State ex rel. Hilgers v. Weber

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 09/09/2026 03:09 PM CDT - 227 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 State ex rel. Michael T. Hilgers, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State of Nebraska, relator, v. Brodey Weber et al., together as the Lincoln City Council, and Soulinne Phan, Lincoln city clerk, respondents. ___ N.W.3d ___ Filed September 9, 2026. No. S-26-706. 1. Mandamus: Words and Phrases. Mandamus is an extraordinary rem- edy, not a writ of right, issued to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, cor- poration, board, or person where (1) the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty existing on the part of the respondent to perform the act, and (3) there is no other plain and adequate remedy in the course of the law. 2. Mandamus: Proof. In a mandamus action, the party seeking mandamus has the burden of proof and must show clearly and conclusively that such party is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks and that the respondent is legally obligated to act. 3. Mandamus. Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s discretion. 4. Constitutional Law: Intent. Constitutional provisions are self-executing when there is a manifest intention that they should go into immediate effect, and no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed. 5. Constitutional Law. That a right granted by a constitutional provi- sion may be better or further protected by supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent the provision in question from being self- executing; nor does the self-executing character of the constitutional provision necessarily preclude legislation for the better protection of the right secured. 6. Constitutional Law: Time. The timing requirement set forth in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is self-executing.  - 228 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 7. Mandamus: Public Officers and Employees. A duty imposed by law which may be enforced by writ of mandamus must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. 8. Mandamus. The general rule is that an act or duty is ministerial only if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified manner upon the existence of certain facts. A duty or act is ministerial when there is no room for the exercise of discretion, official or otherwise, the performance being required by direct and positive command of the law. 9. ____. To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the performance of a legal duty to act, (1) the duty must be imposed by law, (2) the duty must still exist at the time the writ is applied for, and (3) the duty must be clear. 10. Statutes: Words and Phrases. In the context of statutory construction, appellate courts have recognized that the word “shall” is considered mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 11. Statutes. No universal test distinguishes mandatory from directory statutory provisions. Broadly, provisions that relate to the essence of the thing to be done are mandatory while provisions for which compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance are directory. 12. Constitutional Law: Municipal Corporations: Voting: Time. The timing requirement in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is a self-executing provision that imposes a mandatory duty upon the city council or gov- erning authorities to submit the proposed charter amendment to a vote of the qualified electors at the next general or special election not held within 30 days after such petition is filed. 13. Constitutional Law: Statutes. The rules of statutory interpretation apply to constitutional interpretation as well. 14. Constitutional Law: Courts. As in statutory interpretation, the con- struction of constitutional provisions requires the Nebraska Supreme Court to apply basic tenets of interpretation. 15. Constitutional Law: Intent. Constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course; construction is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is necessary. 16. Constitutional Law: Courts: Intent. If the meaning is clear, the Nebraska Supreme Court gives a constitutional provision the meaning that laypersons would obviously understand it to convey. 17. Constitutional Law: Voting: Time: Words and Phrases. In the con- text of Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, “next general . . . election” means the next regular election, one that is recurring automatically as to time.  - 229 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 18. Constitutional Law. A constitution represents the supreme written will of the people regarding the framework for their government. Original action. Peremptory writ of mandamus issued. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Cody S. Barnett, Zachary B. Pohlman, and Lincoln J. Korell for relator. Yohance L. Christie, Lincoln City Attorney, Margaret M. Blatchford, and Nicholas T. Bussey for respondents. Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ., and Pirtle, Judge. Per Curiam. INTRODUCTION A citizen group submitted three initiative petitions to amend the Lincoln City Charter. Anticipating that the city of Lincoln, Nebraska, would decline to submit the charter amendments to the voters at the November 2026 statewide general election, the Nebraska Attorney General asked this court for peremp- tory writs of mandamus directing the city council and city clerk (Respondents) to submit the charter amendments at that election. The city attorney then advised that the city council planned to place the charter amendments on the ballot at the May 2027 city general election pursuant to state law. In deciding whether to grant the Attorney General’s request, we must determine which election is “the next general . . . election” under Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4. The Attorney General contends that it is the next statewide general election in November 2026. Respondents claim it is the next city general election in May 2027. We agree with the Attorney General and conclude that in this case, “the next general . . . election” under article XI, § 4, is the next statewide general election in November 2026. Accordingly, we grant the petition and issue a peremptory writ of mandamus, commanding Respondents to submit the proposed charter amendments to a vote of  - 230 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 the qualified electors at the next general election held on November 3, 2026. BACKGROUND Petitions for Charter Amendment Good Government Lincoln, a Nebraska ballot question com- mittee, submitted three petitions to amend the Lincoln City Charter. The first petition (the “Term Limits Petition”) had the stated purpose “to provide term limits for members of the city council.” The second petition (the “Rescheduling Petition”) had the stated purpose “to increase participation in city elec- tions by aligning city elections with statewide elections.” The third petition (the “Extraterritorial Voters Petition”) had the stated purpose “of allowing all citizens residing in an area gov- erned by the City of Lincoln to vote in its elections.” On August 5, 2026, Good Government Lincoln submit- ted copies of the proposed amendments to the city clerk “to initiate circulation of petitions to place the three proposed charter amendments on the statewide general election ballot.” After the petitions were circulated and signatures were gath- ered, the signed petitions were submitted to the city clerk on August 19. On August 25, 2026, the Lancaster County Election Commissioner certified that the Term Limits Petition had met the signature threshold for a charter amendment petition, and on August 26, the commissioner certified that the Rescheduling Petition had met the signature threshold. On August 27, the city attorney issued a statement regarding the petitions in which he stated that Good Government Lincoln had “missed the dead- line for the City Council’s process to allow inclusion on the November 3rd ballot” and that the “City Council will place the Charter amendments on the next general election ballot (May 2027) pursuant to state law.” On August 28, the election com- missioner certified that the Extraterritorial Voters Petition had also met the signature threshold.  - 231 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 Attorney General Involvement A state senator asked the Attorney General whether, “[u]nder existing state law, if a petition to amend a home-rule charter satisfies the signature and timeline requirements of Neb. Const. art. XI, section 4, does the home-rule city have any discretion to impose additional procedural requirements or processes that could keep such petition off the ballot for the next election not within 30 days of when the petition was submitted?” On August 24, 2026, the Attorney General issued a formal opinion to the senator. In the opinion, the Attorney General concluded that “[w]here petitions are submitted, and the requisite signatures certified, in advance of 30 days before the November general election, the City has a ministerial duty to submit them for the ballot for such election.” The Attorney General explained that “[t]he City has no discretion to implement any procedure that would delay the proposals for a subsequent election.” On August 25, 2026, the Attorney General sent a letter to Respondents in which he inquired about whether the Lincoln City Council and City Clerk plan to submit to the Lancaster County Election Commissioner, by the statutory deadline on September 1, the three charter-amendment petitions recently submitted to the City for inclusion on the general election ballot in November 2026, so long as the Commissioner certifies that each contains the requisite signatures. The letter advised Respondents that “[f]ailing to submit a compliant petition for the November election would violate a direct constitutional command and constitute a derelic- tion of duty by members of the City Council and the City Clerk.” The letter asked for Respondents’ response by 5 p.m. on Thursday, August 27, 2026. The letter explained that the Attorney General would consider a failure to respond by the deadline as “an answer in the negative” and advised that “immediate legal action” would be considered “[i]f the City  - 232 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 Council and City Clerk do not agree to obey their constitu- tional duty.” Respondents did not respond to the Attorney General’s inquiry. On August 27, 2026, the Attorney General, in his official capacity, filed an emergency application for leave to com- mence an original action in this court for writs of mandamus. In a verified petition, the Attorney General sought peremp- tory writs of mandamus requiring Respondents to submit and certify to the election commissioner by September 1 proposed Lincoln City Charter amendments that satisfied the constitu- tional requirements for inclusion on the general election ballot in November 2026. The verified petition alleged that Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, demands that when municipal officials receive a petition with the requisite number of signatures, the “council or governing authorities shall submit the same to a vote of the qualified elec- tors at the next general or special election not held within thirty days after such petition is filed.” On August 28, 2026, the Attorney General moved to supple- ment the verified petition for writs of mandamus. The motion claimed that after the Attorney General filed its emergency application at 5:44 p.m. on August 27, Respondents issued a press release at 6:09 p.m. that same day, which confirmed that Respondents did not intend to submit the three petitions at issue to the election commissioner for inclusion on the November 2026 general election ballot. Alternative Writ and Response On August 28, 2026, we granted the Attorney General leave to docket an original action in this court and accepted the sup- plemental verified petition for writs of mandamus. The same day, we issued an alternative writ of mandamus to Respondents. The writ stated, in part: IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Respondents shall forthwith submit and certify the “Term Limits for Members of the City Council”  - 233 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 Petition, the “Increase Participation in City Elections by Holding City Elections in Conjunction with Statewide Elections” Petition, and the “Allow all Citizens who are Residents of an Area Governed by the City of Lincoln to Vote in its Elections” Petition to the Lancaster County Election Commissioner for certification for the November 3, 2026, General Election Ballot, or show cause by Answer to this Court on or before 9:00 p.m. on Monday, August 31, 2026, why a peremptory writ commanding Respondents to do so should not issue, and then and there return this writ. On August 31, 2026, Respondents filed their answer to our order to show cause why a peremptory writ should not issue. Respondents argued that the Attorney General had no clear right to the relief sought because the petitions were submit- ted too late for them to complete all the steps necessary and allowed by law to submit the proposed charter amendments to the election commissioner by the September 1 statutory deadline under 2026 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1075 (operative July 18, 2026; amending Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-559(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 2024)), to be included on the ballot for the November 3 elec- tion. Respondents asserted that to certify the proposed charter amendments for placement on the ballot, they were required to act by passing a resolution and were required to meet cer- tain requirements under Nebraska’s Open Meetings Act 1 and municipal law, including the Lincoln Mun. Code, ch. 2.04, and City of Lincoln Executive Order No. 19107, Administrative Regulation 1-1, § C.1. (Apr. 19, 1977). Respondents also argued that there was no clear duty for them to submit and certify the proposed charter amendments for the November 2026 election because the “next general . . . election” under Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, clearly meant the next City general election in May 2027. They argued that article XI, § 4, allowed, but did not require, them to hold a 1 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 84-1407 to 84-1414 (Reissue 2024).  - 234 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 special election, and that therefore, they had no clear duty to call a special election and submit the proposed charter amend- ments at a special election. Respondents further noted that article XI, § 4, gave them the right, when submitting a charter amendment proposed by voters, to present and submit “any alternative article or sec- tion” for the choice of the voters. They argued that in addition to the time necessary to submit the charter amendments pro- posed by the petitions, they would also need time to prepare, adopt, and submit such alternatives. They further argued that issuance of the writ would “prohibit [them] from any meaning- ful opportunity to exercise [their] constitutionally-granted right to perform discretionary legislative functions to consider and present alternative amendments.” Respondents finally contended that the issuance of a peremp- tory writ requiring them to submit the proposed charter amend- ments for the November 2026 election would require them to “upend [their] regular and routine operations,” by requiring them to “hold emergency meetings or suspend the normal rules.” They cited authority that issuance of a writ should be denied “where the issuance of a writ would disturb official action, or create disorder or confusion.” 2 After receiving the parties’ pleadings, we ordered the parties to submit simultaneous supplemental briefing. The briefs were to address (1) the understanding of the term “next general or special election” when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912; (2) the relevance, if any, of State v. Schroeder 3 to the proper con- struction of the phrase “next general . . . election” in article XI, § 4; and (3) if “next general . . . election” is construed to mean the next statewide general election or the next city general elec- tion, whether any current provision of the Election Act 4 would 2 See State ex rel. Goetz v. Lundak, 199 Neb. 585, 594, 260 N.W.2d 589, 594 (1977). 3 State v. Schroeder, 79 Neb. 759, 113 N.W.192 (1907). 4 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-101 to 32-1552 (Reissue 2016, Cum. Supp. 2024 & Supp. 2025).  - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 be rendered unconstitutional as applied. The parties filed such briefs, and this matter was submitted without oral argument. Mandamus Legal Standards [1-3] Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, not a writ of right, issued to compel the performance of a purely ministerial act or duty, imposed by law upon an inferior tribunal, corpora- tion, board, or person where (1) the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, (2) there is a corresponding clear duty exist- ing on the part of the respondent to perform the act, and (3) there is no other plain and adequate remedy in the course of the law. 5 In a mandamus action, the party seeking mandamus has the burden of proof and must show clearly and conclusively that such party is entitled to the particular thing the relator asks and that the respondent is legally obligated to act. 6 Whether to grant a writ of mandamus is within a court’s discretion. 7 ANALYSIS The portion of Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, that is relevant to this case provides: Such charter so ratified and adopted may be amended, or a charter convention called, by a proposal therefor made by the law-making body of such city or by the qualified electors in number not less than five per cent of the next preceding gubernatorial vote in such city, by petition filed with the council or governing authorities. The council or governing authorities shall submit the same to a vote of the qualified electors at the next gen- eral or special election not held within thirty days after such petition is filed. In submitting any such charter or charter amendments, any alternative article or section 5 State ex rel. Spung v. Evnen, 317 Neb. 800, 12 N.W.3d 229 (2024). 6 Id. 7 Id.  - 236 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 may be presented for the choice of the voters and may be voted on separately without prejudice to others. (Emphases supplied.) Based on the showing that the Attorney General must make to warrant the issuance of a writ of mandamus, we first address the Attorney General’s authority to bring this action. Next, we consider whether article XI, § 4, imposes a self- executing ministerial duty. Then, we determine the proper interpretation of article XI, § 4, based on the positions of the parties. Finally, we exercise our discretion in issuing a peremptory writ of mandamus. Attorney General’s Authority The Attorney General asserts that he has authority to bring this original mandamus action to protect the public interests of the State of Nebraska. 8 He notes that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 84-203 (Reissue 2024), the Attorney General “is authorized to appear for the state and prosecute and defend, in any court[,] any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in which the state may be a party or interested.” He maintains that as the “‘chief law officer of the state,’” 9 the Attorney General has a duty to “uphold the Constitution” and protect the rights of Nebraskans announced therein, 10 and the common-law authority to “‘exer- cise all such power and authority as public interests may from time to time require.’” 11 We agree that the Attorney General is a proper party to bring this mandamus action because of the authority granted under 8 See, State, ex rel. Johnson, v. Tilley, 137 Neb. 173, 288 N.W.521 (1939) (issuing peremptory writ sought by Attorney General); State, ex rel. Johnson, v. Goble, 136 Neb. 242, 285 N.W.569 (1939) (same). 9 State ex rel. Meyer v. Peters, 188 Neb. 817, 820, 199 N.W.2d 738, 740 (1972). 10 Id. at 821, 199 N.W.2d at 741. 11 Id. at 820, 199 N.W.2d at 740.  - 237 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 § 84-203. The state is interested in enforcing constitutional and statutory ministerial duties of the city officials in this case. 12 Self-Executing Ministerial Duty [4,5] We first recognize that constitutional provisions are self-executing when there is a manifest intention that they should go into immediate effect, and no ancillary legisla- tion is necessary to the enjoyment of a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed. 13 That a right granted by a constitutional provision may be better or further protected by supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent the provision in question from being self-executing; nor does the self-executing character of the constitutional provision nec- essarily preclude legislation for the better protection of the right secured. 14 [6] The timing requirement set forth in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is self-executing. The mandate is clear: “The council or governing authorities shall submit the [issue] to a vote . . . at the next general or special election not held within thirty days after such petition is filed.” 15 No ancillary legislation is necessary to effectuate the 30-day timeline. Neither party disputes the self-executing nature of this timing requirement. They concede that a proposed charter amendment satisfying the signature requirement must be submitted to the voters at the next general or special election, so long as that election is not within 30 days of its filing with the council or govern- ing authorities. 12 See State, ex rel. Sorensen, v. Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Co., 121 Neb. 248, 236 N.W. 736 (1931) (violations of law are public wrongs that state may prevent). See, also, State, ex rel. Hall, v. Ure, 99 Neb. 486, 156 N.W. 1053 (1916) (holding action may have more than one proper party). 13 Wilfong v. Omaha & C. B. Street R. Co., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935). 14 Id. 15 Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4.  - 238 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 [7-9] Moreover, as the parties do not dispute, the self- executing timing requirement is a ministerial duty. Mandamus is available to enforce the performance of ministerial duties of a public official but is not available if the duties are quasi- judicial or discretionary. 16 A duty imposed by law which may be enforced by writ of mandamus must be one which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. 17 The general rule is that an act or duty is ministe- rial only if there is an absolute duty to perform in a specified manner upon the existence of certain facts. 18 A duty or act is ministerial when there is no room for the exercise of discre- tion, official or otherwise, the performance being required by direct and positive command of the law. 19 A ministerial duty is not dependent upon a public officer’s judgment or discre- tion—it is performed under the conditions specified in obedi- ence to the mandate of legal authority, without regard for the exercise of the officer’s judgment upon the propriety of the act being done. 20 To warrant the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus to compel the performance of a legal duty to act, (1) the duty must be imposed by law, (2) the duty must still exist at the time the writ is applied for, and (3) the duty must be clear. 21 [10,11] In the context of statutory construction, we have recognized that the word “shall” is considered mandatory and inconsistent with the idea of discretion. 22 No universal test distinguishes mandatory from directory statutory provisions. 23 Broadly, provisions that relate to the essence of the thing to be 16 Burbank v. Evnen, 321 Neb. 65, 32 N.W.3d 612 (2026). 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 21 Id. 22 American Exch. Bank v. Topp, 321 Neb. 409, 35 N.W.3d 411 (2026). 23 D.I. v. Gibson, 291 Neb. 554, 867 N.W.2d 284 (2015).  - 239 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 done are mandatory while provisions for which compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance are directory. 24 Put another way, we have been reluctant to deem provisions mandatory if something less than strict compliance would not interfere with the law’s fundamental purpose. 25 [12] The timing requirement in article XI, § 4, relates to the essence of the thing to be done—the timing of the submis- sion of the issue to voters. The timing requirement is a self- executing provision that imposes a mandatory duty upon the city council or governing authorities to submit the proposed charter amendment to a vote of the qualified electors at the next general or special election not held within 30 days after such petition is filed. Respondents contend that the timing requirement estab- lishes a “floor” by which proposed charter amendments can- not be submitted to voters because the next election would be too soon, rather than a deadline for proposed charter amend- ments to be submitted to voters. Respondents also contend that because “[i]n submitting any . . . charter amendments, any alternative article or section may be presented for the choice of the voters,” 26 the city council has discretionary authority to present alternative articles or sections alongside the charter petition amendments for the voters to choose from. This right of the city council is discretionary, and the city council is free to exercise that right. However, Respondents go further; they assert that the 30-day timing requirement can- not be a deadline because they need time to consider submit- ting such alternatives. But Respondents’ contentions are not inconsistent with a reading of a mandatory deadline. Although we agree that the timing requirement does create a “floor” as Respondents con- tend, it also creates a positive deadline that must be met. 24 Id. 25 Id. 26 Neb. Const. art. XI, §4.  - 240 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 Accordingly, we must next address whether Respondents’ ministerial duty to submit the issue to voters at the “next gen- eral . . . election” 27 includes the statewide general election in November 2026 as the Attorney General contends. “General” Is “Regular” [13-16] The rules of statutory interpretation apply to consti- tutional interpretation as well. 28 As in statutory interpretation, the construction of constitutional provisions requires us to apply basic tenets of interpretation. 29 Constitutional provisions are not open to construction as a matter of course; construc- tion is appropriate only when it has been demonstrated that the meaning of the provision is not clear and that construction is necessary. 30 If the meaning is clear, we give a constitutional provision the meaning that laypersons would obviously under- stand it to convey. 31 In 1910, close in time to the Legislature’s proposal of article XI, § 4, the term “general election” meant: (1) One at which the officers to be elected are such as belong to the general government,—that is, the general and central political organization of the whole state: as distinguished from an election of officers for a particular locality only. (2) One held for the selection of an officer after the expiration of the full term of the former officer; thus distinguished from a special election, which is one held to supply a vacancy in office occurring before the expiration of the full term for which the incumbent was elected [or] [a]n election for a particular emergency; out of the regular course . . . . 32 27 Id. 28 Conroy v. Keith Cty. Bd. of Equal., 288 Neb. 196, 846 N.W.2d 634 (2014). 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Black’s Law Dictionary 416 (2d ed. 1910).  - 241 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 The definition of “regular election” is also relevant here: “A general, usual, or stated election. When applied to elections, the terms ‘regular’ and ‘general’ are used interchangeably and synonymously.” 33 In article XI, § 4, “general” election is juxtaposed with “spe- cial” election. This dichotomy indicates that article XI, § 4, contemplates only two kinds of elections: those that are regular and those that are out of the regular course. While not disposi- tive, we note that at least one newspaper interpreted “general” to be “regular” before the voters took to the polls in 1912. 34 We agree. In the context of article XI, § 4, we interpret “general” election to be used interchangeably and synonymously with “regular” election. “General” Includes Statewide General Elections The determinative question in this case then is whether the “next general . . . election” in Neb. Const. art. XI, § 4, is limited to a regular election for the city alone or whether it includes a regular statewide election. We interpret the words at the heart of this dispute to include a regular statewide election. Respondents argue that language in State v. Schroeder indi- cates that when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912, the term “general election” in article XI, § 4, would have been under- stood to refer to city elections only and not the November general election. 35 But Respondents reach that conclusion by plucking that language from its context. The issue in State v. Schroeder was how long someone appointed to fill a vacancy as city alderman was entitled to hold that office. A statute pertaining to aldermen provided 33 Id. 34 Omaha Daily Bee, Jan. 12, 1911, at 2 (“after which it is to be submitted to the voters at a regular or special election”). 35 See State v. Schroeder, supra note 3.  - 242 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 that those appointed to fill vacancies were to hold the office “‘until the next general election.’” 36 The appointed alder- man argued that “general election” for purposes of that statute meant “the [municipal] election expressly appointed by statute for the election of aldermen,” 37 while the relator argued that “general election” referred to the “next election at which municipal officers in general are elected.” 38 This court adopted the relator’s reading of the statute and stated, “The words ‘general election’ have no uncertain meaning in this state, and when used with reference to city elections[,] without any qualifying words, must mean the election for municipal officers in general.” 39 Respondents claim that the above-quoted language shows that at the time article XI, § 4, was enacted, “general elec- tion” in that provision would have been understood to refer to a city general election because article XI, § 4, pertains to amendments of city charters and appears “without any qualify- ing words.” But it must be recalled that the dispute in State v. Schroeder was not whether the term “general election” included a statewide general election in November; it was whether “general election” in that particular statute meant the next municipal election at which aldermen were elected or the next municipal election at which municipal officers in general were elected. Viewed in its proper context, the language relied on by Respondents is not, in our opinion, instructive as to the original understanding of article XI, § 4. Similarly, our invocation of that proposition in Allen v. Tobin 40 fails to move the needle in Respondents’ favor. In that case, the plaintiffs contended that a petition was invalid for failing to have sufficient signatures based on the percentage 36 Id. at 761, 113 N.W. at 193. 37 Id. at 762, 113 N.W. at 193. 38 Id. at 761, 113 N.W. at 193. 39 Id. at 762, 113 N.W. at 194. 40 Allen v. Tobin, 155 Neb. 212, 51 N.W.2d 338 (1952).  - 243 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 of votes cast at “the last general election.” 41 The petitioners argued that the last general election was limited to the last state general election and that the intervening city election was not a general election for the purposes of the relevant statute. We disagreed. We noted: Ordinarily, a general election is one provided for by law for the election of officers throughout the state, or certain subdivisions thereof, after the expiration of the full terms of the former officers. . . . A regular or general election is one which recurs at stated intervals as fixed by law; it is one which occurs at stated intervals without any superinducing cause other than the efflux of time. In the application of the foregoing rules, it is held that the term “general election” embraces a regular annual municipal election. . . . Any election at which there is a general and popular expression of the public will, whether that election be a state, county, or city election, is a general election. 42 We went on to hold that the city general election was, in fact, a general election. We did not, however, contrary to Respondents’ position, hold that the city general election was the only applicable general election. That opinion stands for the principle that a city general election is included in the defini- tion of “general election,” and, inherently, it does not exclude the state general election. Our holding in Allen v. Tobin is similar to our holding in State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v. Marsh. 43 There, we recognized that a general election was merely one that occurs on a “regu- lar date[,] operating automatically as to time.” 44 General elec- 41 Id. at 217, 51 N.W.2d at 341. 42 Id. at 218-19, 51 N.W.2d at 342 (citations omitted). 43 State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v. Marsh, 107 Neb. 607, 187 N.W. 88 (1922). 44 Id. at 608, 187 N.W. at 88. Accord State, ex rel. City of Lincoln, v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N.W. 273 (1928).  - 244 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports STATE EX REL. HILGERS v. WEBER Cite as 322 Neb. 227 tions were those held automatically and scheduled on a regular basis, as opposed to special elections. Likewise, in State, ex rel. Long, v. City of Nebraska City, 45 we rejected the notion that the state general election was a special city election as far as it affected a purely municipal question. We recognized that in the context of elections, the word “general” has the same meaning as “regular”; that is, “‘returning or recurring at stated or fixed times or uniform intervals.’” 46 Moreover, when article XI, § 4, was adopted in 1912, so too was an amendment to Neb. Const. art. XVII, § 4, which provides that “[t]he general election of this state” is held in November every 2 years. Therefore, the voters contem- plated that “general . . . election” in article XI, § 4, included the statewide general election set forth in article XVII, § 4. Interpreting the use of the general term “general . . . election,” without a modifier, in article XI, § 4, to be limited to city gen- eral elections disregards the constitution’s own recognition of a statewide general election. One other canon of construction guides our analysis—the general terms canon. 47 General words, as all words, “are to be accorded their full and fair scope. They are not to be arbitrarily limited.”