Witmer v. M.G.C., LLC
CourtMontana Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketDA 26-0021
JudgeBidegaray
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/17/2026
DA 26-0021
Case Number: DA 26-0021
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 277
ROBERT WITMER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MOJO GEOLOGICAL CONSULTING, LLC,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-25-166
Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Torrance L. Coburn, Tipp Coburn Lockwood, PC, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Mariah A. Eastman, Eastman Law Office, PLLC, Three Forks,
Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 2026
Decided: November 17, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Robert Witmer (Witmer) appeals the dismissal of his wrongful-discharge complaint
against Mojo Geological Consulting, LLC (Mojo), by the Fourth Judicial District Court,
Missoula County. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of
personal jurisdiction and denied Witmer’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and leave to
conduct discovery. We address the following restated issues:
1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Witmer failed to establish
general personal jurisdiction over Mojo or specific personal jurisdiction under
M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F).
2. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Witmer’s wrongful-discharge
complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
3. Whether Witmer’s appeal warrants sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5).
¶2 We affirm the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling on the grounds Witmer
developed on appeal, reverse the with-prejudice designation, remand with instructions to
enter a dismissal without prejudice, and deny Mojo’s request for appellate sanctions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 Mojo organized as a Montana limited liability company on March 8, 2007. On
October 29, 2018, Mojo filed articles of domestication in Wyoming and obtained a
certificate of domestication from the Wyoming Secretary of State. The articles identified
its principal office in Casper, Wyoming. On November 1, 2018, Mojo filed articles of
termination in Montana.
¶4 Witmer resides in Missoula and alleges that his employment with Mojo began in
2018. The District Court described a November 13, 2018 services agreement under which
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Witmer would work as an independent contractor. On December 27, 2019, Mojo offered
Witmer a position as a Field Geological Technician, with work assigned on a job-by-job
basis. The offer letter identified Mojo as a Wyoming limited liability company, and the
employer-completed portion of Witmer’s W-4 identified January 2, 2020, as his first date
of employment. Witmer worked for Mojo in Montana and Wyoming. In his declaration,
he stated that Mojo completed jobs and performed services in Montana during his
employment. He identified his own two trips to the Shelby area in 2022 to work on a
drilling project. His 2022 W-2 identified a Montana employer withholding number and
reported Montana income-tax withholding.
¶5 On June 13, 2024, Mojo terminated Witmer’s employment, citing a failed onsite
drug test as the reason for the discharge. According to Mojo, Witmer took the test at a
drilling rig in Wyoming. On February 20, 2025, Witmer filed his complaint, alleging that
he had performed his job duties satisfactorily and that Mojo had discharged him without
good cause. He sought lost wages and fringe benefits, costs, and other appropriate relief
under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. Mojo moved to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. On December 9, 2025, the District Court granted
the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court rejected both
general jurisdiction and Witmer’s asserted ground for specific jurisdiction under
M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F). It did not reach the due process inquiry for specific jurisdiction.
Witmer appeals.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction and construe the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor. Gateway
Hospitality Grp., Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2020 MT 125, ¶ 12, 400 Mont. 80,
464 P.3d 44. Witmer bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Because the District
Court decided the motion on written submissions, without an evidentiary hearing, he
needed to make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to defeat the motion.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
¶7 1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Witmer failed to establish
general personal jurisdiction over Mojo or specific personal jurisdiction under
M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F).
¶8 Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to subject a person or entity to its
adjudicative authority and bind that party to its judgment. M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)
incorporates both general and specific personal jurisdiction. DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
2018 MT 219, ¶ 7, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d 1.
¶9 General personal jurisdiction permits a court to adjudicate any claim against a
defendant, regardless of where the claim arose. When general jurisdiction rests on contacts
with the forum, those contacts must be so continuous and systematic as to render the
defendant essentially at home there. DeLeon, ¶ 8. A corporation ordinarily is at home in
its state of incorporation and the state where it maintains its principal place of business. In
an exceptional case, its operations in another state may be so substantial and of such a
nature as to render it at home there as well. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413-14,
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137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017). Doing business in a state, even on a regular basis, does not
by itself establish general jurisdiction. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. at 414, 137 S. Ct. at 1558.
¶10 Witmer relies on the combined effect of several Montana contacts. He contends
that Mojo organized under Montana law, operated here for more than a decade, and
continued its existence after domestication in Wyoming. He also points to Mojo’s
employment of a Montana resident, Montana tax withholding, and Montana jobs and
services, including the Shelby drilling project. He argues that these contacts, considered
together, establish that Mojo is at home in Montana.
¶11 The organizational history does not establish that Mojo remained organized under
Montana law when Witmer brought this action. Wyoming law provides that domestication
continues the company as though it had been created under Wyoming law and makes the
articles of domestication its organizational articles. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-1012 (2018).
Under § 35-8-906(2), MCA (2017), the existence of a Montana limited liability company
ends when it files articles of termination or on a specified later effective date. Mojo
obtained its Wyoming certificate of domestication on October 29, 2018, and filed its
Montana articles of termination on November 1, 2018. Continuity of the company through
domestication does not establish continuing Montana organizational status after that
termination filing. By the time of the 2024 discharge and this action, Mojo was organized
in Wyoming and maintained its principal place of business there. We need not decide when
Witmer first began working for Mojo to resolve that question.
¶12 Witmer’s remaining assertions establish Montana contacts, but not a Montana
jurisdictional home. We accept Witmer’s assertion that Mojo completed jobs and
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performed services in Montana, including his identified work near Shelby. Employing a
Montana resident, withholding Montana income taxes, and performing Montana work do
not, on this showing, establish operations of a nature and extent that make the company
essentially at home here. Witmer identifies no facts showing that Mojo retained a Montana
center of management or otherwise maintained operations comparable to an additional
business home after its move to Wyoming. The inquiry concerns the nature of the business
activities as a whole, not merely whether the company conducted business in Montana.
Tyrrell, 581 U.S. at 414, 137 S. Ct. at 1558. Considering the asserted contacts together
with the organizational history, Witmer has not made a prima facie showing of general
jurisdiction.
¶13 Specific jurisdiction focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum,
and the litigation. Buckles v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2020 MT 107, ¶¶ 11-12, 400 Mont. 18,
462 P.3d 223. We first determine whether M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction
over a person. Only then do we determine whether exercising jurisdiction comports with
due process. If the asserted basis under the rule fails, the inquiry ends. Buckles, ¶ 12;
Gateway Hospitality, ¶ 20.
¶14 Rule 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction over a person as to claims arising from
enumerated acts done personally or through an employee or agent. Witmer invokes
subsection (F), which authorizes jurisdiction over a person “acting as director, manager,
trustee, or other officer of a corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal
place of business within, Montana.” He contends that the decision by Mojo’s president,
Jake Hanson (Hanson), to discharge him subjects Mojo to jurisdiction. We assume without
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deciding, that subsection (F) could apply to an LLC through the conduct of its president as
Witmer proposes. Even so, Witmer’s theory fails because Mojo lacked the required
Montana organizational or principal-place-of-business connection when Hanson acted. By
the June 2024 discharge, Mojo had domesticated in Wyoming, filed its Montana articles of
termination, and maintained its principal place of business in Wyoming. Its original
Montana formation does not supply the connection subsection (F) requires for that later
act.
¶15 Witmer also argues that his discharge ended an employment relationship involving
a Montana resident and Montana work, and that defending in Montana would not unfairly
burden Mojo. Those arguments do not establish that Mojo was organized under Montana
law or maintained its principal place of business here when Hanson discharged him.
Arguments about purposeful availment and reasonableness cannot substitute for satisfying
the asserted long-arm provision. Because Witmer has not established jurisdiction under
subsection (F), we do not reach the constitutional inquiry. Gateway Hospitality, ¶ 20.
¶16 Our holding is limited to the subsection (F) theory Witmer develops on appeal.
Although Witmer discusses the Montana employment contacts, he does not explain how
another enumerated provision of Rule 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction over this claim. See
M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g). Mojo emphasizes that Witmer took the drug test at a Wyoming
drilling rig and was discharged in Wyoming; it argues that the events giving rise to his
claim therefore occurred outside Montana. We do not treat the testing or discharge location
alone as dispositive. See Buckles, ¶¶ 20, 24-25 (reversing a jurisdictional dismissal because
evidence of supervision from Montana supported a prima facie showing under
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Rule 4(b)(1)(A), despite the worker’s death in North Dakota). The subsection (F) theory
fails because Mojo was neither organized under Montana law nor maintaining its principal
place of business in Montana when Hanson discharged Witmer, not because the testing or
discharge occurred elsewhere. We do not decide whether a different long-arm theory could
support jurisdiction. Witmer likewise develops no separate appellate challenge to the
denial of jurisdictional discovery or an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the jurisdictional
ruling on the grounds presented.
¶17 2. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Witmer’s wrongful-discharge
complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction.
¶18 A court that lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot adjudicate that
defendant’s liability on the merits. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584,
119 S. Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999). Consistent with that principle, M. R. Civ. P. 41(b) excludes
a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction from the ordinary rule that an involuntary dismissal
operates as an “adjudication on the merits.” We applied that distinction to a dismissal for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in In re Estate of Benjamin, 2014 MT 241, ¶¶ 12-13,
376 Mont. 300, 339 P.3d 1232, holding that the with-prejudice designation was improper
because the court lacked authority to adjudicate the merits.
¶19 Here, the District Court dismissed solely for lack of personal jurisdiction. That
ruling did not determine whether Witmer could establish wrongful discharge and did not
support dismissing the claim with prejudice. See In re Estate of Benjamin, ¶ 13. We do
not decide which state’s employment law governs, whether Mojo wrongfully discharged
Witmer, or whether he can obtain relief in another forum.
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¶20 Accordingly, we reverse the with-prejudice designation and remand for entry of a
dismissal without prejudice.
¶21 3. Whether Witmer’s appeal warrants sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5).
¶22 Mojo seeks costs and attorney fees as sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The rule
permits sanctions in favor of a prevailing party when an appeal is frivolous, vexatious, filed
for purposes of harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.
We exercise that authority cautiously. Helvik v. Tuscano, 2025 MT 150, ¶ 38, 423 Mont.
85, 571 P.3d 1058. Unsuccessful legal arguments do not, standing alone, establish a basis
for sanctions. See Kullick v. Skyline Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2003 MT 137, ¶¶ 28-29,
316 Mont. 146, 69 P.3d 225 (applying former M. R. App. P. 32).
¶23 Mojo argues that Witmer failed to investigate its organizational status or misled the
courts by submitting Montana certificates that omitted the termination filing date. The
certificates Witmer submitted were dated October 17, 2018, and formed part of the
Wyoming domestication packet that his attorney authenticated. They described Mojo’s
status before the November 1, 2018 termination filing. The June 17, 2025 certificate
submitted by Mojo reported that later filing. These records describe different points in the
same organizational history, not conflicting histories. The omission of a later event from
an earlier certificate does not establish deception. Although we reject Witmer’s argument
about the continuing legal effect of the historical Montana organization, that unsuccessful
interpretation does not establish that he falsified the records.
¶24 Mojo separately challenges the allegation in paragraph two of the complaint that it
was a Montana limited liability company when it hired Witmer. That allegation concerns
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its status at hiring, not when Witmer filed suit. The distinction does not establish the
accuracy of the allegation: the services agreement and employee start date described by the
District Court both postdate the Montana termination filing. We do not rely on the
challenged allegation as an established fact. Even assuming it was inaccurate, however,
that allegation does not by itself establish that this appeal warrants sanctions under
Rule 19(5).
¶25 Witmer did not base his appeal solely on the challenged hiring allegation or the
historical certificates. He also relied on Mojo’s Montana business activities, his Montana
work, and Montana withholding. Those contacts do not establish jurisdiction on the
grounds he developed, but they provide a factual basis for his request to review the
jurisdictional ruling. In addition, the with-prejudice designation requires correction.
Considering these circumstances, Mojo has not established that the appeal is frivolous,
vexatious, filed for harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.
We decline to impose appellate sanctions.
CONCLUSION
¶26 We affirm the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling on the grounds Witmer
developed on appeal. We reverse the dismissal with prejudice designation and remand for
entry of a dismissal without prejudice. We deny Mojo’s request for appellate sanctions.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON
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