Full Opinion

11/10/2026 DA 26-0231 Case Number: DA 26-0231 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 271N IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: JUSTIN L. AIKINS, Petitioner and Appellant, and LORALEE J. AIKINS, Respondent and Appellee. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Ninth Judicial District, In and For the County of Toole, Cause No. DR-2018-019 Honorable Gregory L. Bonilla, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Justin L. Aikins, Self-Represented, Havre, Montana For Appellee: Jason T. Holden, Katie R. Ranta, Faure Holden Henkel Terrazas, PC, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: October 7, 2026 Decided: November 10, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Justin Aikins (Justin) appeals from the April 3, 2026 Findings of Fact, [Conclusions] of Law, and Order issued by the Ninth Judicial District Court, Toole County. The District Court’s order denied Justin’s motion to amend the parenting plan. We affirm. ¶3 On June 28, 2018, Justin filed a petition for dissolution of his marriage to Loralee Aikins (Loralee).1 At the time of the petition, the parties had four minor children and both lived in Shelby. The parties stipulated to an Interim Parenting Plan on August 28, 2018, and a Final Decree of Dissolution of Marriage and approval of the Final Parenting Plan was ordered by the District Court on November 8, 2018. On June 5, 2020, Justin filed a Motion to Amend Parenting Plan, seeking to amend the parenting plan because he had begun living part-time in Havre, while continuing to reside part-time in Shelby. Justin filed a notice of intent to move and another motion to amend the parenting plan on November 16, 2020, because he had begun residing full-time in Havre. After briefing, the District Court’s Standing Master held a hearing on May 19, 2021. The Standing Master issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order amending the parenting plan on August 25, 2021, 1 Now known as Loralee Lords. 2 finding Justin’s move from Shelby to Havre constituted a change in circumstances sufficient for amendment of the parenting plan pursuant to § 40-4-219, MCA. Loralee filed objections to the Standing Master’s order and the matter was referred back to the District Court. After briefing, a hearing, and various other motions, the parties filed a Stipulated Parenting Plan on March 11, 2022. The District Court issued its Order Adopting Stipulated Parenting Plan on March 14, 2022. ¶4 On August 14, 2024, Justin filed another Motion to Amend Parenting Plan. The reason for this motion was Loralee’s planned move from Shelby to Belt. Justin simultaneously filed both a proposed amended parenting plan and a declaration in support of the motion to amend. After an attempted mediation failed, Loralee filed a Motion to Dismiss or Deny Petitioner’s Motion to Amend Parenting Plan, along with a brief in support and Loralee’s affidavit. The District Court held a hearing on September 12, 2024. The District Court expressed its skepticism that Loralee’s move from Shelby to Belt could constitute a substantial change in circumstances because the distance to each from Havre was similar and noting that, if anything, the drive from Havre to Belt was “a prettier drive” than the one to Shelby. After Justin notified the court of his intention to file a reply brief in support of his motion to amend, both parties agreed it was unnecessary to hold another hearing and were fine with the District Court considering the matter submitted upon the filing of the reply brief. After Justin submitted his reply brief, the District Court did not immediately issue a ruling and on May 13, 2025, Justin filed a Motion to Adopt Petitioner’s Proposed Amended Parenting Plan as an Interim Parenting [Plan] and Affidavit in Support. After briefing on this, several other motions, and two petitions for a writ of supervisory 3 control filed in this Court, the District Court issued its Findings of Fact, [Conclusions] of Law, and Order on April 3, 2026. The District Court determined Loralee’s move from Shelby to Belt did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting amendment of the parenting plan, because the difference between driving to Shelby and driving to Belt from Havre was only nine miles, and denied the motion to amend. ¶5 Justin appeals. We consider whether the District Court clearly abused its discretion by denying the motion to amend the parenting plan. ¶6 We review a district court’s decisions regarding parenting plan modifications for a clear abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Bessette, 2019 MT 35, ¶ 13, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894. An abuse of discretion occurs if a court exercises its discretion based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, an erroneous conclusion of law, or acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or beyond the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Bessette, ¶ 13. We review conclusions of law de novo for correctness. In re Marriage of Bessette, ¶ 13. ¶7 Justin asserts the District Court abused its discretion by denying the motion to amend the parenting plan because Loralee’s “relocation away from the family hub in Shelby” resulted in his reduced contact with the children and constituted a change in circumstances sufficient to amend the parenting plan. Loralee contends the District Court acted within its discretion by denying the motion to amend as Justin failed to prove either a substantial change in circumstances or that amending the parenting plan would be in the children’s best interest because her move from Shelby to Belt did not affect Justin’s parenting time as his travel distance increased by only ten miles. 4 ¶8 “The court may in its discretion amend a prior parenting plan if it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior plan, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child and that the amendment is necessary to serve the best interest of the child.” Section 40-4-219(1), MCA. “Under § 40-4-219(1), MCA, a change in circumstances must be of a substantial nature.” In re Parenting of S.W.B.S., 2019 MT 1, ¶ 15, 394 Mont. 52, 432 P.3d 709. “Unless the parties agree to an interim parenting plan or an amended parenting plan, the moving party seeking an interim parenting plan or amendment of a final parenting plan shall submit, together with the moving papers, an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested plan or amendment and shall give notice, together with a copy of the affidavit, to other parties to the proceeding, who may file opposing affidavits. The court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, based on the best interests of the child, in which case it shall set a date for hearing on an order to show cause why the requested plan or amendment should not be granted.” Section 40-4-220(1), MCA. ¶9 The essential thrust of Justin’s changed circumstances argument on appeal is that, while he has “never once suggested that he is unable to exercise parenting days due to the children’s relocation to Belt,” Loralee’s move makes it harder for him to exercise his flexible “additional days” allotted in the Stipulated Parenting Plan because Belt is less convenient for him than Shelby. Justin argues he would have spent additional days with the children had they remained in Shelby, but because Belt has only two restaurants and “many days are out of the question to visit due to weather alone,” he would end up “hanging 5 out with the children in his vehicle, waiting until it was time to return to their mother” when he attempted to exercise his flexible additional parenting time. Loralee responds that these changes do not reflect a substantial change in circumstances, which is a necessary prerequisite to amending a parenting plan, but simply Justin’s own choices. Loralee points out that her Belt residence is actually a ranch located seven miles outside of Belt, and ten miles outside of Great Falls, so even if Justin’s argument there was nothing to do in Belt was correct—though she notes Belt does have plenty of things for a parent to do with their children outside of sitting in a car and eating takeout food—Justin could just as easily exercise his flexible time in Great Falls and take advantage of the much larger city there. ¶10 “A demonstration of changed circumstances is a prerequisite to amendment of a parenting plan, and a district court may not modify an existing custody arrangement without such a finding.” In re Parenting of R.J.N., 2017 MT 249, ¶ 9, 389 Mont. 68, 403 P.3d 675 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party seeking modification of a parenting plan ‘carries a heavy burden of proof.’” In re Parenting of R.J.N., ¶ 9 (quoting In re Marriage of D’Alton, 2009 MT 184, ¶ 11, 351 Mont. 51, 209 P.3d 251). “[A]lthough § 40-4-219(1), MCA, focuses on ‘circumstances of the child,’ Montana law recognizes that parental developments may qualify when they materially affect the child’s interests and day-to-day life.” In re A.M.B.-B., 2025 MT 270, ¶ 13, 425 Mont. 79, 579 P.3d 989 (collecting cases). “[T]he statutory focus on the child does not exclude parental rehabilitation, stability, or conduct when those developments bear directly on the feasibility and safety of parent-child contact. Whether such parent-focused changes constitute a change in the child’s circumstances is a fact-bound determination grounded solely in 6 § 40-4-219(1), MCA, and not in any judicially created list of factors.” In re A.M.B.-B., ¶ 13. ¶11 Upon our review of the record, we cannot find the District Court clearly abused its broad discretion by denying the motion to amend in this matter. The approximately ten-mile difference in the drive from Havre to Belt, rather than to Shelby, is negligible and certainly not a substantial change in circumstances. Justin’s arguments regarding the central nature of Shelby to his relationship with the children—“the family hub”—are less than persuasive when the Stipulated Parenting Plan only came into effect after he moved away from Shelby. And his lamentations that Belt has nothing to do demonstrate more concern with Justin’s comfort than the best interests of the children. His arguments regarding needing to purchase a hotel room in Great Falls to take advantage of the flexible additional time are unavailing as well. The Stipulated Parenting Plan provides that the children “may spend an additional weekday evening with Father, at Father’s election from after school until 8:00 p.m. at his sole transportation expense.” Justin lives in Havre, not Shelby, which was what required the Stipulated Parenting Plan in the first place. He could simply drive home to Havre after dropping the children off with Loralee—a drive the District Court correctly noted is essentially the same as what it would have been from Shelby. ¶12 “Trial courts have broad discretion when considering the parenting of a child, and we must presume that the court carefully considered the evidence and made the correct decision.” In re Marriage of Crowley, 2014 MT 42, ¶ 44, 374 Mont. 48, 318 P.3d 1031 (citing In re Marriage of Tummarello, 2012 MT 18, ¶ 34, 363 Mont. 387, 270 P.3d 28). 7 “[A]bsent clearly erroneous findings, we will not disturb a district court’s decision regarding parenting plans unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.” In re Parenting of L.R., 2023 MT 235, ¶ 7, 414 Mont. 191, 539 P.3d 642 (citing In re Parenting of C.J., 2016 MT 93, ¶ 12, 383 Mont. 197, 369 P.3d 1028). “When functioning as the finder of fact, trial courts have broad discretion to assess and determine the relative weight and credibility of evidence, particularly in the face of conflicting evidence.” In re Parenting of L.D.C., 2022 MT 161, ¶ 48, 409 Mont. 439, 516 P.3d 631. ¶13 The District Court did not base its decision on clearly erroneous findings of fact or clearly abuse its discretion by denying the motion to amend. Justin failed to set forth a substantial change in circumstances or that the amendment would be in the children’s best interests, and the District Court correctly denied amendment without holding a hearing. Section 40-4-220(1), MCA (“The court shall deny the motion unless it finds that adequate cause for hearing the motion is established by the affidavits, based on the best interests of the child, in which case it shall set a date for hearing[.]”). We would additionally note that Justin affirmatively waived holding a hearing on the motion in any event at the September 12, 2024 hearing. “[T]o the extent that the court is able to correctly apply th[e] statutory requirements while, at the same time, holding the parties to their on-record stipulations and written agreements, it should do so.” In re Parenting of P.H.R., 2021 MT 231, ¶ 17, 405 Mont. 334, 495 P.3d 38 (quoting In re Marriage of Simms, 264 Mont. 317, 326, 871 P.2d 899, 905 (1994)). The District Court did not err when it made the legal conclusion the “changed circumstances” claimed by Justin were insufficient to support amending the parenting plan. The statute’s requirement of “changed circumstances” as a 8 prerequisite to any amendment “promotes stability for the children and discourages unnecessary litigation over parenting plans.” In re Parenting of R.J.N., ¶ 12. Here, Justin’s desire to spend more time in Shelby and lack of interest in Belt failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances of the children. The District Court’s legal conclusion Justin failed to demonstrate a change in circumstances to support amendment pursuant to § 40-4-219(1), MCA, was correct, and its denial of the motion to amend was not a clear abuse of discretion. ¶14 Finally, three of the four children are of the age where their wishes regarding proposed amendments to the parenting plan are statutorily required to be considered by the District Court. See § 40-4-219(1)(a)(iii), MCA (mandating a court to consider whether “the child is 14 years of age or older and desires the amendment”). The parties should be working with the children to determine their wishes and facilitating spending time with each parent, not spending time in court on “unnecessary litigation over parenting plans.” In re Parenting of R.J.N., ¶ 12. ¶15 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. ¶16 Affirmed. /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ JIM RICE 9