Full Opinion

09/15/2026 DA 25-0703 Case Number: DA 25-0703 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 220 ANGELLA MARIE NELSON, Petitioner and Appellee, v. SHELLY FRISK, Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Richland, Cause No. DV-2025-35 Honorable Scott Herring, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Terrance L. Toavs, Law Office of Terrance L. Toavs, PLLC, Wolf Point, Montana For Appellee: Elizabeth A. Kaleva, Kali B. Taylor, Kaleva Law Office, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: June 24, 2026 Decided: September 15, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Respondent Shelly Frisk (Frisk) appeals from the September 17, 2025 Order entered by the Seventh Judicial District Court, Richland County, denying her appeal and affirming the Justice Court’s entry of a permanent order of protection on behalf of Petitioner Angella Marie Nelson (Nelson). We consider: 1. Whether the appeal should be dismissed under the mootness doctrine. 2. Whether the District Court erred by affirming the Justice Court’s entry of a permanent order of protection against Frisk. 3. Whether the District Court erred by determining that Frisk failed to preserve an objection to the scope of the order of protection for appeal. ¶2 We conclude the appeal is not moot, and affirm the remaining issues. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 Appellee Nelson is the principal and special education teacher at Savage Public School. Appellant Frisk is the mother of an autistic student in Nelson’s class. Prior to the events giving rise to this claim, Frisk’s child allegedly assaulted Nelson and two other staff members at the school. ¶4 On February 9, 2025, Nelson entered the Valley Fuel & Supply gas station in Savage to purchase a coffee. At the time, Frisk was employed at the business and was working at the counter. Nelson waited in line while Frisk courteously helped the customers ahead of her. When it was her turn, Nelson paid for her coffee in cash. Frisk threw Nelson’s change at her, and said, “enjoy your last day.” The encounter between Nelson and Frisk was captured by the business’s security cameras. 2 ¶5 The next day, February 10, 2025, Nelson petitioned for and obtained a temporary order of protection from the Richland County Justice Court against Frisk, based upon the petition’s assertion that Frisk had assaulted her in the gas station. A hearing was held on February 25, 2025, at which Frisk’s attorney requested discovery and Nelson’s attorney requested a continuance. The Justice Court denied Frisk’s motion for discovery pursuant to Lear v. Jamrogowicz, 2013 MT 147, 370 Mont. 320, 303 P.3d 790, but granted Nelson’s motion for a continuance, stating as follows regarding the law applicable to orders of protection: I do want to bring to everyone’s attention two things, because even the attorneys with these hearings get confused because this is a really confusing area of law. It doesn’t make a lot of sense, and the statutes aren’t written very good. . . . The [S]upreme [C]ourt in Montana has said that the goal of these hearings is to simply find good cause for the petitioner’s allegations. That is the standard of proof. Most attorneys don’t understand good cause is the lowest standard of proof in our legal system. It is below probable cause. . . . [T]he bar is not very hard – far to get to for good cause, so, and a lot of people don’t understand that. They think because a crime is alleged, that somehow I have to find beyond a reasonable doubt. No, it’s good cause . . . . ¶6 At the rescheduled evidentiary hearing, the Justice Court received testimony and then ruled from the bench: [Frisk], from the [c]ourt’s standpoint, inappropriately, whether you want to call it tossed or threw, she purposely did that with the change to send a message. Now, that throwing of the change initially the [c]ourt believed could’ve been considered an assault, the way it was perceived to have been thrown at her face. At this point in time, after seeing the video of the tossing of the change, [it] was not an assault. So, we’re not dealing with a criminal act. The [c]ourt is considering the statement to the petitioner. The statement, “enjoy your last day,” in conjunction with the tossing of the change, whether 3 that tossing the change be illegal or not, is concerning, and I think a reasonable person would take that as a threat. . . . The disagreement is essentially what she said, what she meant, could people hear it over the radio. I do believe she made that statement, I do believe she made it in a threatening manner, and I do believe in conjunction with the change that that could lead someone to be fearful of bodily injury or harm. ¶7 The Justice Court thus granted Nelson a permanent order of protection against Frisk for a period of one year, which was scheduled to expire on March 25, 2026. The order of protection prevented Frisk from being within 600 feet of Nelson, her residence, her place of employment, and her vehicle. The order also prohibited Frisk from contacting Nelson by phone, email, or any other communication. ¶8 Frisk appealed the Justice Court’s order to the Richland County District Court, contending the Justice Court found that Frisk committed no crime, and thus had erred by issuing the order of protection. The District Court denied Frisk’s appeal and affirmed, reasoning the Justice Court “found that the Appellant personally [sic] or knowingly caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury” in Nelson. It further ruled that Frisk did not raise an objection to the scope of the protective order in Justice Court and as a result did not preserve the issue for appeal. ¶9 Frisk appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶10 “On appeal from a municipal court, the district court acts as an intermediate appellate court.” City of Helena v. Broadwater, 2014 MT 185, ¶ 8, 375 Mont. 450, 329 P.3d 589. We review a district court’s decision on an appeal from a municipal court as if the appeal was originally filed in this Court. Broadwater, ¶ 8. “This Court will not 4 overturn a [] court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection absent an abuse of discretion.” Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153, ¶ 8, 375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631. When determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion, the question is “not whether we would have reached the same decision as the trial judge, but whether the trial judge acted arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason.” Lockhead v. Lockhead, 2013 MT 368, ¶ 12, 373 Mont. 120, 314 P.3d 915. DISCUSSION ¶11 1. Whether the appeal should be dismissed under the mootness doctrine. ¶12 Nelson contends that Frisk’s appeal should be dismissed because, given the expiration of the order of protection, “the Court will be unable to grant effective relief or restore the parties to their original positions, rendering the Appeal moot.” In opposition, Frisk contends that this case “demonstrates the need for guidance,” noting that “[t]he Justice Court itself commented on the confusion surrounding the statute and the standard to be applied. That is exactly the kind of recurring uncertainty that warrants review under the public-interest exception[]” to the mootness doctrine. ¶13 “‘The judicial power of the courts of Montana is limited to justiciable controversies.’” Wilkie v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 2021 MT 221, ¶ 7, 405 Mont. 259, 494 P.3d 892 (quoting Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 22, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881). “A justiciable controversy is one that can be ‘disposed of and resolved in the courts,’ as opposed to a controversy invoking a ‘purely political, administrative, philosophical, or academic 5 conclusion.’” Matter of Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, LLC, 2022 MT 67, ¶ 9, 408 Mont. 187, 507 P.3d 169 (quoting Ramon v. Short, 2020 MT 69, ¶ 20, 399 Mont. 254, 460 P.3d 867). Mootness is a concept of justiciability and “is a threshold issue that must be resolved before we can address the underlying dispute.” Ramon, ¶ 20; Wilkie, ¶ 8 (quoting Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134, ¶ 40, 316 Mont. 103, 68 P.3d 872). An issue is moot when, at an action’s outset, the issue ceases to exist or is no longer “live,” or if, due to a change in circumstances or some intervening event, the court cannot grant effective relief. Ramon, ¶ 20. Thus, “‘[t]he fundamental question to be answered in any review of possible mootness is whether it is possible to grant some form of effective relief to the appellant.’” Wilkie, ¶ 8 (quoting Montanans Against Assisted Suicide (MAAS) v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 2015 MT 112, ¶ 11, 379 Mont. 11, 347 P.3d 1244). “Even where the case is no longer ‘live,’ however, a court may hear and decide the case in specific circumstances.” Wilkie, ¶ 9. “This Court has recognized three such circumstances as exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) voluntary cessation, (2) capable of repetition, yet evading review, and (3) public interest.” Matter of Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, ¶ 15. “[T]he public interest exception[] applies when ‘(1) the case presents an issue of public importance; (2) the issue is likely to recur; and (3) an answer to the issue will guide public officers in the performance of their duties.’” Matter of Big Foot Dumpsters & Containers, ¶ 18 (quoting Ramon, ¶ 21). ¶14 Nelson responds to Frisk’s argument by contending this case does not meet the requirements of the public interest mootness exception because it does not present a constitutional question and the plain language of the statutory scheme for orders of 6 protection is clear. While Nelson is correct that this case does not raise a question of fundamental constitutional rights, it does involve a widely used process that is vital to the safety of citizens, and requires clarity in the application of governing standards for the issuance of protective orders, as evidenced by the Justice Court’s comments in this case, and the issues raised in prior cases. See Fritzler v. Bighorn, 2024 MT 27, 415 Mont. 165, 543 P.3d 571 (reversing an order of protection for insufficiency of evidence). “We have consistently held that where questions implicate fundamental constitutional rights or where the legal power of a public official is in question, the issue is one of public importance.” Ramon, ¶ 22 (citations omitted). Under what standards a judge has the authority to continue, amend, or make permanent an order of protection is an issue of public importance. Further, given the potentially limited duration of orders of protection, a year in this case, this issue is likely to recur and continue to evade appellate review. ¶15 Accordingly, we conclude that the appeal falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine. ¶16 2. Whether the District Court erred by affirming the Justice Court’s entry of a permanent order of protection against Frisk. ¶17 Frisk contends the Justice Court applied an incorrect standard of proof at the March 26, 2025 order of protection hearing and that the District Court erroneously affirmed its application. Specifically, Frisk argues the Justice Court applied a “good cause” standard of proof in which the Justice Court described as “the lowest standard of proof in our legal system.” Frisk urges this Court to clarify the applicable standard of proof at an order of protection hearing. 7 ¶18 Under § 40-15-201(1), MCA, a petitioner may seek a temporary order of protection by filing a sworn petition that states the petitioner is in reasonable apprehension of bodily injury or is a victim of one of the offenses listed in § 40-15-102, MCA, has a relationship to the respondent if required by § 40-15-102, MCA, and is in danger of harm if the court does not issue a temporary order of protection immediately. The purpose of a temporary order of protection is “to protect victims from the danger of harm at the hands of an assaultive person or stalker” by granting “swift and efficient protection [to the] one who is being harassed and intimidated by another.” Lear, ¶¶ 26-27. For this reason, a court may issue a temporary order of protection based on a review of the sworn petition alone. ¶19 A temporary order of protection is a provisional measure to provide protection until the court can conduct a hearing. See §§ 40-15-201(2), 40-15-202(1), MCA. When considering whether to make an order of protection permanent, a court must determine whether, “to avoid further injury or harm, the petitioner needs permanent protection” by considering “the respondent’s history of violence, the severity of the offense at issue, and the evidence presented at the hearing.” Section 40-15-204(1), MCA. As Frisk correctly notes, § 40-15-202(1), MCA, provides that “the court shall determine whether good cause exists for the temporary order of protection to be continued, amended, or made permanent.” (Emphasis added.) ¶20 Assessing the nature of the necessary proof in an order of protection proceeding, the Court in Fritzler explained “the evidence presented at the hearing must be substantial and credible, not merely hearsay speculation, to issue a permanent order of protection.” Fritzler, ¶ 11. Fritzler’s petition for a temporary order of protection consisted primarily of 8 hearsay statements. Fritzler, ¶ 12. At the hearing, none of the witnesses attended to provide corroborating testimony of the allegations made in Fritzler’s petition, and Fritzler did not provide any additional evidence or exhibits to support her allegations. Fritzler, ¶ 12. While Fritzler’s allegations were sufficient to obtain a temporary order of protection, they were “not sufficient to issue a permanent order of protection without additional admission of substantial, credible evidence supporting the allegations.” Fritzler, ¶ 12. We held that the municipal court abused its discretion “by issuing a permanent order of protection without any substantial, credible evidence supporting Fritzler’s initial allegations or demonstrating why permanent protection was needed.” Fritzler, ¶ 12. ¶21 Frisk argues that “[t]he standard of proof in an order-of-protection case is ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ just like any other civil action,” and she is correct. In a hearing to consider whether there is good cause to continue, amend, or make permanent a temporary order of protection, pursuant to § 40-15-202(1), MCA, the petitioner must present substantial and credible evidence that proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the requirements of § 40-15-102, MCA, for issuance of an order are satisfied. Thus, “good cause,” in this context, is not a separate standard of proof. Rather, good cause is demonstrated by the petitioner proving she is eligible for an order of protection under § 40-15-102, MCA, by a preponderance of the evidence. ¶22 Section 40-15-102(1), MCA, provides numerous circumstances under which a petitioner could qualify for an order of protection, predicated on offenses committed by a partner or family member. Under § 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA, a victim of assault is eligible to file for an order of protection against the offender regardless of their relationship to the 9 offender. In this case, Nelson is a principal and teacher at the school in which Frisk’s child attends. The relationship between Frisk and Nelson is not that of a partner or family member, but rather parent and teacher. Thus, Nelson could only qualify for an order of protection under § 40-15-102(2)(a), MCA, including as alleged here, as a victim of an assault. In turn, § 45-5-201(d), MCA, defines an assault as “purposely or knowingly caus[ing] reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in another.” Therefore, at the evidentiary hearing, Nelson was required to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Frisk purposely or knowingly caused a reasonable apprehension of bodily injury in Nelson. ¶23 Frisk argues the Justice Court erred by failing to find that Frisk acted purposefully or knowingly when she threw the change at Nelson, and did not establish good cause because the Justice Court stated there “was not an assault” and “we are not dealing with a criminal act.” ¶24 On the first point, the Justice Court stated in its oral findings that Frisk “purposely did that with the change to send a message,” followed by its explanation that Frisk’s statement “‘enjoy your last day,’ in conjunction with the tossing of the change . . . I think a reasonable person would take that as a threat,” and “could lead someone to be fearful of bodily injury or harm.” Thus, the Justice Court found a purposeful mental state, which it could properly infer from Frisk’s actions and statements. See § 45-2-103(3), MCA. ¶25 We do not read the Justice Court’s findings about a criminal act in the same way that Frisk does. The trial judge first discussed the throwing of the change, and stated he “initially” believed that “the throwing of the change” could have been considered an 10 assault, but that after seeing the security camera footage, he had changed his mind, indicating that, “[a]t this point in time, after seeing the video of the tossing of the change, [it] was not an assault. So, we’re not dealing with a criminal act.” (Emphasis added.) However, the trial judge then turned to the remainder of the evidence, and reinforced his thought that the tossing of the coins alone was not a criminal act, explaining: The [c]ourt is considering the statement to the petitioner. The statement, “enjoy your last day,” in conjunction with the tossing of the change, whether that tossing the change be illegal or not, is concerning, and I think a reasonable person would take that as a threat. . . . I do believe she made that statement, I do believe she made it in a threatening manner, and I do believe in conjunction with the change that that could lead someone to be fearful of bodily injury or harm. (Emphasis added.) The Justice Court thus reasoned that, whether the “tossing of the change [was] illegal or not,” the totality of the evidence proved that Frisk made a threat, and that a reasonable person, here, Nelson, would be fearful of bodily injury or harm. We thus read the findings as satisfying the statute. The District Court likewise read them that way, reasoning that the Justice Court had “found that the Appellant personally [sic] or knowingly caused reasonable apprehension of bodily injury by the Appellee.” Of course, Nelson did not need to prove a crime beyond a reasonable doubt; this is not a criminal proceeding. Her burden was merely the civil burden of preponderance of the evidence. ¶26 Unlike Fritzler, substantial and credible evidence was presented at the March 26, 2025 hearing. Nelson testified she was fearful Frisk would cause her bodily injury and that if the court did not grant the order of protection, she would continue to be fearful because this interaction had occurred in a public setting. Another witness testified that he was 11 standing behind Nelson in line when Frisk threw the change and he heard Frisk’s statement made to Nelson. Finally, the security camera footage from the gas station capturing the interaction was admitted into evidence as well. The Justice Court’s findings were thus supported by substantial, credible evidence. ¶27 We conclude the District Court did not err by concluding the Justice Court’s order was supported by sufficient evidence, and thus there was good cause to enter a permanent order of protection against Frisk. ¶28 3. Whether the District Court erred by determining that Frisk failed to preserve an objection to the scope of the order of protection for appeal. ¶29 At the District Court, Frisk contended the order of protection was unfairly restrictive, because she lost access to most of the town in which she lived. The District Court determined that Frisk did not preserve this issue for appeal. Frisk argues the District Court erred by so concluding, because she had denied the allegations in Nelson’s petition and objected to the requested relief during the order of protection hearing. ¶30 However, “[a]n objection that is ‘very general in nature’ does not preserve an issue for appeal.” City of Missoula v. Moore, 2011 MT 61, ¶ 13 360 Mont. 22, 251 P.3d 679 (quoting State v. LaFreniere, 2008 MT 99, ¶ 12, 342 Mont. 309, 180 P.3d 1161). Rather, “an ‘objection must be specific in order to preserve the issue for appeal.’” LaFreniere, ¶ 12 (quoting State v. Huerta, 285 Mont. 245, 261, 947 P.2d 483, 493 (1997)). At the hearing, Frisk did not argue the terms of the order of protection were unreasonable, and instead elected to oppose the substantive allegations in Nelson’s petition. Prior to concluding the hearing, the Justice Court confirmed each term of the order and then asked 12 whether there was anything else, to which Frisk’s counsel replied, “No, Your Honor.” We thus affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Frisk did not preserve her objection to the scope of the order’s restrictions for appeal. CONCLUSION ¶31 In conclusion, we hold the issues presented in this appeal fall within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, and therefore are not moot. We affirm the District Court’s order concluding the Justice Court did not abuse its discretion by entering the permanent order of protection. Lastly, we affirm the District Court’s ruling that Frisk did not preserve her objection to the scope of the order of protection for appeal. /S/ JIM RICE We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ LAURIE McKINNON 13