Marriage of Cordeiro

09/15/2026 DA 25-0544 Case Number: DA 25-0544 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 219 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: STEPHANIE M. CORDEIRO, Petitioner and Appellee, and STEVEN R. CORDEIRO, Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and For the County of Cascade, Cause Nos. DR-23-465 and DR-23-450 Honorable Robert L. Deschamps III, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Neal P. DuBois, DuBois Mills, PLLC, Great Falls, Montana For Appellee: Zach B. Duhon, Deschenes & Duhon, PLLC, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: July 29, 2026 Decided: September 15, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 This appeal arises from the District Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Protective Order entered June 27, 2025, in the Montana Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County. Appellant Steven R. Cordeiro (Steven) appeals the permanent protective order that was entered in favor of Appellee Stephanie M. Cordeiro (Stephanie) and their minor children in the parties’ dissolution proceeding. ¶2 We restate the issues on appeal as follows: Issue 1: Whether the District Court presiding over a dissolution proceeding has jurisdiction to enter a permanent order of protection when the initial temporary order of protection proceeding was before a different district judge. Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by extending the order of protection twice without a hearing. Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion when issuing a permanent order of protection outside the terms of the parties’ stipulations and by considering evidence that was considered during the stipulation negotiations. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 On September 1, 2023, Stephanie filed her Sworn Petition for Temporary Order of Protection (TOP), Cause No. CDR-23-0450 in the Montana Eighth Judicial District, Cascade County, and the Honorable John A. Kutzman assumed jurisdiction. The District Court granted the TOP on September 5, 2023, and set a hearing for September 25, 2023, as required by § 40-15-202, MCA. ¶4 On September 8, 2023, Stephanie filed her Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage (Dissolution), Cause No. DDR-23-0465 in Montana’s Eighth Judicial District Court, and the Honorable John Parker assumed jurisdiction. 2 ¶5 At the TOP hearing before Judge Kutzman on September 25, 2023, the parties appeared with counsel and stipulated to extension of the TOP and entered the terms of their stipulated agreement into the record instead of introducing evidence. As part of the stipulation, the parties each retained the right to request a hearing to alter or remove the order after 6 months. Additionally, the parties agreed that the District Court in the Dissolution proceeding could issue orders that would supersede the terms of the TOP. Judge Kutzman entered a Stipulated Order Extending Order of Protection on October 11, 2023. Judge Kutzman made no further orders in the TOP action. No objections were raised by either party to the stipulated order of protection. ¶6 In the Dissolution case, Judge Parker was substituted and eventually jurisdiction was assumed by the Honorable Robert Deschamps III on February 13, 2024. Court records reflect that Judge Deschamps also assumed jurisdiction over the TOP action when he accepted jurisdiction in the Dissolution case. However, no formal motion to substitute Judge Kutzman was made in the TOP case, nor were the two cases formally consolidated. Judge Deschamps then referred the Dissolution case to Standing Master Gail Bourguignon on February 16, 2024. ¶7 At a status and scheduling conference held by Standing Master Bourguignon on March 12, 2024, Stephanie expressed the desire to combine the TOP proceedings with the Dissolution matter. In response, Steven stated that Cascade County typically prefers to join the two matters for the purpose of “one judge . . . mak[ing] orders that are consistent with the ongoing family law orders.” Steven elaborated further that he “wouldn’t have [an] objection to combining” the TOP and Dissolution matters. While there were no objections 3 to combining the two cases, neither party formally motioned any court to consolidate the cases. ¶8 Standing Master Bourguignon referred the Dissolution matter back to Judge Deschamps on August 26, 2024. Judge Deschamps ordered a status hearing for September 10, 2024. In the hearing, the parties scheduled a mediation deadline for November 31, 2024. Stephanie also asserted that the TOP would soon expire and that she would like it extended. Steven objected to the extension of the TOP on grounds that he believed it was unnecessary. He also stated that the TOP matter was before Judge Kutzman. However, Steven affirmed that pursuant to the stipulation, the TOP could be “altered by a parenting plan or an order by your Court [in the Dissolution case].” ¶9 Stephanie stated that she believed the matter had been transferred to Judge Deschamps. Judge Deschamps advised that if the case was transferred to him then he would extend the TOP because it seemed fair and reasonable; otherwise, Stephanie would have to raise the matter in front of Judge Kutzman. On September 11, 2024, Judge Deschamps extended the TOP after determining Judge Kutzman had “endorsed [his] assumption of the Order of Protection case (DR-23-0450) by filing a copy of the order to assume DR-23-0465 in the O/P case.” Following Judge Deschamps’ decision, Steven did not object to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction. ¶10 On December 17, 2024, a day before the scheduled mediation, Stephanie filed her Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Extend Order of Protection in the Dissolution case because the bench trial for the Dissolution was reset from January 30-31, 2025, to March 13-14, 2025. The motion took note of Steven’s objection to the extension of the stipulated order 4 of protection. On December 18, 2024, Judge Deschamps granted the motion to extend the order of protection for another year or until entry of the final decree. Steven did not object to the Dissolution court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the TOP. ¶11 During mediation on December 18, 2024, the parties executed a Marital Property Settlement Agreement and Stipulated Final Parenting Plan that was entered into on December 19, 2024. The Stipulated Final Parenting Plan provided in part that the “restraining orders currently in effect and to be filed with the court by the parties’ counsel shall govern the relationship between the parties henceforth.” The stipulation further provided that “[t]he parties shall draft a master restraining order incorporating the final provisions of [the restraining orders still in effect],” which included the prior extensions on September 11 and December 18, 2024. ¶12 At the bench trial for the Dissolution on March 13, 2025, Stephanie explained to the District Court that there was a draft agreement for a stipulated restraining order, and she sought direction on whether the District Court needed to review that agreement before entry of the final decree. Steven confirmed the restraining order does prohibit contact between the parties and that Judge Deschamps had already extended protection for a year. Steven added that he was “just fine” with the extension “unless [they] can find a reason to challenge it.” Steven did not raise any objections during this proceeding to the court’s prior exercise of jurisdiction over the TOP extensions. ¶13 On March 14, 2025, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage. The District Court held that “[p]ursuant to the Stipulated Final Parenting Plan, the parties have agreed that the restraining orders 5 currently in effect, and to be filed with the court by the parties’ counsel, shall govern their interactions henceforth.” Additionally, the court found that “[t]he parties have further agreed to draft a master restraining order to be submitted for filing in Cause No. CDR-23-0450 [TOP proceeding], in Cascade County, Montana.” Consequently, the District Court concluded as a matter of law that “[t]he parties are jointly obligated to file a master restraining order in Cause No. CDR-23-0450, Cascade County, Montana,” and decreed that the parties do so within 10 days of the decree. No objection was raised to the District Court’s exercise of authority over the restraining order in the Final Decree in the Dissolution case. ¶14 The parties later were unable to agree and submit a stipulated master restraining order, and on April 7, 2025, Stephanie filed her Motion to Adopt Permanent Protective Order with her proposed order. The District Court set a hearing for May 16, 2025. ¶15 Prior to the hearing, Steven filed a motion to exclude evidence of actions and events that occurred prior to September 25, 2023, that were considered in the parties’ Stipulated Order of Protection. Steven acknowledged that “this [TOP] matter was consolidated with the above-captioned [Dissolution] case” and did not object to the Dissolution court holding an evidentiary hearing in the TOP matter. ¶16 Judge Deschamps denied Steven’s motion to exclude evidence determining that there were no limitations contained in § 40-15-102(7), MCA, on what evidence could be presented. Further, Judge Deschamps determined that no evidentiary showings had been made before any court on the TOP and that all the decisions prior to this hearing were made by stipulation. 6 ¶17 After hearing the evidence presented by both parties to determine whether good cause existed to extend the protective order permanently, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Protective Order in both Cause Nos. CDR-23-0450 and DDR- 23-0465 on June 27, 2025. The District Court found there was good cause to make the TOP permanent and granted the permanent protective order for Stephanie and her minor children until they reach the age of majority. ¶18 Steven appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶19 Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law. We review a district court’s conclusions of law to determine whether they are correct. Penado v. Hunter, 2024 MT 216, ¶ 8, 418 Mont. 167, 557 P.3d 434 (citing Boe v. Ct. Adm’r for the Mont. Jud. Branch of Pers. Plan & Policies, 2007 MT 7, ¶ 5, 335 Mont. 228, 150 P.3d 927). ¶20 We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection. In re Marriage of Lundstrom and Scholz, 2007 MT 304, ¶ 12, 340 Mont. 83, 172 P.3d 588 (citing Edelen v. Bonamarte, 2007 MT 138, ¶ 6, 337 Mont. 407, 162 P.3d 847). A district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason, resulting in substantial injustice. Helt v. Guess, 2026 MT 117, ¶ 17, 428 Mont. 256, 590 P.3d 401 (citations omitted). ¶21 We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness. Helt, ¶ 17 (citing In re G.W., 2018 MT 192, ¶ 12, 392 Mont. 269, 423 P.3d 575). 7  DISCUSSION ¶22 Issue 1: Whether the District Court presiding over a dissolution proceeding has jurisdiction to enter a permanent order of protection when the initial temporary order of protection proceeding was before a different district judge. ¶23 “[J]urisdiction involves the fundamental power and authority of a court to hear and decide an issue.” Pinnow v. Mont. State Fund, 2007 MT 332, ¶ 16, 340 Mont. 217, 172 P.3d 1273 (citing Stanley v. Lemire, 2006 MT 304, ¶ 30, 334 Mont. 489, 148 P.3d 643). “Indeed, ‘lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter can be raised at any time and a court which in fact lacks such jurisdiction cannot acquire it even by consent of the parties.’” Pinnow, ¶ 16 (citing Stanley, ¶ 31 (quoting Corban v. Corban, 161 Mont. 93, 96, 504 P.2d 985, 987 (1972))). Similarly, a court cannot assume jurisdiction “on its own initiative, [] under the plain language of § 40-15-301(1)-(3), MCA.” Penado, ¶ 14 (citing Lundstrom, ¶ 14). ¶24 Steven argues that Judge Deschamps, when presiding over the Dissolution case, lacked jurisdiction to issue orders related to the TOP because that case had originally been filed in front of Judge Kutzman. Steven states that because neither of the parties appealed or filed a motion to remove the TOP case to the Dissolution court or otherwise effected a procedure to consolidate the cases, that Judge Deschamps did not have jurisdiction over the TOP matter. We disagree. The District Court had jurisdiction over the protection order for two reasons. First, the Dissolution court has statutory authority to grant orders of protection and extensions thereof. Second, the District Court properly assumed jurisdiction when the procedural requirements under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, were satisfied. 8 ¶25 The governing statutes for the District Court’s authority to grant and extend orders of protection are found in §§ 40-15-204 and 40-15-301, MCA. Pursuant to § 40-15-204(2), MCA, a district court in a dissolution proceeding “may, upon request, issue either an order of protection for an appropriate period of time or a permanent order of protection.” This statute expressly grants a district court presiding over a dissolution matter the authority to issue orders of protection upon request or motion by parties. Here, the Dissolution court had statutory authority to issue orders of protection when Stephanie requested the court extend the protection order and make it permanent. ¶26 Additionally, § 40-15-301(1) provides that “[d]istrict courts, justices’ courts, municipal courts, and city courts have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and issue orders [of protection] under § 40-15-201[, MCA].” Furthermore, the statute provides the procedure that governs here: If one of the parties to an order of protection files for dissolution of marriage or files a parenting action after the order of protection is filed but before the hearing is conducted, the hearing must be conducted in the court in which the order of protection was filed. Either party may appeal or remove the matter to the district court prior to or after the hearing. Section 40-15-301(3), MCA (emphasis added). Thus, jurisdiction may be transferred to the district court by either party who may remove or appeal the case to the district court presiding over the dissolution matter before or after the hearing. ¶27 Steven, citing Pinnow as support, argues that because no formal removal or appeal was filed with the District Court the court never acquired jurisdiction. In Pinnow, we analyzed whether the procedure for substituting a justice of the peace was correctly followed when replacing a judge in the Workers Compensation Court. Pinnow, ¶¶ 14-25. 9 We compared that circumstance in Pinnow with Potter v. District Court, 266 Mont. 384, 880 P.2d 1319 (1994), where we held that “unless the procedures for authorizing and calling in a substitute justice of the peace [under § 3-10-231, MCA] were followed, ‘then no substitute justice is appointed’ and ‘the person seeking to exercise the powers of a judge as his substitute has no authority or jurisdiction to do so.’” Pinnow, ¶ 24 (quoting Potter, 266 Mont. at 393, 880 P.2d at 1325). Though Pinnow involved whether the Administrative Rules of Montana provided an alternative source of jurisdiction for a district court judge to sit in place of a workers compensation court judge, we confirmed the fundamental principle of jurisprudence that “jurisdiction is conferred on courts only by the Constitution or statutes adopted pursuant to the Constitution.” Pinnow, ¶ 20 (citing Stanley, ¶ 52). Thus, the administrative law in Pinnow did not provide authority for a district court judge to exercise workers compensation jurisdiction and therefore the district court judge had not properly been substituted pursuant to the statutory authority. ¶28 However, in contrast to Pinnow, we have interpreted the requirement under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, for appeal or removal to have been satisfied when a party avails the court of its jurisdiction by motion or request. In Lundstrom, the husband argued that the justice court retained jurisdiction over the protective order until the date the wife had formally removed the matter to the district court. Lundstrom, ¶ 15. The husband contended that the district court had impermissibly exercised jurisdiction over the protective order when it considered his motion to dismiss or modify the order before any party had formally removed or appealed the protective order as required under § 40-15-301(3), MCA. Lundstrom, ¶ 15. We reaffirmed the long-held principle that “‘[p]arties voluntarily 10 submitting a controversy to a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter cannot question its authority.’” Lundstrom, ¶ 17 (citing Deich v. Deich, 136 Mont. 566, 576, 323 P.2d 35, 41 (1958) (citing Hall v. Hall, 70 Mont. 460, 226 P. 469 (1924))). We held that the husband had availed himself of the court and the court accepted jurisdiction and ruled on such matters that the husband could not thereafter challenge the district court’s jurisdiction. Lundstrom, ¶ 18. ¶29 Section 40-15-301(3), MCA, provides that either party may appeal or remove the case to the district court before or after a hearing. On September 10, 2024, December 17, 2024, and April 7, 2025, Stephanie sought the District Court’s authority when she requested extensions of the protection order and a permanent protection order. The parties both sought the Dissolution court’s authority when they each presented issues and discussed the protective order in hearings before the Dissolution court. Steven requested the District Court exercise its authority when he presented arguments in the Dissolution court that it limit its consideration to circumstances of the stipulated TOP in the post-decree hearing to make the TOP permanent. ¶30 Just as in Lundstrom, the parties here have availed themselves of the District Court’s authority and the court exercised its jurisdictional authority by considering and ruling on the TOP matter. See Lundstrom, ¶¶ 17-18. Therefore, the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under § 40-15-204(2), MCA, over protection-order proceedings, and the statutory requirements for appeal or removal under § 40-15-301(3), MCA, were satisfied. Judge Deschamps properly received and accepted jurisdiction over the TOP when he issued the extensions and made the order permanent. 11 ¶31 Steven argues alternatively that jurisdiction was not proper because Montana’s Eighth Judicial District Local Rule 13 states that cases under Title 40 “may be consolidated so that one judge has jurisdiction over all related civil” proceedings. The Rule provides that the court in which the case was first filed shall assume jurisdiction. However, the public policy behind consolidation is that it is preferred that “one judge has jurisdiction of all related civil . . . proceedings” for the stated purpose to “insure [there is] consistent and fully informed decisions concerning families.” Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Local Rule 13A. To hold that the Dissolution case and the TOP matter were not properly heard together and vacating the extensions merely because they were considered in the Dissolution court rather than the TOP court would be inconsistent with that policy. ¶32 In Penado, we interpreted the statutory purpose of § 40-15-301, MCA. “Penado emphasize[d] the first sentence in § 40-15-301(3), MCA (‘the hearing must be conducted in the court in which the order of protection was filed’)[.]” Penado, ¶ 11 (emphasis in original). She argued that the statute required the hearing to take place in Butte-Silver Bow County Justice Court, where the order of protection was first filed. Penado, ¶ 11. We held that “Penado’s argument that one sentence in § 40-15-301(3), MCA, mandates the hearing be held in the justice court contradicts the standard that we read the statute as a whole.” Penado, ¶ 15 (citing State v. Triplett, 2008 MT 360, ¶ 25, 346 Mont. 383, 195 P.3d 819). We interpreted that “holistically, § 40-15-301, MCA, plainly calls for the court handling the parenting plan, in most cases, to entertain any requests for an order of protection.” Penado, ¶ 15. 12 ¶33 Similarly, Steven’s interpretation of the local rule does not give the proper effect to the public policy in favor of having one judge make orders that are consistent for the family. Rather, it is both appropriate and consistent with the established local practice as well as our interpretation of § 40-15-301, MCA, for the Dissolution and TOP matters to be considered together by the same judge. Stephanie explains that Rule 13A is consistent with M. R. Civ. P. 42(a) and that consolidation in this instance would be consistent with the same public policy. We agree. M. R. Civ. P. 42(a) authorizes a district court to consolidate actions with common questions of law or fact. The order of protection matter is directly related to the Dissolution matter with the same parties, facts, procedure, and each were repeatedly addressed during the same proceedings. By hearing the cases together, the District Court could properly make consistent orders for the benefit of the family. ¶34 Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion by extending the order of protection twice without a hearing. ¶35 Steven asserts that the extensions granted by the District Court on September 11, 2024, and December 18, 2024, were invalid because there was no evidentiary hearing as required by § 40-15-202, MCA. He contends that pursuant to § 40-15-202(1), MCA, a district court must “determine whether good cause exists for [a] temporary order of protection to be continued, amended, or made permanent,” and that because the extensions were made without a hearing to show good cause they were invalid and all other subsequent orders must be vacated. Steven cites Bardsley v. Pluger, asserting that the district court was statutorily required to have a hearing to present evidence and testimony, before extending or making permanent the order of protection to ensure that his rights to notice 13 and opportunity to be heard were not violated. 2015 MT 301, ¶¶ 15-17, 381 Mont. 284, 358 P.3d 907. ¶36 In Bardsley, we held that a hearing needed to be conducted to add an additional party to the protective order and that the preliminary injunction hearing was insufficient to afford the new party opportunity to be heard. Bardsley, ¶16. The new party did not attend the preliminary injunction hearing, nor did the party receive notice of that hearing. Further, the district court had not received or reviewed any evidence concerning the new party’s conduct toward the defendants. Bardsley, ¶16. However, unlike Bardsley, Steven attended the initial TOP proceeding in front of Judge Kutzman with counsel. He had an opportunity to present evidence and testimony in objection to the TOP. Instead, Steven chose to stipulate to an order of protection for Stephanie and their minor children and did not present evidence at the hearing. ¶37 Section 40-15-202(1), MCA, requires the issuing court to conduct a hearing within twenty days of issuance of an order to “determine whether good cause exists for the . . . order . . . to be continued, amended, or made permanent.” However, the parties may waive the hearing requirement. A waiver may be effectuated by stipulation. A stipulation effectively relieves the parties from the necessity of introducing evidence about the ultimate fact covered by the stipulation. Fiedler v. Fiedler, 266 Mont. 133, 142, 879 P.2d 675, 681 (1994). When the stipulation is material, both the parties and the court are bound by it. Fiedler, 266 Mont. at 142, 879 P.2d at 681. Here, the parties submitted to a stipulated order of protection and chose not to submit evidence before the court. Steven thereby waived his opportunity to present evidence on whether good cause existed and 14 cannot now claim that he was not afforded the statutory right. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it acted pursuant to the terms of the parties’ stipulation. ¶38 Turning to Steven’s due process argument, “we will not consider unsupported issues or arguments.” Penado, ¶ 20 (citing In re Marriage of McMichael, 2006 MT 237, ¶ 12, 333 Mont. 517, 143 P.3d 439). Steven cites only the broad requirements that due process entails notice and opportunity to be heard. Penado, ¶ 20. He cites no authority supporting why due process requirements create a right to hearing after he chose to waive his opportunity to present evidence and be heard in the initial evidentiary hearing. ¶39 Furthermore, prior to the District Court’s Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Protection, which extended the protection permanently, an evidentiary hearing was held in which the District Court found good cause to extend the order of protection permanently. In this case, Steven was given the opportunity to present evidence and testimony on two occasions––once where he waived his opportunity, and another where good cause was found. We decline to address his due process argument further. ¶40 Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion when issuing a permanent order of protection outside the terms of the parties’ stipulations and by considering evidence that was considered during the stipulation negotiations. ¶41 Steven’s argument is threefold. First, the court erred when it entered the permanent protection order for a longer period than set forth in the original Stipulated Order of Protection. He maintains this was an abuse of discretion. Secondly, Steven argues that the Stipulated Order of Protection applies res judicata to all the facts and circumstances that occurred prior to the stipulation. He argues it was an abuse of discretion to consider evidence and events that occurred prior to the stipulation, thus allowing Stephanie to 15 re-litigate issues that were available to litigate at the time of the stipulation. Lastly, Steven argues that the court erred when issuing the permanent protective order that went beyond his interpretation of the terms of the Stipulated Parenting Plan. We disagree. ¶42 The stipulation that was made part of the record before Judge Kutzman expressly granted the Dissolution court the authority to modify the protection order. It further stated that either party had the authority to request modifications to the order of protection after 6 months. The stipulation did not include any terms restricting the ability of a party to seek a permanent protective order. Therefore, Steven’s first argument fails because the parties did contemplate extensions of the order of protection beyond the terms of the stipulation. ¶43 Steven’s res judicata argument fails as well. “Res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the relitigation of a claim that the party has already had an opportunity to litigate.” Baltrusch v. Baltrusch, 2006 MT 51, ¶ 15, 331 Mont. 281, 130 P.3d 1267 (citing Kullick v. Skyline Homeowners Assoc., 2003 MT 137, ¶ 17, 316 Mont. 146, 69 P.3d 225). “We have indicated that res judicata will apply once a final judgment has been entered.” Baltrusch, ¶ 15 (citing Holtman v. 4–G’s Plumbing and Heating, 264 Mont. 432, 436, 872 P.2d 318, 320 (1994); Olson v. Daughenbaugh, 2001 MT 284, ¶ 22, 307 Mont. 371, 38 P.3d 154; see also State Med. Oxygen v. American Med. Oxygen, 256 Mont. 38, 43, 844 P.2d 100, 103 (1992) (indicating that “a final judgment on the merits” is a prerequisite to application of res judicata)). ¶44 We have held that a court order arising from a stipulation may have preclusive effect. See In re Marriage of Kolczak, 2004 MT 241, ¶ 14, 322 Mont. 520, 97 P.3d 1091. However, here, the Stipulated agreement itself acknowledges the parties’ continued rights 16 to request modifications to the order as well as the Dissolution court’s ability to modify the temporary order of protection. Additionally, the May 16, 2025, hearing answered a different question––whether the TOP should be extended permanently. Therefore, no final judgment on the merits could have occurred because of the parties’ stipulation and because the hearing on May 16, 2025, addressed making the TOP permanent and not granting another extension. ¶45 Furthermore, district courts are vested with broad discretion in controlling the admission of evidence at trial. Seltzer v. Morton, 2007 MT 62, ¶ 64, 336 Mont. 225, 154 P.3d 561 (citing Lopez v. Josephson, 2001 MT 133, ¶ 14, 305 Mont. 446, 30 P.3d 326). When reviewing a district court’s evidentiary rulings, we do not determine whether this Court would have made the same ruling. Seltzer, ¶ 64 (citing Lopez, ¶ 14). Rather, we determine whether the district court abused its discretion. Seltzer, ¶ 64 (citing Lopez, ¶ 14). ¶46 The District Court used its broad discretion to let both parties present their cases. The evidence presented at the hearing on May 16, 2025, including testimony concerning Steven’s past violence, use of weapons, the continuing fear of various witnesses, and Steven’s post-order conduct, provided ample support for the permanent extension of the protection order. ¶47 Lastly, the issuance of the permanent protective order is not contrary to the language of the Stipulated Final Parenting Plan or the Final Decree. Specifically, the Decree states that the Final Parenting Plan and “the restraining orders currently in effect and to be filed with this court by the parties’ counsel shall govern the relationship between the parties. The parties shall draft a master restraining order incorporating the final provisions of those 17 documents.” The District Court further concluded as a matter of law that “[t]he parties are jointly obligated to file a master restraining order in Cause No. CDR-23-0450, Cascade County, Montana,” and decreed that the parties do so within 10 days of the decree. ¶48 Under the plain language, the orders of protection currently in effect were still to govern the parties’ relationship and be incorporated into a master restraining order. The order of protection in effect at the time still allowed the parties to seek modification from the District Court. Due to the parties failing to agree and jointly issue a master restraining order with new or different terms, Stephanie had the right to request modification of the protection order from the District Court under the terms of the stipulated order of protection which remained “currently in effect.” ¶49 The permanent restraining order was in effect a restraining order “to be filed with the court” which satisfied the terms of the court’s decree and the Stipulated Final Parenting Plan. Steven cannot now object when the court used its authority as provided by his own stipulated agreements. CONCLUSION ¶50 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to statutory authority, stipulations by the parties, and the parties’ actions and admissions to the court. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when extending the order of protection pursuant to the parties’ stipulated agreements. The District Court did not abuse its discretion when allowing the parties to introduce evidence that was considered during negotiation of the Stipulated Order of Protection. ¶51 Affirmed. 18  /S/ LAURIE McKINNON We Concur: /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE 19