Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3106-24 THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON f/k/a THE BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-6CB, MORTGAGE PASS THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2005-6CB, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. WAYNE LEE MARTIN, Defendant-Appellant, and RONA LYNN HOLMES-MARTIN, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, and STATE FARM NORTH, Defendants. _______________________________ Submitted October 15, 2026 – Decided November 17, 2026 Before Judges DeAlmeida and Augostini. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Essex County, Docket No. F-000361-24. Wayne Lee Martin, self-represented appellant. Matthew M. Siti (Leopold & Associates, PLLC), attorney for respondent. PER CURIAM In this residential foreclosure action, defendant Wayne Lee Martin (Martin) appeals from two orders: an August 16, 2024 order granting summary judgment to plaintiff The Bank of New York Mellon F/K/A The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWALT, Inc., Alternative Loan Trust 2005-6CB, Mortgage Pass Through Certificates, Series 2005-6CB; and a May 6, 2025 final judgment. We affirm. I. On January 3, 2005, Martin and Rona Lynn Holmes-Martin (collectively defendants) borrowed $184,000 from Gateway Funding Diversified Mortgage Services L.P., D/B/A Ivy Mortgage (Gateway). Martin executed and delivered a note to Gateway promising to repay the loan (Note). Defendants executed a mortgage to secure the loan, and the mortgage was given to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as nominee for Gateway. A-3106-24 2 In 2008, MERS assigned the Note and mortgage to The Bank of New York as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWALT 2005-06CB (The Bank of New York). In 2022, defendants executed a loan modification agreement to NewRez LLC D/B/A Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing as Attorney in Fact for plaintiff. In 2023, The Bank of New York assigned the Note and mortgage to plaintiff. Both assignments were recorded. In July 2023, defendants ceased paying the amounts due under the Note and mortgage and have not made any payments since then. On November 30, 2023, plaintiff sent defendants a notice of default and intent to foreclose. On January 11, 2024, plaintiff filed a foreclosure complaint against defendants. On January 30, 2024, Martin filed an answer, in which he denied the complaint's allegations regarding default but admitted "ma[king] payments up to July 2023 [but] none thereafter." Martin acknowledged "having possession of and rights to [the] subject property" but denied plaintiff's right to enforce the Note and mortgage. After a trial date was scheduled, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. In support of the motion, plaintiff submitted a certification from Anna Milan, document verification specialist for plaintiff's servicer. Milan certified she personally reviewed plaintiff's business records pertaining to this matter, finding A-3106-24 3 "[p]laintiff has physical possession of the Note and is the holder of the Note and [m]ortgage," thereby giving it standing to foreclose. Regarding the mortgage, Milan certified it had been assigned to MERS as nominee for Gateway in 2005; to The Bank of New York in 2008; and to plaintiff in 2023. Also, defendants executed a loan modification agreement with the servicer of the Note and mortgage in 2022. Milan attached to her certification the Note, endorsements, mortgage, assignments, modification agreement, and notice of intention to foreclose. Defendants did not oppose the motion. On August 16, 2024, the Chancery Division granted summary judgment to plaintiff with an accompanying statement of reasons. A final judgment of foreclosure was entered on May 6, 2025. The judgment awarded plaintiff $342,154.76, plus costs, fees, and post-judgment interest, and allowed plaintiff to sell the mortgaged property to satisfy some of the amount owed. II. On appeal, Martin raises only one argument for our consideration. He claims the Chancery Division erred by relying on an unrelated statement of material facts in support of plaintiff's motion. We review a summary judgment ruling de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial courts. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022) A-3106-24 4 (citing Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019)). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). But we review a decision granting final judgment of foreclosure for abuse of discretion. Customers Bank v. Reitnour Inv. Props., LP, 453 N.J. Super 338, 348 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Sears Mortg. Corp. v. Rose, 134 N.J. 326, 354 (1993)). Martin correctly points out that plaintiff submitted an unrelated statement of material facts in support of its summary judgment motion. The statement referred to an unrelated defendant and property located in another county. Martin, however, does not refute the facts certified by Milan, nor does he raise any substantive challenge to the court's summary judgment findings. Pursuant to Rule 4:46-2(a), a party moving for summary judgment must file a "statement of each material fact as to which the movant contends there is no genuine issue together with a citation to the portion of the motion record establishing the fact or demonstrating that it is uncontroverted." Rule 4:46-2(b) mandates "[a] party opposing the motion shall file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant's statement." "[A]ll A-3106-24 5 material facts in the movant's statement which are sufficiently supported will be deemed admitted . . . unless specifically disputed by citation [to the portion of the motion record] demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact." Ibid. Rule 4:46-5(a) provides "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations [in] the pleading[s], but must respond by affidavits meeting the requirements of [Rule] 1:6-6 . . . setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Rule 1:6-6 states affidavits must be "made on personal knowledge, setting forth only facts which are admissible in evidence to which the affiant is competent to testify." In this case, Martin failed to file a response to plaintiff's statement of material facts or oppose the motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the court reviewed the Milan certification and attachments, properly determined from those documents the uncontested facts, and deemed those facts admitted. The court did not rely on the incorrect statement of material facts. Based on our de novo review, we are convinced the court correctly granted summary judgment to plaintiff. We add only the following admonition. The seriousness of a foreclosure action cannot be understated. Pleadings by which court action is sought require A-3106-24 6 skill, care, and attention. The carelessness in the filings in this case may have been excusable due to an honest mistake, see Mancini v. Eds ex rel. New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association, 132 N.J. 330, 335 (1993). However, plaintiff must exercise greater diligence going forward. Affirmed. A-3106-24 7