Barrett v. Jesperson
CourtMontana Supreme Court
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
DocketDA 26-0094
JudgeMcKinnon
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/17/2026
DA 26-0094
Case Number: DA 26-0094
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 275
JAMES ANTHONY BARRETT, JR.,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
REBECCA ILENE JESPERSON,
Defendant and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-Second Judicial District,
In and For the County of Carbon, Cause No. DV-2020-83
Honorable Matthew J. Wald, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
KC J. Barrett, Barrett Law Firm, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana
For Appellee:
Rodd A. Hamman, Calton Hamman & Wolff, P.C., Billings, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: September 23, 2026
Decided: November 17, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Laurie McKinnon delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 James Anthony Barrett, Jr. (Barrett, Jr.) appeals a January 2, 2026 Order Granting
Motion for Summary Judgment (Order) to Rebecca Jesperson (Jesperson), entered in the
Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Carbon County. The District Court found that
there was no dispute of material facts and that a 2003 deed transferred all of Lot 9 to
Jesperson. We reverse and remand.
¶2 The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the 2003 Deed is ambiguous.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶3 James Barrett, Sr. (Barrett, Sr.), the father of Barrett, Jr. and Jesperson, owned real
property in Carbon County that consisted of roughly six and three quarters acres described
as Lot 9 of Wallis Acreage Tracts, Plat No. 474 (the Property). In 1969, Barrett, Sr. had
the Property surveyed to create a one-acre parcel within Lot 9 for the purpose of
constructing a house, creating Certificate of Survey 491 (COS 491) which was recorded on
July 2 of that same year. Later, Barrett, Sr. discovered that a garage was located on the
boundary line of COS 491 and thus had a second survey completed to change the
boundaries, COS 491A. In COS 491A, the new boundary line was set outside the location
of the garage. COS 491A was recorded in March of 2001.
¶4 In the spring of 2003, Barrett, Sr. was involved in an altercation and charged with
aggravated assault. Fearing a potential civil lawsuit which would encumber his property,
he executed and recorded a Warranty Deed on April 21, 2003 (2003 Deed), transferring
the Property to Jesperson. The 2003 Deed described the Property transferred as “Lot 9 of
Plat 474 Walac [sic] Acreage Tracts[.] See attached exhibit A for additional legal
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description.” Exhibit A was a copy of the metes and bounds description of the surveyed
lot depicted by COS 491A. According to Jesperson, Barrett, Sr. wanted her to keep
5.5 acres and for her to transfer the parcel described in COS 491A to Barrett, Jr. after
Barrett, Jr. had resolved financial problems he was having. In 2007, Jesperson deeded the
one-acre parcel described in COS 491A to Barrett, Jr.
¶5 In 2005, the District Court found Barrett, Sr. incapacitated due to dementia.
Jesperson was appointed conservator of his estate, while both she and Barrett, Jr. were
named co-guardians. In 2015, Barrett, Sr. died. There was no probate action filed, and
Jesperson explained that Barrett, Sr. had no assets subject to probate at the time of his
death. In 2022, Jesperson sold a portion of the deeded land that was along Highway 212
to the Montana Department of Transportation.
¶6 In October 2020, Barrett, Jr. filed a complaint in the Carbon County District Court
that sought to quiet title to the property deeded to Jesperson in 2003. There, he argued that
the Deed only transferred the parcel in COS 491A and left the remaining approximately
5.5 acres still with Barrett, Sr., now his estate. Alternatively, Barrett, Jr. argued a
constructive trust was created if all the property was transferred to Jesperson or that the
transfer was otherwise void under § 70-20-401, MCA, because it was intended to defraud
subsequent encumbrances. Finally, Barrett, Jr. contended that Barrett, Sr. bequeathed all
his property to Barrett, Jr. in a holographic will dated May 3, 2010. The District Court
granted Jesperson’s Motion for Summary Judgment, finding that the Deed transferred all
of Lot 9 and that there was no dispute of material fact as to the terms of the Deed. The
District Court held that Barrett, Jr. did not have standing to assert a constructive trust claim
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on behalf of Barrett, Sr. because no probate had been opened on behalf of Barrett, Sr.
Similarly, the District Court held that because Barrett, Jr. was not a purchaser,
encumbrancer, or a potential or actual creditor of the property under § 70-20-401, MCA,
the statute does not apply to him.
¶7 Barrett, Jr. appeals, asserting only his claim that the 2003 Deed transferred the
Property identified in COS 491A to Jesperson. We address that claim, but for purposes of
clarity on remand we also affirm the District Court’s decision that, absent a probate on
behalf of Barrett, Sr., Barrett, Jr. has no standing to assert a constructive trust was created
or that the 2003 Deed was a fraudulent transfer.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 A district court’s grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo using the same
standards set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56. Winter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2014 MT
168, ¶ 9, 375 Mont. 351, 328 P.3d 665. Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate
where a moving party has demonstrated “both the absence of any genuine issues of material
fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Winter, ¶ 9 (quoting Harris v. State,
2013 MT 16, ¶ 11, 368 Mont. 276, 294 P.3d 382). Interpretation of a contract is a question
of law. AWIN Real Estate, LLC v. Whitehead Homes, Inc., 2020 MT 225, ¶ 11, 401 Mont.
218, 472 P.3d 165.
DISCUSSION
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¶9 The question we must decide is whether the reference to Exhibit A, describing a
one-acre lot, renders the conveyance of Lot 9, nearly a seven-acre lot, ambiguous.1 Section
70-20-201, MCA, provides rules for construing the description of a conveyance of real
property “when the construction is doubtful and there are no other sufficient circumstances
to determine it.” When the terms of an agreement to transfer property have been reduced
to writing, “it is considered as containing all those terms, and therefore there can be
between the parties . . . no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents
of the writing . . . .” Section 70-20-202(1), MCA. However, extrinsic evidence is
admissible “to explain an extrinsic ambiguity . . . .” Section 70-20-202(2), MCA.
¶10 Section 70-1-513, MCA, provides that grants of real property are to be interpreted
according to the same principles as contracts. Pursuant to § 28-3-401, MCA, the language
of the deed reservation is to govern interpretation if the language is clear and explicit.
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We address preliminarily a matter unrelated to the substance of this case. Barrett, Jr. presents
new exhibits that were not part of the District Court record. Jesperson has asked this Court to
disregard these new documents, and she asks for attorney fees for having to respond to Barrett,
Jr.’s attempt to improperly use them. This Court will not consider evidence which is extraneous
to the record. Downs v. Smyk, 185 Mont. 16, 25, 608 P.2d 307, 312 (1979). We have strongly
condemned this practice and warned future parties that this practice will not be tolerated. Downs,
185 Mont. at 25, 608 P.2d at 312. However, we decline Jesperson’s request for attorney’s
fees in responding to Barrett, Jr.’s improper use of new exhibits. She relies on Frank v. Harding,
1998 MT 215, 290 Mont. 448, 965 P.2d 254, wherein the appellant attached documents which
were not part of the record. In dicta, we noted that sanctions would have been appropriate had
they been requested. Here, we agree with the District Court that the family dynamics underlying
these proceedings were unusual and invited conflict. Further, absent statutory or contractual
authority, attorney’s fees will generally not be awarded to the prevailing party in a lawsuit.
Sullivan v. Cherewick, 2017 MT 38, 386 Mont. 350, 391 P.3d 62. Finally, we reject Barrett, Jr.’s
argument that the District Court granted summary judgment to Jesperson without giving him an
opportunity to respond. Barrett, Jr. responded to Jesperson’s summary judgment motion and
argued the 2003 Deed transferred only a one-acre parcel, which was the controversy at issue before
the District Court.
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“Where the language of a written contract is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to
construe and the duty of the court is to apply the language, as written, to the facts of the
case.” Peterson v. Hopkins, 210 Mont. 429, 434, 684 P.2d 1061, 1063 (1984). We address
the matter of ambiguity first because if the language of a deed is clear and explicit, then it
will be applied as written. Proctor v. Werk, 220 Mont. 246, 248, 714 P.2d 171, 172 (1986);
§ 28-3-401, MCA. A deed or contract is ambiguous if, when taken as a whole, it is
reasonably subject to two different interpretations. Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d
at 173. As the grantee, the Deed should be interpreted in favor of Jesperson.
Section 70-1-516, MCA.
¶11 “Courts interpret contracts according to their plain and ordinary meaning, in such a
way as to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties as it existed at the time of
contracting.” Little Big Warm Ranch, LLC v. Doll, ¶ 30, 400 Mont. 536, 469 P.3d 689;
see § 28-3-301, MCA. If a contract has been reduced to writing, this Court ascertains the
intention of the parties from the writing alone. Section 28-3-303, MCA. “The language
of a contract is to govern its interpretation if the language is clear and explicit and does not
involve an absurdity.” Section 28-3-401, MCA. “The whole of a contract is to be taken
together so as to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to
interpret the other.” Section 28-3-202, MCA. If the language of a contract is not clearly
explicit, extrinsic evidence may be used to explain an ambiguity. Proctor, 220 Mont. at
248, 714 P.2d at 172.
¶12 Barrett, Jr. alleges that the District Court failed to address ambiguity in its order
granting Jesperson summary judgment. We disagree with this assertion. While the District
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Court did not explicitly state that the 2003 Deed is unambiguous, it did explain that “[w]hile
there is no doubt the language of the deed could have been drafted in a more artful manner,
the meaning is still clear and there is no issue of material fact as to the terms of the Deed.”
In other words, the District Court found that the Deed was not reasonably subject to two
different interpretations, and therefore all of Lot 9 was transferred.
¶13 Construction and interpretation of a contract present questions of law for the court
to decide. Whary v. Plum Creek L.P., 2014 MT 71, ¶10, 374 Mont. 266, 320 P.3d 973
(citing Mattson v. Mont. Power Co., 2009 MT 286, ¶ 18, 352 Mont. 212, 215 P.3d 675).
When a contract is ambiguous, the court may consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’
intent. Mary J. Baker Revocable Trust v. Cenex Harvest States, Coops., Inc., 2007 MT
159, ¶ 55, 338 Mont. 41, 164 P.3d 851. In the absence of relevant extrinsic evidence, any
ambiguity in a written contract is resolved by the court as a matter of law. Wicklund v.
Sundheim, 2016 MT 62, ¶ 16, 383 Mont. 1, 367 P.3d 403. An ambiguity may be eliminated
by application of statutory rules of construction, as it was in Ferriter v. Bartness, 281 Mont.
100, 931 P.2d 709 (1997).
¶14 Here, while we determine as a matter of law that the 2003 Deed construed together
with Exhibit A creates an ambiguity, we are unable to resolve that ambiguity by the
application of any rules of construction or law. Accordingly, Barrett, Sr’s intent in
transferring the property—whether it was to be a transfer of the entire Lot 9 or only the
one-acre lot—must be resolved based on evidence outside the language of the 2003 Deed
itself. We, therefore, disagree with the District Court that the language of the Deed is
“clear” and conclude there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding what was
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transferred. Barrett, Jr. argues that his father only intended to transfer the one-acre lot,
while Jesperson believed that the Deed transferred all of Lot 9. Both interpretations are
reasonable. According to Barrett, Jr.’s interpretation, the deed’s language, together with
Exhibit A, form a single, continuous legal description of the one-acre tract. Jesperson, on
the other hand, interprets the deed’s language referencing “Lot 9” to convey the entire
Property with Exhibit A describing the one-acre tract as an “additional” parcel. “A deed
reservation is deemed ambiguous when taken as a whole, its wording or phraseology is
reasonably subject to two different interpretations.” Proctor, 220 Mont. at 248, 714 P.2d
at 173.
¶15 Lastly, we address the District Court’s rejection of Barrett, Jr.’s assertion of title
under a non-probated will. Barrett, Jr. alleged he was the sole heir in a holographic will
supposedly drafted by Barrett, Sr. in 2010, four years after his dementia diagnosis. To this
point, there has been no probate or intestacy proceeding concerning Barrett, Sr.’s estate.
For a testamentary writing to affect a transfer of title to real or personal property left by the
decedent, it must be probated. In re Smith’s Estate, 126 Mont. 558, 563, 255 P.2d 687,
690 (1953). Therefore, for Barrett, Jr. to have a claim for distribution of the property
to him through the will, it must first be declared valid and admitted to probate.
See § 72-3-103, MCA. In these proceedings the District Court was not sitting in probate
and did not have jurisdiction to probate any matters. See Estate of Cooney, 2019 MT 293,
¶¶ 6-7, 398 Mont. 166, 454 P.3d 1190. Without jurisdiction to determine the validity of
the will, property cannot be transferred pursuant to the will. Without a probate proceeding,
no one has been determined a successor in interest to any claims Barrett, Sr. may have had.
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Therefore, as held by the District Court, Barrett, Jr. lacks standing to assert a claim of
constructive trust on behalf of Barrett, Sr. Likewise, Barrett, Jr. never asserted he was a
purchaser, encumbrancer, or potential or actual creditor of the property which would give
him standing to pursue a claim under § 70-20-401, MCA.
¶16 What we decide here, however, is that the 2003 Deed is ambiguous as a matter of
law and that it was improper for the court to resolve the ambiguity on summary judgment.
We therefore remand these proceedings to the District Court for consideration of evidence
of the circumstances under which the transfer was made, to explain the ambiguity, and for
it to determine what property was transferred by the 2003 Deed.
CONCLUSION
¶17 The District Court erred in failing to find the 2003 Deed ambiguous as a matter of
law. We reverse that portion of the order on summary judgment which held there was no
ambiguity in the property transferred pursuant to the 2003 Deed and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶18 Reversed, and remanded.
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
/S/ JIM RICE
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