Full Opinion

10/27/2026 DA 26-0018 Case Number: DA 26-0018 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 258N PAULA NORWOOD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF BOZEMAN, NICHOLAS FOCKEN, JULIA BUTTERFIELD, and DANIEL HARP, Defendants and Appellees. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Gallatin, Cause No. DV-2025-796A Honorable Peter B. Ohman, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Paula Norwood, Self-Represented, Austin, Texas For Appellees: Michael P. Manning, Jason S. Ritchie, Ritchie Manning Kautz PLLC, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 30, 2026 Decided: October 27, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Paula Norwood (Norwood) appeals from the December 18, 2025 Order re[:] Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss issued by the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County. The District Court’s order granted the motion to dismiss and motion to strike filed by the City of Bozeman, Nicholas Focken, Julia Butterfield, and Daniel Harp (collectively “the City”). We affirm.1 ¶3 Norwood was employed by the City of Bozeman’s Parking Department for approximately three months between October 2024 and January 2025. While still a probationary employee, she was arrested for DUI. Because her job duties involved driving, she was terminated by the City. Norwood filed a complaint with the Montana Human Rights Bureau, which found no reasonable cause to believe Norwood was discriminated against by the City. 1 We issued an Order on October 13, 2026, denying Norwood’s motion for voluntary dismissal of her appeal. Norwood v. City of Bozeman, No. DA 26-0018, Order (Mont. Oct. 13, 2026). Norwood has since filed a motion for reconsideration of that Order, which we deem a petition for rehearing pursuant to M. R. App. P. 20(1). Upon review, we conclude that Norwood has not presented any of the criteria for rehearing, nor has she demonstrated extraordinary circumstances pursuant to M. R. App. P. 20(1)(d). Accordingly, Norwood’s motion for reconsideration, deemed a petition for rehearing, is denied. 2 ¶4 On May 30, 2025, Norwood filed a Complaint in the District Court. Norwood alleged she was subjected to discrimination and harassment by numerous coworkers as part of a conspiracy, and that the City “conspired and colluded with the Montana Highway Patrol and the Gallatin County Sheriff’s Department in order to bring her up on bogus charges” so the City could fire her. Norwood’s Complaint sought $100 million in compensatory damages and $200 million in punitive damages. The City filed a Motion to Dismiss, along with a brief in support, on July 24, 2025, asserting the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim for relief under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The City argued the complaint was not based on factual allegations, but “speculation, her own legal conclusions, and has asserted causes of action that do not exist.” Norwood filed a response to the motion to dismiss the same day, followed by a second response (along with several other motions) on July 28, 2025. On July 29, 2025, Norwood filed an Amended Complaint, setting forth six asserted causes of action: workplace harassment; hostile work environment; wrongful termination; defamation/slander/libel; age discrimination; and retaliation. The City filed a reply brief in support of its motion to dismiss on August 7, 2025. ¶5 On October 9, 2025, Norwood filed a Third Amended Complaint.2 Norwood did not seek leave to file the Third Amended Complaint, which removed a defendant known only as “Shay.” On October 31, 2025, the City filed Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint, along with a brief in support. On November 6, 2025, Norwood, 2 There was no Second Amended Complaint filed in this case. 3 again without seeking leave, filed a Fourth Amended Complaint. The Fourth Amended Complaint maintained the Amended Complaint’s six causes of action and added a seventh: discrimination based on race. On November 25, 2025, the City filed Defendants’ Motion to Strike Fourth Amended Complaint or, Alternatively, Dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint, along with a brief in support. Norwood did not respond to either the motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint or the motion to strike the Fourth Amended Complaint. On December 18, 2025, the District Court issued an order granting both motions, determining Norwood’s lack of response subjected the matter to summary ruling in accordance with MUDCR 2(c). ¶6 Norwood appeals. We consider whether the District Court abused its discretion under MUDCR 2 when it dismissed Norwood’s Third Amended Complaint and struck the Fourth Amended Complaint. ¶7 We review a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo. Dickson v. Marino, 2020 MT 196, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 526, 469 P.3d 159. We review a district court’s decision regarding a motion to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion. Hickey v. Baker Sch. Dist. No. 12, 2002 MT 322, ¶ 12, 313 Mont. 162, 60 P.3d 966. The decision of whether or not to subject a motion to summary ruling for failure to file briefs is within a district court’s discretion. Marez v. Marshall, 2014 MT 333, ¶ 36, 377 Mont. 304, 340 P.3d 520; MUDCR 2(c). “We review discretionary trial court rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Konitz v. Claver, 1998 MT 27, ¶ 32, 287 Mont. 301, 954 P.2d 1138. An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court acts arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment 4 or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. Sloway Cabin v. Extreme, 2025 MT 161, ¶ 13, 423 Mont. 161, 573 P.3d 290 (citation omitted). ¶8 Norwood asserts the District Court abused its discretion by subjecting the City’s motion to summary ruling after she failed to file answer briefs. Norwood contends the District Court failed to consider her indigent and homeless status or consider lesser sanctions. The City asserts the District Court acted well within its discretion by dismissing the Third Amended Complaint as the record reflects Norwood filed her Fourth Amended Complaint after the City filed its motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, and she was also able to file numerous other pleadings throughout the pendency of the case. The City also notes Norwood did not respond to its motion to strike the Fourth Amended Complaint, which, in any event, was filed in violation of the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure because Norwood did not obtain either the City’s consent or leave of court. We agree with the City. ¶9 This matter began with Norwood filing her initial Complaint, which the City moved to dismiss pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In response to the City’s initial motion, Norwood filed two responses and an Amended Complaint. M. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(B) allows a party to file an amended pleading once as a matter of course within 21 days of service of a motion under Rule 12(b). Under Rule 15(a)(2), other amendments may only occur “with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” ¶10 Norwood filed her Third Amended Complaint on October 9, 2025, without seeking consent from the City or leave from the District Court. The City filed its motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint on October 31, 2025. Six days later, instead of filing a 5 response to the motion to dismiss, Norwood filed her Fourth Amended Complaint, once again without seeking either consent from the City or leave from the court. The District Court did not rule on the City’s motion immediately after Norwood’s response would have been due, but waited nearly 40 days after Norwood filed her Fourth Amended Complaint rather than any response to the motion. ¶11 When a motion, outside of one made pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 56, is filed, the opposing party is required to file an answer brief within 14 days. MUDCR 2(b). A failure to file a brief “may subject the motion to summary ruling” and the “[f]ailure to file an answer brief by the opposing party within the time allowed shall be deemed an admission that the motion is well taken.” MUDCR 2(c). Under this rule, a district court has the “discretion to either deny or grant unsupported or unanswered motions.” Chapman v. Maxwell, 2014 MT 35, ¶ 10, 374 Mont. 12, 322 P.3d 1029 (citing Moody v. Northland Royalty Co., 286 Mont. 89, 94, 951 P.2d 18, 22 (1997)). ¶12 We find no abuse of discretion by the District Court subjecting the City’s unanswered motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint to summary ruling under MUDCR 2(c). Norwood had fully participated in the case, filing numerous motions, and elected to file a Fourth Amended Complaint after the City’s motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint rather than file any response to the motion. The District Court did not immediately subject the motion to summary ruling after Norwood’s response time had run, but waited approximately 40 days with no response before making its decision. “While pro se litigants may be given a certain amount of latitude, that latitude cannot be so wide as to prejudice the other party, and it is reasonable to expect all litigants, including 6 those acting pro se, to adhere to procedural rules.” Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136, 3 P.3d 124. The City filed a motion to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint and received no reply (beyond an improperly-filed Fourth Amended Complaint). Norwood had fully participated in the case up to that point, including filing multiple responses to the City’s motion to dismiss her initial Complaint, but did not file a response to the City’s motion. The District Court was not required to consider lesser sanctions and Norwood’s failure to respond to the motion was “an admission that the motion is well taken.” MUDCR 2(c). The District Court summarily granting the motion pursuant to MUDCR 2(c) was within its discretion, Chapman, ¶ 10, and was not an abuse. ¶13 Regarding the City’s motion to strike the Fourth Amended Complaint, we also find no abuse of discretion in the District Court subjecting the matter to summary ruling under MUDCR 2(c). Both the Third Amended Complaint and the Fourth Amended Complaint were filed without obtaining either the City’s consent or leave from the District Court. The District Court noted Norwood’s Third Amended Complaint failed to obtain either the City’s consent or the court’s leave, M. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), but the improper filing was “minimal” as she made no additional allegations against the City. The Fourth Amended Complaint, however, sought to add additional claims not previously pled. In response, the City filed a motion to strike, which “is the only method of determining whether an amended pleading has been improperly filed.” First Nat’l Bank & Tr. v. Sec. Bank, N. A., 199 Mont. 168, 171, 648 P.2d 1166, 1167 (1982). Once again, Norwood simply did not respond to the City’s motion to strike and her failure to respond to the motion was “an admission that the motion is well taken.” MUDCR 2(c). In addition, the Fourth Amended Complaint was 7 filed in violation of M. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2) in any event and sought to raise new claims not previously pled. The District Court subjecting the matter to summary ruling after Norwood failed to respond was within its discretion pursuant to MUDCR 2(c), Chapman, ¶ 10, and was not an abuse. ¶14 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. In the opinion of the Court, the case presents a question controlled by settled law or by the clear application of applicable standards of review. ¶15 Affirmed. /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA 8