In Re: Conviction of Roginsky
CourtNevada Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 19, 2026
Docket90954
JudgeHerndon, Bell, Cadish
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE WRONGFUL No. 90954
CONVICTION OF ROBERT ALAN
ROGINSKY.
____________________________________
ROBERT ALAN ROGINSKY,
Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF NEVADA,
Respondent.
Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in
an action for wrongful conviction compensation. Eighth Judicial District
Court, Clark County; Bita Yeager, Judge.
Affirmed.
Law Office of Kirk T. Kennedy and Kirk T. Kennedy, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.
Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Jaimie Stilz, Senior Deputy Attorney
General, Heather D. Procter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Michael R.
Shaffer and Elsa M. Felgar, Deputy Attorneys General, Carson City,
for Respondent.
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, C.J., and BELL and
CADISH, JJ.
OPINION
By the Court, HERNDON, C.J.:
NRS 41.900-.970 govern causes of action for wrongful convictions.
In enacting the statutory scheme, the Nevada Legislature set standards for
wrongfully convicted persons to pursue compensation. In this case, we
consider the district court’s application of NRS 41.900, which prohibits a
person “currently incarcerated” from seeking wrongful conviction
compensation. We conclude that “incarcerated” as used in NRS 41.900 means
confinement in general. Because appellant Roger Roginsky was in custody
awaiting trial when he sued respondent State of Nevada for wrongful
conviction compensation based on a vacated conviction for another offense, he
was not qualified to bring the cause of action under NRS 41.900. Thus, the
district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment,
and we therefore affirm. 1
FACTS
In 2014, Roginsky was convicted of violating the conditions of
lifetime supervision, which were imposed after Roginsky pleaded no contest to
a charge of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. Because the alleged
conduct did not violate the statutory conditions, we determined Roginsky was
actually innocent of the supervision violation. Roginsky v. State, No. 75742,
2019 WL 1450199, *1 (Nev. Mar. 29, 2019) (Order of Reversal and Remand).
As a result, we instructed the district court to vacate the conviction. Id. at *2.
Roginsky then filed a cause of action for wrongful conviction
compensation pursuant to NRS 41.900, which permits “[a] person who is not
1We previously issued an order of affirmance. The State thereafter filed
a motion to reissue the order as an opinion. We grant the motion and issue
this opinion in place of our prior unpublished disposition. See NRAP 36(e).
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currently incarcerated for any offense [to] bring a civil action for his or her
wrongful conviction.” (Emphasis added.) At the time, Roginsky was in custody
awaiting trial on a murder charge. The State moved for summary judgment
based on NRS 41.900. Because Roginsky was in county jail for an unrelated
offense when he filed the cause of action, the district court granted summary
judgment for the State.
DISCUSSION
Roginsky contends the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the State. We review an order granting summary judgment de
novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005).
Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings and other evidence on
file demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation
modified).
Roginsky argues that the term “incarcerated” means confinement
in prison and the district court therefore misconstrued NRS 41.900(1).
Construing the statute as a whole, see McCord v. State, 139 Nev. 598, 601, 540
P.3d 433, 437 (2023), we disagree for two reasons. First, NRS 41.900 refers to
both incarceration and imprisonment. Compare NRS 41.900(1) (using the term
“incarcerated”), with NRS 41.900(2)(a) (using the term “imprisoned”). Because
the statute uses “one term in one place, and a materially different term in
another,” we presume that “the different term denotes a different idea.” Kabew
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. 184, 187, 545 P.3d 1137, 1140 (2024) (quoting
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal
Texts 170 (2012)). And second, the word “incarceration” means confinement
generally. See Incarceration, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining
“incarceration” as “[t]he act or process of confining someone”). Thus,
Roginsky’s interpretation is belied by the plain meaning of “incarceration” and
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the presumption of consistent usage. See Moore v. State, 136 Nev. 620, 622-23,
475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020) (“[W]e interpret clear and unambiguous statutory
language by its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to an unreasonable
or absurd result.”). Given that Roginsky was incarcerated when he sought
compensation for the wrongful conviction, the district court did not err in
granting summary judgment for the State. Accordingly, we affirm.
Herndon, C.J.
We concur:
Bell, J.
Cadish, J.
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