Wahl v. Wahl
CourtNebraska Supreme Court
Date FiledJuly 17, 2026
DocketS-25-435
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library
www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/
07/17/2026 08:13 AM CDT
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Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets
321 Nebraska Reports
WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
Charles A. Wahl, appellee, v.
Leanne T. Wahl, appellant.
___ N.W.3d ___
Filed July 17, 2026. No. S-25-435.
1. Divorce: Appeal and Error. In a marital dissolution action, an appellate
court reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether there
has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.
2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When an appellate court reviews a trial
court’s ruling for an abuse of discretion, it is considering whether the
ruling exceeded the bounds of permissible choice, given the evidence
presented and the applicable law.
3. Divorce: Judgments: Appeal and Error. The meaning of a divorce
decree presents a question of law, in connection with which an appellate
court reaches a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
the court below.
4. Statutes. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law.
5. Divorce: Property Division: Armed Forces: Pensions. While a service
member may elect or be ordered by a court to designate a former spouse
as a survivor benefit plan beneficiary, such designation precludes nam-
ing a future spouse as a beneficiary outside the grounds specified in 10
U.S.C. § 1450(b) and (f) (2018).
6. ____: ____: ____: ____. A trial court in a dissolution action has the
option to either order a service member to name his or her former
spouse as survivor benefit plan beneficiary or allow the service member
to name the beneficiary of their choosing, whether it be a former spouse
or a future spouse, but it cannot do both.
7. Stipulations: Waiver: Appeal and Error. A party’s stipulation may
waive the party’s right to assign error relating to the matter stipulated
to, even where the stipulation involves a question of law or some other
evidentiary matters.
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321 Nebraska Reports
WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
Appeal from the District Court for Scotts Bluff County: Leo
P. Dobrovolny, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Ryan K. McIntosh and Scott G. Smith, of Brandt, Horan,
Hallstrom & Stilmock, for appellant.
Jason A. Ossian, of Douglas, Kelly, Ostdiek, Snyder, Ossian
& Vogl, P.C., for appellee.
Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg,
Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ.
Freudenberg, J.
INTRODUCTION
An appellant appeals the district court’s decree of dissolu-
tion ordering her to pay costs associated with maintaining her
as a beneficiary on the appellee’s military survivor benefit
plan coverage and allowing the appellee to name a subse-
quent spouse as the beneficiary on the plan should the appel-
lee remarry. Based upon the following reasoning, we affirm
as modified.
BACKGROUND
Leanne T. Wahl and Charles A. Wahl were married in May
2009. The couple had one child born in 2016. Charles served
in the U.S. Air Force from February 2001 until he retired
in September 2021. During his marriage to Leanne, Charles
served over 12 years of his more than 20 years of service.
Following Charles’ retirement, the Veterans Benefits
Administration of the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs
found that Charles qualified for disability compensation ben-
efits with a 100-percent disability rating. Charles also began
receiving military retired pay. Because military retired pay
ends at the death of the retiree, Charles elected a “Survivor
Benefit Plan” (SBP) at the time of his retirement. An SBP,
created by 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447 to 1455 (2018 & Supp. V
2023), is an annuity plan under which a surviving spouse
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WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
or other designated beneficiary can continue to receive a
monthly benefit following the death of a service member. 1
Charles’ SBP covered Leanne as his spouse and their minor
child. The monthly cost of Charles’ SBP was $167.99 for
Leanne and $0.03 for their minor child.
Charles filed a complaint for legal separation. The par-
ties entered into a written “Custody, Parenting Time, Support
and Property Settlement Agreement” (Settlement Agreement),
which resolved all issues between the parties except the SBP.
The Settlement Agreement was intended to become a part of
the decree of dissolution if approved by the court.
Under the Settlement Agreement, as relevant to this appeal,
the parties agreed to split their property, including bank
accounts, vehicles, and real estate, with a $35,000 equaliza-
tion payment to be made by Leanne to Charles. Under the
Settlement Agreement, Leanne was to receive 29.9 percent
of Charles’ disposable military retirement. Charles was to
receive the remaining 70.1 percent. On the issue of the SBP,
the Settlement Agreement stated: “The issue of the ongo-
ing election of beneficiary(ies) under the [SBP] connected to
[Charles’] military retirement, and the costs thereof, shall be
reserved for a judicial determination.”
The parties also prepared a “Statement of Stipulated
Facts on the Issue of Survivor Benefit Plan.” The stipulated
facts clarified the remaining issue between the parties was
that Leanne wanted the court to order Charles to maintain
SBP coverage on her as long as he received military retire-
ment, whereas Charles wished to be allowed to select the
beneficiaries of his SBP, including a potential future spouse.
The parties agreed in the stipulation that the district court
could order Leanne to reimburse Charles for any portion of
the monthly premium for SBP coverage of a former spouse.
The parties appeared to further stipulate that SBP coverage of
a former spouse precluded coverage for a future spouse, while
1
Kuba v. Kuba, 400 S.W.3d 869 (Mo. App. 2013).
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WAHL v. WAHL
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acknowledging that Charles wished to select a future spouse
as a beneficiary if he was allowed to do so under federal law.
It provided:
12. That [Leanne] is requesting that the Court order
[Charles] to maintain SBP coverage on her as long as he
receives military retirement.
....
14. [That Charles] is requesting that he be allowed to
select his beneficiary for purposes of SBP; specifically,
the ability to designate his minor child as his beneficiary
as long as he is allowed to do so under federal law; and
thereafter, a future spouse.
....
17. [SBP] coverage of a former spouse precludes
coverage for a future spouse. SBP coverage of a former
spouse does not preclude coverage for the child of the
parties, known as former-spouse and child coverage.
....
21. The Court may order [Leanne] to reimburse
[Charles] for any portion of the monthly premium for
former spouse coverage.
At a final hearing, Charles was the sole witness to tes-
tify. Charles testified about the Settlement Agreement he had
reached with Leanne, which the court received as exhibit 4.
Charles also testified about the remaining issue of his SBP,
and the court received the statement of stipulated facts on the
issue of the SBP as exhibit 5.
The district court subsequently issued a ruling on the bene-
ficiaries of Charles’ SBP. The court recognized that “[i]f a for-
mer spouse is covered, a current spouse cannot be covered.”
Nonetheless, the court ordered Charles to “include Leanne
as a SBP beneficiary until such time as he may remarry and
make his then current spouse a SBP beneficiary.” Leanne was
ordered to reimburse Charles for the cost of maintaining her
as an SBP beneficiary.
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WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
In so ordering, the court noted that, due to Leanne’s earning
capacity, the SBP was not the “‘most important material asset
of the marriage.’” The court also set forth that Leanne and
Charles are also almost the exact same age, which the court
reasoned lessened the risk of Charles predeceasing Leanne
and leaving her without a valuable marital asset—her share
of the military pension. The court found that giving Charles
the option to remove Leanne as an SBP beneficiary did not
deprive her of an interest in a marital asset because “the only
way the value of that asset is realized by either party is ongo-
ing payments while Charles survives.”
The court thereafter issued a decree of dissolution incor-
porating the terms of the Settlement Agreement with the SBP
issue resolved pursuant to its ruling.
Leanne appeals. Pursuant to our authority to regulate the
dockets of the appellate courts, we moved the appeal to
our docket.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Leanne assigns on appeal that the district court erred in (1)
ordering her to pay the costs associated with her SBP coverage
and (2) allowing Charles to name a subsequent spouse as the
beneficiary of SBP coverage.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] In a marital dissolution action, an appellate court
reviews the case de novo on the record to determine whether
there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial judge. 2 When
an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling for an abuse of
discretion, it is considering whether the ruling exceeded the
bounds of permissible choice, given the evidence presented
and the applicable law. 3
2
Hawk v. Hawk, 319 Neb. 120, 21 N.W.3d 303 (2025).
3
State v. Damore, 320 Neb. 914, 31 N.W.3d 604 (2026).
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Cite as 321 Neb. 819
[3,4] The meaning of a divorce decree presents a question
of law, in connection with which an appellate court reaches
a conclusion independent of the determination reached by
the court below. 4 Likewise, statutory interpretation presents a
question of law. 5
ANALYSIS
Leanne asserts on appeal that the district court erred in
ordering her to pay the costs associated with her SBP cover-
age and in allowing Charles to name a subsequent spouse as a
beneficiary of the SBP, thereby replacing her as a beneficiary.
As explained below, we hold that while the district court had
discretion to order Leanne to pay the premiums for the SBP,
it did not have the discretion to issue an order that allowed
Charles to replace Leanne as a beneficiary to the SBP in the
event he remarries.
SBPs are a creature of federal law, governed by 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1447 to 1455, and “[a]ny right to create, modify, or revoke
such plans is prescribed by Federal statutes.” 6 Congress cre-
ated the SBP because military pension payments cease upon
the death of a service member. 7 An SBP is an annuity plan
under which a surviving beneficiary, be it a surviving spouse,
former spouse, or surviving minor child, can continue to
receive a monthly benefit following the death of a service
member. 8 A service member may elect to cover a former
spouse or a state court may order a service member to pro-
vide an SBP annuity to a former spouse as part of equitable
4
Hawk v. Hawk, supra note 2.
5
Id.
6
In re Marriage of Coviello, 2016 IL App. (1st) 141652, ¶ 12, 65 N.E.3d
565, 566, 408 Ill. Dec. 343, 344 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7
See 10 U.S.C. § 1448. See, also, Kuba v. Kuba, supra note 1.
8
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447 to 1455. See, also, Martin v. Martin, 320 A.3d 113
(Pa. Super. 2024).
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distribution. 9 The SBP will generally cease upon the death
of the surviving spouse or the surviving spouse’s remarriage
before the age of 55. 10
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses’ Protection Act
(USFSPA) provides that disposable retired military pay is
treated as marital property 11 and that state courts may treat
a retired service member’s disposable retirement pay either
as the sole property of the service member or as property of
both the member and the member’s spouse. 12 Thus, one effect
of the USFSPA is that nondisability military pensions and
SBPs are not treated differently than nonmilitary pensions
for purposes of categorization as marital property under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 42-366(8) (Reissue 2016). 13 Before the passage of
the USFSPA, federal law prohibited state courts from treating
military pensions as marital property subject to division in
dissolution actions. 14
Section 42-366(8) provides that the court shall include
as part of the marital estate, for purposes of equitable divi-
sion, “any pension plans, retirement plans, annuities, and
other deferred compensation benefits owned by either party,
whether vested or not vested.” In Kramer v. Kramer, 15 the
Nebraska Court of Appeals recognized that, pursuant to
the USFSPA, military pensions and SBPs should be viewed
as property subject to equitable division under § 42-366(8)
and not as alimony. The Court of Appeals explained that the
purpose of property division is to distribute the marital assets
9
See, 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b)(2)(A) and (b)(3); 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(4).
10
See 10 U.S.C. § 1450(b).
11
See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c) (2018).
12
See Id.
13
See Taylor v. Taylor, 217 Neb. 409, 348 N.W.2d 887 (1984).
14
See McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728, 69 L. Ed. 2d 589
(1981) (superseded by statute as stated in Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214,
137 S. Ct. 1400, 197 L. Ed. 2d 781 (2019)).
15
Kramer v. Kramer, 1 Neb. App. 641, 510 N.W.2d 351 (1993).
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WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
equitably between the parties, whereas alimony is meant to
provide for the continued maintenance or support of one
party by the other when the relative economic circumstances
and other criteria make it appropriate. 16 The Court of Appeals
explained that, unlike alimony, when marital property is
divided, typically “each party has the benefit of receiving a
fixed amount or value which potentially can appreciate,” and
“each party’s share is not subject to being later reduced or
taken away entirely because of circumstances which occur in
the life of the former spouse.” 17 The Court of Appeals thus
reversed the district court’s decision that alimony be paid out
of the military pension, and it remanded with instructions for
the district court to award the wife a percentage interest in the
military pension as part of the property division as permitted
under 10 U.S.C. § 1408. The Court of Appeals also instructed
the district court to order the husband to maintain the wife as
an SBP beneficiary under 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(4) to ensure
the wife retained complete ownership of the important mari-
tal asset. 18
Designation of Former Spouse Precludes
Designating a New Spouse
We have not had the opportunity to consider whether a disso-
lution court may award SBP benefits to a former spouse subject
to a retired military spouse’s subsequent remarriage. However,
as noted in the parties’ stipulation, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1448 and
1450 provide that an election of coverage of a former spouse
precludes coverage of a future spouse and that such coverage is
not revocable outside of certain limited exceptions that are not
applicable to this case.
16
See id. See, also, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 2016).
17
Kramer v. Kramer, supra note 15, 1 Neb. App. at 647, 510 N.W.2d at 355.
See, also, Kramer v. Kramer, 252 Neb. 526, 567 N.W.2d 100 (1997).
18
See Kramer v. Kramer, supra note 15.
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WAHL v. WAHL
Cite as 321 Neb. 819
According to 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(4), a dissolution court
may order a service member to elect a former spouse as an
SBP beneficiary as set forth under 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b). And 10
U.S.C. § 1448(b)(3) provides that a retired service member who
is already participating in the SBP may elect, or be ordered by
a court, to provide coverage to a former spouse “who was not
that person’s former spouse when that person became eligible
to participate in the [SBP].” Leanne and Charles fall under 10
U.S.C. § 1448(b)(3). Charles was participating in the SBP upon
his retirement, and Leanne is now his former spouse but was
not his former spouse when Charles became eligible to partici-
pate in the SBP. 19
Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. §§ 1448(b)(3)(C) and 1450(g), such
an election under 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b), whether made as a
result of a voluntary agreement or court order, may not be
changed or revoked unless the parties agree to the change or
revocation or a court order modifies all previous court orders
relating to such election. 20 Further, 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(2) gov-
erns changes in beneficiaries when former spouse coverage is
in effect, and it provides:
(f) Change in Election of Insurable Interest or
Former Spouse Beneficiary.—
....
(2) Limitation on change in beneficiary when
former spouse coverage in effect.—A person who,
incident to a proceeding of divorce, dissolution, or
annulment, is required by a court order to elect under
section 1448(b) of this title to provide an annuity to a
former spouse (or to both a former spouse and child),
. . . may not change that election under paragraph (1)
unless, [one] of the following requirements, whichever
are applicable in a particular case are satisfied:
19
See Matter of Marriage of Thrailkill, 57 Kan. App. 2d 244, 452 P.3d 392
(2019).
20
See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1448(b)(3)(C) and 1450(g).
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Cite as 321 Neb. 819
(A) In a case in which the election is required by a
court order, . . . the [service member]—
(i) furnishes to the Secretary concerned a certified
copy of a court order which is regular on its face and
which modifies the provisions of all previous court
orders relating to such election, or the agreement to make
such election, so as to permit the person to change the
election[.]
While the election of former spouse coverage may not be
changed or revoked by the service member outside of the
grounds in § 1450(f)(2), the former spouse’s annuity is subject
to termination if the former spouse dies or remarries before
reaching age 55. 21
Other state courts have consistently held that an election
designating a former spouse as the beneficiary precludes the
member from designating a new spouse or any other former
spouses as beneficiaries absent certain circumstances. 22 In In
re Marriage of Coviello, 23 for instance, an Illinois appellate
court explained that, under 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b), survivor
benefits are not divisible and that naming a former spouse as
a beneficiary forecloses naming a future spouse. The court
said the question of an SBP, “unlike many other questions
regarding marital property, is very much an all-or-nothing
proposition”; 24 thus, trial courts determining the distribu-
tion of an SBP are faced with the “options of giving all
of the survivor benefits to [the former spouse] or none of
them.” 25 Similarly, in Martin v. Martin, 26 the Superior Court
21
See 10 U.S.C. § 1450(b).
22
See, e.g., Kuba v. Kuba, supra note 1; In re Marriage of Coviello, supra
note 6; Martin v. Martin, supra note 8.
23
In re Marriage of Coviello, supra note 6.
24
Id. at ¶ 13, 65 N.E.3d at 567, 408 Ill. Dec. at 345.
25
Id.
26
Martin v. Martin, supra note 8.
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of Pennsylvania explained that “designating a former spouse
as the beneficiary [of an SBP] precludes the designation of
a current, future, or any other former spouses as additional
beneficiaries.” 27 The court there accordingly reversed the trial
court’s order on the division of marital assets, which had
awarded the wife a 60-percent interest in the husband’s mili-
tary pension but allowed the husband to remove the wife as an
SBP beneficiary in the event of remarriage. 28
[5,6] These cases are consistent with both the federal
statutory provisions governing SBPs and Nebraska law hold-
ing that, in equitable property division, “each party’s share
is not subject to being later reduced or taken away entirely
because of circumstances which occur in the life of the for-
mer spouse.” 29 We hold that while a service member may
elect or be ordered by a court to designate a former spouse
as an SBP beneficiary, such designation precludes naming a
future spouse as a beneficiary outside the grounds specified
in 10 U.S.C. § 1450(b) and (f). Accordingly, a trial court in
a dissolution action has the option to either order the service
member to name his or her former spouse as SBP beneficiary
or allow the service member to name the beneficiary of their
choosing, whether it be a former spouse or a future spouse,
but it cannot do both.
The district court abused its discretion by ordering Charles
to maintain Leanne as an SBP beneficiary while giving
Charles the option to remove and replace Leanne as a benefi-
ciary in the future in the event of Charles’ remarriage. Indeed,
the parties acknowledged this when they agreed “coverage of
a former spouse precludes coverage for a future spouse.” The
district court’s decision to order Charles to maintain Leanne
as a beneficiary but also to allow Charles to remove Leanne in
27
Id. at 125 n.3 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1448(b)(2)(B) and (C)).
28
See Martin v. Martin, supra note 8.
29
Kramer v. Kramer, supra note 15, 1 Neb. App. at 647, 510 N.W.2d at 355.
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the event he remarries was not within the bounds of permis-
sible choices based on the applicable law.
Consistent with the statutory scheme governing SBPs, rel-
evant case law, and the parties’ stipulation below, we modify
the district court’s order by striking that part of the order
permitting Charles to remove Leanne as a beneficiary in the
event Charles remarries. Charles may not change or revoke
the ordered election of Leanne as an SBP beneficiary outside
the grounds specified in 10 U.S.C. § 1450(b) and (f).
It Is Permissible to Order Nonmilitary
Spouse to Pay SBP Premiums
[7] We otherwise affirm the district court’s order. We dis-
agree with Leanne’s argument that the district court erred in
ordering her to reimburse Charles for the cost of maintaining
her as an SBP beneficiary. Leanne stipulated below that the
district court could order her to pay any portion of the monthly
premium. And in various contexts, we have held that a party’s
stipulation may waive the party’s right to assign error relating
to the matter stipulated to, even where the stipulation involves
a question of law or some other evidentiary matter. 30 In any
event, the law on this point is clear.
In Harris v. Harris, 31 we held that it is within the district
court’s discretion to order a nonmilitary spouse to pay the
premiums for an SBP benefit. We found in Harris that the dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a husband to
maintain and pay the premiums on an SBP in favor of the wife,
but we noted that courts have “broad discretion” in valuing
pension rights and dividing such rights between the parties. 32
Harris is consistent with other jurisdictions that hold that trial
30
D&M Roofing & Siding v. Distribution, Inc., 319 Neb. 707, 24 N.W.3d
850 (2025).
31
Harris v. Harris, 261 Neb. 75, 621 N.W.2d 491 (2001).
32
Id. at 83, 621 N.W.2d at 498.
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courts have discretion to shift or split the cost of maintaining
an SBP premium. 33
The district court’s decision here ordering Leanne to remit
the costs associated with maintaining her as an SBP beneficiary
was not an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court abused its dis-
cretion by allowing Charles to replace Leanne in the event he
remarries but did not abuse its discretion in ordering Leanne
to reimburse Charles for the cost of maintaining her as an SBP
beneficiary. We therefore affirm as modified.
Affirmed as modified.
33
See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1115, 56 Cal. Rptr.
3d 341 (2007); Leonard v. Leonard, 877 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. App. 2007);
Kuba v. Kuba, supra note 1.