Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2823-25 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION November 20, 2026 v. APPELLATE DIVISION M.A.R.,1 Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Argued October 19, 2026 – Decided November 20, 2026 Before Judges Sabatino, Perez Friscia, and Torregrossa-O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 25-05- 1003. Maura Murphy Sullivan, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney; Maura Murphy Sullivan, of counsel and on the brief). Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Stefan Van Jura, of counsel and on the brief). 1 We use initials pursuant to R. 1:38-3 (d)(12). The opinion of the court was delivered by PEREZ FRISCIA, J.A.D. The State of New Jersey appeals from the March 27, 2026 trial court order granting defendant M.A.R.'s motion to dismiss the indictment charging her with interference with custody, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a)(4), based on the State's alleged speedy trial violation. The State contends the court erred in finding defendant's Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated under the factors established in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530- 33 (1972), because the court improperly used the date defendant allegedly committed the offense in calculating the speedy trial period, rather than the date of her arrest, and considered the pre-indictment period. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand. We hold the date of defendant's arrest was the proper starting point for determining whether her right to a speedy trial was violated. I. We summarize the facts and procedural history from the record, which is largely undisputed. On November 26, 2023, at approximately 8:42 p.m., Camden County Metro Police ("CCMP") received a report of a missing child. S.R. reported that she had been awarded primary custody of her niece, M.R., pursuant to a Family Part order. Defendant was M.R.'s mother, and the Family A-2823-25 2 Part order specified she was only permitted to have supervised parenting time conducted by S.R. or the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division"). S.R. had dropped M.R. off at "her grandfather's residence" for Thanksgiving, but when she returned to pick M.R. up, she learned defendant had taken the child to an undisclosed location in Delaware. S.R. maintained defendant's removal of M.R. was a direct violation of the Family Part's custody and supervised parenting time order. CCMP thereafter attempted to contact defendant on her cell phone. After reaching defendant, she told an officer M.R. was "supposed to be home" and asked "what[ does] that got to do with me?" Defendant then disconnected the call. CCMP recovered surveillance footage from a neighbor's home showing that on November 26, 2023, at about 2:03 p.m., defendant left the home with M.R. The Division was notified about the incident. CCMP learned from S.R. that she had successfully contacted defendant and learned defendant had taken M.R. to Wilmington, Delaware. A "ping" of defendant's cell phone confirmed she was near Wilmington. CCMP officers recorded the witnesses' statements on their body worn cameras ("BWC"). Shortly before midnight, CCMP received an anonymous email tip that defendant had returned M.R. to her grandfather's residence. The next day, A-2823-25 3 CCMP charged defendant on a warrant with interference with custody, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-4(a)(4).2 On July 27, 2024, approximately eight months after the offense, defendant was arrested on the warrant and on an unrelated violation of probation ("VOP") warrant. Defendant had previously been convicted of eluding arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b), in an unrelated case and sentenced to a three-year period of probation in September 2019. Defendant's VOP charged her with failing to report and "abscond[ing]." On April 30, 2025, a grand jury indicted defendant for second-degree interference with custody. She thereafter moved to dismiss the indictment based on the State's alleged speedy trial violation. At the motion hearing, defendant argued the court should apply the four - factor speedy trial test established in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33,3 and dismiss 2 The warrant indicates the offense occurred on November 26, 2023, and CCMP obtained it on November 27, 2023. However, the warrant does not specify whether defendant was charged with the third-degree offense or second-degree offense pursuant to subsection (4)(ii) for taking "the child . . . for more than [twenty-four] hours." We note a CCMP police report indicated the intended charge was for third-degree interference with custody, corresponding to the shorter time frame. 3 In Barker, A-2823-25 4 the indictment. Defendant maintained that since more than one year had passed from the date of her alleged offense, the court had the "presumptive need to review . . . all four of the [Barker] factors." Regarding speedy trial precedent establishing that the period should be calculated from the date of arrest or indictment, defendant argued the facts in this case were "distinguishable." She asserted the court should consider the entire time from the offense until indictment because the investigation had been "finished . . . within [forty-eight] hours," and defendant was the sole known suspect. In addressing the cause of the delay, including the State's argument that defendant was a fugitive with an unknown address and a last known location in Delaware, defendant asserted the State had to "kn[o]w where she was." Further, defendant argued she met the third Barker factor because she timely "asserted her right" to a speedy trial. Regarding the fourth factor, defendant maintained she suffered prejudice from undue stress and the State's failure "to the United States Supreme Court established a balancing test to evaluate claims of speedy trial violations. The Court identified four non-exclusive factors that a court should assess when a defendant asserts that the government denied his[ or her] right to a speedy trial: length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right by a defendant, and prejudice to the defendant. [State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 264 (2013) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).] A-2823-25 5 preserve various forms of evidence." She contended the State failed to preserve or lost evidence, including the CCMP officer's phone call asking her about M.R.'s location and BWC footage "from . . . the investigation." The State opposed defendant's motion, arguing there had been no unreasonable delay. The State represented defendant could not have been arrested, as her location was unknown. In addressing defendant's cell phone "ping" after the offense, the State explained that it obtained a "1[,]200 meter[]" radius of the phone's location, which was approximately "three quarters of a mile" in the Wilmington area. Further, CCMP and the Camden County Prosecutor's Office had requested from the Division an address for defendant, but the last known address the probation department had was in Camden. The State highlighted it knew defendant had traveled back to New Jersey because she was captured on video later dropping off M.R. The State explained the Delaware State Police were contacted, and defendant's information was entered into the National Crime Information Center to ensure "if she were to encounter law enforcement it would have popped up." Addressing the prejudice from the delay in arresting defendant, the State argued defendant's flight was to its "detriment." With respect to the decision whether to indict a defendant whose whereabouts were unknown, the State explained there is no guideline or A-2823-25 6 requirement that the State must indict a defendant before an arrest. Further, the State noted a safeguard exists when a defendant is detained, because the State has ninety days to present the case to a grand jury. See R. 3:25-4(b). The State emphasized this case was with the Special Victims Unit and presentments were based on a number of factors, including a priority assessment based on the nature of a case's complexity and a review of case volume. Moreover, the State emphasized that the court was to consider, under the speedy trial case precedent, the delay "from the date of arrest or indictment, whichever is earlier," until the motion or trial date. In addressing the time before indictment here, the State represented "that the assigned detective was out for medical leave" for some time and had since "medically retired." As to defendant's allegation that there was missing BWC footage and a recorded police phone call to her, the State confirmed all the existing BWC footage was turned over and there was no recorded phone call. The State maintained there was no support for defendant's assertion that evidence from CCMP was missing or spoliation occurred. After the court inquired why it should not "run" the speedy trial "clock" from when the State knew "about . . . the facts, and in fact . . . had charged [defendant]," the State asserted the court was obligated to undertake a due A-2823-25 7 process analysis in considering the passage of time prior to defendant's arrest. The State maintained that to show a due process violation defendant had "the burden to establish both that there was no legitimate reason for the delay and [s]he was prejudice[d]." It again argued "the length of delay between the offense and the arrest in this case . . . [was based on defendant] absenting herself from the jurisdiction." Citing Barker, the State argued the court had to consider under the speedy trial analysis that the arrest occurred in July 2024, "there was . . . motion practice," and "[Division] records" were obtained. Further, the State maintained it extended a "pre-indictment global offer[,] which was rejected," and thereafter presented the case to the grand jury. During argument, the court accepted that the State had issued "a legitimate . . . warrant," defendant was "on the run for nine months," and she "violated probation" on a different offense. It found "the period of time from the point of indictment going forward . . . reflect[ed no] material problems" with delay. The court considered "the totality" of time but reserved decision because it recognized there was a "nuance here." On March 27, 2026, the court issued an oral decision granting defendant's speedy trial motion to dismiss the indictment, which the court thereafter memorialized in its March 30 order. The court framed the "issue before . . . [it a]s whether the [eighteen]-month delay between [defendant]'s A-2823-25 8 alleged offense and her indictment constitutes a violation of her constitutional right to a speedy trial, [requiring] dismissal of the indictment under the Barker" factors. In considering defendant's speedy trial delay argument, the court focused on the fact that the State's "present[ment of] the case to the [g]rand [j]ury" occurred "approximately [eighteen] months after the alleged offense." The court determined the State failed to explain why it "delay[ed] indictment for a year and a half" and how defendant's purported flight from the State and pending arrest impacted the State's decision. The court noted the State argued defendant was "not arrested until July 27, 2024, due to her absconding from probation and concealing her whereabouts despite law enforcement diligence in issuing and entering warrants." However, the court emphasized that the State routinely indicts such individuals and could have indicted defendant. The State's reasons for not indicting defendant during "the pre-arrest period" were found by the court "to [not] be credible." The court ruled "[p]roof of actual trial prejudice is not . . . a condition precedent to the vindication of the speedy trial guarantee." As to defendant's prejudice, the court noted her failure to report to the probation department and the VOP preexisted the present charge but found "some prejudice due to anxiety" from having this case pending. The court A-2823-25 9 found "all four [Barker] factors . . . marginally" in favor of defendant but that "the length of the delay [wa]s significant." It afforded the "greatest weight in this case" to the State's "lack of justification for the [eighteen-month] delay." The State moved to stay the dismissal of defendant's indictment, which the court denied and the State did not appeal. This appeal followed. On appeal, the State contends the following point: POINT I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN DISMISSING THE INDICTMENT. A MERE NINE MONTHS ELAP[S]ED BETWEEN DEFENDANT'S ARREST AND INDICTMENT, WHICH DID NOT VIOLATE HER SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS.4 II. In determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, a trial court's factual findings "should not be overturned unless clearly erroneous." State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2009). "When the decision to dismiss relies on a purely legal question, however, we review that 4 We note in opposition defendant requests that if we conclude the court erred in dismissing the State's indictment based on a violation of her Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, this matter should be remanded for the court to consider whether the State's delay violated her constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause. A-2823-25 10 determination de novo." State v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 480 N.J. Super. 526, 539 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting State v. Twiggs, 233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018)). Thus, "[i]f a trial court's discretionary decision is based upon a misconception of the law, a reviewing court owes that decision no particular deference." State v. Williams, 441 N.J. Super. 266, 272 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting State v. Lyons, 417 N.J. Super. 251, 258 (App. Div. 2010)). It is well-settled that "[t]he right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and imposed on the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Reyes-Rodriguez, 480 N.J. Super. at 543 (quoting Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 8). "The [federal] constitutional right . . . attaches upon defendant's arrest." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 8 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. Super. 183, 190 (App. Div. 2002)). Since it is the State's duty to promptly bring a case to trial, "[a]s a matter of fundamental fairness," it must avoid "excessive delay in completing a prosecution," or risk violating "defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial." Ibid. "[I]n criminal . . . matters, fundamental fairness demands that all parties β€” the State and the defense β€” seriously and diligently prepare and proceed to trial." Id. at 14. The United States Supreme Court announced a four-part test to determine if a defendant's speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment has A-2823-25 11 been violated in Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, which was adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976). Our Supreme Court has elucidated that the Barker "test requires the court to consider: (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether and how defendant asserted his[ or her] speedy trial right, and (4) the prejudice to defendant caused by the delay." State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 487 (2006) (citing Szima, 70 N.J. at 201). The United States Supreme Court has long stated that its "speedy trial cases hold that [the] Sixth Amendment right may attach before an indictment and as early as the time of 'arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.'" United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982)). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a defendant with separate constitutional protection against an unjustified delay in initiating prosecution. We have recognized that "[u]nlike analysis under the Sixth Amendment's Speedy Trial Clause . . . under which prejudice to the defense is presumed from an unusually long delay between indictment and trial, . . . claims under the Due Process Clause arising from undue pre[- ]indictment or pre-arrest delay are measured by a far more rigorous standard." State v. Alexander, 310 N.J. Super. 348, 353 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting State v. Aguirre, 287 N.J. Super. 128, 132 (App. Div. 1996)). "The Due Process A-2823-25 12 Clause imposes a limit on the extent to which prosecuting authorities may delay initiating a criminal prosecution after discovering an offense has been committed." Aguirre, 287 N.J. Super. at 131-32; see also Townsend, 186 N.J. at 488-89 (citing Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 192) (explaining that to establish an "excessive pre-indictment delay" resulted in a due process violation, the defendant must "show: (1) the State's delay in seeking the indictment was a deliberate attempt to gain an advantage over him[ or her], and (2) the delay caused defendant actual prejudice in his[ or her] ability to defend the charge"). A defendant bears the burden of establishing a violation of his or her speedy trial right. See State v. Berezansky, 386 N.J. Super. 84, 99 (App. Div. 2006). "[A]ny delay that defendant caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation." State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J. 345, 355 (1989)). III. The State argues the court erred as a matter of law in dismissing defendant's indictment because only nine months passed from her arrest until indictment. It contends the court improperly counted the time from the offense until indictment, calculating a total delay of eighteen months, in finding the State committed a speedy trial violation warranting dismissal of the indictment. The State specifically asserts reversal is warranted because had A-2823-25 13 the court not "inappropriately consider[ed] the pre-arrest delay, it would have denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment." Stated another way, the State maintains the court improperly considered and weighed heavily against the State the eight-month period before defendant's arrest when she evaded prosecution. Relevant to our review, as we have discussed in more detail above, the timeline of events is largely undisputed. Defendant allegedly committed the offense of interference with custody on November 26, 2023. The State issued a warrant for her arrest the next day. On July 27, 2024, defendant was arrested, and on April 30, 2025, a grand jury indicted her for interference with custody. Thus, the time elapsed from the November 2023 offense until the July 2024 arrest was about eight months, and the time from the arrest until the April 2025 indictment was about nine months, resulting in a total of approximately seventeen months from the alleged offense until indictment. As the court's speedy trial determination focused on the first and second Barker factors, we primarily address those findings. The court found "[t]he length of the delay [wa]s significant" and the "[eighteen]" month "delay" "was not warranted." It gave the greatest weight to the State's "lack of justification for the delay . . . in taking this matter to indictment," finding "[t]here was no need to have . . . defendant actually arrested." In the court's view, the State A-2823-25 14 was not prevented from indicting defendant prior to her arrest and "routinely" chose to indict defendants prior to arrest. Further, the court found the State's reasons for not indicting defendant even though she "was not in custody" were not credible, as it had seen cases where a defendant was indicted while "in flight." The court assigned marginal weight to the third and fourth Barker factors, noting defendant's speedy trial objection was established and she suffered prejudice. It is well-established that generally a "[d]efendant's right to a speedy trial attache[s] upon his[ or her] arrest." State v. Douglas, 322 N.J. Super. 156, 170 (App. Div. 1999); see also Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64, 65 (1975) (explaining that in assessing a speedy trial claim, the delay is counted from "indictment . . . or . . . the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge"). Further, "the protection of the [Sixth] Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been 'accused' in the course of that prosecution." Dillingham, 423 U.S. at 64-65 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971)). In addressing the length of the delay under the first Barker factor, we recognize that "[t]here is no set length of time that fixes the point at which delay is excessive." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 11. However, our Supreme A-2823-25 15 Court has elucidated that generally, "once the delay exceeds one year, it is appropriate to engage in the analysis of the remaining Barker factors." State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253, 266 (2013). Additionally, "Barker's second prong examines the length of a delay in light of the culpability of the parties." Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 12 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 529). Having reviewed the record and the court's decision, the applicable law requires us to reverse the dismissal of defendant's indictment. The court erred in using the date of the alleged offense as the initial event to calculate the speedy trial period and finding the State violated defendant's right to a speedy trial by failing to indict her pre-arrest. Although the court recited the parties' arguments, including defendant's unique circumstances argument, it did not substantively address the State's assertions regarding what occurred before and after defendant's arrest. In assigning heavy weight to the State's failure to indict defendant before her arrest, the court made no finding that the State deliberately delayed presenting the case to a grand jury nor did it explain how an earlier indictment would have resulted in less time between the offense date, defendant's arrest, and the matter proceeding to trial. Stated another way, in reviewing defendant's speedy trial motion the court was obligated to use the date of arrest in calculating the delay period, because defendant was undisputedly evading A-2823-25 16 arrest and the State did not deliberately delay prosecution by not seeking an earlier indictment. Again, no evidence showed a pre-arrest indictment would have resulted in defendant being arrested earlier than in July 2024. We therefore agree with the State that the court erroneously considered, under the first and second Barker factors, the eight months between the date of the offense and defendant's arrest in finding a speedy trial delay by the State. We further conclude the nine months that passed between defendant's arrest and indictment did not constitute a speedy trial violation. Our conclusion that there was no reason for the court to depart from using the date of arrest in its speedy trial analysis is supported by the State's uncontroverted representations regarding its efforts to locate defendant and defendant's failure to surrender on her VOP warrant. As highlighted by the State, after defendant allegedly committed the interference with custody offense, CCMP spoke with her regarding the allegations, a warrant for her arrest was issued, the "Delaware State Police were notified once [the] charge was authorized," and she absconded after allegedly dropping M.R. off. The State attempted to obtain an address for defendant in Delaware. Additionally, as of June 2022, defendant failed to report to the probation department, resulting in the VOP warrant for her arrest, which she also failed to surrender on. A-2823-25 17 We also add that the court did not sufficiently address the State's representations as to its indictment decisions nor analyze "the amount of time customarily required to dispose of similar charges." Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265. The State explained that the Special Victims Unit assessed its cases and presentment priority based on the need to indict detained defendants first, the case's "complex[ity]," and other factors. Cf. State v. Childs, 242 N.J. Super. 121, 129 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting State v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 127 (1979) (explaining the State "has broad discretion, which 'includes both the decision to prosecute an individual whom [it] has probable cause to believe has violated the law, and the converse decision to refrain from prosecuting any such offender'" subject to an abuse of discretion)). Notably, the court did not address the State's representations as to what occurred after defendant's arres t and made no finding that the State unreasonably delayed in indicting defendant after her arrest. Defendant has not demonstrated support for her argument that "exceptional circumstances" warranted counting the pre-arrest time. Thus, we conclude the court erred by using defendant's offense date as a starting point to calculate an eighteen-month speedy trial delay and determining the State was obligated to indict defendant before her arrest. Finally, we are unpersuaded by defendant's request that we remand this matter and direct the court to "assess whether the delay violated defendant's A-2823-25 18 right to due process of law" if we reverse the court's speedy trial determination. Although we decline defendant's request to remand for the "trial court to consider a related claim under the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fifth Amendment," defendant is not foreclosed from filing an appropriate motion in the future. R. 3:10-2(a). In sum, having concluded that the court's finding that the State violated defendant's right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment is unsupported, we reverse the court's March 30, 2026 dismissal order and reinstate the indictment. To the extent we have not addressed the parties' due process arguments, it is because we "decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court." State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015) (quoting State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20 (2009)). Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-2823-25 19