In the Matter of Rudolph Beu

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-0391-24 A-1794-24 A-2785-24 IN THE MATTER OF RUDOLPH BEU, VINELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT. ______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF ADAM AUSTINO, VINELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT. ______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THOMAS RIORDAN, VINELAND POLICE DEPARTMENT. ______________________________ Argued October 15, 2026 – Decided October 26, 2026 Before Judges Mawla, DeAlmeida, and Augostini. On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service Commission, CSC Docket Nos. 2024-2361, 2023-932, 2023-979, and 2022-9763. William F. Cook argued the cause for appellant City of Vineland (Brown & Connery LLP, attorneys; William F. Cook, on the briefs).  Colin G. Bell argued the cause for respondent Rudolph Beu in A-0391-24 (Hankin Palladino Weintrob Bell & Labov, attorneys; Colin G. Bell, on the brief). Katherine D. Hartman argued the cause for respondent Adam Austino in A-1794-24 (Attorneys Hartman Chartered, attorneys; Katherine D. Hartman, on the brief). Christopher St. John argued the cause for respondent Thomas Riordan in A-2785-24 (Law Office of Christopher St. John, attorneys; Christopher St. John, on the brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission in A- 0391-24 (Craig S. Keiser, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission in A- 1794-24 (Erin Gilgen, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission in A- 2785-24 (Charles A. Shadle, Deputy Attorney General, on the statement in lieu of brief). Thomas J. Reilly argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police in A- 0391-24 (Porzio, Bromberg & Newman PC, attorneys; Vito A. Gagliardi, Jr., of counsel; David L. Disler and Thomas J. Reilly, on the brief). PER CURIAM A-0391-24 2  In these three back-to-back appeals, appellant City of Vineland challenges January 17, March 20, and June 14, 2024 final administrative decisions by the Civil Service Commission upholding findings by three different administrative law judges (ALJ) reversing the removal of respondents Vineland Police Department (VPD) Chief Rudolph Beu, Captain Adam Austino, and Lieutenant Thomas Riordan. We affirm. The parties are familiar with the facts, which are also discussed in each ALJ's written opinion. We summarize them here. In 2015, Captain Matthew Finley expressed concerns to Chief Beu, then a captain, that then-Chief of Police Tim Codispoti was "flexing his work schedule." Then-Captain Beu gave Captain Finley approval to investigate the possible theft of time by Chief Codispoti. Around this time, Captain Austino learned of a cash account funded by fees paid to a training center he was assigned to derived from the sale of brass shell casings to a recycling company. He ordered staff to stop recycling the shell casings for money and stockpile them instead. However, when he returned from leave, he discovered the casings had been removed for recycling. Captain Finley began an investigation into the cash account funded by the recycled shell casings. He, Captain Austino, and Captain Beu met with City A-0391-24 3 Solicitor Richard Tonetta and Director of Public Safety Edwin Alicea to discuss the investigation. The trio also met with Lieutenant Leonard Wolf, who was assigned to the internal affairs (IA) unit, to report the potential theft of time by Chief Codispoti and misuse of funds. Lieutenant Wolf told Chief Codispoti and another lieutenant about the confidential meeting. Chief Codispoti ordered Captain Beu to write up Captain Finley for disparaging remarks he made during the meeting, but Captain Beu advised this could be perceived as retaliation against Captain Finley for the investigation. The City hired an accounting firm to audit the cash account. Following the audit, Captain Beu, at the instruction of Tonetta and Alicea, requested the Cumberland County Prosecutor's Office (CCPO) investigate the funding of, and disbursements from, the account. Specifically, Captain Beu requested an investigation into accusations of harassment of Captain Austino, Captain Finley, and himself for bringing the issues to light regarding the account, and an investigation into Lieutenant Wolf for compromising the investigation by informing its targets. The CCPO found insufficient evidence for criminal charges against Chief Codispoti but identified possible violations of City policies. Chief Codispoti retired on December 31, 2016. In January 2017, Captain Beu was promoted to A-0391-24 4 Chief of Police. The police union president spoke with Chief Beu about the union's concerns, including Captain Austino's micro-managing style, which Chief Beu promised to address. Between 2016 and 2018, members of the union filed numerous grievances against Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Captain Finley. In November 2018, the union gave Tonetta a draft complaint of a civil lawsuit naming the City, VPD, Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Captain Finley as defendants. The police union alleged its members were subject to "numerous acts of retaliation" in the workplace because of the grievances they filed. The City retained Todd Gelfand, Esq. to investigate the allegations outlined in the complaint. Gelfand began requesting IA case files in cases where Chief Beu, Captain Finley, or Captain Austino were investigators or witnesses on matters involving the union members as complainants. He also requested a file involving an arrest, in which Captain Austino allegedly described a pattern and practice of illegal stop and frisks, searches, and strip-searches. Gelfand claimed Chief Beu and Captain Austino made it difficult for him to conduct the investigation. Captain Austino filed a complaint with the CCPO regarding Gelfand's attempts to access the IA files. In February 2020, Chief Beu was suspended in part due to his obstruction of the investigation, prompting him A-0391-24 5 to file a complaint in federal court. A retired chief was recalled to take charge of the IA Unit from March to November 2020, and the CCPO conducted IA training. On May 22, 2020, the CCPO authorized the release of IA files to Gelfand. On November 11, 2021, Gelfand submitted a final report with findings and recommendations for revisions to the IA process and VPD policies. The report criticized the "lack of objectivity" displayed by Captain Finley in an investigation of a sergeant's complaint against Captain Austino regarding the arrest incident. Gelfand claimed Captain Finley retaliated against the sergeant and a witness in violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8, and encouraged Chief Beu to retaliate as well. According to Gelfand, Lieutenant Riordan also lacked objectivity and participated in the retaliation by reviewing Captain Finley's report and agreeing with him the witness had lied. Gelfand also investigated a complaint by officers to the CCPO concerning an order to live stream audio from mobile video recorders (MVR) located in police vehicles, which they believed was an illegal wiretap. The underlying incident occurred in December 2016. Captain Austino ordered Lieutenant Wolf to make the MVRs live stream audio continuously, without notice to the officers. A-0391-24 6 Chief Beu testified livestreaming audio full time was not an accepted practice. However, he dismissed a grievance filed against Captain Austino by the sergeant because the activation order was rescinded two days after it was given. The CCPO did not open a criminal investigation into the matter and sent it back to Chief Beu for any further administrative action. Gelfand reported Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Lieutenant Riordan believed the complaint was a form of retaliation against Captain Austino. Ultimately, Gelfand believed the purpose of the MVR order was not to spy on union members. He nonetheless asserted Captain Austino used his IA assignment to investigate and retaliate against the union members who had complained. Gelfand investigated a 2016 incident regarding a motor vehicle stop and subsequent strip-search of a suspect for drugs, which was approved by a VPD lieutenant. Captain Austino conducted an IA investigation and concluded the lieutenant approved an illegal strip-search. However, the IA investigation only reflected the suspect's complaint about the invasive search, which was unsubstantiated. This was reflected by the CCPO's decision not to prosecute the lieutenant. Gelfand concluded Captain Austino's goal was to "pin misconduct" on the lieutenant by going beyond the IA policies and procedures, set forth in A-0391-24 7 Office of the Attorney General, Internal Affairs Policy & Procedures (rev. 2022) (IAPP), to pressure another officer into providing corroborating evidence. According to Gelfand, Captain Austino did this to retaliate against the lieutenant, who was appointed deputy chief instead of him. Gelfand investigated a 2017 incident involving an officer who no longer wished to be a field training officer. The officer claimed he sent his supervisor an email requesting the transfer, to which the supervisor did not respond. He ultimately filed a complaint because his request was denied. Lieutenant Riordan investigated the complaint and could not locate the original email the officer claimed he sent to his superior with his request. He concluded the officer was untruthful and should be charged with untruthfulness. However, Lieutenant Riordan indicated Chief Beu directed there be no discipline. In 2020, the CCPO requested a list of officers who had sustained complaints of untruthfulness. The name of the officer assigned as a field training officer appeared on the list, but his file did not have a disposition letter indicating the outcome of the investigation. Although Gelfand agreed the untruthfulness finding was "a fair conclusion," the officer was neither given notice he was the target of an IA investigation nor told the outcome of the investigation—both of which violated the IAPP. A subsequent investigation A-0391-24 8 recommended a disciplinary complaint against Lieutenant Riordan for these violations, which resulted in him only receiving counseling. Gelfand concluded Lieutenant Riordan sustaining a charge of untruthfulness against the officer was a form of retaliation against members of the police union. In 2018, there was another IA investigation regarding a different lieutenant, who Lieutenant Riordan believed had committed workers' compensation insurance fraud. The lieutenant was involved in a line of duty shooting death and was required to attend a mental health screen evaluation before receiving workers' compensation benefits. He used sick time for his leave thereby delaying the screening, but when the screening was completed and the insurance company approved his claim, the City converted his sick time to paid administrative leave. Lieutenant Riordan referred the matter to the CCPO but did not tell the lieutenant, out of concern he would interfere with the investigation. The CCPO declined to prosecute the lieutenant. As a result, Lieutenant Riordan never completed the investigation, nor provided a recommended disposition. The FBI apparently took over the investigation and requested documents from the VPD. Lieutenant Riordan's superior could not verify an ongoing FBI investigation and recommended Lieutenant Riordan be disciplined A-0391-24 9 for not providing the lieutenant with notice of the investigation. Although the then-chief, not Chief Codispoti or Chief Beu, doubted the existence of an FBI investigation, he decided against disciplining Lieutenant Riordan because he had already been suspended. Based on his investigation, Gelfand believed VPD was split into two factions: Chief Beu, Captain Finley, and Captain Austino on one hand, and the union members on the other. He testified the IA process was contrary to the IAPP and VPD standard operating procedures, resulting in little to no discipline, favoritism to Captain Austino and Captain Finley, and greater scrutiny toward union members. These conditions existed prior to and continued under Chief Beu. Gelfand proposed a revised investigation policy to require cooperation between the City and the VPD. This would keep the City informed of employment practices, which could expose it to liability and ensure a more robust disciplinary process. On November 15, 2021, the City served Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Lieutenant Riordan with preliminary notices of disciplinary action. Chief Beu was suspended with pay. Captain Austino was suspended without pay. As to Chief Beu, the City alleged: several violations of regulations and the VPD policy. The City later amended the charges, alleging Chief Beu used A-0391-24 10 his authority and power to retaliate against complainants, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(12); discriminated against employees, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(9); and engaged in conduct unbecoming of a public employee, in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6), requiring "immediate and serious corrective action by the City of Vineland." As to Captain Austino, the City alleged incompetence, inefficiency and failure in performance of duty; insubordination by countermanding, or disregarding prior orders of the Chief of Police; conduct unbecoming of an officer, negligence of duty, and other sufficient cause in connection with various IA investigations, including a policy regarding live-streaming audio features in police vehicles, and allegations of workplace harassment and retaliation. Lieutenant Riordan was charged with violating the IAPP, failure to perform his duty, conduct unbecoming of a public employee, neglect of duty, and other sufficient cause based on the investigations detailed in Gelfand's report. The CCPO interceded and advised it had the "sole and appropriate authority to review allegations of misconduct against" a chief and senior management and to make any determination regarding violations of IAPP. The letter requested a copy of Gelfand's report and that the City "stand down until A-0391-24 11 such time as an investigation into the allegations that the City alleges is completed by [the] CCPO." On June 24, 2022, Lieutenant Ray Cavagnaro, on behalf of the CCPO, issued an IA report concluding there were violations of the IAPP "during the tenure of Chief Codispoti and Chief Beu. Such violations ranged from minor deviations to failing to conduct investigations into allegations of police misconduct." However, the deficiencies were addressed and VPD personnel were given guidance under the retired chief appointed by the CCPO. He also found not all the allegations in Gelfand's report were confirmed or "handled in conformity" with IA policy. On October 21, 2022, the City issued a final notice of disciplinary action, terminating Chief Beu effective November 15, 2021. This notice removed the IAPP violation charges. The same result occurred in Captain Austino's and Lieutenant Riordan's cases. Chief Beu appealed. An ALJ conducted twelve days of hearings and heard from nine witnesses, including Chief Beu. On December 8, 2023, the ALJ issued a decision reversing the Chief's removal. She found no credible evidence of retaliation, noting none of the officers involved "were terminated, demoted, lost pay, or suffered discipline." Rather, "[t]he allegations against Beu stemmed A-0391-24 12 from his discretionary management decisions over the day-to-day operations of the VPD, his decision-making authority in all IA matters, or errors that were made by IA investigations in failing to properly document IA investigations and comply with all applicable . . . IAPPs." The ALJ observed the City did not allege Chief Beu's conduct violated federal or state law but instead argued for his termination "because his conduct in handling various matters between 2016 and 2018, created a culture of discrimination that could lead to future violations." There was no evidence Chief Beu engaged in discrimination or retaliation , no officer was disciplined, and a collateral investigation was not evidence of retaliation. It followed the City had not proven the conduct unbecoming charge. On January 17, 2024, the Commission voted to adopt the ALJ's recommendation. The chair abstained from the vote. The Commission issued a written decision the same day, reversing Chief Beu's termination, ordering his immediate reinstatement, and awarding him back pay, benefits, seniority, and attorney fees. On September 25, 2024, the Commission issued a final decision quantifying the back pay, counsel fees, and costs awarded. The ALJ in Captain Austino's case conducted a fourteen-day hearing and heard from twelve witnesses, including Captain Austino. On February 5, 2024, the ALJ issued an opinion dismissing all counts against Captain Austino and A-0391-24 13 reversing his removal. She concluded Gelfand's report was not impartial because it contained "unsubstantiated conclusions and overreaching not supported by the facts presented in the matter" and was "contrary to various findings made by the CCPO." The ALJ addressed each factual allegation and concluded Captain Austino was either not involved or had been exonerated. There was no evidence of a privacy violation regarding any MVR incident. "None of the City's witnesses . . . testified to having suffered an adverse employment action." The ALJ noted Gelfand acknowledged most of the alleged complaints of retaliation-involved judgment calls, which she found were "issues well within management's rights as set forth in the collective bargaining agreement." She credited Lieutenant Cavagnaro's testimony and the CCPO's investigation over Gelfand's because the former "was a neutral and independent IA investigator." The ALJ concluded the City had not met the burden of proof to establish retaliation, discrimination, or disparate treatment under state or federal law, or any regulation affecting equal employment opportunity or conduct unbecoming. On March 20, 2024, the Commission adopted the ALJ's findings and ordered Captain Austino "be immediately reinstated to his permanent position and A-0391-24 14 receive back pay, benefits, and seniority." On February 5, 2025, the Commission awarded Captain Austino back pay and counsel fees. A third ALJ conducted a seven-day hearing and heard from three witnesses in Lieutenant Riordan's case. On May 17, 2024, she issued a decision finding the charges against Lieutenant Riordan were unsupported and dismissed the charges. She found no evidence Lieutenant Riordan acted in concert with Chief Beu, Captain Finley, or Captain Austino. "If anything, it was to the contrary." The ALJ parsed the testimony and reached similar conclusions to those of the first two ALJs. She found nothing to show other officers suffered an adverse employment action for any of the instances Gelfand found allegedly problematic, let alone a causal connection to Lieutenant Riordan. The sergeant was not involved in the collateral investigation conducted by Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Captain Finley. And the collateral investigation was not evidence of retaliation. In addition, two of the City's witnesses, including Gelfand, lacked first-hand knowledge of some of the incidents they testified about. Two officers the City claimed had been retaliated against did not even testify. Thus, the City did not establish a prima facie case of discrimination, disparate treatment, or retaliation. A-0391-24 15  On June 14, 2024, the Commission adopted the ALJ's findings. On April 9, 2025, the Commission awarded counsel fees and costs to Lieutenant Riordan. I. Typically, when an agency issues a final decision, our review is limited. Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 172 (2014). The "final determination of an administrative agency . . . is entitled to substantial deference." In re Eastwick Coll. LPN-to-RN Bridge Program, 225 N.J. 533, 541 (2016) (citing Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp. v. N.J. Dep't of Env't Prot., 191 N.J. 38, 48 (2007)). We will not reverse an agency's final decision unless the decision is "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable," the determination "violate[s] express or implied legislative policies," the agency's action offends the United States Constitution or the State Constitution, or "the findings on which [the decision] was based were not supported by substantial, credible evidence in the record." Ibid. (quoting Univ. Cottage Club of Princeton N.J. Corp., 191 N.J. at 48) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Although an appellate court is 'in no way bound by the agency's interpretation of a statute or its determination of a strictly legal issue,' . . . if substantial evidence supports the agency's decision, 'a court may not substitute its own judgment for the agency's even though the court might have reached a A-0391-24 16 different result . . . .'" In re Carter, 191 N.J. 474, 483 (2007) (citations omitted). This highly deferential standard reflects the Commission's expertise in administering its legislative authority. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194-95 (2011). II. In all three appeals, the City challenges the ALJs' findings there were no CEPA violations by Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Lieutenant Riordan. It argues the ALJs were mistaken, as a matter of law, in finding the City could not act proactively to prevent retaliation and had to prove retaliation occurred to establish a prima facie case of a CEPA violation. The City also urges us to conclude it provided sufficient cause to show it acted preventatively to terminate Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Lieutenant Riordan for violating CEPA. It claims it did not have to prove retaliation and the ALJs and the Commission improperly substituted their judgment for the City's. The City argues even if proof of retaliation was required, it met the burden of proof. In Captain Austino's case, the City argues an officer can be removed without the necessity of progressive discipline. And in Lieutenant Riordan's case, it asserts the ALJ erred by granting his motion for summary decision. A-0391-24 17  "The Legislature enacted CEPA to 'protect and encourage employees to report illegal or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers from engaging in such conduct.'" Allen v. Cape May Cnty., 246 N.J. 275, 289 (2021) (quoting Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 461 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). CEPA "is considered remedial legislation entitled to liberal construction[.]" Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 378 (2015). CEPA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who perform a whistleblowing activity. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3. Employers cannot retaliate against an employee who reports, objects to, or refuses to participate in what the employee "reasonably believes" to be unlawful activity or who provides information or testifies before a public body conducting an investigation. Ibid. CEPA defines "[r]etaliatory action" as "discharge, suspension or demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e). CEPA's definition of retaliatory action "speaks in terms of completed action." Keelan v. Bell Commc'ns Rsch., 289 N.J. Super. 531, 539 (App. Div. 1996). It "does not encompass action taken to effectuate the 'discharge A-0391-24 18 suspension or demotion.'" Ibid. Retaliatory actions can also include "further serious intrusions into the employment relationship beyond those solely affecting compensation and rank. The commonly understood meaning of the phrase includes, for example, length of the workday[]. . .; increase or decrease of salaries, hours, and fringe benefits[]. . .; physical arrangements and facilities[]. . .; and promotional procedures[]. . . ." Beasley v. Passaic Cnty., 377 N.J. Super. 585, 608 (App. Div. 2005) (citations omitted). Generally, an investigation of an employee is not considered retaliation. Id. at 606. CEPA recognizes "employers are best situated to avoid or eliminate impermissible vindictive employment practices, to implement corrective measures, and to adopt and enforce employment policies that will serve to achieve" the legislative mandates. Abbamont v. Piscataway Twp. Bd. of Educ., 138 N.J. 405, 418 (1994). An employer does not have "'to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.'" Karins v. City of Atl. City, 152 N.J. 532, 561-62 (1998) (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)). This is especially true where the employee "has the responsibility of sedulously maintaining the departmental morale and discipline[]" and the safety of the public may be at stake. Id. at 562. A-0391-24 19  Pursuant to these principles, we reject the City's argument it could act preventatively, indeed preemptively, to terminate employees for retaliation under the circumstances presented in this case. As a civil service jurisdiction, the disciplinary process and its attendant procedures and protections apply to all City employees. The ability to mete out that discipline required some showing of retaliation because the City's claims were based on allegations Chief Beu, Captain Austino, and Lieutenant Riordan were punishing whistleblowers. The facts in the record amply support each ALJ's conclusion, there was no evidence of retaliation. The City essentially asks us to second-guess the ALJs' and the Commission's findings and conduct a de novo review. We decline to do so because each ALJ sifted and weighed the evidence, made credibility determinations, and applied the facts found to the law. Even if we were to review the record de novo, it would not lead us to a different result. T he Commission's decision to adopt the ALJ's findings in each case is supported by sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). III. The City argues the Commission's ruling is void because the chair recused herself without giving a reason. As we recounted, the Commission voted to adopt the ALJ's findings in Chief Beu's case. The vote was a unanimous 4-0. A-0391-24 20  The Commission may not render a decision "unless supported by the vote of members constituting a majority of the quorum present." N.J.A.C. 19:61-1.6. A quorum of three out of the five Commission members is necessary to render a disciplinary decision. In re Restrepo, Dep't of Corr., 449 N.J. Super. 409, 422 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J.S.A. 11A:2-3; King v. N.J. Racing Comm'n¸103 N.J. 412, 418 (1986)). Pursuant to the administrative code, recusal is defined as "the process by which a person is disqualified, or disqualifies [themselves], from a matter because of a conflict of interest." N.J.A.C. 19:61-7.3. Recusals must typically be memorialized in writing, specifying the reason, duration, and effect of the recusal, and the name of the person who will assume responsibility. N.J.A.C. 19:61-7.5(b). Abstentions are a different matter. Depending on context, an abstention may be treated as an affirmative vote, such as when a majority vote is needed by a governing body to enact certain measures. Booker v. Rice, 431 N.J. Super. 548, 554 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Kozusko v. Garretson, 102 N.J.L. 508, 509- 10 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Mount v. Parker, 32 N.J.L. 341, 342 (Sup. Ct. 1867)). However, "when a statute requires a 'specific, fixed number of actual affirmative votes for a majority,' abstentions should be regarded as negative votes." Id. at A-0391-24 21 555 (quoting Patterson v. Cooper, 294 N.J. Super. 6, 18 (Law Div. 1994)). In other contexts, courts have interpreted abstentions as negative votes, such as when a voter's abstention was "meant to intentionally frustrate the voting process." Ibid. Governing bodies may create their own rules of procedure regarding the voting process, so long as the rules do not violate statutes or ordinances. Id. at 553, 556; see also Zimmer v. Castellano, 432 N.J. Super. 412, 414 (App. Div. 2013) (council may choose to apply treatise when specific rules of procedure provide no guidance). The chair did not recuse herself; she abstained. Unlike a recusal, no explanation was required. The abstention was inconsequential because there was a quorum and only a simple majority of the vote was required for the Commission to act. Given the Commission members' unanimous vote to adopt the ALJ's findings in Chief Beu's case, the chair's vote would not have affected the outcome. IV. In Chief Beu's case, the City argues CEPA claims are not within the purview of the Commission and therefore we need not defer to its findings. Amicus curiae, the New Jersey State Association of Chiefs of Police, argues the A-0391-24 22 ALJ lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the disciplinary charges in Chief Beu's case because the chief of police alone is responsible for the day-to-day operations of the police department, including establishing duties, assignments, and schedules. The Association claims the City usurped Chief Beu's authority and control over the IA function by second-guessing his handling of IA investigations by conducting its own investigation, rather than referring the matter to the CCPO. It argues this matter should never have been before an ALJ because the City's investigation was unlawful. Regardless, Gelfand's findings were properly disregarded by the ALJs. Chief Beu's brief echoes the amicus arguments. At the outset, because Chief Beu has not filed a cross-appeal, we need not address his jurisdiction-related arguments. However, because we recognize amicus's interest in this matter and to provide the parties guidance going forward, we briefly discuss the jurisdictional claims. "The criminal business of the State shall be prosecuted by the Attorney General and the county prosecutors." N.J.S.A. 2A:158-4. The Attorney General has "broad law enforcement authority" and "exercised that authority to issue the IAPP in 1991 to establish uniform procedures for investigating complaints of police misconduct." Fraternal Ord. of Police, Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of A-0391-24 23 Newark, 244 N.J. 75, 100 (2020). In 1996, the Legislature "effectively made the [Attorney General]'s IAPP required policy for all municipal law enforcement agencies." Id. at 101. The IAPP § 10.0.1 reserves the responsibility of "conducting substantive oversight to ensure that the internal affairs function s of all law enforcement agencies within their jurisdiction are operating professionally and effectively[]" for the county prosecutor. Under the IAPP, complaints of officer misconduct may originate from any member of the public or from an employee of the law enforcement agency, and "[i]f the subject of the [IA] investigation is the Police Chief, Police Director, Sheriff or Head of [IA], the County Prosecutor or the Attorney General's Office shall handle the investigation." Id. § 5.1.8. Although investigations into complaints regarding chiefs of police are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the county prosecutor or Attorney General, the IA function is not limited to resolving complaints; it may also be used to examine "collateral issues" presented in the complaint, which do not resolve the issue of the complaint. Id. § 7.12.1. Examining such collateral issues can provide an agency with valuable information concerning the agency's policies and procedures, and the competency and skill of its officers. Id. § 7.12.2. An investigation's "insight, if properly used, can be extremely helpful to A-0391-24 24 management. In contrast, the failure to use this resource can deprive the law enforcement agency of the ability to identify and correct problems with personnel and procedures through self-critical analysis." Id. § 7.12.3. Although the Attorney General and county prosecutor have authority over investigating law enforcement officers, and the municipality has authority over investigating their employees, the facts of this case clearly present an overlap of these separate but mutual jurisdictions. Indeed, the IA function and municipal administration may examine the same action, and lead to different results. See IAPP § 7.12.1. Following CCPO's request to "stand down" on charging Chief Beu with violations of IAPP, the City charged him with employee conduct violations, under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3, and unbecoming conduct under common law. This was permissible. The unique facts of this case convince us the charges leveled against Chief Beu were not the exclusive jurisdiction of either the Attorney General, county prosecutor, or the City. As the appointing authority over its police department, the City could bring charges as grounds for disciplinary action up to and including termination, under N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.2. Similarly, Gelfand's role was not as a third-party IA investigator, but as a consultant to provide the City with insight into the actions of its police department, to assess its deficiencies, and to A-0391-24 25 make recommendations for better policies and procedures to address these deficiencies, especially in light of the union's draft complaint. Because neither the charges nor Gelfand's investigation intruded upon the Attorney General's or the CCPO's authority over IA investigations, the case properly proceeded on its merits. Notwithstanding these observations, we reject the City's assertion the Commission could not consider the merits of the CEPA claims in making its decision on the discipline imposed on Chief Beu. The CEPA claims were at the center of Gelfand's report, the ALJ's findings, and the reason why the City believed Chief Beu and his fellow officers should be terminated. Although CEPA claims do not typically fall within the heartland of the Commission's charge, under the facts of this case it could not reach the merits without addressing whether there were CEPA violations warranting the City's imposition of discipline. V. Finally, the remaining arguments of the parties and amicus we have not addressed, including but not limited to the argument in Lieutenant Riordan's case regarding the ALJ's grant of his motion for summary decision, lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). A-0391-24 26 Affirmed in A-0391-24, A-1794-24, and A-2785-24. A-0391-24 27