Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN THE MATTER OF DISCIPLINE OF No. 92712 DAVID EDWARD WALTERS, BAR NO. 7203. Petition to impose reciprocal attorney discipline under SCR 114. Petition granted. Dan Hooge, Bar Counsel, and R. Kait Flocchini, Assistant Bar Counsel, Reno, for Petitioner State Bar of Nevada. Richard Harris Law Firm and David A. Clark, Las Vegas, for Respondent David Edward Walters. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, PICKERING, PARRAGUIRRE, and BELL, JJ. OPINION By the Court, PICKERING, J.: The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit suspended Nevada-licensed attorney David Edward Walters for six months. Walters and the State Bar of Nevada (SBN) agree that SCR 114(4) requires “identical discipline” in the form of a six-month suspension, but they disagree as to when that suspension should commence. Walters argues the Nevada suspension should be retroactive to the date of the Ninth Circuit suspension (November 24, 2025), while the SBN argues the Nevada suspension should run from the date this court enters its order on the SBN’s petition for reciprocal discipline. SCR 114 does not specify when a reciprocal suspension begins. We conclude that two considerations guide this court’s discretion in deciding when a reciprocal suspension commences: prompt notice to the SBN as required by SCR 114(1) and cessation of practice in Nevada during the foreign suspension. Both considerations support a retroactive suspension here. The SBN received prompt notice of the Ninth Circuit suspension, and Walters provided additional information during the reporting period set forth in SCR 114(1), but the SBN did not file the reciprocal discipline petition until after the Ninth Circuit suspension expired. Walters also ceased practicing immigration law, which comprises almost all his practice, and all corollary immigration actions in Nevada during the suspensions. Under these circumstances, making the reciprocal suspension run from the date of the Ninth Circuit suspension would not diminish the discipline imposed on Walters. Instead, it would prevent the delay in initiating reciprocal proceedings from extending a suspension that Walters had served while refraining from practicing. For these reasons, we conclude that Walters’ reciprocal suspension should be effective as of the date when the Ninth Circuit suspension was imposed. Accordingly, we grant the reciprocal discipline petition and impose a concurrent six-month suspension, retroactive to November 24, 2025, such that, while the discipline is a matter of record in Nevada, no additional period of suspension is due. I. David Walters is a Nevada-licensed lawyer who almost exclusively practices immigration law. The Ninth Circuit disciplined Walters for deficient briefing in three immigration appeals by imposing a six-month suspension, effective November 24, 2025. The Ninth Circuit ordered Walters to withdraw from six pending matters and directed its clerk to send the suspension order to the SBN and the Executive Office of Immigration Review’s (EOIR) disciplinary 2 counsel. The SBN had received notice of the Ninth Circuit suspension by December 10, 2025, when it sent Walters a letter confirming it was investigating the matter. Walters responded and provided documents concerning the Ninth Circuit proceedings. The Ninth Circuit suspension prompted EOIR and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to institute their own joint reciprocal disciplinary proceedings. Walters admitted the allegations but opposed identical discipline, alternatively requesting that any suspension run retroactive to the Ninth Circuit suspension. On March 4, 2026, EOIR and DHS rejected Walters’ request and imposed a six-month suspension from practice before the Bureau of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Courts, and DHS, effective March 19, 2026. The SBN filed its petition for reciprocal discipline with this court on May 26, 2026, seeking a consecutive six-month suspension in Nevada based on the Ninth Circuit and EOIR/DHS discipline. As of May 26, Walters had completed his Ninth Circuit suspension, while the EOIR/DHS suspensions had not yet expired. Walters does not dispute that SCR 114 requires reciprocal discipline. Walters instead asks this court to run the Nevada six-month suspension retroactive to November 24, 2025, when the Ninth Circuit suspension began. II. A. Reciprocal discipline permits a jurisdiction to discipline its lawyers for misconduct committed elsewhere. See Ching v. State Bar of Nev., 111 Nev. 779, 784, 895 P.2d 646, 649 (1995) (explaining in part that SCR 114 calls for identical reciprocal discipline for Nevada attorneys who have been disciplined in another jurisdiction). The same reciprocal discipline framework applies to immigration lawyers practicing before federal tribunals, who remain subject 3 to discipline in their licensing jurisdictions for misconduct committed in that practice. See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law of Lawyering § 66.02 n.4, at 66-5 (4th ed. supp. 2025). The jurisdiction where the misconduct occurs may report it to the lawyer’s licensing jurisdiction, which may impose reciprocal discipline. Id. § 66.03, at 66-8. Reciprocal discipline procedures conserve judicial and disciplinary resources by allowing courts to rely on another jurisdiction’s adjudication rather than duplicate disciplinary proceedings, while preserving the lawyer’s opportunity to show why reciprocal discipline should not follow if an exception applies. See Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct: Practice Guides, 101 Misconduct and Discipline, Disciplinary Process, § 101:2101.90 (Am. Bar Ass’n & Bloomberg Indus. Grp., Inc. 2024) (discussing In re Lisse, 921 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2019)). SCR 114 governs reciprocal discipline in Nevada. It requires an attorney subject to this court’s disciplinary authority to report discipline imposed in another jurisdiction within 30 days. SCR 114(1). Upon receiving notice of such discipline, bar counsel must obtain a copy of the disciplinary order or other documents demonstrating that discipline was imposed and petition this court to order reciprocal discipline. SCR 114(2)-(3). SCR 114(4), in turn, requires this court to impose the “identical discipline” rendered by the other jurisdiction, subject to certain exceptions. We note that none of the recognized exceptions apply here, as the foreign tribunals afforded Walters an opportunity to respond, the record supports the findings of misconduct, and the conduct implicates RPC 1.1 (competence) and RPC 3.3 (candor to the tribunal). Although SCR 114(4) generally requires this court to impose identical discipline, SCR 114 does not specify when a reciprocal suspension must begin. See also ABA Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, R. 22 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2020) (addressing “identical discipline” reciprocally 4 imposed but not specifying when that discipline should commence). Nevada caselaw addressing reciprocal suspensions has not developed a framework for determining when a reciprocal suspension should begin. For instance, we have commonly imposed reciprocal suspensions to run from the date of this court’s order, without addressing the date of the other jurisdiction’s suspension. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Ramos, No. 89054, 2025 WL 432982 (Nev. Feb. 6, 2025) (Order Imposing Reciprocal Discipline and Suspending Attorney) (suspending attorney for two years from the date of this court’s order); In re Discipline of Gagic, No. 87020, 2023 WL 6940313 (Nev. Oct. 19, 2023) (Order Imposing Reciprocal Discipline and Suspending Attorney) (suspending attorney for one year starting from the date of this court’s order); In re Discipline of Berlin, No. 82305, 2021 WL 1530747 (Nev. Apr. 16, 2021) (Order Imposing Reciprocal Discipline and Suspending Attorney) (suspending attorney for six months starting from the date of this court’s order). But Nevada caselaw also recognizes that delaying reciprocal discipline can result in a suspension that is effectively consecutive to the discipline imposed by another jurisdiction. In Copren v. State Bar of Nevada, this court considered whether a Nevada suspension based on misconduct previously disciplined in California should extend beyond the expiration of the California suspension. 64 Nev. 364, 387, 183 P.2d 833, 844 (1947). Applying principles of comity, Copren declined to extend the reciprocal portion of the Nevada suspension beyond the California suspension, reasoning that doing so only because Nevada proceeded later could make the suspensions “virtually consecutive, rather than concurrent” and potentially impose an aggregate suspension “many times the period of the original suspension.” Id. at 387, 183 P.2d at 843. And we have imposed reciprocal suspensions retroactively where the foreign jurisdiction stayed some or all of the suspension subject to 5 probationary conditions. E.g., In re Discipline of Wajda, No. 87141, 2023 WL 6799620 (Nev. Oct. 13, 2023) (Order Imposing Reciprocal Discipline and Suspending Attorney) (reciprocally imposing a six-month suspension retroactive to the foreign suspension date and stayed subject to the conditions of the foreign discipline, where this court entered its order after the six-month foreign probationary period had ended); In re Discipline of Seegmiller, No. 72525, 2017 WL 3261765 (Nev. July 31, 2017) (Order Imposing Reciprocal Discipline) (reciprocally suspending attorney for one year, with all but 90 days stayed, retroactive to the foreign suspension date). Those orders, however, did not address why the foreign suspensions’ effective dates should also govern the Nevada suspensions. Thus, Nevada caselaw reflects different approaches to the effective date of reciprocal suspensions, including suspensions made retroactive to the foreign discipline and suspensions made effective on a later date. Though Copren cautioned that a reciprocal suspension should not “tend to increase the punishment far beyond that intended” by the foreign jurisdiction, particularly where the resulting increase would be “far in excess of the requirements of justice,” 64 Nev. at 387, 183 P.2d at 844, neither Copren nor our later cases have articulated a standard for determining when a reciprocal suspension should be effective. B. Other jurisdictions have directly addressed when reciprocal suspensions should run concurrently. For example, in In re Goldberg, the United States Court of Appeals for the District Court of Columbia “anticipate[d] that concurrency will be the norm” and recognized that requiring an attorney to serve a reciprocal suspension after completing the foreign suspension could, particularly if the suspension is short, mean that the two suspension periods “would never even intersect.” 460 A.2d 982, 985 (D.C. Cir. 6 1983). Goldberg explained, like Copren, that this “would tend to increase the punishment far beyond that intended by the original state and far beyond the degree of discipline warranted.” Id. Building on Goldberg’s reasoning, the Maryland Court of Appeals decision in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Midlen identified two considerations that favor concurrent reciprocal discipline: first, whether the attorney promptly notifies disciplinary authorities of the foreign suspension as required by the applicable rule; and second, whether the attorney promptly ceases practicing in the reciprocating jurisdiction during the foreign suspension. 911 A.2d 852, 865-66 (Md. 2006). Midlen considered this approach “fully consistent with the notion and function of reciprocal and corresponding discipline” but cautioned that concurrent discipline is not a matter of right. Id. at 866. Rather, it remains within the reciprocating jurisdiction’s “discretion and practice, to be used when the circumstances warrant.” Id. We agree with Midlen’s rationale and approach. The first consideration, prompt notice to the reciprocal jurisdiction, is consistent with SCR 114’s framework, which requires an attorney subject to foreign discipline to notify bar counsel of that discipline within 30 days. SCR 114(1). Once the office of bar counsel learns of the discipline, it must obtain a copy of the foreign discipline order, or other demonstrative documents, and file a petition for reciprocal discipline with this court. SCR 114(2)-(3). SCR 114(2) also contemplates that bar counsel may receive notice from someone other than the disciplined attorney. When that occurs, SCR 114(2) directs bar counsel to investigate and, if the discipline is confirmed, file a reciprocal discipline petition with this court. Thus, an attorney’s reporting obligation and bar counsel’s responsibility to act on notice serve complementary functions in facilitating timely reciprocal discipline. 7 Prompt notice allows the SBN to begin the reciprocal discipline process while the foreign discipline remains in effect, naturally making “the sanction here more contemporaneous.” Midlen, 911 A.2d at 866-67. The prompt-notice requirement also prevents an attorney from benefiting by withholding notice of the foreign suspension. Id. at 865 (noting that an attorney should not be rewarded for unreasonably delaying notice of foreign discipline). But once bar counsel receives timely notice, SCR 114 requires bar counsel to act on that information by obtaining the disciplinary order and petitioning this court for reciprocal discipline. SCR 114(2), (3). Thus, after an attorney has complied with the notice requirement, the timing of the reciprocal proceedings is no longer within the attorney’s control. The timing of bar counsel’s action may therefore bear on whether the resulting reciprocal suspension should operate concurrently with, or consecutively to, the foreign suspension. See, e.g., In re Barocas, 240 N.Y.S.3d 9, 12-13 (App. Div. 2025) (considering whether disciplinary counsel “substantially delay[ed] in seeking reciprocal discipline” when determining whether prospective or nunc pro tunc discipline is warranted). The second consideration, cessation of practice in the reciprocal jurisdiction, serves the principal purpose of attorney discipline: protecting the public and maintaining confidence in the legal profession. See State Bar of Nev. v. Claiborne, 104 Nev. 115, 129, 756 P.2d 464, 473 (1988) (describing this as “the paramount objective” of attorney discipline). If an attorney continues practicing in Nevada during a foreign suspension, making a later Nevada suspension retroactive would not provide the same protection to the public during the period of the foreign suspension. But when an attorney promptly ceases practicing in Nevada, the public receives the protection that the reciprocal suspension is meant to provide during that period. As Midlen 8 explained, encouraging an attorney to cease practice during the foreign suspension “provides more immediate protection to” the public. 911 A.2d at 867. We therefore adopt Midlen’s framework for determining the appropriate effective date of a reciprocal suspension. The notice and cessation- of-practice considerations inform our exercise of discretion under SCR 114, but they do not create a right to concurrent discipline. Rather, we consider those factors, together with any other pertinent circumstances, in deciding when a reciprocal suspension should take effect, including whether it should operate concurrently with the foreign suspension. See Goldberg, 460 A.2d at 985. C. Applying the Midlen considerations to this case, the parties first dispute whether Walters complied with the notice requirement in SCR 114(1). The SBN contends that Walters did not personally report the foreign suspensions and therefore did not promptly notify the SBN. Walters responds that the Ninth Circuit sent its suspension order to the SBN within SCR 114(1)’s 30-day reporting period and that he was in active communication with the SBN about that suspension during that period. The Ninth Circuit’s suspension order directed that court’s clerk to send the order to the SBN, and by December 10, 2025, the SBN had opened an investigation into Walters’ discipline. At that point, Walters’ 30-day period to report the November 24 suspension under SCR 114(1) had not expired. By December 12, Walters had responded to the SBN and provided more information concerning the Ninth Circuit disciplinary proceedings. Walters’ communications therefore supplemented the notice provided by the Ninth Circuit during the reporting period. Walters continued to keep the SBN informed as other reciprocal proceedings progressed. On January 8, 2026, EOIR and DHS issued a joint notice of intent to discipline Walters based on 9 the Ninth Circuit suspension. Twelve days later, Walters provided that notice to the SBN. Although the joint notice did not itself impose discipline, Walters’ prompt disclosures further informed the SBN of the reciprocal proceedings arising from the Ninth Circuit suspension. The first Midlen consideration, prompt notice to the reciprocal jurisdiction, supports a reciprocal suspension retroactive to the Ninth Circuit’s effective date. The SBN was promptly notified, giving it an opportunity to pursue reciprocal discipline while the Ninth Circuit suspension remained in effect. Because the SBN received timely notice but did not file the reciprocal discipline petition until after the Ninth Circuit suspension had expired, Walters should not bear the consequence of that delay. See, e.g., In re Reciprocal Discipline of Zelotes, No. 3:13-gp-18 (SRU), 2017 WL 354849, at *3 (D. Conn. Jan. 23, 2017) (recognizing that a delay in reciprocal disciplinary proceedings may make the later imposition of reciprocal discipline contrary to the interest of justice). The second Midlen consideration likewise supports making the reciprocal suspension effective on the date of the Ninth Circuit’s six-month suspension. The record shows that Walters neither practiced immigration law after the Ninth Circuit suspended him nor appeared as counsel in any related state action. This is significant because Walters practices almost exclusively in immigration law. By ceasing to practice immigration law during the foreign suspensions, he effectively ceased practicing law in Nevada during that period. Walters’ cessation of practice therefore reduced the risk to the public while reciprocal proceedings were ongoing and provided the immediate public protection that underlies reciprocal discipline. See Midlen, 911 A.2d at 867. Accordingly, making the reciprocal suspension effective as of the Ninth Circuit 10 suspension would recognize the full period of foreign discipline, beginning with the suspension that triggered later reciprocal suspensions. Additional circumstances also favor imposing a concurrent suspension. The Ninth Circuit’s six-month suspension was relatively short, yet the SBN received timely notice of that suspension and could have filed a petition while that suspension remained in effect. Instead, it did not petition this court for reciprocal discipline until May 26, 2026, after the Ninth Circuit’s suspension had run. Nothing in the record attributes that delay to Walters. Walters will have the stain of a Nevada suspension on his record regardless of the date that suspension begins to run, and a consecutive Nevada suspension commencing from the date of the reciprocal discipline order under these circumstances would unfairly double the suspension, not reciprocate it. In this case, therefore, running Nevada’s suspension retroactive to the Ninth Circuit’s suspension makes Nevada’s discipline more contemporaneous, fair, and, under these facts, reciprocal to the foreign discipline. This result also prevents the SBN’s delay from increasing Walters’ discipline beyond that intended or warranted by the original discipline. Because the Ninth Circuit imposed a six- month suspension effective November 24, 2025, Walters’ reciprocal Nevada suspension will run from that date. III. SCR 114 requires identical reciprocal discipline but does not require a reciprocal suspension to begin on the date this court enters its order. We adopt Midlen’s prompt-notice and cessation-of-practice considerations to guide our discretion in determining whether a reciprocal suspension should apply retroactively so that it is fully concurrent with the foreign suspension. Neither consideration is dispositive, and retroactive discipline remains within this court’s discretion based on the circumstances of each case. 11 Both considerations support retroactive discipline here. Accordingly, we grant the petition for reciprocal discipline and suspend David Edward Walters from the practice of law in Nevada for six months, retroactive to November 24, 2025, the effective date of the Ninth Circuit suspension. Given the retroactive effective date of Walters’ suspension, no present suspension remains for purposes of SCR 115. Walters and the SBN shall comply with SCR 121.1. Pickering, J. We concur: Parraguirre, J. Bell, J. 12