Marriage of: Kearns

10/27/2026 DA 25-0831 Case Number: DA 25-0831 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 252 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: BARBARA KING KEARNS, Petitioner and Appellee, and KENNETH MICHAEL KEARNS, Respondent and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-2010-691(C) Honorable Heidi J. Ulbricht, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: P. Mars Scott, P. Mars Scott Law Offices, Missoula, Montana For Appellee: Emily von Jentzen, Shelly F. Brander, Kaufman Vidal Hileman Ellingson PC, Kalispell, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 2, 2026 Decided: October 27, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Kenneth Michael Kearns (Ken) appeals three rulings of the Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, concerning a student loan that he agreed to pay when he and Barbara King Kearns (Barbara) dissolved their marriage. The District Court denied his request for additional account access, held him in contempt for nonpayment, entered a $388,741.24 judgment in favor of Barbara, and awarded her $3,237.50 in attorney fees. ¶2 We restate the issues as follows: 1. Whether the District Court erred by denying Ken’s request for additional access to the Parent PLUS loan account. 2. Whether the District Court erred by holding Ken in contempt for failing to make monthly payments on the loan after the June 2024 order. 3. Whether the District Court erred by entering an immediately collectible money judgment in Barbara’s favor for the entire unpaid loan balance. 4. Whether the District Court erred by awarding Barbara $3,237.50 in attorney fees. 5. Whether Barbara is entitled to appellate attorney fees and sanctions. We affirm the account-access ruling and the contempt determination based on the August and September 2024 nonpayments. We vacate the full-balance judgment and remand for further proceedings concerning the enforcement remedy. We affirm the $3,237.50 attorney-fee award, remand for determination of reasonable appellate fees within the applicable contractual provisions, and deny appellate sanctions. 2  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶3 Ken and Barbara executed a Marital and Property Settlement Agreement (MPSA) on November 29, 2012. Paragraph 10 identifies marital debts by reference to schedules in a bankruptcy proceeding. In lieu of additional maintenance, Ken agreed “to be solely responsible for said debt in its entirety” and to “indemnify and hold [Barbara] harmless thereto.” The parties do not dispute that the assigned debts included the Parent PLUS loan at issue here. The December 20, 2012 Dissolution Decree incorporated the MPSA and directed both parties to comply with it. Paragraph 19 of the MPSA prohibited modification by a subsequent court order. ¶4 Ken resolved the other assigned debts but made no payment on the Parent PLUS loan until after Barbara sought contempt in 2022. The parties resolved that proceeding through an October 11, 2022 Stipulation. They acknowledged an estimated loan balance of $342,230 and an existing federal payment pause. They agreed to seek the addition of Ken to the account and removal of Barbara if possible. Otherwise, they would direct the servicer to mail monthly statements to Ken. Paragraph 2 then provided “Kenneth will make the monthly payments on the account.” ¶5 Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation stated that failure to make the monthly payment would subject Ken to contempt and make him responsible for attorney fees incurred to compel compliance. The Stipulation also required application of Ken’s share of the proceeds from the sale of a business condominium to the loan. Paragraph 7 recognized a claim against his estate for an unpaid balance if he predeceased Barbara. The parties thus 3 specified ongoing payment obligations while preserving Ken’s responsibility for the remaining debt. Barbara remained the named borrower. ¶6 Barbara again sought contempt in May 2024. After a June 5 hearing, the District Court entered its June 17, 2024 order holding Ken in contempt. The court explained that Aidvantage, which was servicing the Parent PLUS loan at issue, had calculated a $590.33 monthly payment after Barbara applied for income-contingent repayment and that Ken had not paid the full amount despite notice through counsel. The court entered judgment for delinquent and current payments and awarded enforcement-related attorney fees. It warned that further failure to meet the monthly-payment obligation would result in a judgment for the entire outstanding loan balance. ¶7 On June 6, the day after the hearing, Ken requested and obtained a forbearance. Aidvantage removed it on June 10 after Barbara objected. Ken later maintained that a representative arranged a separate hardship deferment during a July 30 call, with payments to resume in October 2024. He acknowledged making no payments in August or September 2024. Ken also changed the mailing address, telephone number, and email address on the account to his information without notifying Barbara. After Barbara stopped receiving account communications and discovered that her tax document had gone to Ken, she had Aidvantage restore her information and impose additional account access restrictions. ¶8 In April 2025, Ken moved for account information, documents, reinstatement as an authorized recipient of information, and a username and password. He invoked equitable subrogation and asserted that he needed access to negotiate repayment terms and meet his 4 obligation. Barbara opposed unrestricted access and moved to enforce the Decree or hold Ken in contempt. Among alternative remedies, she requested a judgment for the full loan balance that she could execute against his assets. ¶9 At the July 28, 2025 hearing, Ken testified about his health, substantial debts, and difficulty sustaining the monthly payment. He attributed the payment amount to Barbara’s alleged failure to recertify her income. The District Court instead credited written repayment-plan approvals that undermined his assertion. A January 2025 approval reduced the monthly payment to $511.31. The court also found that Ken possessed the payment amount and due date, and that his unauthorized account changes justified restrictions on broader access. ¶10 The payment history showed no August or September 2024 payment and no February 2025 posting, but two payments posted in March 2025. Ken attributed the August and September nonpayments to the deferment and disputed that he missed the February payment, explaining that processing delayed the posting to March. Both parties understood the account to be in good standing at the hearing. The September 16, 2025 order nevertheless held Ken in contempt, denied additional account access, directed Barbara to provide the payoff amount, and ordered submission of a proposed full-balance judgment. ¶11 On October 8, 2025, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Barbara for $388,741.24, the amount Aidvantage quoted for payoff by U.S. mail in account information dated October 7. The court concluded that Ken was responsible for paying the loan in full and was therefore liable to Barbara for the unpaid debt. The judgment awarded Barbara the money, imposed ten-percent annual interest, and authorized ordinary collection 5 remedies. It did not direct Barbara to apply collections to the loan or address corresponding credit for payments to the creditor. After Ken filed a notice of nonobjection to the attorney fees provided for in the September order and claimed in counsel’s affidavit, the court awarded Barbara $3,237.50. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶12 Section 3-1-523(2), MCA, permits review because the contempt order includes ancillary rulings affecting substantial rights. We examine whether the District Court acted within its jurisdiction and whether the evidence supports contempt. We review findings of fact for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness. In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, 2025 MT 289, ¶¶ 16–17, 425 Mont. 306, 581 P.3d 32. Contract interpretation presents a legal question. In re Marriage of Harms, 2022 MT 41, ¶ 12, 408 Mont. 15, 504 P.3d 1108. Whether the agreements and applicable law authorize the challenged monetary recovery presents a legal question that we review for correctness. See In re Marriage of Harms, ¶ 12; In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, ¶ 17. DISCUSSION ¶13 1. Whether the District Court erred by denying Ken’s request for additional access to the Parent PLUS loan account. ¶14 Ken first argues that the District Court failed to address equitable subrogation and enter findings sufficient for review. M. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(3) generally makes findings and conclusions unnecessary on motions unless another rule provides otherwise. Del Duca v. Skydancer, 2025 MT 156, ¶ 11, 423 Mont. 115, 572 P.3d 804. Here, the court entered detailed findings and expressly denied the requested additional access. The pertinent 6 question is whether those findings and the accompanying reasoning disclose the basis for that ruling. See Byrum v. Andren, 2007 MT 107, ¶¶ 52–55, 337 Mont. 167, 159 P.3d 1062. ¶15 Equitable subrogation generally permits a person who pays an obligation for which another bears ultimate responsibility to succeed to rights associated with the satisfied claim. It places the burden on the person who should bear it. Skauge v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 Mont. 521, 524–26, 565 P.2d 628, 630–31 (1977). Ken does not seek to exercise creditor rights arising from a payment. He seeks the administrative rights of the named borrower to manage the account and negotiate repayment terms. The subrogation principle Ken invokes concerns succession to creditor rights; it does not establish his claimed entitlement to exercise the administrative rights of the named borrower. See Schuff v. A.T. Klemens & Son, 2000 MT 357, ¶ 91, 303 Mont. 274, 16 P.3d 1002. Moreover, although Barbara remains liable to the creditor, Ken bears responsibility for the debt as between the former spouses. ¶16 The District Court also had a sufficient factual basis to deny unrestricted account control. Ken changed contact information without Barbara’s consent, causing her to stop receiving mailed and emailed communications about an account for which she remained liable. The court found that he nevertheless had the information necessary to remit payments and protected his access to the payoff amount. Those findings explain the refusal to require disclosure of credentials that would enable further account changes. The omission of the words “equitable subrogation” does not prevent review of the ruling. We affirm the account-access ruling as a denial of the unrestricted access Ken claimed under 7 subrogation. We do not read that ruling to extinguish the provisions for monthly statements in the Stipulation or the information the September order entitles him to receive. ¶17 The record likewise supports rejecting Ken’s assertion that the access restrictions made payment impossible. Impracticability requires an event occurring without the obligor’s fault whose nonoccurrence formed a basic contractual assumption, and the obligor must have taken virtually every action within his power to perform. Lewis & Clark Cnty. v. Wirth, 2022 MT 105, ¶ 36, 409 Mont. 1, 510 P.3d 1206. Ken continued remitting payments despite the restrictions, and written approvals contradicted his claim that Barbara had failed to supply the income information necessary to establish the payment amount. These facts do not establish his ability to pay the entire loan immediately or sustain payments indefinitely. They do support the determination that the restrictions did not prevent the performance at issue. ¶18 2. Whether the District Court erred by holding Ken in contempt for failing to make monthly payments on the loan after the June 2024 order. ¶19 We next address contempt. A contempt determination must rest on disobedience of a definite, certain, and specific judicial command. Goodover v. Lindey’s Inc., 257 Mont. 38, 41–42, 847 P.2d 699, 701 (1993). The Decree here directed compliance with the MPSA. The parties subsequently specified monthly payments in the Stipulation, and the June order enforced that obligation after identifying the established payment amount. The basis for contempt is the judicially enforced payment obligation, not merely the statement in the Stipulation that a breach would constitute contempt. 8 ¶20 Read together, the Stipulation and June order required continuing monthly payments once repayment began and the amount was established. The Stipulation acknowledged the existing federal pause before repayment commenced; it did not give Ken a continuing option to suspend his promised performance through a separate arrangement with the servicer. The June order described and enforced that promise. It did not amend the Stipulation to make avoidance of federal default the measure of compliance. Even accepting Ken’s account of the later hardship deferment, the arrangement did not itself alter his payment obligation to Barbara. This conclusion concerns the voluntary arrangement Ken described, not the effect of any independently applicable federal prohibition or mandatory suspension. See § 28-3-202, MCA. ¶21 Ken admitted that he made no August or September payments. The court found his noncompliance willful after considering his explanations, financial circumstances, and account changes. His admitted nonpayments support the contempt determination without resolving whether he timely made the February payment. We therefore affirm contempt on the August and September grounds. Our affirmance does not resolve the disputed February payment, which the court must address if relevant to the relief it awards on remand. ¶22 3. Whether the District Court erred by entering an immediately collectible money judgment in Barbara’s favor for the entire unpaid loan balance. ¶23 The full-balance judgment presents a different question. Ken preserved an objection to that remedy. At the hearing, counsel argued that entering judgment would impose payment terms contrary to the settlement agreement. In his opening brief, Ken challenged 9 acceleration and expressly objected to an award requiring him to pay the entire debt to Barbara. In his reply, Ken reiterated that he had not agreed to a single payment. Barbara responded that the judgment would permit collection and use of the proceeds to pay the loan. The permissible scope of that recovery is therefore before us, notwithstanding the emphasis Ken placed on subrogation and impossibility. See Becker v. Rosebud Operating Servs., Inc., 2008 MT 285, ¶¶ 17–18, 345 Mont. 368, 191 P.3d 435. ¶24 Section 40-4-201(5), MCA, permits enforcement of an incorporated separation agreement through remedies available to enforce a judgment, including contempt, and as contract terms. The statute authorizes enforcement of the obligation the parties undertook. The availability of judgment-enforcement remedies does not answer whether the agreements entitle Barbara to immediate recovery of the entire unpaid balance. Courts must respect the agreement and the final adjudication rather than substitute a different bargain without a proper legal basis. In re Marriage of Harms, ¶¶ 21–25. The distinction is especially important where, as here, paragraph 19 of the MPSA expressly prohibits later judicial modification. See § 40-4-201(6), MCA. ¶25 The District Court relied on § 28-3-601, MCA, because the 2012 MPSA contained no payoff deadline. But the parties did not leave the manner of performance unaddressed. In 2022, with an identified balance exceeding $342,000, they agreed to monthly payments, application of specified sale proceeds, and preservation of a claim against Ken’s estate. Section 28-3-601, MCA, supplies a reasonable time for performance when the agreement specifies none. The statute also requires immediate performance of an exactly ascertained obligation that a party can perform instantly. In applying the reasonable-time provision, 10 we consider the surrounding circumstances and the time necessary to perform what the agreement requires, rather than impose a uniform period for performance. Summer Night Oil Co., LLC v. Munoz, 2011 MT 202, ¶ 26, 361 Mont. 424, 259 P.3d 778. Both provisions require identification of the performance the parties promised. The absence of a final payoff date in the 2012 MPSA therefore does not resolve whether, after the 2022 Stipulation, Ken owed Barbara an immediate payment equal to the entire loan balance. The court had to consider the effect of the Stipulation before deciding what further performance Barbara could compel. ¶26 The estate provision does not require Barbara to await Ken’s death before enforcing his obligations. Conversely, its preservation of responsibility for the unpaid balance does not establish that she may collect that balance immediately during his lifetime. A party may remain responsible for an entire debt while the agreement prescribes installment performance. The absence of a release answers whether responsibility continues; it does not resolve when the entire monetary equivalent becomes recoverable. ¶27 Our decision in Rader v. Taylor, 134 Mont. 419, 428–31, 333 P.2d 480, 486–88 (1958), distinguishes enforcement of accrued installments from acceleration of future performance. There, a contract for deed did not authorize a demand for the entire unpaid purchase price upon default. Although Rader involved a different contract, the same interpretive restraint applies: alone, a default does not itself supply a contractual or statutory right to accelerate. Here, neither the MPSA nor the Stipulation expressly makes all remaining payments immediately due upon a missed installment. A different basis for presently recoverable relief therefore must support the full-balance judgment. 11 ¶28 The indemnity promise could provide a basis for recovery distinct from collection of delinquent installments, but its presence does not complete the analysis. Section 28-11-314(1), MCA, permits recovery under an indemnity against liability once liability exists. Subsection (2), by contrast, requires the indemnitee to have paid the specified claims, demands, damages, or costs before recovering under an indemnity against those actual losses. These rules apply unless the parties’ agreement expresses a contrary intention. Section 28-11-313, MCA. Thus, Barbara need not necessarily pay the creditor before recovering from Ken, and a judgment in her favor is not categorically improper. We therefore consider whether the later Stipulation expresses a contrary intention concerning immediate recovery of the entire loan balance. ¶29 The District Court did not make that determination. Its conclusion that Ken is responsible for the loan “in full and is liable to Barbara for the unpaid debt under Montana law” joins the allocation of responsibility to an immediate monetary recovery without explaining the legal connection. The payoff documentation establishes what would satisfy the creditor, not necessarily the amount Barbara could presently recover from Ken under their agreements. We may affirm a correct result despite incorrect reasoning. Dewey v. Stringer, 2014 MT 136, ¶ 16, 375 Mont. 176, 325 P.3d 1236. But even an indemnity against liability remains subject to a contrary intention concerning performance. Section 28-11-313, MCA. Here, with knowledge of the substantial outstanding balance, the parties later agreed to monthly payments, application of specified sale proceeds, and preservation of a claim against Ken’s estate. Read together, those provisions preserve Ken’s responsibility for the entire debt while prescribing how he must perform that obligation. 12 Interpreting the monthly-payment provisions to allow immediate recovery of the entire balance after a single missed installment would undermine the parties’ agreed method of performance. We construe the Stipulation as qualifying the timing of recovery under the earlier indemnity promise, not extinguishing that promise. Barbara’s continuing liability to the creditor therefore did not, standing alone, make the entire balance immediately recoverable from Ken notwithstanding the agreed installment performance. His missed payments justified enforcement of that performance; they did not supply an acceleration term that the parties omitted. See § 28-3-202, MCA; Rader, 134 Mont. at 428–31, 333 P.2d at 486–88. We therefore conclude that the District Court lacked authority under the parties’ agreements to accelerate the entire unpaid loan balance based on Ken’s failure to make the required monthly payments. ¶30 M. R. Civ. P. 70 does not supply the missing substantive right. It provides mechanisms to enforce a judgment requiring a specific act. Subsection (d), on which the language in the September order appears to rely, concerns execution or assistance upon a judgment or order for possession. M. R. Civ. P. 70(a), (d)-(e). The rule does not independently authorize conversion of a promise to pay a creditor in installments into an unconditional personal judgment for every remaining installment. Likewise, the June warning informed Ken of the consequence the court contemplated; it did not establish that the parties had agreed to acceleration or resolve the contractual basis for that consequence. The June order entered judgment for then-due amounts and announced a consequence for future noncompliance; it did not enter the full-balance judgment that Ken now challenges. 13 The earlier adjudicated payment obligations remain intact, but the warning does not dispense with review of the remedy actually imposed in 2025. ¶31 The dissolution cases do not eliminate that distinction. In In re Marriage of Scoffield, 258 Mont. 337, 339–40, 852 P.2d 664, 665–66 (1993), the District Court entered judgment in favor of a former spouse for assigned marital debts and stayed execution on the condition that the obligor make installments. The appeal concerned which debts he had assumed, not the power to disregard a later installment agreement. In re Marriage of Scoffield demonstrates that an interspousal judgment can enforce assigned debt; it does not establish that this judgment follows from nonpayment alone. ¶32 In In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, ¶ 22, we expressly distinguished modification of a decree from the contempt sanction. We then addressed the statutory conditions for reopening a property disposition under § 40-4-208(3), MCA, and the evidence supporting the modified remedy. In re Marriage of Steinbeisser, ¶¶ 24–27. Here, the District Court did not identify such a basis for reopening the disposition. Its concerns about prolonged nonpayment, the growing balance, and the risk to Barbara support effective enforcement, but they do not dispense with identifying the obligation and legal authority that support the remedy selected. ¶33 Barbara defends the judgment as a means of obtaining funds to pay the loan. The written judgment, however, permits her to collect the entire payoff amount without directing application of collections to that obligation. At the hearing, the judge explained that entry of the judgment would replace Ken’s monthly payments with collection through counsel. These features underscore the substantive change in performance. We do not 14 presume that Barbara would retain the proceeds without paying the creditor, and we do not hold that a money judgment must always name the creditor as payee. But an expectation that collections will satisfy the loan cannot substitute for establishing the right to the judgment and defining how the relief enforces the underlying obligation. ¶34 We therefore vacate paragraph 2 of the operative September 16 order and the resulting October 8 judgment. We remand for determination of an enforcement remedy consistent with the MPSA, the Stipulation, and applicable law. The remaining tasks concern the extent of uncured noncompliance, the credit due for payments already made, and the appropriate remedy for the violations established under this Opinion. They do not require the District Court to reconsider our construction of the agreements. See M. R. App. P. 19(1)(c). The court may enforce Ken’s obligations through a legally authorized remedy, but it may not accelerate the entire unpaid loan balance based on the missed monthly payments or reinstate the vacated judgment under another label without an independent legal basis for that relief. ¶35 The court may enforce the monthly-payment obligation and determine the amount necessary to cure adjudicated deficiencies. That amount must account for subsequent payments and existing judgments without counting an obligation twice. Section 27-1-303, MCA. Because contempt rests on Ken’s separate promise to make monthly payments, the figure need not be identical to whatever Aidvantage currently classifies as delinquent. If the District Court orders Ken to pay amounts toward the Parent PLUS loan, it must require payment to the creditor or direct application of those amounts to the outstanding loan balance and provide corresponding credit for payments made. The court must distinguish 15 those payments from separately authorized fees or other relief. Our decision leaves the underlying debt allocation and the June 2024 adjudicated obligations undisturbed. ¶36 4. Whether the District Court erred by awarding Barbara $3,237.50 in attorney fees. ¶37 The attorney-fee award requires separate treatment. Paragraph 15 of the MPSA requires reasonable fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce, modify, or interpret the agreement. Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation separately makes Ken responsible for fees incurred when Barbara must compel compliance with his monthly-payment obligation. We review contractual entitlement for correctness; clear fee provisions control. In re Marriage of Fossen, 2019 MT 119, ¶¶ 8, 11, 395 Mont. 495, 443 P.3d 418. Our contempt holding preserves Barbara’s entitlement to reasonable fees for that enforcement; Ken’s unsuccessful subrogation theory does not defeat the contractual entitlement. ¶38 The District Court awarded Barbara $3,237.50 in attorney fees after considering the reasonableness of the requested amount under the factors identified in In re Marriage of Mease, 2004 MT 59, ¶ 58, 320 Mont. 229, 92 P.3d 1148. Ken expressly notified the court that he did not object to the fees provided for in the September 16 order and claimed in counsel’s September 30 affidavit. Although we vacate the full-balance judgment, Barbara prevailed in establishing Ken’s noncompliance with the monthly-payment obligation, and the parties’ agreements authorize reasonable fees for enforcing that obligation. The unsuccessful request for the full-balance remedy arose from the same enforcement proceeding and does not, by itself, render the related legal work unreasonable or require reduction of the award. Given Ken’s express nonobjection and the District Court’s 16 reasonableness determination, we find no basis to disturb the $3,237.50 award. We affirm the October 30, 2025 attorney-fee order. ¶39 5. Whether Barbara is entitled to appellate attorney fees and sanctions. ¶40 Barbara also requests appellate sanctions and contractual appellate attorney fees. Ken has obtained relief from the full-balance judgment, and his appeal presented substantial questions about the permissible enforcement remedy. Sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5) are unwarranted. His lack of success on account access and contempt does not make the appeal frivolous. ¶41 Barbara invokes the contractual fee provisions as well. Her partial success requires us to examine the scope of the contractual fee provisions and the matters on which she prevailed. See In re Marriage of Winters, 2004 MT 82, ¶¶ 59–61, 320 Mont. 459, 87 P.3d 1005. Section 28-3-704(1), MCA, makes contractual attorney-fee rights reciprocal and entitles the prevailing party to reasonable fees within the scope of the contractual right. A party may prevail on the particular claim covered by a fee provision despite mixed results elsewhere in the litigation. TransAction Network, Inc. v. Wellington Techs., Inc., 2000 MT 223, ¶¶ 24-35, 301 Mont. 212, 7 P.3d 409. Paragraph 3 of the Stipulation separately assigns Ken responsibility for future fees relative to compelling compliance with the monthly-payment agreement. Barbara prevailed in establishing Ken’s violation of that obligation and successfully defended the resulting contempt determination on appeal. Vacating the full-balance remedy does not disturb that success. Paragraph 15 of the MPSA provides an additional contractual basis for reasonable fees attributable to Barbara’s successful enforcement of Ken’s continuing responsibility for the debt. She therefore 17 remains entitled to reasonable fees for enforcing the monthly-payment obligation under the parties’ agreements, subject to an assessment of the work reasonably necessary and the results obtained. The full-balance request was a proposed remedy for the noncompliance; our rejection of that remedy does not automatically place all work concerning it outside the contractual fee provision. Contractual enforcement fees may include fees on appeal. See In re Marriage of Cini, 2011 MT 295, ¶¶ 27–28, 363 Mont. 1, 266 P.3d 1257. Barbara’s entitlement therefore includes reasonable fees for defending the contempt determination on appeal. ¶42 On remand, the court shall determine the reasonable appellate fees attributable to enforcing the continuing monthly-payment obligation. The court must assess the reasonable amount in light of Barbara’s success in establishing noncompliance and her failure to sustain the full-balance remedy. But the court need not exclude work merely because it also concerned the full-balance remedy. When compensable and unsuccessful matters share a common factual core or related legal theories and the court cannot reasonably divide the work, it may assess the significance of the overall relief obtained in relation to the hours reasonably expended. Plath v. Schonrock, 2003 MT 21, ¶ 37, 314 Mont. 101, 64 P.3d 984. The court must consider the results obtained together with the other applicable factors governing a reasonable fee, rather than reduce the award mechanically because Barbara did not obtain every form of relief she requested. Plath, ¶¶ 36–38. The court must explain the reasonable amount awarded. Neither the contractual entitlement nor the contempt determination makes every claimed appellate fee reasonable. Each party shall bear his or her own costs on appeal. M. R. App. P. 19(3)(a). 18  CONCLUSION ¶43 We affirm the account-access ruling, without diminishing the existing rights to statements and payment information, the contempt determination based on the August and September 2024 nonpayments, and the award of the $3,237.50 attorney-fee award. We vacate the directive for a full-balance judgment in paragraph 2 of the September 16, 2025 order and the October 8, 2025 judgment. We remand for determination of the enforcement remedy and reasonable appellate attorney fees consistent with this Opinion. We deny Barbara’s request for appellate sanctions. ¶44 Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON 19