Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA CRYSTAL TANNEHILL, No. 91764-COA Appellant/Cross-Respondent, vs. MATTHEW TANNEHILL; THOMAS TANNEHILL; AND MARY ELAINE TANNEHILL, Respondents/Cross-Appellants. ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, VACATING IN PART AND REMANDING Crystal Tannehill appeals and Matthew Tannehill, Thomas Tannehill, and Mary Elaine Tannehill cross-appeal from findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order after bench trial in a divorce action.1 Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Kerri J. Maxey, Judge. Crystal and Matthew married in Las Vegas in September 2000 and have three children, only the youngest of whom was still a minor at the time of trial.2 Crystal and Matthew separated in September 2022, and Crystal filed for divorce in October 2023. The district court issued a joint preliminary injunction the next day, restraining both parties from “transferring, 1Because the parties share a surname, we refer to them by their first names. Matthew’s parents, Thomas and Mary Elaine Tannehill were joined as third-party defendants below and, with Matthew, are the respondents and cross-appellants here (collectively, respondents). We refer to them as such unless reference to their individual names is required. 2The youngest child was born in November 2007. She was seventeen at the time of trial and had turned eighteen, though she remained in high school, when the district court entered its order. encumbering, concealing, selling or otherwise disposing of” community property that was the subject of a claim of community interest, “except in the usual course of conduct or for the necessities of life or for the retention of counsel.” This dispute centers on a refrigeration and air-conditioning business that predates the marriage. Matthew’s father, Thomas, started ET&M Refrigeration (ET&M) as a sole proprietorship in 1989 and ran its day- to-day operations for three decades. When Thomas and Elaine retired around 2019 and moved to Georgia, Matthew became the company’s manager, ran ET&M himself, and drew a weekly wage. He also took additional funds from the business, reported to him on Forms 1099, which grew from roughly $36,000 in 2019 to $298,092 in 2022. Crystal, for her part, was primarily a homemaker and had little knowledge of the intricacies of the business. While Matthew and Crystal were married, Matthew formed two limited-liability companies in his name, ET&M Refrigeration LLC (ET&M LLC) and Matthew Mechanical LLC (MM LLC) (collectively, the LLCs).3 Beginning in April 2023, funds from the business that had flowed through ET&M were diverted to the accounts of Matthew’s new LLCs. Roughly $1.6 million moved through the LLCs’ accounts between April and November 2023. In addition, Matthew purchased, or guaranteed and titled, eight work vehicles in his own name, rather than in the name of the LLCs. At trial, Matthew acknowledged that the day after he was served with divorce papers, he withdrew $100,000 from the ET&M LLC account by cashier’s check and deposited it into Thomas’s original ET&M business 3The record does not establish precisely when the LLCs were formed. Crystal alleged below that ET&M LLC was formed on February 4, 2022, and the order does not state when MM LLC was formed. 2 account, and that he subsequently transferred at least $239,000 to Thomas’s account. At Matthew’s request, the attorney who helped form his LLCs filed articles of dissolution for both on February 1, 2024. Crystal then amended her complaint, naming Thomas and Elaine as parties as it appeared that funds had been comingled between the LLCs and the ET&M account. Thomas and Elaine maintained that Thomas alone owned the ET&M account and all the monies contained in it. Discovery proved contentious. The district court found that Crystal was not diligent in obtaining access to the business records, which were in Thomas and Elaine’s control, but it also found that the parties were not working together and that both sides were “playing games.” The matter proceeded to a three-day bench trial with the presentation of evidence concluding in June 2025. Matthew admitted to diverting more than $300,000 from ET&M between 2020 and 2022, and testified that the money went to home improvements, bills, and trips. The unreported income left him owing the Internal Revenue Service $128,103.04. He also testified that he gambled with his veterans’ disability benefits of about $4,200 per month and never used other funds, although his 2023 win/loss statement from a single casino reflected almost $2 million in coin-in and a net win of $102,961.28. Matthew acknowledged that Crystal was not aware of the extent of his gambling, and no witness testified that she knew he was withdrawing money from the ET&M account. Matthew also testified that he withdrew $23,000 from his 401(k) retirement account after the divorce proceedings began. At the time, Crystal was working six hours a week earning $15.50 per hour at Ulta Beauty, and a temporary order entered earlier in the case required Matthew to pay her $3,000 per month in spousal support. After the parties submitted closing briefs, the district court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. Regarding the 3 businesses, the court found that Matthew, not Thomas, owned both LLCs; that their formation was never completed; that the LLCs had no present value; and summarily found that the assets transferred to and from ET&M were ultimately owned by Thomas and returned to him. The court further found that Crystal had not provided evidence that community funds purchased the vehicles titled in Matthew’s name only, and thereby determined the vehicles were Matthew’s separate property. Turning to the remaining property, the court divided it nearly evenly, awarding each party property valued at approximately $173,114, consisting chiefly of equal shares of the $310,000 marital residence, together with vehicles, a camper, and modest bank balances. Finally, it divided the community portion of Matthew’s 401(k) equally.4 The district court found the family’s certified public accountant and its business attorney credible as to the LLCs’ formation and value. It found, however, that the attorney’s testimony “directly contradict[ed]” the testimonies of Thomas, Elaine, and Matthew that there was no intention to sell or transfer ET&M to Matthew; that Thomas’s and Elaine’s explanations for their lack of knowledge of Matthew’s withdrawals from ET&M were “dubious at best”; and that Matthew, Thomas, and Elaine “were not being forthright” about the purpose of the LLCs. As to Crystal, the district court found her testimony about her credit card spending less than credible and found that she remained underemployed without reasonable justification. The district court made no other adverse credibility findings as to Crystal, and it found her valuation of the marital residence more credible than Matthew’s. The district court also awarded Crystal alimony of $2,000 per month for four years, then $1,000 per month for four years, then $500 per 4Along with community portion of the 401(k) proceeds, the district court awarded Matthew $173,114.14 and Crystal $173,114.12. 4 month, in a schedule the parties describe as running another four years. Addressing community waste, the court found that Matthew had commingled veterans’ benefits with community funds to earn the 2023 net gambling win; that he did not definitively testify about the source of the money he wagered; and that, although Matthew testified that he spent the winnings on the marital residence, the household bills, and weekly payments to Crystal, there was “no documented proof” of that spending. The district court ordered him to reimburse Crystal $46,362.43, representing one-half of the net winnings, less a $5,118.21 credit the court gave him. The district court then turned to the parties’ debts and the remaining disputes. It assigned the entire $128,103.04 tax debt to Matthew, finding that his concealed withdrawals from ET&M amounted to theft that created the liability, exposed community assets to seizure, and occurred without Crystal’s knowledge. Of Crystal’s roughly $30,000 credit card debt, the court treated the $20,751.25 balance reflected on her first financial disclosure after filing for divorce as community debt, and the rest, which accrued after she filed, as hers alone, and then applied the exact same method to apportion Matthew’s credit card debt. It found that Thomas and Elaine gifted Matthew a new air conditioning unit and its installation at the marital residence, and it denied their request that Crystal reimburse half the cost. It further stated that no qualified domestic relations order was necessary to value 5 Matthew’s retirement account because the parties would divide it evenly.5 Finally, in denying every request for attorney fees, including Thomas and Elaine’s, and denying the sanctions respondents sought against Crystal’s counsel, the district court concluded that none of the parties truly prevailed, listing among its reasons that Crystal was solely responsible for approximately $30,000 in community waste without identifying the dissipated assets. Crystal appealed, and respondents cross-appealed, raising numerous issues. We address each issue in turn. The district court erred by resolving characterization of the LLC bank accounts and the vehicles without applying the community property presumption Crystal argues that the district court erred in its treatment of the LLCs’ bank accounts, the money that moved through them in 2023, and the eight vehicles titled in Matthew’s name. She contends that each vehicle was acquired during the marriage, as were the LLC accounts Matthew created, and therefore, they were presumptively community property. She further contends that the district court never applied the community property presumption, instead resolving the dispute based on both of the LLCs’ present value, without deciding if any of the money that ran through the LLCs was community property. She asks this court to award her $145,560.09, which is half of the 5On appeal, Matthew challenges the district court’s statement that no qualified domestic relations order was necessary in connection with the division of his 401(k). But because he represents that a qualified domestic relations order dividing the account was subsequently entered, that issue is moot, and we do not address it. See Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010) (explaining that a case presenting a live controversy at its beginning may be rendered moot by subsequent events); see also In re Guardianship of A.L.R.-Q., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 66, 584 P.3d 824, 830 n.6 (Ct. App. 2025) (noting that an issue had become moot and the court did not address it further). 6 LLCs’ account balances at the time she filed for divorce, and half of the vehicles’ value. Respondents answer that substantial evidence supports the district court’s finding that the money belonged to Thomas, that the district court found the testimony of the family’s longtime accountant and the attorney who helped form the LLCs to be credible, and that this court may not reweigh those credibility determinations. As to the vehicles, respondents contend that every witness with personal knowledge testified that ET&M funds were used to purchase them for business purposes, that Matthew’s name on the titles reflected his role as manager rather than owner, and that Crystal offered no evidence that community funds were used to purchase any of them. In reply, Crystal contends that the district court’s own finding that Matthew owned both LLCs, not Thomas, triggers the community property presumption, and that the funds moving through their accounts were generated by Matthew’s labor. All property acquired after marriage by either spouse, other than separate property, is community property unless the spouses agree otherwise in writing or another statutory exception applies. NRS 123.220; see also NRS 123.130 (defining separate property to include property a spouse owned before marriage and property acquired after by gift, bequest, devise, or descent). As our supreme court has recognized, when property is acquired during the marriage there is a presumption that any such property is community property, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. Pryor v. Pryor, 103 Nev. 148, 150, 734 P.2d 718, 719 (1987); Peters v. Peters, 92 Nev. 687, 690, 557 P.2d 713, 715 (1976). “When reviewing a district court’s determination of the character of property, this court will uphold the district court’s decision if it was based on substantial evidence. However, [this court] will review a purely legal 7 question, such as the application of [the community property] presumption, de novo.” Draskovich v. Draskovich, 140 Nev. 161, 163, 545 P.3d 96, 99 (2024) (quoting Waldman v. Maini, 124 Nev. 1121, 1128, 195 P.3d 850, 855 (2008)); see also Eivazi v. Eivazi, 139 Nev. 408, 411, 537 P.3d 476, 482 (Ct. App. 2023) (explaining that deference is not owed to legal error). The community property presumption, and the burden of overcoming it by clear and convincing evidence, “also apply to entities created during the marriage from mixed community and separate funds.” Draskovich, 140 Nev. at 163, 545 P.3d at 99. Where the origin of the money is unclear, the entities created or property purchased with those funds are presumed to be community property. Id. (citing Moberg v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 96 Nev. 235, 237, 607 P.2d 112, 114 (1980) (presuming that property purchased during the marriage with funds of uncertain origin was community property)). Here, the district court did not apply the community property presumption to the LLCs and related property that was acquired during the marriage. It found that the formation of the LLCs was never completed, that Matthew requested their dissolution, and that there was “currently no intrinsic or monetary value associated with either LLC.” The court then went on to deny Crystal a share of each LLC, and any property ever held therein, “due to the company not having any intrinsic or monetary value.” As for the money that moved through the LLCs’ accounts during the marriage, the court treated “any and all funds transferred to and from ET&M’s bank account” as Thomas’s property “unless it is shown that [Matthew] legitimately earned the money or was gifted the funds.” But that approach inverted the community property presumption. The court concluded that Matthew, not Thomas, owned both LLCs but the court did not find that the money held in the LLCs’ accounts during the marriage was presumptively community property. The district 8 court never applied the community property presumption to the roughly $1.6 million that moved through the LLCs’ accounts in 2023 or to the balances on hand when Crystal filed for divorce, and it never explained how this presumption was overcome. Instead, the district court solely focused on the purported value of the LLCs at the time it was resolving Crystal’s claim of a community interest, rather than determining whether any of the funds belonged to the community. After determining whether any of the funds that passed through an LLC were community property, valuation becomes important for dividing the proceeds of the LLC, because the community’s interest in the LLC can rise or fall with what the LLC owns at the time of the division. See NRS 86.091 (defining a member’s interest as “a share of the economic interests in a limited-liability company, including profits, losses and distributions of assets”); NRS 86.351(1) (providing that “[t]he interest of each member of a limited-liability company is personal property”). But valuation does not determine the character of property. Therefore, the character of the funds that passed through the corresponding LLC accounts must be determined. Accordingly, the district court’s finding that “all assets that were transferred to and from ET&M were ultimately owned by Thomas and returned to Thomas” fails to resolve an important question. That is, whether any of the funds that passed through the LLCs’ accounts were community property. The challenged finding summarily resolved that question in a single sentence, as quoted above, even though the funds transferred to Thomas were substantially less than the amounts that passed through the LLCs. By resolving the issue in this way, the district court did not address the roughly $1.6 million that moved through the LLCs’ accounts in 2023, the balances on hand when Crystal filed for divorce, and all the transfers that followed. 9 The record also indicates that some of the money did come from Thomas. Indeed, bank records show that about $215,000 deposited into the ET&M LLC account in April 2023 came from Thomas, but ET&M LLC also earned business revenues and cut checks for labor on its jobs and paid for the vehicles. In fact, Matthew’s 2023 personal tax return reported about $1.6- million in gross receipts for ET&M LLC as his own sole proprietorship, and Matthew testified that the ET&M LLC account “was paying for everything while we were using it,” including insurance on personal vehicles. To the extent the LLCs acquired funds and other assets during the marriage, that property was presumptively community property. See Draskovich, 140 Nev. at 165, 545 P.3d at 100-01. The court, however, made no finding explaining how that presumption was overcome as to the assets the LLCs acquired. Additionally, the district court’s findings conflict with its characterization of the LLC accounts. The court found that ET&M LLC “was formed with the intention of [Matthew] being the business owner,” “suspect[ed] that Thomas and Elaine intended to transfer ET&M assets to [Matthew] instead of forcing an actual sale,” and found that “[Matthew], not Thomas, was the owner of ET&M LLC and MM LLC.” But the court never reconciled those findings with its conclusion that all the funds in the LLCs’ accounts remained Thomas’s. We recognize that Thomas paid the taxes associated with the LLCs and that funds from Thomas were eventually returned to ET&M’s account. But the funds were returned only after Crystal filed for divorce and after the joint preliminary injunction was issued, and the district court did not weigh this evidence against the evidence described above, including the $1.6 million that was acknowledged as gross receipts in 2023. The district court also treated the vehicles the same way, by failing to apply the community property presumption. The court found that Crystal 10 “did not provide any evidence that [Matthew] utilized community funds” to purchase the vehicles, and it concluded that they “were in [Matthew’s] name only.” But title does not determine the character of the property. Lopez v. Lopez, 139 Nev. 533, 541 n.12, 541 P.3d 117, 125 n.12 (Ct. App. 2023) (noting that an account’s titling “is not determinative of the character of the funds contained therein”). Indeed, the record shows that the vehicles, although titled in Matthew’s name alone, may have ties to the LLCs. Because the vehicles were acquired during the marriage, the community property presumption applied to them as well, and the order does not explain how it was overcome. See Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 411-12, 537 P.3d at 482. Further, to the extent the vehicles were paid for with funds held in the LLCs’ accounts, their character depends, at least in part, on the character of the accounts and all of the funds therein, which the district court did not determine. See Malmquist, 106 Nev. at 245, 792 P.2d at 381. Respondents’ reliance on the deference owed to the district court’s credibility determinations does not alter our conclusion that the district court failed to properly account for and evaluate the ownership of all the funds in the LLCs’ accounts and assets purchased with those funds including the vehicles. We do not question the district court’s decision to credit the family’s accountant and attorney, but those determinations addressed the LLCs’ formation and value, not the ownership or characterization of the funds that moved through the LLCs’ accounts that Matthew operated during the marriage. See Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 103, 86 P.3d 1042, 1046 (2004) (explaining that this court will not reweigh credibility determinations on appeal). The district court, moreover, found that Matthew, Thomas, and Elaine “were not being forthright” about the purpose of the LLCs, and that Thomas and Elaine’s explanations for their lack of knowledge of Matthew’s withdrawals were 11 “dubious at best.” Based on this record, deference to credibility findings cannot substitute for factual findings that the district court never made. See Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 411, 537 P.3d at 482 (explaining that deference is not owed to findings so conclusory that they mask legal error). Finally, we decline Crystal’s request that this court resolve the characterization question and enter an award in her favor. “An appellate court is not particularly well-suited to make factual determinations in the first instance.” Ryan’s Express Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Amador Stage Lines, Inc., 128 Nev. 289, 299, 279 P.3d 166, 172 (2012). Nor will we imply the missing findings, because a finding may be implied only “where the evidence clearly supports the judgment.” Gorden v. Gorden, 93 Nev. 494, 496, 569 P.2d 397, 398 (1977). Where it is not clear that the district court would have reached the same result without the errors that were made, the proper course is to reverse and remand for further proceedings. See In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R., 136 Nev. 494, 500, 474 P.3d 838, 844 (Ct. App. 2020) (reversing and remanding because it was not clear that the district court would have reached the same conclusion had it applied the correct standard). On remand, the district court shall determine whether any of the funds that passed through the LLCs or the vehicles were community property applying the community property presumption and requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome it. If the district court finds on remand that the funds were community property, it shall address the post-filing transfers under NRS 125.150(1)(b) to determine the distribution of value to the parties. This is not to suggest that the district court must award Crystal any portion of the funds that were once in the LLCs’ accounts or any of the vehicles’ value. Rather, it must apply the correct standard when adjudicating Crystal’s claims. The district court abused its discretion by setting alimony without determining Crystal’s earning capacity or explaining the award 12 Crystal argues that the district court overstated her income by counting the temporary spousal support she was receiving as though it were her own earnings. She also argues that the district court never made a determination of what she could earn, and that it never explained why it selected a declining award for a marriage of this length and an income gap of this size. Matthew answers that the schedule is rehabilitative, that Crystal remains voluntarily underemployed despite a judicial directive to seek work, and that the district court considered each statutory factor before awarding alimony. This court reviews a challenge to the fairness of an alimony award for an abuse of discretion. Oshiro v. Oshiro, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 59, 579 P.3d 1024, 1027 (2025). Under that standard, “[r]ulings supported by substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.” Id. at 1030 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 120 Nev. 559, 566, 97 P.3d 1124, 1129 (2004)); see also Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 411, 537 P.3d at 482 (explaining that factual findings will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous or unsupported by substantial evidence). A district court must award such alimony as appears “just and equitable,” “having regard to the conditions in which the parties will be left by the divorce.” Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196, 954 P.2d 37, 39 (1998) (quoting Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 859, 878 P.2d 284, 287 (1994)); see also NRS 125.150(1)(a). Temporary support is not one of those conditions. As the supreme court has explained, “orders for preliminary allowances pending litigation in divorce cases, including counsel fees and support, are interlocutory, not final judgments,” and they leave “the ultimate awards of custody and spousal support . . . to be made after the later bench trial.” Barry v. Lindner, 119 Nev. 661, 669, 81 P.3d 537, 542-43 (2003), superseded by rule 13 on other grounds as stated in LaBarbera v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 134 Nev. 393, 395, 422 P.3d 138, 140 (2018). As the Shydler court recognized, “[p]ayment of . . . interim support should not preclude a post-divorce spousal support award.” 114 Nev. at 197, 954 P.2d at 40. There, the district court denied alimony after noting that the wife had received more than $165,000 in pre-divorce support and would receive post-divorce property equalizing payments. Id. The supreme court observed that the pre-divorce payments had been “mainly disbursed for then-current community expenses,” and went on to conclude that the district court “was wrong in finding that [the husband’s] pre-divorce support and post-divorce property equalizing payments obviated the need for any post-divorce spousal support.” Id. at 197-98, 954 P.2d at 40-41. Consistent with these conclusions, the supreme court reversed the denial of alimony and remanded for the district court to determine a fair award. Id. at 199, 954 P.2d at 41. In short, temporary spousal support paid while a divorce is pending does not control the final determination of alimony. Before determining alimony, the district court found that Crystal’s gross monthly income was $3,403, “with only $403.00 coming from her employment,” and the remaining $3,000 coming from temporary spousal support. The court also reasoned that, had Crystal obtained meaningful employment, she would have been able to pay for her financial necessities since she was also receiving $3,000 per month in temporary spousal support. The court therefore treated the temporary spousal support as part of Crystal’s ongoing means. But the temporary award did not continue once the final award was made and thus it did not represent income earned by Crystal. See Shydler, 114 Nev. at 198-99, 954 P.2d at 41. Instead, the court replaced the temporary spousal support with the $2,000 alimony award beginning 14 December 2025. Thus, the district court improperly included the $3,000 in temporary spousal support as part of Crystal’s income in making its final alimony determination, even though after the final order was entered, Crystal’s income consisted of the $403 in wages she earned plus the alimony the court set. Further, the district court did not consider Crystal’s “earning capacity when evaluating an award of alimony.” Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 425, 537 P.3d at 491-92. “[R]egardless of whether [Crystal] was willfully unemployed,” the district court should have determined her “ability to earn money in light of her talent, skills, training, and experience.” Id. But the court never determined the amount Crystal could reasonably earn. Rather, the court’s underemployment finding appears in its discussion of Crystal’s credit card debt, where it found that she “remains underemployed and reliant on temporary spousal support without reasonable justification” and had not reasonably explained her $30,000 credit card balance. And when the court addressed the earning-capacity factor in NRS 125.150(9)(e), it noted the parties’ ages and health and then stated that “[t]he earnings/ability to earn of each [spouse] was addressed in” its finding regarding each spouse’s financial condition. But that finding did not actually determine or address Crystal’s earning capacity in light of her training and experience. Instead, it simply recited Crystal’s current hours and income, including the temporary spousal support, without determining her ability to earn money in light of her training and experience, which the district court should have considered. See Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 425, 537 P.3d at 491-92. These summary findings cannot sustain this award, because a district court must consider the factors in NRS 125.150(9), Kogod, 135 Nev. at 66, 439 P.3d at 400-01, and must then “explain why those findings supported 15 its alimony award in both amount and duration,” Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 426, 537 P.3d at 492. That explanation matters most when the findings point toward compensatory alimony, which addresses the economic losses a marriage causes, including lost earning capacity. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 70-71, 439 P.3d at 403-04. The findings here describe that kind of case, including a marriage of about twenty-five years, a “comfortable” standard of living, no career before the marriage and none developed during it, and a homemaker contribution “greater than [Matthew’s].” Yet, the court only provided a single sentence adopting the tiered alimony award as “both fair and appropriate.” The court did not explain why it selected $2,000, why it chose four-year steps, or why the award should fall to $500. Nor did the court describe Crystal’s necessary expenses when considering an appropriate award of alimony. Additionally, two findings the district court made under the second statutory factor, NRS 125.150(9)(b), which addresses the nature and value of the respective property of each spouse, further compound the court’s alimony award error. Under that factor, the court weighed “the amount of the marital waste committed by both parties,” which included an unsupported finding of $30,000 of waste by Crystal, which we address below.6 The court also treated Matthew as leaving the marriage with “over $400,000.00 in debt,” a figure it had declined to credit earlier in its order “due to lack of supporting information.” It then confusingly concluded that the marital waste factor “benefits [Matthew].” These findings undermine the district court’s alimony award. See Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 423, 537 P.3d at 490. 6Because the $30,000 finding of waste by Crystal is unsupported and must be reversed, the district court shall not consider this finding in reconsidering the alimony issue on remand. 16 Matthew nevertheless defends the alimony schedule as rehabilitative and argues that a declining tiered award is appropriate under the circumstances presented here. See Shydler, 114 Nev. at 199, 954 P.2d at 41 (concluding that the equities favored support “at least for a period of rehabilitation”). But the district court did not use the term “rehabilitative”, nor did the court adopt this rationale when awarding alimony, see NRS 125.150(10), and a court “must have reached its conclusions for the appropriate reasons,” Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 411, 537 P.3d at 482 (quoting Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241-42 (2007)). Further, Crystal did not seek rehabilitative alimony below, and as discussed above, the district court’s findings and analysis regarding the alimony issue do not suggest that an award of rehabilitative alimony was considered or intended by the court. NRS 125.150 grants district courts “broad discretion to craft just and equitable alimony awards.” Oshiro, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 59, 579 P.3d at 1027. Thus, the record dissuades us from concluding that the district court’s award was rehabilitative in nature. Accordingly, we vacate the alimony award and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the district court shall determine Crystal’s earning capacity and reasonable expenses and explain the amount and the duration of the alimony award. If the court imposes a tiered award, a precise and correct date for the conclusion of the final tier shall be included.7 And because the property division may change on remand, the district court may need to reconsider the amount of the alimony award in light of that division. See NRS 125.150(9)(j); Draskovich, 140 Nev. at 166, 545 P.3d at 101 (vacating the denial of alimony because the district court had to reconsider its community property 7The current order states the third tier of the alimony award runs from “December 1, 2033, through November 30, 2033 [sic].” 17 determination). We express no view on the amount or duration of the alimony award and we note that, in awarding alimony, Nevada law does not require a district court to “effectively equalize salaries.”8 Kogod, 135 Nev. at 72, 439 P.3d at 404 (quoting Shydler, 114 Nev. at 199, 954 P.2d at 41). The waste finding against Crystal is unsupported, and her attorney fee request must be reconsidered without it Crystal argues that the order allocates $30,000 in community waste against her without identifying a single transaction that constituted waste, and that the unsupported finding undermined her request for attorney fees, which the district court denied. Matthew answers that the waste finding played at most a limited role in the district court’s fee decision in which the court concluded that no party prevailed. This court reviews district court decisions regarding marital waste and whether to award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 411, 537 P.3d at 482. “However, where a trial court exercises its discretion in clear disregard of the guiding legal principles, this action may constitute an abuse of discretion.” Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 (1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in In re DISH Network Derivative Litig., 133 Nev. 438, 451 n.6, 401 P.3d 1081, 1093 n.6 (2017). Waste, or dissipation, generally may be found when a spouse uses “marital property for a selfish purpose unrelated to the marriage” while the 8In our disposition of this matter, we do not disturb the district court’s consideration of Matthew’s veterans’ disability benefits, see Oshiro, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 59, 579 P.3d at 1026 (holding that a district court may consider such benefits in the alimony calculus although NRS 125.165 bars dividing them), and its use of his current documented income rather than a multi-year average, which was a permissible weighing of the evidence, see Barry, 119 Nev. at 670, 81 P.3d at 543; Ellis, 123 Nev. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244. 18 marriage is in serious jeopardy or breaking down. Kogod, 135 Nev. at 75-76, 439 P.3d at 406-07 (quoting 24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 524 (2018)). “Whether a particular expenditure by one spouse constitutes waste does not turn on whether the other spouse had knowledge of the expenditure at the time it was made; rather, waste generally requires a finding by the court that the expenditure in question was for a selfish purpose.” Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 420, 537 P.3d at 488. And a district court may not find waste simply because a spouse fails to account for everyday expenditures. See Kogod, 135 Nev. at 78, 439 P.3d at 408 (concluding that a district court erred by requiring a spouse to account for everyday expenditures where the other spouse had not raised a reasonable inference that the transactions furthered a purpose inimical to the marriage, were made to diminish her community property share, or were unusually large withdrawals from community accounts). In Eivazi the district court listed categories of unexplained transactions, found a prima facie case of waste because the wife had not known of or consented to the expenditures, and required the husband to disprove waste. Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 417-18, 537 P.3d at 486-87. This court reversed, explaining that the district court erred by “placing an evidentiary burden on [the husband] to demonstrate the absence of waste . . . without first requiring [the wife] to raise a reasonable inference that any transactions were, in fact, waste.” Id. at 418, 537 P.3d at 487. This court then remanded for a proper evaluation of waste. Id. at 421, 537 P.3d at 489. Here, in addressing whether Matthew committed waste, the district court focused on Matthew’s conduct, such as his 2023 gambling activities, his trips—including those with his girlfriend—and his withdrawal from his retirement account. In contrast, the only finding that Crystal committed waste appears in the attorney fee discussion, where the district 19 court states that she “is also solely responsible for approximately $30,000.00 in community waste.” But the order identifies no transaction, no account, no date, and no purpose behind this purported waste figure. If the $30,000 refers to Crystal’s credit card balance, as both parties assume, then treating this balance as waste cannot be reconciled with the district court’s treatment of that same balance as $20,751.25 in community debt and the remainder as Crystal’s separate debt. Because the district court’s “factual findings were incomplete, unsupported by substantial evidence, and internally inconsistent,” we must reverse the district court’s finding that Crystal committed $30,000 in community waste. See Eivazi, 139 Nev. at 423, 537 P.3d at 490. Our reversal of the district court’s $30,000 waste finding against Crystal also requires reversal of the court’s decision to deny her request for attorney fees. Here, the court denied attorney fees because it concluded that “none of the Parties truly prevailed,” and the court’s waste finding was one of the reasons the district court gave for its conclusion that attorney fees were not warranted for either side. Because that finding against Crystal is not supported, we necessarily reverse and remand the denial of Crystal’s request for fees for further proceedings. Reversal and remand of the denial of fees is further necessitated by our reversal of the district court’s findings as to the LLCs’ accounts and the vehicles and our vacatur of the alimony award, as the outcome of those issues on remand may bear on whether Crystal prevailed, such that an award of attorney fees could potentially be warranted. The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Crystal one-half of Matthew’s 2023 net gambling winnings On cross-appeal, Matthew raises four challenges to the gambling award. First, he argues that he gambled only with his veterans’ disability benefits, which are his separate property. Second, he contends that his multi- year results show a far smaller gain than the 2023 figure the district court 20 used, and that there can be no waste where the community suffered no loss. Third, he argues that the winnings were use