. The judge reasoned if plaintiff had been as close to the judge's sister-in-law as she claimed, she would have recognized her sister-in-law shared her last name. Given the judge's relatives followed plaintiff on social media, the judge suggested plaintiff A-0911-25 8 initially believed those connections would work to her advantage, and she delayed seeking recusal until after an adverse ruling. We subsequently granted plaintiff's motion for leave to appeal the trial court's denial of the recusal motion. We also granted plaintiff's motion to supplement the record to include new evidence supporting recusal. In her application to supplement the record, plaintiff stated she visited Syria in September 2025 and later became aware of an Instagram video mocking her and her trip to Syria. The video portrays a woman wearing a hijab in a similar style as plaintiff's with lipstick worn in an exaggerated manner. Plaintiff further stated the mother of the trial judge's law clerk created the video along with some friends. Plaintiff believes the clerk's mother is the trial judge's close friend. When the law clerk's mother posted the video, plaintiff asserted the trial judge and her law clerk were following the clerk's mother on Instagram. We ordered a limited remand for the court to reconsider the recusal motion in light of the new allegations and to provide a detailed statement of reasons for its decision. As a result, the trial court issued another order denying plaintiff 's recusal motion on December 18, 2025. The trial judge denied being her law clerk's mother's close friend and noted the relatives of a judicial employee are not bound by the Code of Conduct for Judicial Employees. Nevertheless, the A-0911-25 9 court reassigned the matter to another law clerk but denied the application, finding the judge's continued participation in the case created no appearance of impropriety. This court granted plaintiff leave to appeal from the interlocutory orders denying recusal and denying an increase in attorney's fees for the litigation fund. II. Before us, plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in denying the recusal motion. She further contends the judge erred in denying her reconsideration motion regarding the litigation fund issue. Because we conclude the judge should have recused herself, we confine our discussion to the recusal issues and remand for a new judge to consider plaintiff's application for attorney's fees related to the litigation fund. The trial court's order to grant or deny a motion for recusal is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. McCabe, 201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "However, we review de A-0911-25 10 novo whether the judge applied the proper legal standard." Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 2019) (citing McCabe, 201 N.J. at 45). Plaintiff argues the trial judge erred in denying her recusal motion because the "trial judge and her family and friends are intimately intertwined with the parties and witnesses in this case." She notes the judge previously recused herself from another matter involving N.A., whom plaintiff intends to call as a witness at trial in this case. According to plaintiff, there is, at the very least, an appearance of impropriety under Rule 1:12-1(g). Plaintiff argues, in light of the judge's acknowledged relationship with N.A., she should have recused herself here, as both N.A. and A.M. are expected to testify in the divorce trial. Because the trial judge will be required to evaluate their credibility, plaintiff maintains recusal in this matter is also necessary. Plaintiff further highlights the trial judge's family members' purported close relationship with the parties. Because we determine below the judge must be disqualified based on her relationship with N.A. alone, we need not address the judge's findings regarding the other alleged conflicts. Judges are required to comport themselves in a manner that "promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the A-0911-25 11 judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Code of Jud. Conduct r. 2.1; see also In re Reddin, 221 N.J. 221, 227 (2015). Judges must recuse themselves from "proceedings in which their impartiality or the appearance of their impartiality might reasonably be questioned," Code of Jud. Conduct r. 3.17(b), or if "there is any other reason which might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment, or which might reasonably lead counsel or the parties to believe so." R. 1:12-1(g). To determine if an appearance of impropriety exists, we must discern whether "a reasonable, fully informed person [would] have doubts about the judge's impartiality." DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008); see also Code of Jud. Conduct, r. 2.1 cmt. 3. However, "the belief that the proceedings were unfair must be objectively reasonable." McCabe, 201 N.J. at 43 (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 279 (1997)). Because "the mere appearance of bias may require disqualification," a party is not always compelled "to prove actual prejudice on the part of the court." Ibid. A judge's withdrawal from a case "upon a mere suggestion" of disqualification is improper. Panitch v. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. 63, 66 (App. Div. 2001). A judge should not step aside from a case "unless the alleged cause of recusal is known by him to exist or is shown to be true in fact." Hundred E. A-0911-25 12 Credit Corp. v. Eric Schuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986); see also Marshall, 148 N.J. at 276 (stating "judges are not free to err on the side of caution; it is improper for a court to recuse itself unless the factual bas es for its disqualification are shown by the movant to be true or are already known by the court"). Disqualification must rest on a factual basis, as adverse rulings alone do not warrant disqualification. Marshall, 148 N.J. at 276. Following our review of the record and the governing legal framework above, we conclude the trial judge misapplied her discretion in denying plaintiff's recusal motion. Although the judge characterized the recusal motion essentially as plaintiff's attempt to judge-shop following an adverse ruling, she did not squarely address the underlying conflict involving N.A.4 Under Rule 1:12-1(g), the judge's continued participation in this matter would be improper because she previously acknowledged a close familial relationship with N.A. 4 Plaintiff's counsel represented he moved for recusal, in part, because the court's ruling on the attorney's fees issue was "so, humbly, inappropriate under the circumstances that we had to go further and [make] this application . . . ." Although we ultimately conclude the judge should have recused herself, we do not condone plaintiff's counsel's conduct of only moving to disqualify the judge after an adverse ruling. A party's dissatisfaction with a judge's ruling, by itself, does not constitute a valid basis for recusal. Marshall, 148 N.J. at 279. If counsel believed there was a conflict, a motion should have promptly been filed upon learning that information. Nevertheless, when there is an independent basis for recusal, such as the situation before us regarding N.A. appearing as a witness, we are satisfied the court should have granted the motion for recusal. A-0911-25 13 and she recused herself from N.A.'s case. The judge's prior recusal warrants disqualification where a fully informed person would have doubts about the judge's impartiality. Plaintiff represents she intends to call N.A. and A.M. as witnesses at trial, at which time the court would be required to assess their credibility. Under these circumstances, we determine there exists a basis for the judge to recuse herself, given her impartiality would fairly be called into question. DeNike, 196 at 517. We are mindful plaintiff's motion for recusal was not a model of clarity regarding N.A.'s involvement in this case because it is not clear the judge was advised N.A. was a potential witness. Although plaintiff now maintains she intends to call N.A. as a witness at trial—and there appears to be a legitimate basis to do so—in the initial letter to the judge seeking her disqualification, plaintiff only stated N.A. was actively participating in the case. Moreover, plaintiff also suggested the judge recused herself from N.A.'s case because the court "recognized her from the Syrian community." The judge correctly determined that simply because she and N.A. were both part of the local Syrian community did not require her to recuse herself from N.A.'s case. Rather, she explained she recused herself in N.A.'s underlying case because of their families' close relationship. However, the judge should have inquired further when A-0911-25 14 advised N.A. was actively participating in this case. Doing so would have revealed plaintiff intended to call her as a witness. Had the judge recognized N.A.'s potential involvement in this matter, we trust she would have recognized the conflict under Rule 1:12-1(g). Accordingly, we reverse the trial judge's order denying plaintiff's recusal motion. Given our determination the judge should have recused herself, we remand for a new judge to consider plaintiff's application regarding the attorney's fee issues related to the litigation fund. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for further proceedings. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-0911-25 15