State of New Jersey v. Arcadio J. Nova

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1521-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ARCADIO J. NOVA, a/k/a JUNIOR NOVA, Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Submitted September 22, 2026 – Decided November 2, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Bishop-Thompson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 14-02-0094. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Jeffrey L. Weinstein, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Timothy Kerrigan, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a supplemental brief on appellant's behalf. PER CURIAM Defendant Arcadio J. Nova appeals a December 18, 2024 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Before us, appellate counsel raises the following arguments for our consideration: POINT I TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO PROPERLY CHALLENGE IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE, WHICH WAS THE HEART OF THE STATE'S CASE AGAINST DEFENDANT. A. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO QUESTION S.L. 1 AT THE PRE-TRIAL IDENTIFICATION HEARING. B. COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CROSS-EXAMINE S.L. AT TRIAL, WHICH DENIED DEFENDANT THE RIGHT TO CONFRONT THE STAR WITNESS AGAINST HIM AND PREVENTED HIM FROM PRESENTING A COMPLETE DEFENSE. POINT II TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAIL[ING] TO EXERCISE CHALLENGES ON JUROR NUMBER FOUR, WHO INDICATED HE FAVORED LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COULD NOT BE FAIR. 1 We use initials to protect the identity of the alleged victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(9). A-1521-24 2  POINT III THE PCR COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED [DEFENDANT'S] RECUSAL MOTION IN LIGHT OF ITS PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ABOUT HIM; FURTHER, THE PRACTICE OF ASSIGNING PCR CASES TO THE SAME JUDGE WHO PRESIDED AT TRIAL DENIES [DEFENDANT] AND THOSE SIMILARLY SITUATED A FAIR CONSIDERATION OF THEIR PCR CLAIMS. POINT IV THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS DENIED DEFENDANT A FAIR TRIAL. POINT V TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PRESENT EXPERT TESTIMONY REGARDING THE UNRELIABILITY OF CHILD IDENTIFICATIONS. POINT VI TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE STATE'S UNQUALIFIED EXPERT ON COMPUTER FORENSICS (SIC) AND TO PRESENT A COMPETING EXPERT TO REFUTE THIS PREJUDICIALLY ERRONEOUS 2 TESTIMONY. 2 We have reconstituted defendant's point headings in his counseled brief to correspond to the manner in which we address the issues raised. A-1521-24 3  Additionally, defendant presents the following supplemental arguments in his self-represented brief: POINT VI THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S POINT III OF HIS [SELF- REPRESENTED] SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF, SPECIFICALLY, WHEN HIS POORLY PREPARED STATE-APPOINTED ATTORNEY FAILED TO FILE A MOTION AS TO WHY THE STATE WAITED NINETY [SIC] AND FOUR HUNDRED AND EIGHTY DAYS IN SEEKING THE WARRANTS TO SEARCH DEFENDANT'S CELLPHONES, CONTRARY TO THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1, PARA. 10 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION. A. [THE] PCR COURT ERRED WHEN STAT[ING] [IN] ITS OPINION THAT . . . PCR COUNSEL [FAILED TO RAISE] THE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE WITHHELD BY THE STATE[] DURING THE GRAND JURY PRESENTATION. Having reviewed the record against the relevant legal principles, we reject defendant's arguments raised in Points I(A), I(B), and II through IV, and all his self-represented arguments, substantially for the reasons expressed in the PCR judge's written opinion, as amplified, below at pages 16-20. As to the claims raised in Point V and Point VI of his counseled brief, however, we remand for a limited evidentiary hearing. A-1521-24 4  I. Defendant was convicted of various crimes against S.L., who was eight- years old at the time of the assault. These charges include: first-degree kidnapping, first-degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree attempting to lure or entice, second-degree sexual assault, and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child. Defendant's convictions stem from a 2013 incident at an apartment in Paterson where S.L. lived with her mother, D.D., her mother's friend, G.M., and G.M.'s infant child. As set forth more fully in our prior opinion in which we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, see State v. Nova, No. A-1915-15 (App. Div. Feb. 15, 2019), certif. denied, 239 N.J. 481 (2019) (slip op. at 1), the State alleged defendant initially came to the apartment in connection with a DirecTV installation and later returned that evening. Ibid. S.L. testified that defendant asked her to hold the door to the main entrance open for him while he got additional materials. Ibid. When he returned to the main entrance, he locked the door, kept S.L. in a small space near the entrance and told her they were going to "play a little game." Ibid. S.L. stated defendant blindfolded her with a black plastic bag and inserted part of his penis into her mouth for approximately one minute. Ibid. The A-1521-24 5 incident stopped when S.L. heard her mother calling for her. Ibid. S.L. ran upstairs, with the black bag still around her neck, upset and crying, and told her mother what had happened. Ibid. D.D. testified that S.L. told her the cable man placed his penis in her mouth, placed her on her knees, put his hand on her shoulder, told her not to move, and stated that he was recording the incident. Id. at 2. D.D. called 9-1-1 and then she, G.M., and S.L. went to the police station. Ibid. Officer Haydee Santana met with D.D. and S.L. Ibid. The officer stated they were both extremely upset and they told her that the suspect was an Hispanic male of Dominican descent and that he worked for DirecTV. Ibid. They gave Santana defendant's phone number, which G.M. had obtained from the owner of a local restaurant. Ibid. Officer Michael Johnson testified he recovered the black plastic bag that was used to blindfold S.L., and a drill. Ibid. The police were not able to recover any fingerprints or DNA from the plastic bag or the drill. Ibid. Detective Maria Tejada of the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office was assigned to investigate and went to a bookstore that defendant owned. Ibid. There, he was observed wearing a blue uniform bearing a gold DirecTV logo and gave her a pamphlet with his phone number on it. Ibid. The phone number A-1521-24 6 was the same number that D.D. had provided to the police. Ibid. Before Detective Tejada entered the store, she spoke with another employee, and that employee went outside and spoke with defendant. Ibid. Detective Danielle D'Annibale testified that the prosecutor's office confirmed the number was registered to defendant's cellphone. Ibid. After defendant was arrested, police confiscated his phone and seized 116 photos, two of which became critical evidence against defendant at trial. Ibid. Over defendant's objection, the court permitted Henry J. Hernandez, a media specialist in the prosecutor's office, to testify as an expert in forensic data extraction. Ibid. He explained that one image was a photo of a young child with something over her eyes and a penis in her mouth, and the second image depicted the same child with a penis in front of her face. Ibid. Hernandez stated the photos were on defendant's cellphone when he was arrested, and the court admitted the photos into evidence. Ibid. Giselle Henriquez, a bilingual interview specialist at the prosecutor's office, testified regarding her interview with S.L. five days after the incident. Ibid. In that interview, which was recorded and played for the jury, S.L. stated that the man who came to the apartment to install the cable asked her to hold the door for him. Ibid. She also stated the man tied a black plastic bag around her A-1521-24 7 eyes, and placed his penis in her mouth, told her he was recording the event and would be placing it on YouTube. Ibid. S.L. said the incident upset her and caused her to worry that the man would hurt other children. Ibid. When asked whether the man had "a mark or a mole or something on his skin that was different," S.L. did not identify any such distinctive markings. Henriquez also testified that approximately thirteen days after the incident, she conducted a photo array procedure with S.L. According to Henriquez, S.L. positively identified defendant as the perpetrator and stated that she was "100 percent certain" he was the person who committed the offenses. Ibid. Henriquez separately showed D.D. the photo array. Id. at 3. D.D. selected defendant's photo and said he looked familiar, and G.M. also selected defendant's photograph, but neither could identify him with certainty as the perpetrator. Ibid. Although defendant did not testify and did not present any witnesses in his defense, Ibid., in summation, his counsel referred to the second person that worked at the store and suggested more than one person could have accessed the truck or phone. A-1521-24 8  Defendant filed a self-represented PCR petition, alleging his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the two-prong Strickland 3 test because counsel failed to: (1) cross-examine S.L. during the Wade4 hearing and trial; (2) file a motion for the unreasonable delay in obtaining a search warrant for his cellphone; (3) object to certain evidence and the prosecutor's closing; (4) retain a data extraction expert to refute the State's findings; (5) challenge the State's delay in obtaining search warrants for defendant’s cellphone; (6) object that the jury instructions and verdict sheet improperly broadened the kidnapping theory, thereby constructively amending the indictment, and also failed to object to the omission of second-degree kidnapping as a separate verdict option; and (7) challenge asserted defects in the grand-jury presentation, including the State's alleged reliance on hearsay and its purported failure to present allegedly exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. 3 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a convicted defendant must satisfy the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), by demonstrating that: 1) counsel's performance was deficient, and 2) the deficient performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. The Strickland test has been adopted for application under our State constitution in New Jersey. See State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). 4 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). A-1521-24 9  Defendant later filed a self-represented motion to recuse the trial court judge from presiding over his PCR application. In support of his recusal motion, defendant cited the judge's comment at sentencing that he "should never be let out of prison" as evidence of her bias. He also alleged her bias was gender related. The PCR judge denied defendant's motion for recusal. She stated her comments were made after defendant's convictions of serious offenses against a young child and in the context of sentencing. The judge also explained that she substantially detailed all her rulings which were affirmed on appeal. In addition to his self-represented petition, defendant's assigned counsel filed a brief in support of his petition. PCR counsel argued that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) retain and proffer a computer forensics expert or an expert in human perception and memory; (2) cross-examine S.L.; (3) object to not having S.L. present during the Wade hearing; (4) remove juror number four from the panel; (5) file motions to suppress the contents of defendant's phone; (6) object to the amendment of the indictment and omission of second- degree kidnapping on the verdict sheet; and (7) challenge the grand-jury A-1521-24 10 presentation including the State's use of alleged hearsay evidence and its failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.5 In support, defendant submitted two expert reports. First, Geoffrey R. Loftus, Ph.D., a psychology professor, issued a report challenging the reliability of S.L.'s identification and opining, in substance, that her memory and perception may have been affected by stress, limited opportunity to observe, the passage of time between the incident and the photo array, and asserted suggestive features of the identification procedure. Second, he submitted a report from John Lucich, a digital forensics consultant, who directly challenged aspects of the State's cell phone evidence, including Hernandez's interpretation of the filename associated with a deleted video and the provenance of certain images recovered from the phone. More specifically, Dr. Loftus asserted that S.L.'s initial memory of the assailant may have been fragmented and incomplete, and factors such as stress, duration, attention, and the structure of the photo-array procedure could have 5 Defendant has not raised before us any error with respect to many of the arguments raised in the PCR proceedings. We thus consider as waived any of his unbriefed Strickland-related claims. See Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax'n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div. 2012) (deeming a contention waived when the party failed to include any arguments supporting the contention in its brief); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2027) ("[A]n issue not briefed is deemed waived."). A-1521-24 11 affected the reliability of her identification. Lucich, for his part, opined that Hernandez incorrectly misread the naming convention of one video file, the deleted file may have been created at a time inconsistent with the State 's trial theory and Hernandez's testimony that the child-pornography images appeared to be cached images, rather than photographs necessarily created by the phone itself. The PCR judge denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. In a written opinion, she reaffirmed her denial of defendant's motion to recuse and rejected defendant's bias allegations. The judge again explained all her rulings were based on a careful and thorough consideration of the issues presented. As to trial counsel's failure to cross-examine S.L., the PCR judge determined the decision was clearly based on a reasonable trial strategy. She explained counsel was faced with the possibility that cross-examination of S.L. could evoke sympathy from the jury while also allowing the witness to repeat damaging details of the offense and her identification. With respect to defendant's arguments regarding juror number four, the judge noted both defendant and his counsel wanted juror number four on the panel. She explained that defendant was consistently consulting with counsel A-1521-24 12 during the jury selection process, and they elected not to use one of their four remaining peremptory challenges to dismiss juror number four. The PCR judge also noted that juror number four stated he could remain fair and recognized the State's burden of proof. The PCR judge also concluded that defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing to address the reasons counsel failed to retain or call an expert witness on human perception and memory. She noted the jury viewed the video where S.L. positively identified the defendant, and there was nothing suggestive in the presentation of the photo array. The judge also explained she issued the model jury charge on identification, then in effect, addressing factors established in State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). See Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Identification: In-Court and Out-of-Court Identifications" (rev. July 19, 2012). The judge stated the jurors therefore were adequately informed of the relevant reliability factors, including matters such as stress, opportunity to observe, and the passage of time. She therefore concluded Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony would not have had the clear capacity to change the verdict. The PCR judge noted the State's forensics expert had worked in the Forensic Tech Unit of the Passaic County Prosecutor's Office for over six years and was therefore qualified to opine on the subjects proffered, including the A-1521-24 13 procedures he used to extract photographs from defendant's phone. She noted that the jury was shown the extracted pictures and was instructed that the identity of the child depicted in the photographs was unknown and the evidence was limited to identification issues. The judge explained the photographs were nevertheless highly probative, and it was undisputed the images were located on the phone and depicted what appeared to be the same child in two images, in a manner similar to the assault on S.L. The judge also found that any dispute regarding a deleted video was less significant than the two images presented to the jury and rejected defendant's argument that the opinions in Lucich's report satisfied either Strickland's performance or prejudice prongs. She reasoned, any disagreement about the deleted video file did not materially undermine the more significant evidence that two images depicting a child in a pose similar to the charged assault were found on defendant's phone. II. We review the PCR judge's legal and factual determinations de novo because she rendered her decision without an evidentiary hearing. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). Further, a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon establishing a prima facie case for relief, showing A-1521-24 14 there are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing record, and a hearing is necessary to resolve those claims. R. 3:22- 10(b); State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). We review under an abuse-of-discretion standard the PCR judge's decision to deny an evidentiary hearing. State v. L.G.-M., 462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2020). The first prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. A defendant, however, must overcome a strong presumption that counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. "The test is not whether defense counsel could have done better, but whether he met the constitutional threshold for effectiveness." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 543 (2013). Further, the failure to raise unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). It is well-settled that a defense attorney's trial strategy is generally not second-guessed in PCR proceedings. State v. Gary, 229 N.J. Super. 102, 116 (App. Div. 1988). To the contrary, trial counsel's informed strategic decisions demand our heightened deference, and "are virtually unchallengeable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. "[C]omplaints 'merely of matters of trial A-1521-24 15 strategy' will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy of representation." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (quoting State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)); see also State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 358 (2009) (holding presumption that counsel provided effective reasonable legal assistance "may be rebutted if defendant demonstrates that counsel's actions did not equate to 'sound trial strategy.'"). "Merely because a trial strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Under the second prong, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's errors prejudiced the defense such as to deprive defendant of a fair and reliable outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To prove this element, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. III. In Point I(A), defendant reprises his contention that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to question S.L. at the pre-trial identification hearing. We disagree. Trial counsel cross-examined Henriquez, the witness who administered the photo array, regarding the timing of the procedure, the source and order of the photographs, the instructions given, and the circumstances surrounding the A-1521-24 16 identifications by the victim, her mother, and G.M. Defendant's claim that counsel should have compelled testimony from the child victim at the hearing rests on speculation as to what additional information would have been elicited and whether it would have materially aided the defense. We agree with the PCR judge that defendant failed to establish either deficient performance or prejudice with respect to his arguments in Point I(A). We likewise reject defendant's argument in Point I(B) that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to cross-examine S.L. at trial. As the PCR judge correctly noted, that decision was based on trial strategy clear from the trial record. We are convinced the record supports the PCR's findings and legal conclusions that counsel made a reasoned tactical decision not to cross-examine S.L. at trial because such an examination would have likely resulted in her reaffirmation of her identification that would have strengthened, not weakened, the State's case. It is clear that counsel instead advanced the defense theory by challenging the State's proof of identity through cross-examination of other witnesses and by arguing in summation that the State had failed to meet its burden of proof. We are satisfied defendant has not overcome the strong presumption related to this sound strategic decision. A-1521-24 17  We also discern no basis to disturb the PCR judge's rejection of defendant's juror-related arguments in Point II. As the judge explained, and as confirmed by the voir dire transcript, although juror number four expressed hesitation during voir dire and at points suggested he might favor testimony from the police, he ultimately stated he understood the State's burden of proof and could, and would, evaluate the evidence fairly. The judge also noted trial counsel used sixteen of twenty peremptory challenges and, in her recollection, both defendant and his attorney wanted juror number four to remain on the panel. Again, we are satisfied defendant failed to either Strickland's performance or prejudice prongs on this point.6 We also reject all of defendant's arguments in Point III, in which he contends the PCR judge should have granted his recusal motion. The mere fact that the same judge presided over the trial, sentencing, and PCR proceedings does not require recusal. "Judges may not 'err on the side of caution and recuse themselves unless there is a true basis that requires disqualification.'" Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 31 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Johnson v. 6 We also add that on direct appeal we rejected a similar argument under the plain error standard and concluded the record supported the trial judge's determination that juror number four could be fair. Nova, slip op. at 10-11. A-1521-24 18 Johnson, 204 N.J. 529, 551 (2010)). Defendant relies principally on remarks made by the judge at sentencing and on her adverse rulings. Adverse rulings alone do not demonstrate judicial bias and after our conscientious review of the entire record, we are satisfied that the court's sentencing comments and later rulings do not support defendant's claims of a disqualifying bias. As noted, the PCR judge explained the challenged remarks were made after defendant had been convicted of serious crimes against a child and reflected the judge's sentencing determination, not an inability to later consider collateral claims fairly. On this point, the record of the PCR proceedings, including the comprehensive written decision, supports the conclusion that the judge considered defendant's claims thoroughly and based her decision on the facts and applicable law. Finally, we reject defendant's cumulative-error argument in Point IV in light of our rejection of defendant's claims in Points I(A) through III. IV. In defendant's self-represented brief, he contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the delay in obtaining warrants to search his cellphone. He further argues the indictment was flawed because the State allegedly failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, including the A-1521-24 19 absence of fingerprints or DNA on items recovered from the scene, and that the court erred in its conclusions regarding the grand-jury proceedings. We are unpersuaded by all of these arguments. Contrary to his contentions, the PCR judge addressed defendant's claims related to the cellphone warrants. In her written decision, the PCR judge expressly acknowledged the "issues of probable cause and staleness" and noted they related to the "initial seizure of the items, not the subsequent examination of them," and further explained the delay related to the State's initial inability to open the phone because of its "substantial security" issues and found defendant "was in no way prejudiced by the passage of time in searching the items." Similarly, the judge addressed, and rejected, the alleged improprieties related to the grand-jury proceeding. The judge noted counsel had in fact moved to dismiss the indictment. She further explained that, after thoroughly reviewing the transcripts, briefs, and arguments, she found "no reason whatsoever to dismiss the indictment." We are satisfied that any motion defendant contends counsel should have filed would have been unsuccessful. It is well settled that counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to file motions that had no likelihood of success. State v. O’Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007). A-1521-24 20  V. We part company with the PCR judge, however, with respect to defendant's claims in Points V and Point VI. Unlike defendant's other arguments, those claims were supported by two reports that expressly challenged critical portions of the State's proofs. As such, we are satisfied a limited evidentiary hearing was required under Rule 3:22-10(b). Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony went directly to the reliability of S.L.'s identification. Our Supreme Court has recognized that eyewitness identification evidence may be highly persuasive yet unreliable, and that factors affecting perception, memory, stress, confidence, and identification procedures bear directly on reliability. Henderson, 208 N.J. at 217-18, 283-92. Dr. Loftus's potential opinion clearly addresses case specific factors bearing on the reliability of S.L.'s eyewitness identification, including the effects of stress, the length of the encounter, any potential distractions affecting the identification during the assault, the time delay between the incident and the photo array, and the alleged mismatch between S.L.'s initial description and defendant's appearance. Further, his proffered opinion, and any information he may have been able to provide to assist the defense, carries particular significance as S.L. was the A-1521-24 21 only witness to the sexual assault. Her mother and G.M. each identified defendant's photograph as familiar, but neither stated with certainty that he was the DirecTV worker. The only positive eyewitness identification, S.L.'s, did not occur until approximately two weeks after the incident. Thus, Dr. Loftus did not offer a generalized critique of eyewitness testimony; his proposed opinion was directed at the actual identification evidence presented to the jury. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 405 N.J. Super. 163, 170-72 (App. Div. 2009); United States v. Nolan, 956 F.3d 71, 79-84 (2d Cir. 2020) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel where defense counsel "failed to hire an expert on eyewitness testimony or seek to introduce expert testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness identifications in the circumstances presented"). The significance of expert testimony in this trial was potentially heightened by trial counsel's decision not to cross-examine S.L. on identification. Dr. Loftus's proposed testimony may have provided the primary means to challenge the reliability of the only positive eyewitness identification presented by the State. We are satisfied under the circumstances, the failure to retain or call such an expert requires further inquiry into whether trial counsel's choice was informed by reasonable investigation or was instead made without the benefit of consultation that would have equipped counsel to make a reasoned A-1521-24 22 strategic judgment. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63; State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354-55 (2013). We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the opinion of State consultant John Lucich. Just as with Dr. Loftus, Lucich did not offer generalized opinions but rather opined on the specific cellphone evidence relied on by the State at trial. For example, Hernandez testified that a deleted video with the filename "20130703_200929" may have been taken on July 3 and was the 29th image of the day. Lucich, by contrast, maintains that the filename is a date and time stamp reflecting July 3, 2013, at 8:09.29 p.m. Because the State contends that the assault was around 7:00 p.m., Lucich's proposed testimony would have rebutted the State's theory the deleted file was created during the assault. Without Lucich, Hernandez's uncontested testimony provided a temporal, corroborative connection at trial between defendant's cellphone and S.L.'s statement that defendant claimed to be recording the incident. In addition, Lucich's opinion addresses whether the two critical images on the phone were cached rather than files necessarily created, saved, or knowingly accessed by defendant. At trial, the State relied heavily on those images as evidence of identity because they depicted a child being assaulted in a manner similar to that described by S.L. We are satisfied that his proposed opinions A-1521-24 23 address one of the State's evidentiary pillars and thus, was sufficient at the PCR stage to require a hearing into whether counsel's failure to consult with or present a competing expert was strategic and professionally reasonable. See generally Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 274-76 (2014). We stress that we do not suggest these expert reports establish defendant's entitlement to PCR. We conclude only that, as to the opinions proffered by Dr. Loftus and Lucich, the existing record does not adequately reveal what trial counsel investigated, whether counsel made an informed strategic decision, or what expert testimony may have been available. Those issues require further factual development. The PCR judge resolved those issues without a hearing by concluding the proposed testimony would not have changed the verdict. But the present record contains no testimony from trial counsel and no developed record as to any consultation, the reasons the expert was not consulted or retained, or if counsel had strategic reasons to forgo such action. Because those issues bear directly on both Strickland prongs, a limited evidentiary hearing is warranted. See State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 311-14 (2014); Porter, 216 N.J. at 354-55. Nothing in our disposition should be understood as criticism of the PCR judge, who issued a careful and detailed written opinion addressing the issues A-1521-24 24 presented on the record then before her. Our remand is limited and is required only because we conclude, as to the proposed opinions of Dr. Loftus and Lucich, further factual development is necessary. Accordingly, on remand, the court shall conduct a limited evidentiary hearing to address whether trial counsel investigated or consulted expert assistance on (1) perception and memory/identification and (2) the cellphone extraction evidence; whether counsel's decision not to present such testimony was an informed strategic decision; and whether defendant can establish prejudice under Strickland. To the extent necessary, the parties may also address the scope in which such testimony would have been admissible. The court then shall issue supplemental findings of fact and conclusions of law. See R. 1:7-4. Affirmed in part and remanded in part for a limited evidentiary hearing consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. A-1521-24 25