In Re: Petition by Campbell
CourtCourt of Appeals of Nevada
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
Docket91047-COA
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION No. 91047-COA
BY: JOHNNIE C. CAMPBELL
____________________________________
JOHNNIE C. CAMPBELL,
Appellant,
vs.
TRINA RENEE OFFUTT-OSBORNE,
Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING
Johnnie C. Campbell appeals from a district court order denying a
motion for contempt and modification of custody and an order modifying
electronic parenting time. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon.
Heidi Almase, Judge.
Johnnie and respondent Trina Renee Offutt-Osborne were never
married and have one minor child together, T.O., who was born in 2009. Trina
has been T.O.’s sole caregiver since his birth. T.O. resides with Trina in Las
Vegas while Johnnie lives in Iowa. When T.O. was nine years old, Johnnie
filed a complaint to obtain joint legal and physical custody of T.O. and establish
a shared out-of-state custody arrangement. In 2019, the district court entered
a custody decree in which the parties stipulated that Trina would have sole
legal and physical custody of T.O. while Johnnie and T.O. participated in
reunification therapy to build their relationship.
After multiple failed attempts to complete reunification therapy
and extensive litigation between the parties, Johnnie requested a hearing to
address reunification. In May 2023, the district court found that “the
reunification therapy order caused substantial issues for the parties” because
Trina and Johnnie “resid[ed] in separate states and need[ed] insurance
coverage for the therapy.” The court deferred reunification therapy and
ordered that Johnnie have electronic parenting time with T.O., with Johnnie
initiating phone calls to T.O. and Trina ensuring T.O.’s availability for those
calls.
The following month, Johnnie filed a motion to modify custody
using a Family Law Self-Help Center form. He argued that modification was
warranted because, as relevant here, Trina did not allow T.O. to speak with
him privately and would interrupt and end his conversations with T.O. Trina
opposed his motion and requested to maintain the current custody
arrangement. In her opposition, Trina admitted that she did not let T.O. use
the phone Johnnie provided to him and indicated that she listened to Johnnie’s
conversations with T.O. but denied interrupting them. In September 2023, the
district court denied Johnnie’s motion and entered an order requiring Johnnie
to call T.O. at 5:00 p.m. every Monday and Wednesday and requiring Trina to
ensure T.O. was available for Johnnie’s calls. The district court also found that
Trina did not establish that she had “fully cooperated” with the electronic
parenting time order, as she admittedly did not give T.O. privacy during his
parenting time with Johnnie and “conceded she does not allow the child access
to Johnnie.”
In May 2024, Johnnie used a Family Law Self-Help Center form to
file a motion for an order to show cause regarding contempt (the “contempt
motion”). The form Johnnie used only contained points and authorities
regarding contempt and enforcement under NRS Chapter 22; it did not contain
any points and authorities related to custodial modification. In the facts and
argument section of the form, Johnnie asserted that Trina did “not obey the
2
custody/visitation schedule” and he sought the following relief: “Custody to be
handed over to non[-]custodial parent. Full custody, sole custody and physical
custody.”
In his form declaration in support of that motion, Johnnie
identified the September 2023 order as the order being violated and listed the
relevant pages and line numbers of the order that he contended were being
violated. Johnnie alleged that Trina was not ensuring T.O. was available for
his calls and that Trina had taken the phone he provided T.O. Johnnie further
alleged that Trina had interfered with his calls to T.O. by taking the phone and
preventing T.O. from using it. Johnnie explained that this conduct caused his
electronic parenting time to stop completely, and that it had been months since
he last talked with T.O.
Trina filed her opposition to the motion that same day. Trina
argued that she should not be held in contempt because Johnnie had only
called seven times since the court entered the September 2023 electronic
parenting time order. Four days later, Johnnie filed exhibits in support of his
motion that included his phone call logs, video call history, and the unreturned
text messages he sent to T.O. and Trina. Although the district court initially
set Johnnie’s contempt motion for a hearing, that hearing was ultimately
vacated.
In August 2024, the district court denied Johnnie’s motion without
holding a hearing. The court found that Johnnie “failed to meet his burden to
establish on a prima facie basis” that Trina violated the September order by
failing to ensure T.O. was available for electronic parenting time or by
interfering with T.O.’s use of the phone. The court further found that “Johnnie
did not identify the telephone number of the cell phone he provided for the child
and did not demonstrate his compliance by calling that telephone number only
3
to communicate with the child as ordered each Monday and Wednesday at 5:00
PM.” In addition to denying Johnnie’s contempt motion, the district court
treated Johnnie’s request to modify custody as an independent motion, denying
it separately because he failed to support it with a memorandum of points and
authorities pursuant to EDCR 5.503(a).
Johnnie then filed two, nearly identical NRCP 60(b) motions to set
aside the district court’s order denying his contempt motion and his related
request to modify custody. He argued that the court should set the order aside
because he was not served with Trina’s opposition to his contempt motion and
the court did not review the exhibits he filed. The district court held a hearing
on Johnnie’s motions in December 2024. After briefly addressing Johnnie’s set-
aside motions, the court discussed how Johnnie might reestablish a
relationship with T.O., recognizing that T.O. was, at the time, almost 16 years
old and had not communicated with Johnnie in over a year.
During that discussion, the district court acknowledged that the
current order required Johnnie to initiate communication with T.O. and
suggested “having [T.O.] call or maybe even start with a text to his dad on
Mondays.” Both Johnnie and Trina agreed to have T.O. initiate
communication with Johnnie, and neither party objected to communication
occurring through text messages. Johnnie requested, and the court agreed, to
have T.O. send him text messages on both Mondays and Wednesdays. In June
2025, the court entered a written order reflecting Johnnie’s proposed parenting
time arrangement and ordered: “[T.O.] shall TEXT [Johnnie] via the minor
child’s mobile device OR [Trina’s] mobile device . . . on MONDAYS, and
WEDNESDAYS at 6:00 PM.” The court implicitly denied Johnnie’s motions to
set aside, stating that “all prior orders STAND.” Johnnie appeals.
4
On appeal, Johnnie first argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it found that he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of
contempt and denied his motion and requested relief—modification of
custody—without holding a hearing.
This court “normally review[s] an order of contempt for abuse of
discretion.” Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 456, 373 P.3d 878, 880 (2016). We
likewise review a district court order concerning child custody for abuse of
discretion, Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 169, 535 P.3d 274, 284 (Ct. App. 2023),
including orders denying modification of custody without an evidentiary
hearing, Myers v. Haskins, 138 Nev. 553, 556, 513 P.3d 527, 531 (Ct. App.
2022). A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly
erroneous, Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018), or
is not supported by substantial evidence, Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149,
161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007). “[D]eference is not owed to legal error, or to findings
so conclusory they may mask legal error.” Davis v. Ewalefo, 131 Nev. 445, 450,
352 P.3d 1139, 1142 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
Contempt orders are not independently appealable. Pengilly v.
Rancho Santa Fe Homeowners Ass’n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000).
However, this court has jurisdiction to review a contempt order that is
“included in an order that is otherwise independently appealable.” Vaile v.
Vaile, 133 Nev. 213, 217, 396 P.3d 791, 794-95 (2017). In this case, Johnnie
filed a contempt motion that sought an inappropriate remedy for
relief—modification of custody. See Sims v. Sims, 109 Nev. 1146, 1149, 865
P.2d 328, 330 (1993) (“[A] court may not use changes of custody as a sword to
punish parental misconduct . . . .”). Although Johnnie’s contempt motion
improperly sought custodial modification as a sanction for Trina’s contempt,
the district court treated that request as a stand-alone motion to modify
5
custody and then denied it in the same order that it denied Johnnie’s contempt
motion. And because a party may appeal from the denial of a motion to modify
custody, see NRAP 3A(b)(7), we have jurisdiction to consider Johnnie’s appeal
of the district court’s order denying his contempt motion because it was
contained in an order denying modification of custody.
Here, the district court denied Johnnie’s request to modify custody
because he failed to provide any points and authorities in support of custodial
modification as required by EDCR 5.503(a). In challenging that decision,
Johnnie contends that the district court abused its discretion because his
contempt motion alleged sufficient facts to imply that the best interest factors
and “the possibility of a substantial change in circumstances” were at issue.
We disagree.
Despite misinterpreting Johnnie’s request as a separate motion to
modify custody, the district did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Johnnie’s request for full/sole custody of T.O. for failing to provide points and
authorities in support of that custodial modification. A district court has broad
discretion to deny a motion based on a party’s failure to include a memorandum
of points and authorities in support of their requested relief. EDCR 5.503(a)
(providing that a failure to include points and authorities “may be construed
as an admission that the filing is not meritorious, or as cause for its denial”
(emphasis added)). And here, Johnnie’s motion only provided legal authority
for contempt and enforcement and lacked any points and authorities to support
his request for full/sole custody of T.O. To the extent Johnnie asks this court
to overlook his failure to comply with EDCR 5.503(a), he does not provide any
authority demonstrating that the district court abused its discretion when it
applied EDCR 5.503(a) to deny his request for modification. Edwards v.
Emperor’s Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38
6
(2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that lack the support
of relevant authority). We therefore conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Johnnie’s request to modify custody under
EDCR 5.503(a).
Johnnie next argues that the district court violated his due process
rights when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing before denying his request
for full/sole custody of T.O. To the extent the district court construed Johnnie’s
request to modify custody as a separate motion, we conclude he failed to
demonstrate adequate cause to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the
court did not violate his due process rights by failing to hold one. A party
seeking to modify custody is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
hearing and must first demonstrate adequate cause. Myers, 138 Nev. at 556,
513 P.3d at 531. Adequate cause can be established by demonstrating “(1) the
facts alleged in the affidavits are relevant to the grounds for modification; and
(2) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.” Rooney v. Rooney,
109 Nev. 540, 543, 853 P.2d 123, 125 (1993). To establish grounds for
modification, the movant must show that “(1) there has been a substantial
change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child’s
best interest is served by the modification.” Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 3,
501 P.3d 980, 982 (2022), abrogated in part on other grounds by Killebrew v.
State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 404-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1171 (2023). NRS
125C.0035(4) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors a court must consider
when evaluating the child’s best interest.
Not only did Johnnie fail to provide points and authorities to
support his request to modify custody, but he also failed to allege any facts
demonstrating how awarding full/sole custody to Johnnie would be in T.O.’s
best interest. Although Johnnie’s contempt allegations, coupled with Trina’s
7
prior conduct, could support an inference of changed circumstances, see Martin
v. Martin, 120 Nev. 342, 345, 90 P.3d 981, 983 (2004) (explaining that a
“custodial parent’s substantial or pervasive interference may constitute
changed circumstances”), inferences alone cannot establish grounds to modify
custody, Rooney, 109 Nev. at 543, 853 P.2d at 125. Critically, Johnnie failed to
provide any facts, allegations, or arguments demonstrating how awarding him
full/sole custody of T.O. would be in T.O.’s best interest.
Ultimately, Johnnie failed to establish adequate cause for an
evidentiary hearing on custodial modification under Myers and Rooney because
he did not provide points and authorities in support of modifying custody and
did not demonstrate any grounds for modification. See Rooney, 109 Nev. at
543, 853 P.2d at 125 (concluding that the appellant was not entitled to a
hearing where her affidavits and points and authorities did not establish
adequate cause). We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion or violate Johnnie’s due process rights to the extent that it denied
Johnnie’s request to modify custody without first holding an evidentiary
hearing.
Although the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Johnnie’s request to modify custody, the court did abuse its discretion when it
denied Johnnie’s contempt motion on the basis that Johnnie failed to make a
prima facie case of contempt. Disobeying “any lawful writ, order, rule or
process issued by the court or judge at chambers” is contempt. NRS 22.010(3).
If a contempt is committed outside the court’s view, “an affidavit must be
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt.” NRS
22.030(2). Under the Eighth Judicial District Court Rules, a party seeking an
order to show cause for contempt must provide “a detailed affidavit complying
with NRS 22.030(2)” and set forth “the specific provisions, pages and lines of
8
the existing order(s) alleged to have been violated, the acts or omissions
constituting the alleged violation, any harm suffered or anticipated, and the
need for a contempt ruling.” EDCR 5.509(a).
Here, Johnnie used a Self-Help Center form which provided a
declaration1 template containing a blank section for each required element of
EDCR 5.509(a). Johnnie filled out the entire declaration and noted how Trina
was violating specific lines of the electronic parenting-time order, how her
alleged violation harmed his relationship with his son, and why the court
needed to hold Trina in contempt. This was sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of contempt. See Bohannon v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 69719, 2017 WL
1080066, at *2 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2017) (Order Granting Petition in Part) (holding
that an affidavit established a prima facie case for contempt where it “indicated
that [the real party in interest] had returned several positive drug tests, in
violation of the November 14, 2013, district court order that she remain drug
and alcohol free during a three-year period”).
The district court denied Johnnie’s motion based on two findings:
his failure to demonstrate that he complied with the order and his failure to
identify the telephone number of the cell phone he provided to T.O. These
findings do not demonstrate that Johnnie failed to state a prima facie case of
contempt. Neither EDCR 5.509(a) nor NRS 22.030(2) require that amount of
specificity in an affidavit or require a party to establish that they have
complied with the court order to demonstrate an alleged contempt. Because
1Johnnie submitted a form declaration signed under penalty of perjury
rather than an affidavit in support of his motion. A party may submit an
unsworn declaration signed under penalty of perjury in place of an affidavit.
NRS 53.045. And the supreme court has held that a declaration can fulfill a
statutory requirement to submit an affidavit. Buckwalter v. Eighth Jud. Dist.
Ct., 126 Nev. 200, 202, 234 P.3d 920, 922 (2010).
9
Johnnie’s declaration complied with NRS 22.030(2) and EDCR 5.509(a), it
cannot be said that he failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of contempt.
Nevertheless, Johnnie fails to establish that the district court was
required to hold a hearing on his contempt motion simply because he stated a
prima facie case of contempt. Johnnie relies on Myers and Rooney to support
his argument that such a hearing was required. To the extent Johnnie argues
that these cases should be extended to require an evidentiary hearing on a
contempt motion, the Nevada appellate courts have never applied Myers or
Rooney in this manner and Johnnie cites no authority suggesting this court
should extend those cases to apply in these circumstances. See Edwards, 122
Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38 (providing that this court need not
consider claims that lack the support of relevant authority). As such, we reject
any argument that Myers or Rooney would require a hearing on a motion for
an order to show cause.
Further, whether a hearing is held on a contempt motion is
entirely within the district court’s discretion. See EDCR 5.509(c) (“Upon
review of the motion and application, the court may . . . [d]eny the motion and
vacate the hearing . . . .”). Even if the district court decides to hold a hearing,
the court still retains discretion to decide whether to issue sanctions against
the person accused of contempt. See EDCR 5.509(e) (“At the first hearing after
issuance of an OSC, the accused contemnor may be held in contempt, or
not . . . .”).
Although we conclude that the district court abused its discretion
in finding that Johnnie’s declaration failed to demonstrate a prima facie case
of contempt, we do not know whether the court would have exercised its
discretion and held a hearing on Johnnie’s motion had it not made that error.
See In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R., 136 Nev. 494, 500, 474 P.3d 838, 844 (Ct.
10
App. 2020) (reversing the denial of a request to make Special Immigrant
Juvenile status findings because the district court applied the incorrect
standard of proof and remanding for further proceedings given that it was “not
clear that the district court would have reached the same conclusion ... had it
applied the correct standard of proof.”). We therefore reverse the district
court’s order to the extent it found Johnnie did not make a prima facie case of
contempt and remand this matter for the district court to decide whether a
hearing is warranted on Johnnie’s contempt motion in light of this decision.
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART
AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court
for proceedings consistent with this order.2
Bulla, C.J.
Gibbons, J. Westbrook, J.
2With respect to Johnnie’s argument that the district court’s June 2025
order lacked sufficient particularity under NRS 125C.010, we conclude that
this argument does not provide Johnnie with a basis for relief. The order was
not susceptible to different interpretations, see NRS 125C.010(2); NRS
125C.0045(5), the parties agreed to have T.O. initiate communication with
Johnnie, and Johnnie requested to have T.O. send him text messages on both
Mondays and Wednesdays, see, e.g., Pearson v. Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 297, 871
P.2d 343, 345 (1994) (explaining that “a party will not be heard to complain on
appeal of error which he himself induced or provoked the court . . . to commit”).
Insofar as Johnnie raises other arguments not specifically addressed in
this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present
a basis for further relief.
11
cc: Hon. Heidi Almase, District Judge
Kainen Law Group
Trina Renee Offutt-Osborne
Barbara E. Buckley, Notice Only
Kelly H. Dove, Notice Only
Elizabeth R. Mikesell, Notice Only
Paul C. Ray, Notice Only
Eighth District Court Clerk
12