Full Opinion

11/17/2026 DA 26-0094 Case Number: DA 26-0094 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 275 JAMES ANTHONY BARRETT, JR., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. REBECCA ILENE JESPERSON, Defendant and Appellee. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District, In and For the County of Carbon, Cause No. DV-2020-83 Honorable Matthew J. Wald, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: KC J. Barrett, Barrett Law Firm, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana For Appellee: Rodd A. Hamman, Calton Hamman & Wolff, P.C., Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 2026 Decided: November 17, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 James Anthony Barrett, Jr. (Barrett, Jr.) appeals a January 2, 2026 Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment (Order) to Rebecca Jesperson (Jesperson), entered in the Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County. The District Court found that there was no dispute of material facts and that a 2003 deed transferred all of Lot 9 to Jesperson. We reverse and remand. ¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the 2003 Deed is ambiguous. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 James Barrett, Sr. (Barrett, Sr.), the father of Barrett, Jr. and Jesperson, owned real property in Carbon County that consisted of roughly six and three quarters acres described as Lot 9 of Wallis Acreage Tracts, Plat No. 474 (the Property). In 1969, Barrett, Sr. had the Property surveyed to create a one-acre parcel within Lot 9 for the purpose of constructing a house, creating Certificate of Survey 491 (COS 491) which was recorded on July 2 of that same year. Later, Barrett, Sr. discovered that a garage was located on the boundary line of COS 491 and thus had a second survey completed to change the boundaries, COS 491A. In COS 491A, the new boundary line was set outside the location of the garage. COS 491A was recorded in March of 2001. ¶4 In the spring of 2003, Barrett, Sr. was involved in an altercation and charged with aggravated assault. Fearing a potential civil lawsuit which would encumber his property, he executed and recorded a Warranty Deed on April 21, 2003 (2003 Deed), transferring the Property to Jesperson. The 2003 Deed described the Property transferred as “Lot 9 of Plat 474 Walac [sic] Acreage Tracts[.] See attached exhibit A for additional legal 2 description.” Exhibit A was a copy of the metes and bounds description of the surveyed lot depicted by COS 491A. According to Jesperson, Barrett, Sr. wanted her to keep 5.5 acres and for her to transfer the parcel described in COS 491A to Barrett, Jr. after Barrett, Jr. had resolved financial problems he was having. In 2007, Jesperson deeded the one-acre parcel described in COS 491A to Barrett, Jr. ¶5 In 2005, the District Court found Barrett, Sr. incapacitated due to dementia. Jesperson was appointed conservator of his estate, while both she and Barrett, Jr. were named co-guardians. In 2015, Barrett, Sr. died. There was no probate action filed, and Jesperson explained that Barrett, Sr. had no assets subject to probate at the time of his death. In 2022, Jesperson sold a portion of the deeded land that was along Highway 212 to the Montana Department of Transportation. ¶6 In October 2020, Barrett, Jr. filed a complaint in the Carbon County District Court that sought to quiet title to the property deeded to Jesperson in 2003. There, he argued that the Deed only transferred the parcel in COS 491A and left the remaining approximately 5.5 acres still with Barrett, Sr., now his estate. Alternatively, Barrett, Jr. argued a constructive trust was created if all the property was transferred to Jesperson or that the transfer was otherwise void under § 70-20-401, MCA, because it was intended to defraud subsequent encumbrances. Finally, Barrett, Jr. contended that Barrett, Sr. bequeathed all his property to Barrett, Jr. in a holographic will dated May 3, 2010. The District Court granted Jesperson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the Deed transferred all of Lot 9 and that there was no dispute of material fact as to the terms of the Deed. The District Court held that Barrett, Jr. did not have standing to assert a constructive trust claim 3 on behalf of Barrett, Sr. because no probate had been opened on behalf of Barrett, Sr. Similarly, the District Court held that because Barrett, Jr. was not a purchaser, encumbrancer, or a potential or actual creditor of the property under § 70-20-401, MCA, the statute does not apply to him. ¶7 Barrett, Jr. appeals, asserting only his claim that the 2003 Deed transferred the Property identified in COS 491A to Jesperson. We address that claim, but for purposes of clarity on remand we also affirm the District Court’s decision that, absent a probate on behalf of Barrett, Sr., Barrett, Jr. has no standing to assert a constructive trust was created or that the 2003 Deed was a fraudulent transfer. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶8 A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo using the same standards set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56. Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 MT 168, ¶ 9, 375 Mont. 351, 328 P.3d 665. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate where a moving party has demonstrated “both the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Winter, ¶ 9 (quoting Harris v. State, 2013 MT 16, ¶ 11, 368 Mont. 276, 294 P.3d 382). Interpretation of a contract is a question of law. AWIN Real Estate, LLC v. Whitehead Homes, Inc., 2020 MT 225, ¶ 11, 401 Mont. 218, 472 P.3d 165. DISCUSSION 4 ¶9 The question we must decide is whether the reference to Exhibit A, describing a one-acre lot, renders the conveyance of Lot 9, nearly a seven-acre lot, ambiguous.1 Section 70-20-201, MCA, provides rules for construing the description of a conveyance of real property “when the construction is doubtful and there are no other sufficient circumstances to determine it.” When the terms of an agreement to transfer property have been reduced to writing, “it is considered as containing all those terms, and therefore there can be between the parties . . . no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing . . . .” Section 70-20-202(1), MCA. However, extrinsic evidence is admissible “to explain an extrinsic ambiguity . . . .” Section 70-20-202(2), MCA. ¶10 Section 70-1-513, MCA, provides that grants of real property are to be interpreted according to the same principles as contracts. Pursuant to § 28-3-401, MCA, the language of the deed reservation is to govern interpretation if the language is clear and explicit. 1 We address preliminarily a matter unrelated to the substance of this case. Barrett, Jr. presents new exhibits that were not part of the District Court record. Jesperson has asked this Court to disregard these new documents, and she asks for attorney fees for having to respond to Barrett, Jr.’s attempt to improperly use them. This Court will not consider evidence which is extraneous to the record. Downs v. Smyk, 185 Mont. 16, 25, 608 P.2d 307, 312 (1979). We have strongly condemned this practice and warned future parties that this practice will not be tolerated. Downs, 185 Mont. at 25, 608 P.2d at 312. However, we decline Jesperson’s request for attorney’s fees in responding to Barrett, Jr.’s improper use of new exhibits. She relies on Frank v. Harding, 1998 MT 215, 290 Mont. 448, 965 P.2d 254, wherein the appellant attached documents which were not part of the record. In dicta, we noted that sanctions would have been appropriate had they been requested. Here, we agree with the District Court that the family dynamics underlying these proceedings were unusual and invited conflict. Further, absent statutory or contractual authority, attorney’s fees will generally not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. Sullivan v. Cherewick, 2017 MT 38, 386 Mont. 350, 391 P.3d 62. Finally, we reject Barrett, Jr.’s argument that the District Court granted summary judgment to Jesperson without giving him an opportunity to respond. Barrett, Jr. responded to Jesperson’s summary judgment motion and argued the 2003 Deed transferred only a one-acre parcel, which was the controversy at issue before the District Court. 5 “Where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe and the duty of the court is to apply the language, as written, to the facts of the case.” Peterson v. Hopkins, 210 Mont. 429, 434, 684 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1984). We address the matter of ambiguity first because if the language of a deed is clear and explicit, then it will be applied as written. Proctor v. Werk, 220 Mont. 246, 248, 714 P.2d 171, 172 (1986); § 28-3-401, MCA. A deed or contract is ambiguous if, when taken as a whole, it is reasonably subject to two different interpretations. Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d at 173. As the grantee, the Deed should be interpreted in favor of Jesperson. Section 70-1-516, MCA. ¶11 “Courts interpret contracts according to their plain and ordinary meaning, in such a way as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting.” Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, ¶ 30, 400 Mont. 536, 469 P.3d 689; see § 28-3-301, MCA. If a contract has been reduced to writing, this Court ascertains the intention of the parties from the writing alone. Section 28-3-303, MCA. “The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit and does not involve an absurdity.” Section 28-3-401, MCA. “The whole of a contract is to be taken together so as to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.” Section 28-3-202, MCA. If the language of a contract is not clearly explicit, extrinsic evidence may be used to explain an ambiguity. Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d at 172. ¶12 Barrett, Jr. alleges that the District Court failed to address ambiguity in its order granting Jesperson summary judgment. We disagree with this assertion. While the District 6 Court did not explicitly state that the 2003 Deed is unambiguous, it did explain that “[w]hile there is no doubt the language of the deed could have been drafted in a more artful manner, the meaning is still clear and there is no issue of material fact as to the terms of the Deed.” In other words, the District Court found that the Deed was not reasonably subject to two different interpretations, and therefore all of Lot 9 was transferred. ¶13 Construction and interpretation of a contract present questions of law for the court to decide. Whary v. Plum Creek L.P., 2014 MT 71, ¶10, 374 Mont. 266, 320 P.3d 973 (citing Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 2009 MT 286, ¶ 18, 352 Mont. 212, 215 P.3d 675). When a contract is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent. Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 2007 MT 159, ¶ 55, 338 Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851. In the absence of relevant extrinsic evidence, any ambiguity in a written contract is resolved by the court as a matter of law. Wicklund v. Sundheim, 2016 MT 62, ¶ 16, 383 Mont. 1, 367 P.3d 403. An ambiguity may be eliminated by application of statutory rules of construction, as it was in Ferriter v. Bartness, 281 Mont. 100, 931 P.2d 709 (1997). ¶14 Here, while we determine as a matter of law that the 2003 Deed construed together with Exhibit A creates an ambiguity, we are unable to resolve that ambiguity by the application of any rules of construction or law. Accordingly, Barrett, Sr’s intent in transferring the property—whether it was to be a transfer of the entire Lot 9 or only the one-acre lot—must be resolved based on evidence outside the language of the 2003 Deed itself. We, therefore, disagree with the District Court that the language of the Deed is “clear” and conclude there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding what was 7 transferred. Barrett, Jr. argues that his father only intended to transfer the one-acre lot, while Jesperson believed that the Deed transferred all of Lot 9. Both interpretations are reasonable. According to Barrett, Jr.’s interpretation, the deed’s language, together with Exhibit A, form a single, continuous legal description of the one-acre tract. Jesperson, on the other hand, interprets the deed’s language referencing “Lot 9” to convey the entire Property with Exhibit A describing the one-acre tract as an “additional” parcel. “A deed reservation is deemed ambiguous when taken as a whole, its wording or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different interpretations.” Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d at 173. ¶15 Lastly, we address the District Court’s rejection of Barrett, Jr.’s assertion of title under a non-probated will. Barrett, Jr. alleged he was the sole heir in a holographic will supposedly drafted by Barrett, Sr. in 2010, four years after his dementia diagnosis. To this point, there has been no probate or intestacy proceeding concerning Barrett, Sr.’s estate. For a testamentary writing to affect a transfer of title to real or personal property left by the decedent, it must be probated. In re Smith’s Estate, 126 Mont. 558, 563, 255 P.2d 687, 690 (1953). Therefore, for Barrett, Jr. to have a claim for distribution of the property to him through the will, it must first be declared valid and admitted to probate. See § 72-3-103, MCA. In these proceedings the District Court was not sitting in probate and did not have jurisdiction to probate any matters. See Estate of Cooney, 2019 MT 293, ¶¶ 6-7, 398 Mont. 166, 454 P.3d 1190. Without jurisdiction to determine the validity of the will, property cannot be transferred pursuant to the will. Without a probate proceeding, no one has been determined a successor in interest to any claims Barrett, Sr. may have had. 8 Therefore, as held by the District Court, Barrett, Jr. lacks standing to assert a claim of constructive trust on behalf of Barrett, Sr. Likewise, Barrett, Jr. never asserted he was a purchaser, encumbrancer, or potential or actual creditor of the property which would give him standing to pursue a claim under § 70-20-401, MCA. ¶16 What we decide here, however, is that the 2003 Deed is ambiguous as a matter of law and that it was improper for the court to resolve the ambiguity on summary judgment. We therefore remand these proceedings to the District Court for consideration of evidence of the circumstances under which the transfer was made, to explain the ambiguity, and for it to determine what property was transferred by the 2003 Deed. CONCLUSION ¶17 The District Court erred in failing to find the 2003 Deed ambiguous as a matter of law. We reverse that portion of the order on summary judgment which held there was no ambiguity in the property transferred pursuant to the 2003 Deed and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ¶18 Reversed, and remanded. /S/ LAURIE McKINNON We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ JIM RICE 9