Ortega v. Dist. Ct. (Ortega)
CourtCourt of Appeals of Nevada
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket93300-COA
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
KRISTEN ORTEGA, N/K/A KRISTEN No. 93300-COA
MEDINA,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA,
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF
CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE
NADIN CUTTER,
Respondents,
and
AARON ORTEGA,
Real Party in Interest.
ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS OR PROHIBITION
Kristen Ortega, n/k/a Kristen Medina, petitions for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition challenging a district court order of contempt in a
child custody matter.
Medina and real party in interest Aaron Ortega were married and
have one minor child together. The parties divorced in August 2023. The
divorce matter reopened when Ortega alleged that Medina was not allowing
him to have his parenting time with the minor child. During a January 2025
hearing, the district court ordered Ortega to have supervised parenting time
every other Sunday from 10:00 a.m.-2:00 p.m., and every other Wednesday
from 5:00 p.m.-7:30 p.m. during the weeks he did not have Sunday parenting
time. The written order from this hearing was entered on February 10, 2025.
In December 2025, Ortega filed a motion for an order to show cause
as to why Medina should not be held in contempt because he had not seen the
minor child between May 4 and November 2, 2025, and although Medina
permitted Ortega to exercise his parenting time with the child on November 2
and 9, she again withheld the child following November 9. The district court
entered an order to show cause and set a hearing for January 21, 2026. The
court held various hearings, appointed counsel for Medina, and scheduled the
matter for an evidentiary hearing.
The matter proceeded to an August 2026 evidentiary hearing
where Medina was represented by appointed counsel. At the conclusion of the
evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Medina was in indirect
contempt of the court’s February 10, 2025, written order. In its written order
following the evidentiary hearing, the court found that Ortega’s motion and
affidavit detailed the facts constituting the contempt and identified the specific
provision of the February 10, 2025, order alleged to have been violated, and
that an order to show cause was issued in December 2025. The court further
found that Medina was represented by counsel. The court found that the
testimony during the evidentiary hearing supported that there were 23 dates
that Medina did not comply with the court’s order for Ortega’s supervised
parenting time. The court found Medina’s actions were willful, intentional,
and calculated. The district court found Ortega satisfied the standard of proof
for civil contempt, which was clear and convincing evidence, as he testified that
Medina did not bring the minor child to supervised parenting time on 23
occasions.
The district court found that Ortega outlined at least 23 counts of
contempt against Medina where she did not comply with the court’s order for
Ortega’s parenting time and ordered Medina to serve two days of incarceration
for each count of contempt for a total of 46 days. The court ordered Medina to
serve 30 days of incarceration immediately but indicated that it would stay the
remaining 16 days. The court awarded Ortega sole physical custody of the
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minor child for the period of Medina’s incarceration. The court indicated that
it would set a hearing in six months to allow Medina to establish that she had
complied with the court’s orders for a period of six months. The court explained
that, at the conclusion of the six months, it may elect to remove the remaining
16 days of incarceration if there was perfect compliance with the court’s orders.
Medina filed the present petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition to seek
relief from the district court’s contempt determination.1
In her writ petition, Medina argues, among other things, that the
district court improperly imposed criminal contempt sanctions using the
standard for civil contempt. She argues the 30-day incarceration was criminal
in nature, and the stay of the remaining 16 days did not convert the separate
30-day term into a civil contempt sanction. She also argues the court
improperly applied the clear and convincing evidence standard when the
standard for criminal contempt is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In Ortega’s answer, he argues that the district court imposed a
civil contempt sanction. He further argues that Medina’s incarceration was
the means the court chose to protect an initial period in which Ortega could
exercise sole custody without Medina preventing an exchange, withholding the
child, or otherwise defeating his time, as the court found she had done on 23
specified occasions amid a pattern that had deprived him of meaningful time
with the child for years. He argues that because the incarceration was directed
at restricting Medina’s conduct to secure Ortega’s custody with the minor child,
the order operated to compel compliance, and thus, had a civil contempt
purpose.
1On September 11, 2026, this court entered an order directing Medina’s
immediate temporary discharge from custody, temporarily staying the order of
contempt, and directing an answer to the writ petition.
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A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an
act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Int’l
Game Tech., Inc. v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 193, 197, 179 P.3d 556, 558
(2008). A writ of prohibition arrests the proceedings of a tribunal that is acting
in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. NRS 34.320; Club Vista Fin. Servs. v.
Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 128 Nev. 224, 228, 276 P.3d 246, 249 (2012). The decision
whether to entertain a petition for extraordinary writ relief is within our sole
discretion, Smith v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 107 Nev. 674, 677, 818 P.2d 849, 851
(1991), and the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that such relief is
warranted, Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844
(2004). Because the contempt determination is not appealable, we elect to
entertain the merits of this writ petition. See Pengilly v. Rancho Santa Fe
Homeowners Ass’n, 116 Nev. 646, 649, 5 P.3d 569, 571 (2000) (stating that
“contempt orders must be challenged by an original petition pursuant to NRS
Chapter 34”); Div. of Child & Family Servs. v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev.
445, 449-50, 92 P.3d 1239, 1242 (2004) (explaining that a contempt order is not
appealable and the proper way for a party to challenge a contempt order is
through a writ petition). This court reviews contempt orders for an abuse of
discretion. Lewis v. Lewis, 132 Nev. 453, 456, 373 P.3d 878, 880 (2016).
Generally, criminal contempt sanctions are punitive in nature, and
act to punish a party for disobeying a court directive. Rodriguez v. Eighth Jud.
Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 798, 804-05, 102 P.3d 41, 45-46 (2004). In contrast, civil
contempt is considered to be remedial in nature, as the purpose of civil
contempt is to coerce a party into future compliance with court orders. Id. at
805, 102 P.3d at 46. To this end, civil contempt sanctions are considered
conditional; any sanctions imposed will terminate upon the offending party’s
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compliance with the court order at issue. Id. Conversely, criminal contempt
sanctions are unconditional, as they are intended to punish past disobedience,
rather than compel future compliance. Id.
Given the differing purposes of civil and criminal contempt
proceedings, different procedural safeguards apply based on whether the
contempt at issue is civil or criminal in nature. Notably, if a contempt
proceeding is criminal in nature, the contemnor is entitled to the assistance of
counsel at any hearing, and the allegations at issue must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988); Rodriguez, 120
Nev. at 804, 102 P.3d at 45. When a contempt proceeding is civil in nature,
any allegations need only be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In the
Matter of Battaglia, 653 F.2d 419, 422 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Lewis, the Nevada Supreme Court set out factors for
determining whether a contempt is classified as civil or criminal. These
include (1) whether the sanction is punitive or remedial, (2) whether the
sanction is conditional or determinate, and (3) whether the contempt order
contains a purge clause, allowing a contemnor to stop all sanctions upon
compliance with the court’s order. 132 Nev. at 457, 373 P.3d at 880-81.
Applying this test, the supreme court concluded that a district court’s contempt
order sentencing the contemnor to 80 days of jail, which was stayed “on the
condition that [the contemnor] follow the Orders of the Court,” was criminal in
nature because “the order failed to contain a purge clause that would allow”
the contemnor to be released from the sentence. Id. at 456-58, 373 P.3d at 880-
81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court’s order imposed a 46-day incarceration
sentence with the first 30 days of incarceration to be served immediately, while
the remaining 16 days would be stayed. If Medina complied with the court’s
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orders, the court stated that it may elect to remove the remaining 16 days of
incarceration. The order provides no mechanism by which Medina could
change her behavior to be released before the expiration of the initial 30-day
incarceration sentence. Thus, the contempt proceedings in this case were
criminal in nature. Lewis, 132 Nev. at 457-58, 373 P.3d at 880-81; Bohannon
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., No. 69719, 2017 WL 1080066 at *3 (Nev Mar. 21, 2017)
(Order Granting Petition in Part) (explaining that contempt proceedings were
criminal in nature because the order imposed a 160-day suspended sentence,
and when the district court lifted the stay on 30 days of petitioner’s
incarceration sentence, there appeared to be no mechanism by which petitioner
could change her behavior to be released before the expiration of the 30-day
sentence.). While the court’s order explained that the stay of the remaining 16-
days was a purge clause, inclusion of that provision did not provide Medina
with any way to alleviate the initial 30-day incarceration, and thus, did not
transform the overall sanction into one that was civil in nature. See Detwiler
v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 202, 211, 486 P.3d 710, 719 (2021) (explaining
that a contempt sanction was criminal “if the defendant has no way to purge
his sentence to avoid or get out of jail” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
To impose a criminal contempt sentence, the district court was
required to find any violation of the court’s February 10, 2025, order beyond a
reasonable doubt. City Council of Reno v. Reno Newspapers, Inc., 105 Nev. 886,
893, 784 P.2d 974, 979 (1989) (applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard of proof to criminal contempt proceedings). But the court instead
applied a clear and convincing evidence civil contempt standard. Therefore,
we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in its contempt
determination.
Accordingly, we
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ORDER the petition GRANTED AND DIRECT THE CLERK OF THIS COURT
TO ISSUE A WRIT OF MANDAMUS instructing the district court to vacate
its contempt determination.2
Bulla, C.J.
Gibbons, J. Westbrook, J.
cc: Hon. Nadin Cutter
TMR Law Group, PC
Kristen Medina
Eighth District Court Clerk
2Insofar as the parties raise arguments that are not specifically
addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they
do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given our disposition of
this writ petition. For the same reason, to the extent Medina seeks orders
permitting her to proceed in forma pauperis, directing the preparation of
transcripts, and directing the district court clerk to transmit certain audio
recording, we deny her request. We also lift the temporary stay imposed by
our September 11, 2026, order.
Lastly, this court takes no action with respect to Medina’s motion for
permission to file omitted Supplemental Appendix Volume III, as she has
already filed the supplemental appendix.
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