Van Damme v. Nat'l Default Serv. Corp.
CourtCourt of Appeals of Nevada
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket91398-COA
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ARMIN VAN DAMME, No. 91398-COA
Appellant,
vs.
NATIONAL DEFAULT SERVICING
CORPORATION,
Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Armin Van Damme appeals from a district court order denying a
NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside a decision in a foreclosure mediation matter
and declaring him a vexatious litigant. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark
County; Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, Judge.
In 2003, Van Damme and his then-wife Geraldine purchased a
residence in Las Vegas (the subject property). In 2004, the Van Dammes
secured a $740,000 mortgage secured by a deed of trust to refinance the subject
property. The Van Dammes subsequently defaulted on the mortgage. Since
that initial default almost two decades ago, Van Damme has initiated multiple
actions in several forums to stave off foreclosure on the subject property. In
August 2022, Van Damme recorded a grant, bargain, and sale deed conveying
ownership of the subject property to Geraldine with the Clark County
Recorder.
On April 11, 2024, respondent National Default Servicing
Corporation (NDSC) recorded a notice of default and election to sell under deed
of trust with the Clark County Recorder. That notice was subsequently served
on Van Damme and Geraldine on April 19, 2024, and included a written notice
regarding the Nevada Foreclosure Mediation Program. Pursuant to NRS
107.086(3), Van Damme had 30 days from the April 19, 2024, service date—i.e.,
until May 19, 2024—to petition the district court to participate in foreclosure
mediation. On July 17, 2024, NDSC filed a foreclosure mediation certificate
which stated Van Damme did not attend the foreclosure mediation conference
and that foreclosure could proceed. On December 23, 2024, NDSC recorded a
notice of trustee’s sale which indicated the subject property would be sold at
public auction in January 2025.
On December 30, 2024, Van Damme petitioned the district court
for foreclosure mediation. The next day, Van Damme filed a motion for a
temporary restraining order to halt the impending trustee sale. In the motion,
Van Damme alleged, among other things, that a notice of default recorded in
January 2008 was never rescinded and was therefore terminated under NRS
106.240, that a February 2008 loan modification he had entered into was never
funded, and that NDSC executed an improper substitution of trustee in 2013.
Van Damme also alleged that NDSC was not qualified to act as a trustee, that
the firm representing NDSC had a conflict of interest, that NDSC lacked
standing, that NDSC committed fraud, and that the beneficiary of the deed of
trust improperly expunged a lis pendens he had recorded. A week later, Van
Damme filed an “emergency motion to halt trustee sale” that was largely
reiterative of his motion for a temporary restraining order. NDSC opposed Van
Damme’s motions and counter-moved the district court to dismiss the petition.
The district court thereafter entered an amended order denying
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Van Damme’s motions and dismissing the petition.1 With respect to Van
Damme’s request for injunctive relief, the court concluded that such relief was
“beyond the scope of the Foreclosure Mediation Rules” and that injunctive
relief “must be sought through a separate civil action.” The court also
concluded that Van Damme did not meet the eligibility requirements of NRS
107.0865 and Foreclosure Mediation Rule 7 to participate in foreclosure
mediation because he was not an owner-occupant of the subject property
following the 2022 conveyance to Geraldine, and because his petition for
foreclosure mediation was untimely filed. In light of these conclusions, the
court dismissed Van Damme’s petition in its entirety.
Van Damme subsequently filed several motions seeking
reconsideration as well as other types of relief, including, inter alia, vacatur of
the district court’s order, declaratory and injunctive relief, sanctions against
NDSC’s counsel, referral to federal enforcement agencies, and a halt of the
impending auction of the subject property. These motions were largely
repetitive of each other and included multiple exhibits Van Damme included
with his initial filings.
The district court subsequently held a hearing on Van Damme’s
motions. At that hearing, counsel for NDSC notified the district court that the
subject property had sold. The court later entered a written order denying Van
Damme’s motions, in which it concluded that Van Damme had failed to
demonstrate the court had made a clerical mistake, or a mistake arising from
1The original order entered by the district court erroneously included
language ordering the issuance of a certificate of foreclosure; the amended
order removed that language and left the remainder of the order intact.
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oversight or omission which warranted reconsideration. The court also noted
that, as in his prior filings, Van Damme requested relief beyond what the court
could grant in a foreclosure mediation, and that in any event, “the relief sought
by [ ] Van Damme is [m]oot because a foreclosure sale has seemingly already
happened outside of the Foreclosure Mediation Program.”
Van Damme continued to file motions with the district court,
including motions seeking forms of relief that the court had previously
concluded were outside the scope of relief available in foreclosure mediation.
The court entered an order denying all these motions. The court noted that
Van Damme had raised “no new substantive arguments” since it had ruled on
his first motion for reconsideration, and warned Van Damme that should he
“continue to file [r]equests based on the same allegations previously ruled on,
this Court may issue a show cause order” requiring him “to explain why these
filings are not being filed to delay hearings, or harass the judge, and explain
why he should not be deemed a vexatious litigant.” The court also noted that
Van Damme continued to request unavailable relief, and that Van Damme was
not eligible to participate in the foreclosure mediation program.
Van Damme subsequently filed motions seeking reconsideration or
clarification of the district court’s order and information concerning the deed
of trust. Van Damme included multiple exhibits he had previously submitted
to the district court and requested the same forms of relief the court had
already declined to grant.
The district court thereafter entered an order denying those
motions. The court reiterated its prior findings that Van Damme was not
eligible to participate in the foreclosure mediation program. The court also
found that Van Damme had not raised any new substantive arguments or
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produced any new evidence, and that there was “no additional relief” it could
grant to Van Damme. Further, the court warned Van Damme for the second
time that should he continue to request unavailable relief or continue to file
requests based on the same allegations previously ruled on, the court would
issue an order to show cause requiring Van Damme to “explain why these
filings are not being filed to delay hearings, or harass the court and opposing
counsel, and explain why he should not be deemed a vexatious litigant, and
subject to sanctions.”
One day after the district court denied Van Damme’s motion for
reconsideration and motion to compel, Van Damme filed another motion for
reconsideration in which he alleged that, among other things, the court
violated his rights to due process by denying the motion to compel without
conducting a hearing. Subsequently, Van Damme filed a supplemental motion
seeking to present new evidence and seeking reconsideration. Van Damme
presented many of the same arguments and exhibits he had presented in his
prior filings, and requested forms of relief the court had previously deemed
unavailable.
The district court subsequently entered an order denying this
latest motion and supplement. As it had in its prior orders, the court noted it
had already determined that Van Damme was not eligible to participate in the
foreclosure mediation program, and that Van Damme had not presented any
new substantive arguments or new evidence. The court concluded that it had
“now ruled on [ ] Van Damme’s Motions to Reconsider three times” and there
was “no additional relief” it could grant him. The following day, Van Damme
filed a motion seeking, among other things, relief under NRCP 60(b), which
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reiterated several arguments he had presented in his earlier filings. Van
Damme later filed a supplement to that motion.
The district court thereafter issued an order to show cause why
Van Damme should not be declared a vexatious litigant and set a hearing
concerning that issue. The order notified Van Damme that the hearing would
consider the four factors set forth in Jordan v. State ex rel. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles, 121 Nev. 44, 110 P.3d 30 (2005), and observed that Van Damme
appeared to have “filed numerous rogue, fugitive, or unmeritorious documents”
in the case, that the filings “share similar attributes, as despite prior warnings
from this court, each request, including the three motions to reconsider, seems
to request relief this [c]ourt cannot grant,” and that the filings “appear to be
for an improper purpose, such as to harass, vex, annoy, or increase [the] cost
of litigation, but fail to assert meritorious grounds for relief.” The order also
warned Van Damme of the potential restrictions the court could impose on him
should it deem him a vexatious litigant. The district court also entered an
order denying Van Damme’s recent filings.
Van Damme later filed a motion to vacate the district court’s
orders. Two days later, Van Damme filed an opposition to the court’s order to
show cause. In his opposition, Van Damme argued that his filings were not
vexatious because they were “responsive to [NDSC’s] fraudulent actions,” and
that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over him as a
“non-party” given that he had conveyed the subject property to Geraldine.
The district court held a hearing on the order to show cause. The
court opened the hearing by identifying each pleading and paper Van Damme
had filed in the case, noting that although a select few of Van Damme’s filings
were nonfrivolous, the rest were “one motion after another seeking the same
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relief or arguing that [the court does not] have authority to do what [it] did,”
despite being told that he could seek relief via an appeal to the appellate courts.
When presented with the opportunity at the hearing to address whether his
filings were frivolous or harassing, Van Damme instead reiterated his
underlying claims.
The district court subsequently entered a written order declaring
Van Damme a vexatious litigant. The order identified 19 different filings Van
Damme made in the case and concluded that an overwhelming majority of the
filings were made without an objective good faith expectation of prevailing, and
that several of those bad-faith filings “needlessly caused expense to the other
side.” The court then made substantive findings regarding the frivolous or
harassing nature of Van Damme’s actions. The court noted that Van Damme
had filed “numerous lawsuits” relating to the subject property. The court also
found that the “entire case record demonstrated repetitive and harassing
activities” and that Van Damme’s filings lacked “an arguable factual or legal
basis.” The court further found that Van Damme filed his motions with the
intent to harass. The court also found that Van Damme’s repetitive filings
caused NDSC to retain counsel and incur legal fees. To curb further vexatious
filings, the court ordered that Van Damme (1) could not submit any additional
motions or documents in the case without prior approval of the presiding judge;
and (2) could not initiate any new “foreclosure mediation cases” related to the
subject property without prior review and approval of the chief judge of the
district. The court added that its order did not preclude Van Damme from
“opening a new District Court case seeking relief appropriate to the arguments
he made regarding chain of title, quiet title, and other issues not appropriate
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for the foreclosure mediation program.” Finally, the court denied Van
Damme’s NRCP 60(b) motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Van Damme argues that the district court abused its
discretion in declaring him a vexatious litigant because each of his filings
“corresponded to issues reflected in the district court’s own orders and records”
and were therefore not frivolous or filed to harass the court or opposing counsel.
2 This court reviews an order declaring someone a vexatious litigant and
setting restrictions on their ability to access the courts for an abuse of
discretion. Jordan, 121 Nev. at 62, 110 P.3d at 44, abrogated on other grounds
by Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228 n.6, 181 P.3d 670,
672 n.6 (2008). Because vexatious litigant orders limit a litigant’s right to
access the courts, the orders must meet the four factors enumerated in Jordan:
(1) the litigant must be provided reasonable notice and an opportunity to
oppose the order; (2) the district court must create an adequate record for
review, including an explanation of the reasons it issued the order; (3) the
district court must find the filings were frivolous or harassing and not simply
based on “a showing of litigiousness;” and (4) the order must be narrowly
drawn. 121 Nev. at 60-61, 110 P.3d at 42-43.
Van Damme does not allege that he was deprived of reasonable
notice and an opportunity to oppose the vexatious litigant designation, nor does
2Although Van Damme also appealed from the district court’s denial of
his June 19 NRCP 60(b) motion, he does not present any cogent argument on
appeal regarding reconsideration. We therefore conclude Van Damme has not
demonstrated the district court abused its discretion by denying his request for
reconsideration. See Rodriguez v. Fiesta Palms, LLC, 134 Nev. 654, 656, 428
P.3d 255, 257 (2018) (“The district court has wide discretion in deciding
whether to grant or deny a motion to set aside a judgment under NRCP 60(b).”).
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he allege that the district court either failed to create an adequate record for
review or failed to narrowly tailor the restrictions the district court placed on
his ability to access the courts. Instead, Van Damme singularly focuses on the
third prong of Jordan, which requires the district court to make “substantive
findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions.” Id. at
61, 110 P.3d at 43 (quoting DeLong v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir.
1990)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
adopted a five-factor standard which provides a “helpful framework” for
determining whether a plaintiff’s litigation has been frivolous or harassing.
Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty Corp., 500 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir. 2007). That
standard includes: (1) the litigant’s history of litigation and in particular
whether it entailed vexatious, harassing or duplicative lawsuits; (2) the
litigant’s motive in pursuing the litigation, e.g., whether the litigant had an
objective good faith expectation of prevailing; (3) whether the litigant is
represented by counsel; (4) whether the litigant has caused needless expense
to other parties or has posed an unnecessary burden on the courts; and (5)
whether other sanctions would be adequate to protect the courts and other
parties. Id. (quoting Safir v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 19, 24 (2d Cir.1986)).
The district court expressly employed this standard in assessing
whether Van Damme’s filings were frivolous or harassing. The court first
noted that Van Damme had “filed numerous lawsuits relating to” the subject
property. The record supports the court’s finding on this factor. As noted by
NDSC in its motion to dismiss and several of its responsive filings, Van Damme
initiated at least two lawsuits related to the subject property which, following
removal to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, were
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resolved against him. See Van Damme v. U.S. Bank, N.A., Case No. 2:24-cv-
01287-JAD-BNW, 2024 WL 4892599 (D. Nev. Nov. 26, 2024) (amended order
granting defendant’s motion to dismiss); Van Damme v. JP Morgan Chase
Bank, Inc. N.A., Case No. 2:15-cv-1951-GMN-PAL, 2018 WL 1512599 (D. Nev.
Mar. 26, 2018) (order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss). NDSC also
provided documentation showing Van Damme initiated a separate lawsuit
against it on December 16, 2024, which had likewise been removed to the
federal district court. In addition, Van Damme filed for bankruptcy four times
in two different federal bankruptcy courts in an apparent effort to stave off
foreclosure of the subject property. See, e.g., In re Damme, No. 25-10329-GS,
2025 WL 825282, at *8 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2025) (discussing Van
Damme’s multiple bankruptcies), aff’d sub nom. In re Van Damme, No. BAP
NV-25-1052-NBC, 2025 WL 3191701 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2025).
The district court also concluded that the “entire case record
demonstrates repetitive and harassing activities,” including improper motion
practice and multiple motions for reconsideration that lacked “an arguable
factual or legal basis.” Next, the court considered Van Damme’s motives in
pursuing litigation and concluded that Van Damme filed his motions with the
intent to harass, pointing to the fact that Van Damme continued to file motions
“despite consistently not raising new arguments” and despite multiple
warnings from the district court.
The district court then determined that Van Damme’s pro se status
did not “absolve him of the responsibility to cogently explain to the Court why
he believes he is entitled to relief.” The court next determined that Van
Damme had caused NDSC to incur needless expenses because his filings
caused NDSC to retain legal counsel and incur legal fees to defend against his
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“frivolous and harassing claims,” and also caused unnecessary costs and
burden on the court. Finally, the court determined that imposing sanctions
would promote the efficient administration of justice.
The district court’s aforementioned findings are supported by the
record before this court, and Van Damme does not demonstrate that those
findings are clearly erroneous. See Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 668, 221
P.3d 699, 704 (2009) (“The district court’s factual findings, however, are given
deference and will be upheld if not clearly erroneous and if supported by
substantial evidence.”). In light of the foregoing, we conclude Van Damme has
not demonstrated the district court abused its discretion in declaring him a
vexatious litigant.3 Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bulla, C.J.
Gibbons, J. Westbrook, J.
3To the extent Van Damme raises additional issues in his appellate briefs
that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same
and conclude that they are either not germane to the issues on appeal or need
not be reached given the disposition of this appeal. We also deny NDSC’s
request to strike Van Damme’s opening brief.
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cc: Hon. Jerry A. Wiese, District Judge
Tiffany & Bosco, P.A./Las Vegas
Armin Van Damme
Eighth District Court Clerk
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