Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN THE MATTER OF THE WRONGFUL No. 90954 CONVICTION OF ROBERT ALAN ROGINSKY. ____________________________________ ROBERT ALAN ROGINSKY, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Appeal from a district court order granting summary judgment in an action for wrongful conviction compensation. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Bita Yeager, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of Kirk T. Kennedy and Kirk T. Kennedy, Las Vegas, for Appellant. Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Jaimie Stilz, Senior Deputy Attorney General, Heather D. Procter, Chief Deputy Attorney General, and Michael R. Shaffer and Elsa M. Felgar, Deputy Attorneys General, Carson City, for Respondent. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, HERNDON, C.J., and BELL and CADISH, JJ. OPINION By the Court, HERNDON, C.J.: NRS 41.900-.970 govern causes of action for wrongful convictions. In enacting the statutory scheme, the Nevada Legislature set standards for wrongfully convicted persons to pursue compensation. In this case, we consider the district court’s application of NRS 41.900, which prohibits a person “currently incarcerated” from seeking wrongful conviction compensation. We conclude that “incarcerated” as used in NRS 41.900 means confinement in general. Because appellant Roger Roginsky was in custody awaiting trial when he sued respondent State of Nevada for wrongful conviction compensation based on a vacated conviction for another offense, he was not qualified to bring the cause of action under NRS 41.900. Thus, the district court did not err in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment, and we therefore affirm. 1 FACTS In 2014, Roginsky was convicted of violating the conditions of lifetime supervision, which were imposed after Roginsky pleaded no contest to a charge of lewdness with a child under the age of 14. Because the alleged conduct did not violate the statutory conditions, we determined Roginsky was actually innocent of the supervision violation. Roginsky v. State, No. 75742, 2019 WL 1450199, *1 (Nev. Mar. 29, 2019) (Order of Reversal and Remand). As a result, we instructed the district court to vacate the conviction. Id. at *2. Roginsky then filed a cause of action for wrongful conviction compensation pursuant to NRS 41.900, which permits “[a] person who is not 1We previously issued an order of affirmance. The State thereafter filed a motion to reissue the order as an opinion. We grant the motion and issue this opinion in place of our prior unpublished disposition. See NRAP 36(e). 2 currently incarcerated for any offense [to] bring a civil action for his or her wrongful conviction.” (Emphasis added.) At the time, Roginsky was in custody awaiting trial on a murder charge. The State moved for summary judgment based on NRS 41.900. Because Roginsky was in county jail for an unrelated offense when he filed the cause of action, the district court granted summary judgment for the State. DISCUSSION Roginsky contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment for the State. We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “when the pleadings and other evidence on file demonstrate that no genuine issue as to any material fact remains and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citation modified). Roginsky argues that the term “incarcerated” means confinement in prison and the district court therefore misconstrued NRS 41.900(1). Construing the statute as a whole, see McCord v. State, 139 Nev. 598, 601, 540 P.3d 433, 437 (2023), we disagree for two reasons. First, NRS 41.900 refers to both incarceration and imprisonment. Compare NRS 41.900(1) (using the term “incarcerated”), with NRS 41.900(2)(a) (using the term “imprisoned”). Because the statute uses “one term in one place, and a materially different term in another,” we presume that “the different term denotes a different idea.” Kabew v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. 184, 187, 545 P.3d 1137, 1140 (2024) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012)). And second, the word “incarceration” means confinement generally. See Incarceration, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “incarceration” as “[t]he act or process of confining someone”). Thus, Roginsky’s interpretation is belied by the plain meaning of “incarceration” and 3 the presumption of consistent usage. See Moore v. State, 136 Nev. 620, 622-23, 475 P.3d 33, 36 (2020) (“[W]e interpret clear and unambiguous statutory language by its plain meaning unless doing so would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result.”). Given that Roginsky was incarcerated when he sought compensation for the wrongful conviction, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment for the State. Accordingly, we affirm. Herndon, C.J. We concur: Bell, J. Cadish, J. 4