Full Opinion

11/17/2026 DA 26-0021 Case Number: DA 26-0021 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 277 ROBERT WITMER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MOJO GEOLOGICAL CONSULTING, LLC, Defendant and Appellee. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-25-166 Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Torrance L. Coburn, Tipp Coburn Lockwood, PC, Missoula, Montana For Appellee: Mariah A. Eastman, Eastman Law Office, PLLC, Three Forks, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 2026 Decided: November 17, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Robert Witmer (Witmer) appeals the dismissal of his wrongful-discharge complaint against Mojo Geological Consulting, LLC (Mojo), by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction and denied Witmer’s requests for an evidentiary hearing and leave to conduct discovery. We address the following restated issues: 1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Witmer failed to establish general personal jurisdiction over Mojo or specific personal jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F). 2. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Witmer’s wrongful-discharge complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. 3. Whether Witmer’s appeal warrants sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5). ¶2 We affirm the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling on the grounds Witmer developed on appeal, reverse the with-prejudice designation, remand with instructions to enter a dismissal without prejudice, and deny Mojo’s request for appellate sanctions. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 Mojo organized as a Montana limited liability company on March 8, 2007. On October 29, 2018, Mojo filed articles of domestication in Wyoming and obtained a certificate of domestication from the Wyoming Secretary of State. The articles identified its principal office in Casper, Wyoming. On November 1, 2018, Mojo filed articles of termination in Montana. ¶4 Witmer resides in Missoula and alleges that his employment with Mojo began in 2018. The District Court described a November 13, 2018 services agreement under which 2 Witmer would work as an independent contractor. On December 27, 2019, Mojo offered Witmer a position as a Field Geological Technician, with work assigned on a job-by-job basis. The offer letter identified Mojo as a Wyoming limited liability company, and the employer-completed portion of Witmer’s W-4 identified January 2, 2020, as his first date of employment. Witmer worked for Mojo in Montana and Wyoming. In his declaration, he stated that Mojo completed jobs and performed services in Montana during his employment. He identified his own two trips to the Shelby area in 2022 to work on a drilling project. His 2022 W-2 identified a Montana employer withholding number and reported Montana income-tax withholding. ¶5 On June 13, 2024, Mojo terminated Witmer’s employment, citing a failed onsite drug test as the reason for the discharge. According to Mojo, Witmer took the test at a drilling rig in Wyoming. On February 20, 2025, Witmer filed his complaint, alleging that he had performed his job duties satisfactorily and that Mojo had discharged him without good cause. He sought lost wages and fringe benefits, costs, and other appropriate relief under the Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act. Mojo moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. On December 9, 2025, the District Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. The court rejected both general jurisdiction and Witmer’s asserted ground for specific jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F). It did not reach the due process inquiry for specific jurisdiction. Witmer appeals. 3 STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶6 We review de novo a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and construe the complaint in the plaintiff’s favor. Gateway Hospitality Grp., Inc. v. Phila. Indem. Ins. Co., 2020 MT 125, ¶ 12, 400 Mont. 80, 464 P.3d 44. Witmer bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Because the District Court decided the motion on written submissions, without an evidentiary hearing, he needed to make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to defeat the motion. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Portage La Prairie Mut. Ins. Co., 907 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1990). DISCUSSION ¶7 1. Whether the District Court erred in concluding that Witmer failed to establish general personal jurisdiction over Mojo or specific personal jurisdiction under M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1)(F). ¶8 Personal jurisdiction is a court’s power to subject a person or entity to its adjudicative authority and bind that party to its judgment. M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) incorporates both general and specific personal jurisdiction. DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2018 MT 219, ¶ 7, 392 Mont. 446, 426 P.3d 1. ¶9 General personal jurisdiction permits a court to adjudicate any claim against a defendant, regardless of where the claim arose. When general jurisdiction rests on contacts with the forum, those contacts must be so continuous and systematic as to render the defendant essentially at home there. DeLeon, ¶ 8. A corporation ordinarily is at home in its state of incorporation and the state where it maintains its principal place of business. In an exceptional case, its operations in another state may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render it at home there as well. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. 402, 413-14, 4 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017). Doing business in a state, even on a regular basis, does not by itself establish general jurisdiction. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. at 414, 137 S. Ct. at 1558. ¶10 Witmer relies on the combined effect of several Montana contacts. He contends that Mojo organized under Montana law, operated here for more than a decade, and continued its existence after domestication in Wyoming. He also points to Mojo’s employment of a Montana resident, Montana tax withholding, and Montana jobs and services, including the Shelby drilling project. He argues that these contacts, considered together, establish that Mojo is at home in Montana. ¶11 The organizational history does not establish that Mojo remained organized under Montana law when Witmer brought this action. Wyoming law provides that domestication continues the company as though it had been created under Wyoming law and makes the articles of domestication its organizational articles. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17-29-1012 (2018). Under § 35-8-906(2), MCA (2017), the existence of a Montana limited liability company ends when it files articles of termination or on a specified later effective date. Mojo obtained its Wyoming certificate of domestication on October 29, 2018, and filed its Montana articles of termination on November 1, 2018. Continuity of the company through domestication does not establish continuing Montana organizational status after that termination filing. By the time of the 2024 discharge and this action, Mojo was organized in Wyoming and maintained its principal place of business there. We need not decide when Witmer first began working for Mojo to resolve that question. ¶12 Witmer’s remaining assertions establish Montana contacts, but not a Montana jurisdictional home. We accept Witmer’s assertion that Mojo completed jobs and 5 performed services in Montana, including his identified work near Shelby. Employing a Montana resident, withholding Montana income taxes, and performing Montana work do not, on this showing, establish operations of a nature and extent that make the company essentially at home here. Witmer identifies no facts showing that Mojo retained a Montana center of management or otherwise maintained operations comparable to an additional business home after its move to Wyoming. The inquiry concerns the nature of the business activities as a whole, not merely whether the company conducted business in Montana. Tyrrell, 581 U.S. at 414, 137 S. Ct. at 1558. Considering the asserted contacts together with the organizational history, Witmer has not made a prima facie showing of general jurisdiction. ¶13 Specific jurisdiction focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation. Buckles v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2020 MT 107, ¶¶ 11-12, 400 Mont. 18, 462 P.3d 223. We first determine whether M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction over a person. Only then do we determine whether exercising jurisdiction comports with due process. If the asserted basis under the rule fails, the inquiry ends. Buckles, ¶ 12; Gateway Hospitality, ¶ 20. ¶14 Rule 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction over a person as to claims arising from enumerated acts done personally or through an employee or agent. Witmer invokes subsection (F), which authorizes jurisdiction over a person “acting as director, manager, trustee, or other officer of a corporation organized under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within, Montana.” He contends that the decision by Mojo’s president, Jake Hanson (Hanson), to discharge him subjects Mojo to jurisdiction. We assume without 6 deciding, that subsection (F) could apply to an LLC through the conduct of its president as Witmer proposes. Even so, Witmer’s theory fails because Mojo lacked the required Montana organizational or principal-place-of-business connection when Hanson acted. By the June 2024 discharge, Mojo had domesticated in Wyoming, filed its Montana articles of termination, and maintained its principal place of business in Wyoming. Its original Montana formation does not supply the connection subsection (F) requires for that later act. ¶15 Witmer also argues that his discharge ended an employment relationship involving a Montana resident and Montana work, and that defending in Montana would not unfairly burden Mojo. Those arguments do not establish that Mojo was organized under Montana law or maintained its principal place of business here when Hanson discharged him. Arguments about purposeful availment and reasonableness cannot substitute for satisfying the asserted long-arm provision. Because Witmer has not established jurisdiction under subsection (F), we do not reach the constitutional inquiry. Gateway Hospitality, ¶ 20. ¶16 Our holding is limited to the subsection (F) theory Witmer develops on appeal. Although Witmer discusses the Montana employment contacts, he does not explain how another enumerated provision of Rule 4(b)(1) authorizes jurisdiction over this claim. See M. R. App. P. 12(1)(g). Mojo emphasizes that Witmer took the drug test at a Wyoming drilling rig and was discharged in Wyoming; it argues that the events giving rise to his claim therefore occurred outside Montana. We do not treat the testing or discharge location alone as dispositive. See Buckles, ¶¶ 20, 24-25 (reversing a jurisdictional dismissal because evidence of supervision from Montana supported a prima facie showing under 7 Rule 4(b)(1)(A), despite the worker’s death in North Dakota). The subsection (F) theory fails because Mojo was neither organized under Montana law nor maintaining its principal place of business in Montana when Hanson discharged Witmer, not because the testing or discharge occurred elsewhere. We do not decide whether a different long-arm theory could support jurisdiction. Witmer likewise develops no separate appellate challenge to the denial of jurisdictional discovery or an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the jurisdictional ruling on the grounds presented. ¶17 2. Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Witmer’s wrongful-discharge complaint with prejudice for lack of personal jurisdiction. ¶18 A court that lacks personal jurisdiction over a defendant cannot adjudicate that defendant’s liability on the merits. Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584, 119 S. Ct. 1563, 1570 (1999). Consistent with that principle, M. R. Civ. P. 41(b) excludes a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction from the ordinary rule that an involuntary dismissal operates as an “adjudication on the merits.” We applied that distinction to a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in In re Estate of Benjamin, 2014 MT 241, ¶¶ 12-13, 376 Mont. 300, 339 P.3d 1232, holding that the with-prejudice designation was improper because the court lacked authority to adjudicate the merits. ¶19 Here, the District Court dismissed solely for lack of personal jurisdiction. That ruling did not determine whether Witmer could establish wrongful discharge and did not support dismissing the claim with prejudice. See In re Estate of Benjamin, ¶ 13. We do not decide which state’s employment law governs, whether Mojo wrongfully discharged Witmer, or whether he can obtain relief in another forum. 8 ¶20 Accordingly, we reverse the with-prejudice designation and remand for entry of a dismissal without prejudice. ¶21 3. Whether Witmer’s appeal warrants sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5). ¶22 Mojo seeks costs and attorney fees as sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5). The rule permits sanctions in favor of a prevailing party when an appeal is frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes of harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds. We exercise that authority cautiously. Helvik v. Tuscano, 2025 MT 150, ¶ 38, 423 Mont. 85, 571 P.3d 1058. Unsuccessful legal arguments do not, standing alone, establish a basis for sanctions. See Kullick v. Skyline Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 2003 MT 137, ¶¶ 28-29, 316 Mont. 146, 69 P.3d 225 (applying former M. R. App. P. 32). ¶23 Mojo argues that Witmer failed to investigate its organizational status or misled the courts by submitting Montana certificates that omitted the termination filing date. The certificates Witmer submitted were dated October 17, 2018, and formed part of the Wyoming domestication packet that his attorney authenticated. They described Mojo’s status before the November 1, 2018 termination filing. The June 17, 2025 certificate submitted by Mojo reported that later filing. These records describe different points in the same organizational history, not conflicting histories. The omission of a later event from an earlier certificate does not establish deception. Although we reject Witmer’s argument about the continuing legal effect of the historical Montana organization, that unsuccessful interpretation does not establish that he falsified the records. ¶24 Mojo separately challenges the allegation in paragraph two of the complaint that it was a Montana limited liability company when it hired Witmer. That allegation concerns 9 its status at hiring, not when Witmer filed suit. The distinction does not establish the accuracy of the allegation: the services agreement and employee start date described by the District Court both postdate the Montana termination filing. We do not rely on the challenged allegation as an established fact. Even assuming it was inaccurate, however, that allegation does not by itself establish that this appeal warrants sanctions under Rule 19(5). ¶25 Witmer did not base his appeal solely on the challenged hiring allegation or the historical certificates. He also relied on Mojo’s Montana business activities, his Montana work, and Montana withholding. Those contacts do not establish jurisdiction on the grounds he developed, but they provide a factual basis for his request to review the jurisdictional ruling. In addition, the with-prejudice designation requires correction. Considering these circumstances, Mojo has not established that the appeal is frivolous, vexatious, filed for harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds. We decline to impose appellate sanctions. CONCLUSION ¶26 We affirm the District Court’s jurisdictional ruling on the grounds Witmer developed on appeal. We reverse the dismissal with prejudice designation and remand for entry of a dismissal without prejudice. We deny Mojo’s request for appellate sanctions. /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON 10