Kuehn v. Pillen

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 09/11/2026 08:06 AM CDT - 297 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 John Kuehn, appellant, v. James D. Pillen, in his official capacity as Governor of Nebraska, et al., appellees. ___ N.W.3d ___ Filed September 11, 2026. No. S-25-503. 1. Motions to Dismiss: Appeal and Error. Appellate review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. 2. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party’s case, because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court; determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law. 3. Motions to Dismiss: Pleadings. To prevail against a motion to dismiss, the pleader must allege sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 4. Standing: Jurisdiction: Pleadings: Evidence: Words and Phrases. A court’s consideration of standing will vary depending on when the issue is raised during the progression of a case. If standing is challenged at the pleadings stage, before an evidentiary hearing and before any evidence outside of the pleadings is admitted, it is deemed a facial challenge. In considering a facial challenge, a court will typically review only the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish standing. But when an issue of standing is presented and the court holds an evidentiary hearing and reviews evidence outside the pleadings, it is considered a factual challenge. 5. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties. Standing refers to whether a party had, at the commencement of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject mat- ter jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf. 6. Standing: Parties. To have standing, the plaintiff must have some legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy.  - 298 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 7. Standing: Proof. To show standing, it is generally insufficient for a plaintiff to have merely a general interest common to all members of the public. 8. Standing: Jurisdiction: Proof. A party invoking a court’s or tribunal’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing. 9. Standing. Common-law standing generally focuses on whether the liti- gant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. 10. Equity: Taxation: Injunction. Because taxpayers have an equitable interest in public funds, a resident taxpayer may bring an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds raised for governmental purposes. Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Susan I. Strong, Judge. Affirmed. Andrew LaGrone, of La Grone Law, L.L.C., and Edward D. Greim and Katherine Mitra, pro hac vice, of Graves Garrett Greim, L.L.C., for appellant. Michael T. Hilgers, Attorney General, Zachary B. Pohlman, and Cody S. Barnett, for State appellees. Jason W. Grams and Karson S. Kampfe, of Grams Law, L.L.C., for Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission appellees. Alexander S. Arkfeld and Daniel J. Gutman, of Gutman Law Group, for appellees Anna Wishart, Crista Eggers, and Adam Morfeld. Funke, C.J., Cassel, Stacy, Papik, Freudenberg, Bergevin, and Vaughn, JJ. Funke, C.J. INTRODUCTION John Kuehn appeals the order of the district court for Lancaster County dismissing his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief after determining that he lacked standing. Kuehn sought to challenge the constitutionality of medical cannabis laws that were enacted pursuant to initiative peti- tions that were approved by the voters in the November 2024  - 299 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 general election. The defendants moved to dismiss Kuehn’s complaint on the basis that he lacked standing. Kuehn con- ceded that he had not suffered an injury in fact, but he asserted he had standing based on exceptions, including taxpayer stand- ing and standing for a matter of great public concern. The district court rejected Kuehn’s arguments, found that he lacked standing, and dismissed his complaint without prejudice. We affirm the district court’s order. BACKGROUND Prior to the November 2024 general election, Kuehn filed a preelection challenge to the legal sufficiency of two initiative petitions that were aimed at decriminalizing and regulating medical cannabis. The district court rejected Kuehn’s challenge in that case. We affirmed the district court’s order. 1 On December 10, 2024, Kuehn filed a complaint in the district court challenging the validity of the two initiative measures. The complaint named as defendants Governor Jim Pillen (the Governor) and Secretary of State Robert B. Evnen (the Secretary) in their official capacities. The complaint also named as defendants the three sponsors of the initiative petitions, Anna Wishart, Crista Eggers, and Adam Morfeld (collectively the Sponsors). With the complaint, Kuehn filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to prevent the Governor from declaring the two initiative measures to be enacted into law. The district court denied the motion, and the Governor thereafter signed a proclamation certifying the enactment of the two initiative measures into law. The two initiative measures were codified as the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Patient Protection Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-24,103 to 71-24,105 (Supp. 2025), which removes pen- alties for possession and use of medical cannabis, and the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Regulation Act, Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 71-24,106 to 71-24,111 (Supp. 2025) (the Regulation Act), 1 Kuehn v. Evnen, ante p. 161, ___ N.W.3d ___ (2026).  - 300 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 which removes penalties for the manufacture and distribution of medical cannabis and creates a commission to regulate can- nabis establishments (collectively the Acts). Operative Complaint Kuehn filed an amended complaint in January 2025, and he filed a second amended complaint on June 16. The second amended complaint is the operative complaint for purposes of this appeal. In his second amended complaint, Kuehn named as defendants in their official capacities the Governor, the Secretary, the chief executive officer of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), the State Treasurer, and the Tax Commissioner (collectively the State Officials). Also named in their official capacities as members of the Nebraska Medical Cannabis Commission (NMCC) were Bruce D. Bailey, Monica Oldenburg, Lorelle Mueting, and Kim M. Lowe (collectively the NMCC Commissioners). Kuehn again named the Sponsors as defendants. In the second amended complaint, Kuehn alleged that he was “an individual resident of Nebraska, a registered Nebraska voter, and property owner in Nebraska, who pays income, property, and sales taxes in the State of Nebraska.” He also described himself as a “citizen opponent” of the initiative measures and the petitions that sought to place the initiatives on the ballot. Kuehn generally alleged that the Acts were unconstitu- tional under both Nebraska law and federal law. He alleged that federal law prohibited the use, production, and distri- bution of marijuana and that state measures legalizing and regulating medical marijuana are preempted by federal law and therefore in violation of the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI. Kuehn also cited Neb. Const. art. III, § 2, which provides, in part, that “[t]he constitutional limitations as to the scope and subject matter of statutes enacted by the Legislature shall apply to those enacted by initiative,” and he contended that the Acts were  - 301 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 not a proper exercise of the initiative power because they violated the Supremacy Clause. Kuehn further alleged that the Regulation Act violated Neb. Const. art. II, § 1, regarding the distribution of powers because it improperly delegated regulatory authority to the NMCC. The operative complaint alleged that after the measures were passed by the voters, Kuehn served on the Governor a demand letter dated December 6, 2024. In that letter, Kuehn set forth reasons the measures would be unconstitutional and requested that the Governor not issue a proclamation declaring the measures to be law. Kuehn attached to his second amended complaint a copy of the demand letter in which he asked for a response from the Governor by 10 a.m. on December 10. Kuehn alleged that the Governor did not respond to his demand letter and that on December 12, the Governor issued the proc- lamation declaring the measures to be law. The operative complaint further alleged that various defend­ ants had expended or would be required to expend public mon- eys to comply with the Acts. Specifically, it alleged that the NMCC Commissioners and officials of the Nebraska Liquor Control Commission (NLCC), who served as staff for the NMCC Commissioners, had used significant employee time and expenditures to implement the Acts. It also alleged that the Governor had appointed members to the NMCC and pledged “administrative support and financial resources” to help the NMCC meet its deadlines and that the Nebraska Legislature had passed, and the Governor approved, “Legislative Bill 261” (L.B. 261), which provided funding of $30,000 for the NMCC. The complaint further alleged DHHS would be required to expend additional resources to comply with its credentialing duties related to health care practitioners who would be quali- fied to issue written recommendations for medical use of can- nabis under the Acts. Kuehn set forth theories of relief under eight counts: counts I and II—to declare the Governor’s proclamation and actions to implement the Acts to be preempted by federal law and in  - 302 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 violation of Nebraska’s constitutional separation of powers; count III—to declare the initiative measures legally insufficient under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-1412 (Cum. Supp. 2024); counts IV and V—to enjoin or prevent DHHS from spending gov- ernment employee time and public funds to comply with the Acts; counts VI and VII—to prevent the NMCC from spending public funds to carry out its duties under the Acts; and count VIII—to prevent the State Treasurer and the Department of Revenue from collecting and maintaining taxes from the sale of medical cannabis. Kuehn alleged that he had standing to bring counts I, IV, VI, and VIII as a taxpayer challenging the illegal expenditure of public funds. In counts IV, VI, and VIII, he alleged that he made demands on DHHS, the NMCC, and the State Treasurer and the Department of Revenue, respectively, to not make illegal expenditures to comply with the Acts and that each refused to respond to his demands. Kuehn alleged that he had standing to bring counts II, V, and VII because they involved matters of great public concern. Kuehn also alleged that as a resident of Nebraska, he had standing under § 32-1412 to bring count III. Kuehn sought relief, including a declaratory judgment that the commitment of employee time and the expenditure of tax moneys to carry out the Acts was unlawful, a declaratory judg- ment that the measures were legally insufficient and invalid, an award of attorney fees and costs, and such other relief as the court deemed just and equitable. Motions to Dismiss The three groups of defendants—the State Officials, the NMCC Commissioners, and the Sponsors—filed sepa- rate motions to dismiss Kuehn’s first amended complaint. Each motion alleged, among other reasons for dismissal, that Kuehn’s complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Neb. Ct. R. Pldg. § 6-1112(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We have stated that because a defect in standing is a defect in  - 303 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 subject matter jurisdiction, a challenge to standing is treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction brought under § 6-1112(b)(1). 2 The district court held a hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss on May 20, 2025, during which the arguments generally focused on the defendants’ contentions that Kuehn lacked standing. After the court granted Kuehn leave to file his second amended complaint on June 16, the three groups of defendants renewed their previously filed motions to dismiss. District Court Decision On June 26, 2025, the district court entered an order in which it determined that Kuehn lacked standing because he had not suffered an injury in fact and that he lacked standing under any of the exceptions to the injury-in-fact rule that he asserted. The court also found that other parties would have standing to challenge the Acts. Before addressing whether Kuehn had standing, the district court noted that at the hearing on May 20, 2025, the NMCC Commissioners had offered four exhibits in support of their motion to dismiss. It stated that the NMCC Commissioners’ intent was to make a factual challenge to Kuehn’s standing, as well as a facial challenge. The court cited Washington v. Conley, 3 in which we distinguished between facial and fac- tual challenges to a court’s subject matter jurisdiction over an action. The court further noted that Kuehn objected to the NMCC Commissioners’ evidence and to any factual challenge to his standing when a stay on discovery was in effect pend- ing disposition of the motions to dismiss. Kuehn alternatively offered his own exhibit, which he argued created a factual dispute regarding standing. In its order ruling on the motions to dismiss, the court sus- tained Kuehn’s objection and ruled that the exhibits offered 2 Jacobs Engr. Group v. ConAgra Foods, 301 Neb. 38, 917 N.W.2d 435 (2018). 3 Washington v. Conley, 273 Neb. 908, 734 N.W.2d 306 (2007).  - 304 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 by the NMCC Commissioners and by Kuehn would not be received. The court indicated that it would consider only a facial challenge to Kuehn’s standing. But the court also stated that because Kuehn had included many of the documents in his offered exhibit to the second amended complaint, it would consider the documents in ruling on the motions to dismiss. Turning to the issue of standing, the district court cited precedent to the effect that common-law standing generally focuses on whether the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact; that such injury must be concrete in both a qualitative and a temporal sense; that the complainant must allege an injury to itself that is distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely abstract; and that the alleged harm must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. 4 The court indicated that Kuehn conceded he did not have an injury in fact and that instead, he asserted he had standing under the following exceptions to the injury-in-fact requirement: (1) standing as “any resident” under § 32-1412 to challenge the legal sufficiency of an initiative petition, even after the elec- tion is over; (2) standing as a taxpayer to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds; and (3) standing on the basis that the constitutionality of the measures was a matter of great public concern. Regarding standing under § 32-1412, the district court noted that the statute was an example of the Legislature’s con- ferring standing that was broader than common-law standing for an injury in fact when it granted “any resident” the right to challenge the legal sufficiency of an initiative petition. But the court concluded for two reasons that Kuehn did not have standing under § 32-1412 to sue for a declaration that the Acts were unconstitutional. First, Kuehn did not challenge the legal sufficiency of the ballot measures, and second, Kuehn did not file this action until after the election, when it was too 4 See Hauxwell v. Middle Republican NRD, 319 Neb. 1, 21 N.W.3d 34 (2025).  - 305 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 late to provide the relief provided by § 32-1412, which the court described as “an injunction preventing the Secretary . . . from certifying or printing the petition on the official ballot.” The district court rejected Kuehn’s reliance on Duggan v. Beermann 5 to argue that pursuant to § 32-1412, he could file a postelection challenge to the constitutionality of the Acts. The court stated that the case “does not stand for the rule that any resident has standing under § 32-1412 to challenge the con- stitutionality of a voter-initiated statute after the election” and that instead, the case involved the plaintiffs’ separate claim for declaratory judgment, “which was properly joined with their injunction claim under the predecessor to § 32-1412.” The district court next addressed the taxpayer exception to the common-law requirement of an injury in fact. It described the exception as being that a resident taxpayer, with no injury in fact, may bring an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds raised for governmental purposes. 6 The court noted that the defendants argued that most taxpayer standing cases involve a direct expenditure of public funds, such as a contract between the government and a third party, and that expanding the definition of an expenditure of public funds to include incidental costs of implementing a law would “effec- tively swallow” the requirement of an injury in fact. The court stated that Kuehn’s allegations of taxpayer standing in this case were “remarkably broad” and that Kuehn’s “theory seems to be that any government action, any use of government resources like computers, and any employee time . . . is an expenditure of public funds.” The district court stated that Kuehn’s strongest case for taxpayer standing was his claim against the NMCC Commissioners to declare the Regulation Act unconstitu- tional. It noted that the Regulation Act provides that the three 5 Duggan v. Beermann, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68 (1996). 6 See Myers v. Nebraska Invest. Council, 272 Neb 669, 724 N.W.2d 776 (2006).  - 306 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 members of the NLCC shall be ex officio members of the NMCC, see § 71-24,109(3), and that the Governor may appoint two additional members, if confirmed by the Legislature, see § 71-24,109(4). But it also noted that the Regulation Act did not provide for the NLCC members to be paid more for their new duties related to the NMCC and that the Act did not pro- vide for compensation of the two additional members of the NMCC. The court concluded that although the Regulation Act authorized the NMCC to acquire office space and staff, see § 71-24,111(11), the Regulation Act provided “no financial means to do so” and “no funding at all.” Next, the district court addressed Kuehn’s allegation that L.B. 261 provided funding of $30,000 to the NLCC to assist the NMCC to implement the Acts. The court determined, as a matter of law, that L.B. 261 did not provide such funding for the NMCC. It cited the section of L.B. 261 that set forth the appropriation for the NLCC and stated that although the Legislature’s appropriations for other agencies stated that part of their appropriation was for a specific purpose, the Legislature did not provide any similar direction in the NLCC’s appropriation and did not state that any amount was appropriated to implement the Acts. The district court also addressed Kuehn’s allegation that the Governor had pledged administrative support and finan- cial resources to help the NMCC perform its duties under the Regulatory Act. It characterized Kuehn as arguing that performing acts required under the Regulatory Act, such as making rules and granting applications, would require use of employee time and other government assets and that “these incidental burdens of implementing a law are the expenditure of public funds.” The district court noted Kuehn’s reliance on Chambers v. Lautenbaugh 7 to support his “expansive version of the taxpayer- standing doctrine.” It described Chambers v. Lautenbaugh as 7 Chambers v. Lautenbaugh, 263 Neb. 920, 644 N.W.2d 540 (2002).  - 307 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 an action in which a resident taxpayer sued a county elec- tion commissioner to declare that redrawn district lines were unlawful, and this court determined the taxpayer had alleged an expenditure of public funds in that employees in the elec- tion commissioner’s office had spent and would spend public time and money to implement the new district boundary lines. The court indicated that Chambers v. Lautenbaugh “look[ed] very good” for Kuehn’s position but determined that Chambers v. Lautenbaugh had been limited by this court’s decision in Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm. 8 In Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., this court described a tension between Chambers v. Lautenbaugh and other cases, finding similar allegations insufficient to show an illegal expenditure of public funds. We suggested in Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm. that Chambers v. Lautenbaugh was more properly characterized as involving a matter of great public concern. The district court recognized that Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm. had later been overruled on other grounds but agreed with the sug- gestion that Chambers v. Lautenbaugh “should be understood as something other than a taxpayer-standing case.” The district court reasoned that “[i]f alleging ‘employee time’ is enough to claim taxpayer standing, then taxpayer standing would no longer be an ‘exception,’” and that instead, “[i]t would be the rule anytime a statute requires a government employee to do anything.” It further reasoned that such an application of tax- payer standing would be inconsistent with the principle that exceptions to a rule of standing must be carefully applied “‘to prevent the exceptions from swallowing the rule.’” The district court concluded it did not “believe that the incidental burdens of implementing a law, like employee time and printing costs, is an ‘expenditure of public funds’ 8 Project Extra Mile v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 283 Neb. 379, 810 N.W.2d 149 (2012), overruled on other grounds, Griffith v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 304 Neb. 287, 934 N.W.2d 169 (2019).  - 308 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 sufficient to confer taxpayer standing under Nebraska law.” Based on this understanding, it determined that Kuehn did not have taxpayer standing in this case. With respect to Kuehn’s assertion that he had standing for a matter of great public concern, the district court cited Cunningham v. Exon, 9 wherein this court applied an excep- tion to the requirement of an injury in fact “where matters of great public concern are involved and a legislative enactment may go unchallenged unless plaintiff has the right to bring the action.” In Cunningham v. Exon, this court concluded that the plaintiff had standing to challenge an amendment to the Nebraska Constitution and reasoned: An amendment which changes the provisions of a state constitution as to the use of public funds for sectarian and educational purposes is of such great public interest and concern that a citizen taxpayer should have standing sufficient to maintain an action for a declaratory judgment as to such an amendment without the necessity of show- ing that he has sustained some special injury peculiar to himself and distinct from that of the public generally. 10 The district court stated that it was not clear whether this court had applied the matter of great public concern excep- tion after Cunningham v. Exon. It again noted that this court had suggested that Chambers v. Lautenbaugh was better understood as a case involving standing for a matter of great public concern, rather than taxpayer standing. In Thompson v. Heineman, 11 four justices had applied the exception for a matter of great public concern in a constitutional challenge to a statute. But the district court noted that in Egan v. County of Lancaster, 12 this court “expressly declined to say whether 9 Cunningham v. Exon, 202 Neb. 563, 567, 276 N.W.2d 213, 215 (1979). 10 Id. at 568-69, 276 N.W.2d at 216. 11 Thompson v. Heineman, 289 Neb. 798, 857 N.W.2d 731 (2015). 12 Egan v. County of Lancaster, 308 Neb. 48, 952 N.W.2d 664 (2020).  - 309 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 the standing analysis in the four-justice opinion in Thompson [v. Heineman] was controlling.” The district court noted that this court had “rejected the matter-of-great-public-concern exception on several occasions,” and it cited Neb. Against Exp. Gmblg. v. Neb. Horsemen’s Assn. 13 and State ex rel. Reed v. State. 14 The district court rea- soned that if the issues in Neb. Against Exp. Gmblg. v. Neb. Horsemen’s Assn. (“proliferation of gambling”) and State ex rel. Reed v. State (“harm to the state’s natural resources”) were not matters of great public concern, then it would be “hard- pressed to say that the legalization and regulation of medical cannabis is” a matter of great public concern. It further stated that Kuehn’s constitutional separation of powers argument in this case was “much more mundane than the constitutional issue in Cunningham [v. Exon]” and that it did not “believe that every claim alleging a violation of the separation of pow- ers is automatically a matter of great public concern.” It con- cluded that Kuehn did not have standing for a matter of great public concern. The defendants’ argument that taxpayer standing and stand- ing for a matter of great public concern do not apply in this case because there are others who could sue to challenge the Acts was also addressed. The court stated its conclusions that Kuehn lacked both types of standing did not depend on the existence of others who had standing but agreed that the fac- tor was relevant. It cited Cunningham v. Exon as stating that the exception for a matter of great public concern applies only if the legislative enactment might otherwise go unchal- lenged, and it cited Woodruff v. Welton 15 to assert that part of the reason for taxpayer standing was that there might be no one else who could challenge the government action. The 13 Neb. Against Exp. Gmblg. v. Neb. Horsemen’s Assn., 258 Neb. 690, 605 N.W.2d 803 (2000). 14 State ex rel. Reed v. State, 278 Neb. 564, 773 N.W.2d 349 (2009). 15 Woodruff v. Welton, 70 Neb. 665, 97 N.W. 1037 (1904).  - 310 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 court stated that the federal government would have standing to challenge the Acts as being preempted by federal law and that it was “questionable” whether a private individual like Kuehn had a right to do so. The court also stated there are other parties who could challenge the Regulation Act based on constitutional separation of powers and gave as examples “a landowner near a registered cannabis establishment” and “any person fined by the NMCC” pursuant to § 71-24,111(8) or (9). The court noted the State Officials argued that the Attorney General had standing to sue state officers’ implementing a law the Attorney General believed to be unconstitutional, but the court did not decide in this case whether the Attorney General had standing to challenge the Acts. In conclusion, the district court stated that Kuehn admit- ted that he had not suffered an injury in fact and found that Kuehn lacked standing under any of his asserted exceptions to the common-law requirement of an injury in fact. As such, the court dismissed Kuehn’s second amended complaint with- out prejudice. Kuehn appeals the order dismissing his second amended complaint. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Kuehn assigns several specific errors by the district court, but he argues them as three main errors. Kuehn generally assigns, combined and restated, that the district court erred in determining (1) that he did not have taxpayer standing, (2) that he did not have standing for a matter of great public concern, and (3) that he lacked both taxpayer standing and standing for a matter of great public concern because others have common- law standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Acts. In their separate brief for appellees, the Sponsors argue that because Kuehn did not assign any error to the district court’s conclusion that he did not have standing under § 32-1412, Kuehn abandoned his sole claim against them because they were named as defendants only because they are necessary  - 311 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 parties for a claim under § 32-1412(2). In their brief for appellees, the State Officials and the NMCC Commissioners similarly assert that the Secretary of State was named as a defendant only because of Kuehn’s claim under § 32-1412. In his reply brief, Kuehn agrees with the Sponsors’ contention that he has not appealed the district court’s order as to his chal- lenge under § 32-1412. We therefore do not review the portion of the district court’s order determining that Kuehn did not have standing under § 32-1412. STANDARD OF REVIEW [1-3] Appellate review of an order granting a motion to dismiss is de novo. 16 Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party’s case, because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court; determination of a jurisdic- tional issue which does not involve a factual dispute presents a question of law. 17 To prevail against a motion to dismiss, the pleader must allege sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. 18 ANALYSIS Judicial Notice Requests In his brief, Kuehn asked that we take judicial notice of what he described as “five matters of public record.” 19 In addi- tion, Kuehn filed two motions for judicial notice in this court. In a motion filed April 24, 2026, he requested that we take judicial notice of two legislative bills that became law when signed by the Governor on April 7. In a motion filed May 20, he requested that we take judicial notice of a recent job posting for a position as legal counsel for the NMCC. 16 In re Application A-19594, 315 Neb. 311, 995 N.W.2d 655 (2023). 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Brief for appellant at 18.  - 312 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 Although Neb. Rev. Stat. § 27-201(6) (Reissue 2016) autho- rizes courts to take judicial notice of adjudicative facts “at any stage of the proceeding,” it is not clear whether a motion for judicial notice can be made in a brief on appeal. But we have declined to take judicial notice even when a motion was filed if we can resolve the appeal without taking judicial notice. 20 [4] Based on the procedural posture of this case, not only can we resolve the appeal without taking judicial notice as requested by Kuehn, but we must. As discussed above, the district court ruled that it would not receive exhibits offered by the NMCC Commissioners and by Kuehn at the hearing on the motions to dismiss and stated that it would consider only a facial challenge and not a factual challenge to Kuehn’s standing. A court’s consideration of standing will vary depend- ing on when the issue is raised during the progression of a case. If standing is challenged at the pleadings stage, before an evidentiary hearing and before any evidence outside of the pleadings is admitted, it is deemed a “facial challenge.” 21 In considering a facial challenge, a court will typically review only the pleadings to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish standing. 22 But when an issue of standing is presented and the court holds an eviden- tiary hearing and reviews evidence outside the pleadings, it is considered a “factual challenge.” 23 Kuehn asks that we take judicial notice of matters, includ- ing events that occurred after the district court entered its order, that were not alleged in the pleadings. The district court considered the motion to dismiss based on standing as a facial challenge, rather than a factual challenge, and it limited 20 See State ex rel. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Ewing, 319 Neb. 663, 24 N.W.3d 861 (2025). 21 North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 311 Neb. 33, 41, 970 N.W.2d 461, 468 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 North Star Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stewart, supra note 21. 23 Id. at 41, 970 N.W.2d at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted).  - 313 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 its review to the allegations in the pleadings and attachments thereto. We similarly limit our review on appeal to the plead- ings and do not consider any evidence outside the pleadings. We therefore overrule Kuehn’s requests that we take judicial notice of matters beyond what is alleged in the pleadings. Standing Generally [5-8] Standing refers to whether a party had, at the com- mencement of the litigation, a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation that would warrant a court’s exercise of its subject matter jurisdiction and remedial powers on that party’s behalf. 24 To have standing, the plaintiff must have some legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. 25 To show standing, it is generally insufficient for a plaintiff to have merely a general interest common to all members of the public. 26 A party invoking a court’s or tribu- nal’s jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the elements of standing. 27 [9] Common-law standards are typically used to determine whether one has standing. 28 Common-law standing generally focuses on whether the litigant has suffered or will suffer an injury in fact. 29 In some cases, however, we have recognized exceptions to the usual requirement that a plaintiff demon- strate an injury in fact that is actual, imminent, concrete, and particularized. 30 In the district court, Kuehn conceded that he did not suffer an injury in fact, and on appeal, Kuehn does not challenge 24 Nebraska Firearms Owners Assn. v. City of Lincoln, 319 Neb. 723, 24 N.W.3d 891 (2025). 25 Id. 26 Id. 27 Id. 28 In re Application A-19594, supra note 16. 29 Id. 30 Johnson v. City of Omaha, 319 Neb. 402, 23 N.W.3d 420 (2025).  - 314 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 322 Nebraska Reports KUEHN v. PILLEN Cite as 322 Neb. 297 that concession. As noted above, Kuehn also does not chal- lenge the district court’s determination that he did not have standing under § 32-1412. Instead, Kuehn challenges the district court’s determinations that he did not have standing under exceptions to the injury in fact requirement for taxpayer standing and for matters of great public concern. Taxpayer Standing [10] One of the exceptions to the requirement of an injury in fact is taxpayer standing. Usually, a person seeking to restrain the act of a public board or officer must show special injury peculiar to himself or herself aside from and independent of the general injury to the public. 31 But because taxpayers have an equitable interest in public funds, a resident taxpayer may bring an action to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds raised for governmental purposes. 32 We have found taxpayer standing to enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds where a plaintiff challenged a contract awarded by a municipality based on alleged impro- priety in the bid process, 33 where a plaintiff challenged an investment by the state investment officer as being prohibited by statute, 34 where a plaintiff alleged that a city’s allocation of funds for the construction of a new firehouse was made neces- sary because of the city’s illegal failure to fulfill its firefight- ing duty, 35 whe