State v. Mata

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 06/18/2026 08:09 AM CDT - 566 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Raymond Mata, Jr., appellant. ___ N.W.3d ___ Filed June 18, 2026. No. S-24-664. 1. Evidence: Appeal and Error. A trial court has the discretion to deter- mine the relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determina- tions will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of that discretion. 2. Judges: Words and Phrases. A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. 3. Postconviction: Evidence: Witnesses: Appeal and Error. In an evi- dentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, resolves conflicts in the evidence and questions of fact. An appellate court upholds the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 4. Postconviction: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a ques- tion of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s ruling. 5. Trial: Evidence: Appeal and Error. The admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party. 6. ____: ____: ____. Erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal if the evidence would have been cumulative and other relevant evidence, properly admitted, supports the trial court’s finding. 7. Evidence: Words and Phrases. Cumulative evidence means evi- dence tending to prove the same point to which other evidence has been offered.  - 567 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 8. Rules of Evidence. Neb. Evid. R. 403, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 2016), allows the exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 9. Constitutional Law: Criminal Law: Right to Counsel. The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees every criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel. 10. ____: ____: ____. The right to effective assistance of counsel entitles the accused to the undivided loyalty of an attorney, free from any con- flict of interest. 11. Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. A conflict of interest exists when a defense attorney is placed in a situation inherently conducive to divided loyalties. 12. Attorney and Client: Conflict of Interest: Words and Phrases. The phrase “conflict of interest” denotes a situation in which regard for one duty tends to lead to disregard of another, where a lawyer’s represen- tation of one client is rendered less effective by reason of his or her representation of another client, or where it becomes a lawyer’s duty on behalf of one client to contend for that which the lawyer’s duty to another client would require him or her to oppose. 13. Constitutional Law: Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest: Proof. To establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raises no objection at trial must demonstrate that his or her lawyer actively represented conflicting interests and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected the lawyer’s performance. 14. Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest: Proof. While a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his or her representation need not demonstrate prejudice, such conflict of interest must be shown to have resulted in counsel’s conduct detrimental to the defense. 15. Effectiveness of Counsel: Conflict of Interest. An asserted conflict of interest must be actual, rather than speculative or hypothetical, before a conviction can be overturned on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 16. Appeal and Error. An appellate court has the discretion to affirm, as it deems appropriate, a correct result that was reached below for the wrong reason. 17. Postconviction. The need for finality in the criminal process requires that a defendant bring all claims for relief at the first opportunity.  - 568 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 18. Postconviction: Pleadings. The effect of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-3001(3) (Cum. Supp. 2024) is to require that all available grounds for postcon- viction relief must be stated in the initial postconviction motion and, once that motion has been judicially determined, any subsequent post- conviction motion regarding the same conviction and sentence may be dismissed by the district court unless the motion affirmatively shows on its face that the basis relied upon for relief was not available at the time of filing the prior motion. Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Affirmed. Celeste Bacchi and Sylvia Irvin, Assistant Federal Public Defenders for District of Nevada, pro hac vice, and Peder Bartling for appellant. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, and Austin N. Relph for appellee. Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, and Vaughn, JJ., and Moore and Bishop, Judges. Funke, C.J. I. INTRODUCTION Raymond Mata, Jr., appeals the order of the district court for Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, dismissing his successive motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred. Mata argues that his successive motion should have been allowed under State v. Williams, 1 because the counsel who represented him for his initial motion for postconviction relief had con- flicts of interest that prevented that counsel from raising the ineffective assistance and conflicts of Mata’s trial and appel- late counsel. Because we find no merit to that argument or to Mata’s other arguments, we affirm the order of the dis- trict court. 1 State v. Williams, 295 Neb. 575, 889 N.W.2d 99 (2017).  - 569 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 II. BACKGROUND 1. Trial and Sentencing We have opined on Mata’s convictions and sentences on multiple occasions. 2 As is relevant here, we need note only the following. Mata was tried and convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping in the killing of Adam Gomez, the 3-year-old son of a woman with whom Mata had had an intimate relationship. The presiding judge sentenced Mata to life imprisonment for kidnapping, and after finding the existence of an aggravating circumstance, exceptional depravity, a three-judge panel sen- tenced Mata to death for first degree premeditated murder. On direct appeal, we affirmed Mata’s convictions, as well as the sentence of life imprisonment imposed for the kidnapping conviction. However, based on Ring v. Arizona, 3 we vacated Mata’s death sentence and remanded the cause for resentencing on the first degree murder conviction. On remand, a jury unanimously found the existence of the aggravating circumstance of exceptional depravity. Thereafter, a three-judge panel heard evidence on mitigating circum- stances and sentencing disproportionality. Ultimately, the panel determined that the penalty was not excessive or disproportion- ate to the penalty imposed in similar cases and sentenced Mata to death. Mata appealed his resentencing, and we affirmed the impo- sition of his death sentence. However, we determined that electrocution as a method of execution was cruel and unusual 2 See, State v. Mata, 304 Neb. 326, 934 N.W.2d 475 (2019); State v. Mata, 280 Neb. 849, 790 N.W.2d 716 (2010), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Robertson, 294 Neb. 29, 881 N.W.2d 864 (2016); State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008); State v. Mata, 266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003), disapproved on other grounds, State v. Falcon, 319 Neb. 911, 25 N.W.3d 462 (2025). 3 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).  - 570 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 punishment in violation of the Nebraska Constitution and stayed Mata’s execution. During the proceedings described above, which lasted from 1999 to 2008, Mata was represented by the Nebraska Commission on Public Advocacy (NCPA). NCPA staff attor- neys Jeffery A. Pickens and Jerry L. Soucie were Mata’s “pri- mary lawyers,” but NCPA chief counsel James R. Mowbray also represented Mata. 2. Initial and Amended Motions for Postconviction Relief In 2009, Mata filed a “Pro Se Verified Motion for Postconviction Relief and Request for Appointment of Counsel,” although there was subsequently testimony that the NCPA “prepared” the motion for Mata. The motion raised two claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, as well as five other grounds for relief. The district court denied Mata’s motion for postconvic- tion relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mata’s request for the appointment of counsel was also denied, and he was not granted leave to amend. Mata appealed, and the Scotts Bluff County public defend- er’s office was appointed to represent him on appeal. At that time, the Scotts Bluff County public defender was Bernard Straetker. As discussed below, Straetker had served as an NCPA commissioner between 2004 and 2008, when the NCPA represented Mata for his resentencing. We found that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mata leave to amend. As such, we reversed the order of the district court and remanded the cause with directions to appoint counsel for Mata and grant him leave to amend. On remand, the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s office was again appointed to represent Mata. When the attorney in that office who had been handling Mata’s post- conviction motion left in late 2011, Straetker personally took on the responsibility. Straetker filed an amended motion for  - 571 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 postconviction relief on Mata’s behalf, followed by a sec- ond amended motion for postconviction relief. The second amended motion was the operative pleading. It raised the same two claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appel- late counsel that Mata had raised in his pro se motion, as well as eight other grounds for relief. The district court denied Mata’s second amended motion for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. Mata appealed, and in 2019, we affirmed the order of the dis- trict court. 3. Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief In 2021, represented by different counsel, Mata filed a 282- page successive motion for postconviction relief. In so doing, Mata relied on our statement in Williams that a defendant “may raise . . . ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims in [a] second postconviction motion” where the second motion is the defendant’s “first opportunity” to raise those claims. 4 Mata argued that his situation was like that of the defendant in Williams because, due to Straetker’s “conflicts and ineffective- ness,” Mata’s successive postconviction motion was his “‘first meaningful opportunity’” to raise the ineffective assistance and conflicts of his trial and appellate counsel. Mata’s successive motion for postconviction relief raised 28 claims (many with subparts) regarding the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel and his initial postconviction counsel, as well his trial and sentencing. Mata conceded that some of those claims had been raised “in [his] direct appeal, the appeal of his penalty retrial, or in his first postconvic- tion proceeding.” However, Mata said that he had raised those claims again in the present motion because they “must be considered to properly analyze [his] claim that cumu- lative error render[ed] his convictions and death sentence 4 Williams, supra note 1, 295 Neb. at 590, 889 N.W.2d at 114.  - 572 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 unconstitutional.” As relevant here, one of Mata’s claims was that Pickens had conflicts of interest that “unconstitutionally . . . impaired” his representation of Mata. The State responded that Mata’s claims were time barred, procedurally barred, or otherwise unavailing. A records hearing was held and additional briefing was taken. Thereafter, the district court issued an order opining that “Williams is not on all fours with this case,” because the defendant in Williams had the same counsel for both his direct appeal and his first postconviction motion. Nonetheless, the court set the matter for hearing on the “limited issue” of whether Straetker had a conflict of interest that prevented him from raising claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appel- late counsel and whether Pickens had a conflict of interest. 4. Evidentiary Hearing on Mata’s Successive Motion for Postconviction Relief An evidentiary hearing was subsequently held on Straetker’s and Pickens’ alleged conflicts. At that hearing, Mata offered 210 exhibits that, broadly speaking, purported to show: (1) Pickens had a conflict of interest due to his prior prosecu- tion of Mata and Mata’s family members, his investigation of Mata for another murder, and his prior representation of Gomez’ grandfather; (2) Straetker had a conflict of interest due to his prior service as an NCPA commissioner, his incen- tives as a public defender to maintain a good relationship with the NCPA, his alleged advice that Mata accept representation by the NCPA, and his prior representation of Gomez’ grand- father; and (3) the claims Straetker raised on postconviction as compared to those that a conflict-free counsel would allegedly have raised. Among the exhibits Mata offered were declara- tions by Straetker and Pickens, as well as the depositions of Straetker, Pickens, Mowbray, and Robert Lindemeier, another former NCPA commissioner. The State, in turn, offered one exhibit that detailed its objec- tions, primarily on relevancy grounds, to the bulk of Mata’s  - 573 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 proposed exhibits. The State did not object to the declarations and depositions noted above, although it did object to specific testimony in the depositions. The district court admitted into evidence the State’s exhibit and all of Mata’s exhibits to which the State did not object. It also took under advisement the admission of the remaining exhibits and the State’s objections to the deposition testimony. The following paragraphs summarize the pertinent evidence admitted at or after the hearing. Other evidence is discussed later in the opinion as it relates to our analysis of the parties’ arguments. Our discussion of the evidence is informed by the parties’ briefs and by our own review of the record. However, insofar as there may be additional evidence in the record that supports Mata’s arguments, but that was not cited by him in his brief, we would note that an appellate court ordinarily does not scour the record in search of facts that might support an appellant’s claim. 5 (a) Evidence Regarding Pickens’ Alleged Conflicts There was evidence that while Pickens was employed by the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s office between 1991 and 1994, he represented Gomez’ grandfather and saw the grandfather “frequently” at the courthouse. Pickens said that he “always enjoyed seeing” Gomez’ grandfather and that the two were “friendly with each other.” Pickens also said that later, during Mata’s “guilt trial,” Gomez’ grandfather “attended every day.” Pickens could not remember whether he told Mata about his “representation, relationship, or interactions” with Gomez’ grandfather. There was also evidence that while Pickens was employed by the Scotts Bluff County Attorney’s office between 1994 and 1996, he prosecuted Mata and members of Mata’s fam- ily and investigated Mata for another murder. Pickens and 5 See State v. Wood, 310 Neb. 391, 966 N.W.2d 825 (2021).  - 574 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 Mowbray (who was Pickens’ supervisor at all relevant times) both testified that when the NCPA was approached about rep- resenting Mata in Gomez’ death, they were cognizant of the conflict or the appearance of a conflict. Mowbray, in particular, said that Mata’s convictions in cases prosecuted by Pickens could have “play[ed] a role” in Mata’s sentencing in the capital proceeding and that Pickens would have been responsible for interviewing members of Mata’s family, some of whom he had prosecuted, as “part of a mitigation investigation.” However, both Pickens and Mowbray indicated that Mata had waived the conflict. Pickens said he discussed the matter with Mata, first by telephone and later in person, and con- firmed that Mata knew Pickens had previously prosecuted and investigated him and that both he and Mata were “comfortable” with his representing Mata. Mowbray testified similarly that he viewed the “issue” as “null and void” once there was a written waiver from Mata. Pickens said he did not think he secured a written waiver from Mata. Mowbray said he had not reviewed a written waiver prior to his deposition, with the potential implication that there was such a waiver. However, Mowbray agreed that waivers could be oral. (b) Evidence Regarding Straetker’s Alleged Conflicts The evidence showed that as a result of his work in the Scotts Bluff County public defender’s office, Straetker knew Mata prior to March 17, 1999, the date when Mata was arraigned for Gomez’ murder. However, while Straetker agreed he was “probably” in the courthouse that day, he did not recall talking to Mata “at or before [Mata’s] arraignment.” Straetker conceded that it was “possible” he or someone else from his office spoke to Mata about “accepting” represen- tation by the NCPA, and Straetker said he had no “reason to dispute” Mata’s claim that Straetker recommended Mata “accept[]” representation by the NCPA. Even so, Straetker indicated that he was unlikely to have made such a comment  - 575 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 because he was not then the public defender, and his “boss did not want us talking to anybody like that.” Straetker also noted that indigent defendants do not have a choice of counsel; that the courtroom where Mata was arraigned was on the other side of the building; that there was heavy security surrounding Mata, and he might not have been allowed to talk to Mata; and that it was not his “practice to . . . go up and talk to people” in Mata’s situation. The evidence also showed that subsequently, in 2000, while still with the public defender’s office, Straetker represented Gomez’ grandfather. Straetker admitted that he never disclosed this fact to Mata. Straetker similarly admitted that in March 2012, shortly after he personally began working on Mata’s case, he told Mata he was “concerned there may be a conflict of interest in [his office’s] representation of [Mata] in postconviction pro- ceedings,” because of his service as an NCPA commissioner. Straetker said his concern was based on his belief that another attorney who had served as an NCPA commissioner was not appointed to represent a former NCPA client on postconvic- tion because that attorney had a conflict due to his service as a commissioner. However, Straetker said he “talked about” the issue with Mata and later learned that he was mistaken in his belief about why the other attorney was not appointed to represent the former NCPA client. Otherwise, Straetker said he thought he was “okay” to keep Mata’s case because he was no longer a commissioner, and the commissioners “didn’t have any direct involvement with any of the ongoing cases.” In contrast, Pickens, Mowbray, and Lindemeier all testi- fied, at times over the State’s objection, that current or for- mer NCPA commissioners should not “accept[] postconviction appointments in cases where [the NCPA] served as trial or appellate counsel.” According to Mowbray, this was because the claims raised on postconviction often involve ineffective assistance of counsel, and it is “difficult” for commissioners to raise such claims due to the relationships they build with  - 576 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 the NCPA attorneys. Mowbray was less sure there were con- cerns arising from “[i]nformation and insights that a commis- sioner receives that perhaps others might not be as privy to.” Lindemeier similarly noted the relationships that commission- ers develop with the NCPA attorneys. In addition, Lindemeier said it “doesn’t pass the smell test” to argue that attorneys whom one had “overseen as a commissioner” were not effec- tive when NCPA policies call for effective representation. Mowbray was not “aware of any other instance where an active or former commissioner [had] accepted an appointment” to represent a former client of the NCPA on postconviction. He and Pickens also indicated they would support a policy prohibiting this, but the evidence showed this had “never been a policy.” (c) Evidence Regarding NCPA The evidence showed that the NCPA was created to relieve counties of the expenses that can arise from the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, although the witnesses disagreed about the difficulties that public defenders faced in obtaining funds from county commissioners. Lindemeier said that “[a]s a public defender . . . , [he did not] get a lot of financial support from the [county] commissioners. They don’t like to pay for . . . criminals.” In contrast, Straetker said that he “didn’t really have very many problems with . . . asking for money through the county commissioners.” There was also evidence that the NCPA’s taking a case had other benefits, including giving public defenders more time for other cases and “taking some pressure off of the local bar” in “messy” cases. The evidence similarly showed that the NCPA made sample motions and briefs available to criminal defense attorneys and provided other assistance to them. According to the witnesses, the NCPA commissioners “hired” and had “oversight” over the chief counsel, and the chief counsel “reported” to them. The witnesses also said that the commissioners “evaluate[d]” or “review[ed]” the chief  - 577 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 counsel’s performance annually, with one “consideration[]” being whether clients “were receiving . . . adequate repre- sentation.” However, one witness who testified to this effect seemed to characterize this evaluation as a “housekeeping” matter, centered upon “whether [the chief counsel] should continue . . . in his position.” There was also evidence that the commissioners adopted policies, “signed off” on expenses for expert witnesses and other items, and promoted the NCPA to legislators, judges, and county commissioners. However, the evidence showed that the commissioners were not “involved in [the] individual decisions that were made in the representa- tion of any client,” and the chief counsel never sought their “permission” to take specific positions in cases. The evidence likewise showed that the commissioners’ review of expenses was limited to determining whether the expense was “a legiti- mate cost of the defense.” Lindemeier, in particular, said he could not “recall ever even informally talking” about whether an expert should be retained. In addition, the witnesses testified that, formally or infor- mally, the commissioners received information about the NCPA’s cases. Specifically, the witnesses said they received “case lists,” identifying the NCPA’s clients, the charges against them, their attorneys, and the case’s procedural posture, as well as “financial reports” with “case costs.” However, the witnesses said the information was provided purely for “aware[ness]” and involved matters of “public record.” According to the witnesses, the commissioners were not aware of any “confidences” or “details,” they knew noth- ing of the “guts of the case,” they did not know the case strategy or litigation plans, and they had no access to the attorneys’ files or communications. There was evidence that “Mata’s case,” and, in particular, rulings in Mata’s case, were discussed with the commissioners, in part because “a lot of things that happened in that case . . . were pretty noteworthy and newsworthy.” Also, Mowbray, who was the chief counsel  - 578 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 at the time, said he wanted the commissioners to be “aware” and “informed” of matters, such as the challenge to electrocu- tion as a means of carrying out a death sentence, “[b]ecause of the cost of all of that, I wanted them to be aware that what we were doing wasn’t cheap.” 5. Subsequent Orders of District Court After the hearing, the district court entered a journal entry ruling on the admission of Mata’s exhibits. The court sustained the State’s objections to the exhibits based on relevancy, except as to the objections made during the depositions. Subsequently, the court overruled all objections in the deposi- tions and dismissed Mata’s successive motion for postconvic- tion relief. The court began by noting that this case was unlike Williams because the counsel who filed Mata’s direct appeal did not also file his initial postconviction motion. However, the court then concluded that “Mata’s case [was] not a Williams situation” because Straetker had no conflict of interest. In so conclud- ing, the court observed that Mata was tried and sentenced before Straetker began his term as an NCPA commissioner and that Straetker was not appointed as Mata’s postconvic- tion counsel until “years after” Mata was resentenced and Straetker’s term as commissioner ended. The court acknowl- edged Mata’s argument that the commissioners were “involved in” and “supervis[ed]” the cases handled by the NCPA attor- neys, “‘directly and indirectly supervised’” Mata’s attorneys, and were “privy to information” about Mata’s case. However, the court found that the evidence did not support Mata’s argu- ment here. The court also opined that in acting as postconvic- tion counsel, Straetker “was attentive” to the issue of conflicts, but ultimately did not believe there was a conflict. The court similarly observed that Straetker had raised claims of ineffec- tive assistance of trial and appellate counsel, as well as other claims, on Mata’s behalf.  - 579 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 The court also concluded that Mata waived any conflict based on Pickens’ prosecution of Mata and members of Mata’s family. The court said it was “unclear whether a writ- ten waiver was obtained,” but it found that there was “no dis- pute” that Mata was aware of this circumstance and waived the conflict. As such, the court concluded that Mata was “not entitled to bring” a successive postconviction motion. In particular, the court said that Mata’s present claims could have been raised either on direct appeal or in his initial postconviction proceedings. Mata appealed, and the case was assigned to our docket. 6 III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Mata assigns, restated, renumbered, and reordered, that the district court erred in (1) sustaining the State’s objections to his exhibits; (2) rejecting his argument that due to conflicts on the part of his initial postconviction counsel, his succes- sive motion for postconviction relief was his first opportunity to raise his claims; (3) finding that he waived any conflict on Pickens’ part; (4) dismissing his successive motion for post- conviction relief on procedural grounds; and (5) not granting him a further evidentiary hearing on the merits of his claims. IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1,2] A trial court has the discretion to determine the rel- evancy and admissibility of evidence, and such determinations will not be disturbed on appeal unless they constitute an abuse of that discretion. 7 A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly unten- able, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying just results in matters submitted for disposition. 8 6 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(1) (Cum. Supp. 2024). 7 State v. Price, 320 Neb. 1, 26 N.W.3d 70 (2025). 8 Id.  - 580 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 [3] In an evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconvic- tion relief, the trial judge, as the trier of fact, resolves con- flicts in the evidence and questions of fact. 9 An appellate court upholds the trial court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. 10 [4] Whether a claim raised in a postconviction proceeding is procedurally barred is a question of law which an appellate court reviews independently of the lower court’s ruling. 11 V. ANALYSIS 1. Any Error in Excluding Mata’s Exhibits Was Harmless Mata claims that the district court abused its discretion in excluding most of his proposed exhibits on relevancy grounds. Mata argues that relevancy is a “‘low bar’” 12 and “‘requires only that the probative value be something more than nothing.’” 13 Mata maintains that the excluded exhibits cleared this bar and are relevant for various reasons. As such, Mata argues that the evidence was admissible under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 2016), which prescribes that “[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible” except as otherwise provided. The State, in turn, argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Mata’s exhibits. The State also argues that even if the district court did abuse its discretion here, any error was harmless because the evidence was cumulative. The table below illustrates Mata’s claims regarding his exhibits and their purported relevancy: 9 State v. Betancourt-Garcia, 317 Neb. 174, 9 N.W.3d 426 (2024). 10 Id. 11 State v. Harms, 315 Neb. 445, 996 N.W.2d 859 (2023). 12 Brief for appellant at 36 (quoting State v. Munoz, 303 Neb. 69, 927 N.W.2d 25 (2019)). 13 Brief for appellant at 36 (quoting State v. Devers, 306 Neb. 429, 945 N.W.2d 470 (2020)).  - 581 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 Exhibit Numbers and Purported Relevancy Contents 1001-1006 (prior Nebraska Relevant to compare the Supreme Court opinions claims Mata asserts should in Mata’s case and related have been raised to those briefs) appellate counsel raised 1001-1006, 1008, 1009, Relevant to the constitution- 1013 (prior Nebraska ality of Mata’s conviction Supreme Court opinions and death sentence in Mata’s case and related briefs); 1016, 1046, 1059- 1062, 1068, 1069, 1165 (materials related to trial and sentencing); 1176-1178 (materials related to initial postconviction proceeding) 1017-1034, 1069, 1070, Show the claims that 1187 (materials related to conflict-free counsel would trial and sentencing); 1048- allegedly have raised on 1058 (records related to postconviction Pickens’ prior prosecution of Mata and Mata’s family members); 1063-1067 (infor- mation about Mata’s mental health and family back- ground); 1170-1175 (NCPA correspondence regarding Mata’s case); 1179 (death penalty defense manual); 1185, 1186 (Scotts Bluff County budgets and audits)  - 582 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 Exhibit Numbers and Purported Relevancy Contents 1048-1058, 1085, 1170, Show Pickens previously 1171 (records related to prosecuted Mata and Mata’s Pickens’ prosecution of family members and inves- Mata and Mata’s family tigated Mata for another members); 1172 (materials murder related to sentencing); 1173 (records related to Pickens’ investigation of Mata for murder) 1075-1081 (ethics advisory Address circumstances like opinions for lawyers) those allegedly present here 1082-1085 (records from Relevant to Mata’s claim cases where Straetker or his that Straetker advised him to office represented Mata); accept representation by the 1180 (Mata’s declara- NCPA tion); 1205, 1206 (court records from day of Mata’s arraignment) 1086-1106 (NCPA annual Explain the NCPA and the reports); 1107 (webpage types of actions Straetker listing commissioners and would have taken as an staff); 1108-1122, 1161 NCPA commissioner (rules and regulations); 1123-1125 (NCPA policy and procedure manuals); 1126-1135, 1140-1156 (NCPA agendas and min- utes); 1159, 1160, 1204 (standards); 1162 (statutes); 1163 (news coverage)  - 583 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 Exhibit Numbers and Purported Relevancy Contents 1167 (email chain involving Shows that the NCPA was a Pickens and Straetker) resource for Straetker 1168, 1174, 1187-1203 Show Mowbray’s involve- (materials related to ment in Mata’s case Mowbray’s work on case) 1168, 1169 (NCPA’s costs Show the financial benefits in defending Mata); 1185, to the county of the NCPA’s 1186 (Scotts Bluff County representation of Mata budgets and audits) [5-7] We agree with the State that any error in excluding Mata’s exhibits was harmless because the evidence was cumu- lative. The admission or exclusion of evidence is not reversible error unless it unfairly prejudiced a substantial right of the complaining party. 14 Specifically, the erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal if the evidence would have been cumulative and other relevant evidence, properly admit- ted, supports the trial court’s finding. 15 Cumulative evidence means evidence tending to prove the same point to which other evidence has been offered. 16 In this case, even without the exhibits noted above, there was other properly admitted evidence that supported the district court’s conclusion that Straetker had no conflict, as explained below. That conclusion is dispositive of Mata’s claim that Pickens, too, had conflicts, as also explained below. Mata attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that the State “effectively conceded” that most of “the exclusions were in error” by giving only “‘illustrative’” examples of 14 Jaeger v. Jaeger, 307 Neb. 910, 951 N.W.2d 367 (2020). 15 Id. 16 State v. Hagens, 320 Neb. 65, 26 N.W.3d 174 (2025).  - 584 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 321 Nebraska Reports STATE v. MATA Cite as 321 Neb. 566 how the excluded exhibits were cumulative and not “specifi- cally address[ing] the other excluded exhibits.” 17 Moreover, Mata argues that even when the State did address specific exhibits by way of illustration, it “failed to do so with suffi- cient particularity,” 18 apparently because it did not “articulate which specific facts [were] cumulative.” 19 However, Mata bases those arguments on opinions of this and other courts that have no application here 20—and that would not preclude us from affirming the trial court’s order on the ground that the evidence was cumulative even if the State had waived the argument. Mata’s apparent argument that evidence cannot be cumula- tive if it includes any fact not contained in the admitted evi- dence is equally unavailing. In arguing that there is no merit to the State’s claim that the excluded evidence of Mowbray’s involvement in Mata’s case was cumulative, Mata points to an excluded exhibit he claims showed Mowbray “spent at least 81.75 hours