Marriage of Christofferson

11/04/2026 DA 25-0252 Case Number: DA 25-0252 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 262 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: KATHRYN JOAN CHRISTOFFERSON, Petitioner and Appellant, and COLIN ORVAL CHRISTOFFERSON, Respondent and Appellee. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR-22-395 Honorable Tara J. Elliott, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Marybeth M. Sampsel, Measure Law, PC, Kalispell, Montana For Appellee: Lucy Hansen, Hansen Law Practice, PLLC, Missoula, Montana Submitted on Briefs: October 7, 2026 Decided: November 4, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Kathryn Christofferson appeals from the April 15, 2026 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order resolving her motion to recalculate child support, entered by the Montana Fourth Judicial District, Missoula County, after our remand for additional findings. We restate the dispositive issues as follows: 1. Whether the District Court erred by adopting a child-support calculation inconsistent with its findings and order concerning health insurance. 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by declining to award earlier retroactive child support. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND ¶2 Kathryn (Katie) and Colin Christofferson (Colin) married in 2010 and have two minor children, born in 2011 and 2014. The parties separated in January 2021, and Katie filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 27, 2022. In April 2023, the District Court entered a decree dissolving the marriage. ¶3 Before entry of the decree, the parties executed a stipulated final parenting plan and a marital and property settlement agreement. The parenting plan provided for calculation of child support under the Montana Child Support Guidelines through the Child Support Services Division (CSSD). It further provided that Colin would maintain health insurance for the children, so long as it was available to him at a reasonable cost, and that beginning with tax year 2023 the parties would divide the federal tax dependency exemptions with Colin claiming one child and Katie claiming the other, with future rotation as specified by the agreement. 2 ¶4 On October 10, 2023, CSSD issued a temporary administrative support order requiring Colin to pay $96.50 per child per month, for a total transfer payment of $193 per month. The accompanying worksheet assumed 210 parenting days for Katie and 155 parenting days for Colin, included imputed income for Katie, used income Colin reported to CSSD, and credited Colin with paying the children’s health-insurance costs. ¶5 Katie requested an administrative review hearing of the CSSD calculation, but the Office of Administrative Hearings denied her request as untimely. ¶6 On January 17, 2024, Katie filed a motion in the dissolution action requesting recalculation of child support. She asserted that the CSSD calculation contained material errors—including parenting days, income, medical deductions, and health-insurance amounts—and requested back support from the date of the dissolution filing. Colin opposed the motion and argued, in part, that the parties had agreed to proceed through CSSD for the calculation and enforcement of child support. His February 2024 response opposed the request for back support, and Katie renewed it in her April 2024 reply. ¶7 The parties later agreed on several inputs for a new calculation, including annual net self-employment income of $30,000 for Katie, an average of Colin’s recent earnings, and 134 parenting days for Colin. Applying the parties’ agreed three-year averaging method, CSSD used annual earnings of $83,316 for Colin and calculated a total monthly transfer payment of $853 for both children. At a January 27, 2025 conference, the District Court requested revisions to Colin’s tax-filing status and the treatment of the earned income tax credit. CSSD filed a revised worksheet the next day calculating a $770 monthly 3 payment. That worksheet included $6,534 in annual health-insurance premiums for the children and credited Colin for paying them. ¶8 The District Court held an evidentiary hearing on February 10, 2025. At the hearing, the parties presented testimony and exhibits regarding their respective incomes, the children’s health insurance, parenting time, and the prior CSSD calculations. Both parties and CSSD attorney Patrick Quinn testified. ¶9 Katie testified that her income for 2023 was approximately $26,939 and estimated her 2024 income would be approximately $29,000. Katie also testified regarding the financial difficulties she experienced while the temporary CSSD support order remained in effect. She testified that her expenses exceeded her income and that she used savings and assistance from her parents to cover household expenses. Her parents offered their home to Katie and the children, and her parents moved to another home. Katie paid rent and utilities and hoped to purchase the home. The court admitted her monthly budget and proposed calculation of back support. She acknowledged that the children’s basic needs were met but testified that she could not provide the additional benefits they enjoyed with Colin. She requested retroactive support reaching back to the January 2021 separation. ¶10 Colin testified that he had provided the information CSSD requested and had paid the support required by its temporary order. He also testified that he had maintained health insurance for the children since separation and provided for their needs during his parenting time. He confirmed a monthly insurance premium of $592 and described fluctuating earnings and a monthly mortgage payment of $3,861 after refinancing the marital home as part of the dissolution. He opposed retroactive support and testified that the proposed 4 increase, together with insurance premiums and his housing expense, would create substantial financial difficulty. ¶11 The parties and the court discussed placing the children on Healthy Montana Kids and removing the private insurance expense from the calculation. As allowed by the court, the parties submitted proposed findings and conclusions. With his post-hearing proposal, Colin included Exhibit D, a child-support worksheet calculation in which he assumed Katie’s income as $30,000 per year, his income as $83,316 per year, the children being with Katie 210 days per year and with him 155 days per year, and no child health-insurance premium. Exhibit D also allocated both children to Katie for tax benefits. Based on that calculation, Colin proposed he pay child support of $342 per child per month, or $684 per month for the two children. ¶12 In its March 10, 2025 order, the District Court recited the testimony about income and support but did not determine the essential inputs for its calculation. The court found that no testimony indicated the children had suffered harm while Colin paid the lower amount and that testimony indicated he supplied what they needed to maintain their accustomed lifestyle. The court nevertheless ordered Colin to pay $684 per month in child support for the two children, relying on Exhibit D attached to Colin’s post-trial proposed findings, and denied back support. Exhibit D had not been admitted into evidence at the hearing. ¶13 The worksheet on which the court relied, Exhibit D, reflected assumptions that differed from the earlier CSSD calculations, including parenting days, tax treatment, and health-insurance costs. The District Court did not make findings resolving these 5 discrepancies or explaining why it adopted the inputs from Colin’s post-trial submission of Exhibit D instead of the figures reflected in the evidence presented at the hearing or in the CSSD modified calculation. ¶14 In addition to ordering the $684 monthly payment, the District Court modified provisions of the parties’ stipulated parenting plan. The parenting plan allocated the children’s federal tax dependency exemptions between the parties, but the court ordered that Katie claim both children beginning in tax year 2024 (or 2025 if necessary). The court also altered the parenting plan’s health-insurance provision. The plan required Colin to maintain health insurance for the children if available through his employment at a reasonable cost, but the court instead ordered Katie to enroll the children in Healthy Montana Kids and notify the court if the children later became ineligible. The order provided that, to the extent these directives conflicted with the parenting plan, the order superseded the plan. ¶15 Katie appealed. We remanded for findings and conclusions explaining the support calculation, tax allocation, insurance arrangements, and denial of retroactive support. We allowed the District Court to conduct further proceedings or obtain additional filings as necessary and provided for supplemental briefing after the court entered its order. ¶16 On April 15, 2026, the District Court entered its amended findings, conclusions, and order. It determined that 134 days most accurately represented Colin’s parenting time, accepted annual income of $30,000 for Katie and approximately $83,000 for Colin, and restored the allocation of one child to each parent for the child tax credit. It allocated the earned income tax credit for both children to Katie and retained the requirement that she 6 enroll the children in Healthy Montana Kids. The court also resolved the disputes over additional family income and childcare expenses. ¶17 The court considered the $684 calculation it previously had adopted, a new $680 calculation it obtained, and the $770 calculation CSSD filed before the hearing. It selected the $770 calculation as the most accurate because it reflected 134 parenting days for Colin and the tax allocation the court determined would benefit the children. The amended order described that calculation as consistent with Healthy Montana Kids coverage, although the worksheet retained the $6,534 annual premium and corresponding credit to Colin. The operative provision made the $770 obligation effective April 1, 2025, with credit for support already paid. ¶18 The court again declined to award earlier support. It found that both parents had met the children’s needs since separation and had received family assistance that benefited the children. It acknowledged Katie’s financial difficulties but found her assertions about Colin’s greater lifestyle speculative. It emphasized Colin’s payment of insurance premiums and, after the temporary order, cash support. The court also stated that Katie waited nearly a year after the temporary order to request back support. That statement overlooked her January 2024 motion and the ensuing briefing. Katie challenges the amended calculation and seeks retroactive application from the date of that motion. Colin defends the amended order and requests appellate attorney fees and costs as sanctions. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶19 We review child-support determinations, including decisions concerning retroactive support, for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Miller, 2022 MT 110, ¶ 14, 409 Mont. 7 29, 511 P.3d 307. A district court abuses its discretion if it acts arbitrarily without conscientious judgment or exceeds the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Miller, ¶ 14. The failure to set forth the essential and determining facts underlying a child-support calculation is an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Mills, 2006 MT 149, ¶ 20, 332 Mont. 415, 138 P.3d 815. We review underlying factual findings for clear error and conclusions of law for correctness. A finding is clearly erroneous if substantial evidence does not support it, the court misapprehends the effect of the evidence, or review of the record leaves us convinced the court made a mistake. An exercise of discretion resting on a clearly erroneous material finding or an erroneous application of law also constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Jackson, 2025 MT 177, ¶¶ 8-9, 423 Mont. 329, 573 P.3d 812. We do not reweigh conflicting evidence or substitute our assessment of credibility for that of the trial court. In re Marriage of Frick, 2011 MT 41, ¶ 23, 359 Mont. 296, 249 P.3d 67. DISCUSSION ¶20 1. Whether the District Court erred by adopting a child-support calculation inconsistent with its findings and order concerning health insurance. ¶21 The problem with the order on appeal is not that the District Court lacked authority to address child support after CSSD acted. A district court in a dissolution proceeding remains obligated to enter a support order consistent with § 40-4-204, MCA. A temporary administrative order under § 40-5-225(3), MCA, remains subject to supersession by the final district court order. Section 40-5-225(4)(b), MCA. The parenting plan contemplated that CSSD would calculate and collect support; it did not displace that statutory framework. 8 The problem is that the calculation the District Court adopted does not implement the findings it made on remand. ¶22 Under M. R. Civ. P. 52(a), a district court must make findings that disclose the essential and determining facts underlying its decision so that this Court can conduct meaningful appellate review. See In re Marriage of Banka, 2009 MT 33, ¶¶ 9-10, 349 Mont. 193, 201 P.3d 830. The rule serves a practical purpose: without adequate findings, appellate review becomes speculation. In re Marriage of Banka, ¶ 9; In re Marriage of Mills, ¶ 20. ¶23 Unlike the original order, the amended order resolves the disputes over income and parenting days and explains the allocation of tax benefits. Katie does not ask us to disturb those determinations in her supplemental appeal. The remaining problem is not simply an absence of findings. The adopted worksheet contradicts the court’s decision to replace the children’s private health insurance with Healthy Montana Kids coverage. ¶24 The accuracy of those inputs matters. Section 40-4-204(2), MCA, requires the court to consider all relevant factors, including the financial resources of the parents, the standard of living the children would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved, the cost of day care, and the parenting plan. The court must apply the uniform Guidelines, and the resulting amount is presumptively adequate and reasonable. Section 40-4-204(3)(a), MCA. When the court varies from the presumptive Guidelines amount, § 40-4-204(3)(a)-(b), MCA, requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that application of the standards and Guidelines would be unjust to the child or a party or inappropriate in the 9 particular case, explain its reasons, and identify the amount that would otherwise be ordered under the Guidelines. ¶25 The Guidelines require the court to supplement the primary support allowance with specified expenses, including the actual cost of adding the children to an existing health insurance policy or obtaining a child-only policy. Admin. R. M. 37.62.123(1)(b). The court must credit each parent for the supplemental expense that parent pays. Admin. R. M. 37.62.123(3). Thus, the calculation must reflect both the expense and the parent who bears it. In In re Marriage of Stevens, 2011 MT 106, ¶¶ 18-20, 360 Mont. 344, 253 P.3d 877, we reversed a calculation that failed to account for the children’s insurance costs that the father paid. Conversely, a court need not credit a parent for insurance costs the parent does not incur. In re Marriage of Frick, ¶¶ 38-41. ¶26 The amended order and adopted worksheet do not agree on this essential input. The order requires Healthy Montana Kids coverage and provides for allocation of private insurance premiums only if the children later lose eligibility. The worksheet nonetheless adds $6,534 in annual private premiums to the children’s supplemental needs at line 12b and credits Colin for that expense at line 23. Those entries assume an expense that the ordered coverage eliminates. The fact that the worksheet accurately reflects other determinations does not resolve this contradiction. ¶27 Although the District Court found the $770 calculation “the most accurate,” the court did not explain why that worksheet continued to credit Colin with the children’s private insurance expense after the order replaced that coverage. Its reasons for selecting 134 parenting days and the tax allocation do not resolve the insurance discrepancy. And 10 the court did not enter variance findings under § 40-4-204(3), MCA, to support a departure from a correctly calculated presumptive amount. Colin’s reliance on Midence v. Hampton, 2006 MT 294, ¶ 15, 334 Mont. 388, 147 P.3d 227, does not cure that omission. The court selected $770 as the accurate guideline calculation, not as an identified and justified variance. Deference to its factual findings does not permit us to affirm a calculation that contradicts them. ¶28 We do not hold that a district court may never consider post-hearing proposed calculations. But where the court does so, the resulting order still must rest on findings that identify the material facts the court actually found and explain how those facts support the ordered amount. In In re Marriage of Frick, ¶¶ 14-15, the court entered findings and then directed the parties to submit proposed child-support calculations. Here, the dispositive defect is substantive, not evidentiary: the worksheet the District Court adopted does not implement the Healthy Montana Kids insurance arrangement the District Court ordered. We therefore need not decide Katie’s separate contention that the court could not consider the $770 worksheet because no party formally offered it as an exhibit at the hearing. ¶29 Colin also argues that Katie should not obtain more support than she requested below and that she failed to object to post-hearing submissions. Katie requested an accurate calculation and contested the treatment of health-insurance costs. The parties discussed removing those costs when they considered Healthy Montana Kids coverage. Her agreement to submit proposed findings did not concede the accuracy of Colin’s worksheet, and the particular inconsistency now before us arose when the court adopted its 11 amended order. Her challenge seeks application of the Guidelines to the facts the court found, not enforcement of a particular figure divorced from those facts. ¶30 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion by declining to award earlier retroactive child support. ¶31 The District Court had authority to award retroactive child support. A district court has discretion regarding retroactive support, but that discretion must rest on an adequate record and a legally sufficient rationale. See In re Marriage of Miller, ¶¶ 14, 26; In re Marriage of Banka, ¶ 9. Section 40-5-225(4)(b), MCA, expressly provides for crediting payments under a temporary administrative order if the final order applies retroactively; it does not require every final order to apply retroactively. We likewise have recognized that a court may revise a temporary support obligation retroactively after hearing the evidence. Stoneman v. Drollinger, 2000 MT 274, ¶ 50, 302 Mont. 107, 14 P.3d 12, overruled in part on other grounds by In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 25, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39. Whether to do so remains a matter of judicial discretion. In re Marriage of Frick, ¶ 44. ¶32 We first address the finding that Katie waited nearly a year after the temporary order to request back support. Katie’s January 2024 motion sought back support from the dissolution filing date, while later arguments referenced other periods. Colin opposed the request in February, and Katie renewed it in April. The omission of retroactivity from a later list of issues did not make November 2024 the first notice of the request. The court heard evidence and decided the issue on its merits. We therefore do not affirm based on waiver, lack of notice, or the inaccurate finding of delay. 12 ¶33 Katie argues that the disparity between the temporary payment and the later calculations, together with her financial hardship, required a retroactive award. She distinguishes cases affirming denial of retroactivity because the custodial parent already had received substantial financial benefits. In Midence, ¶ 21, the father had paid more than the children needed under the mother’s expense calculations. In In re Marriage of Miller, ¶ 27, substantial housing assistance and continuing monthly payments supported the finding that an additional retroactive award would produce a financial windfall. In In re Marriage of Franks, 275 Mont. 66, 71, 909 P.2d 712, 715 (1996), the mother’s use of income-producing marital property supported denial of support reaching back through an eleven-year separation. Katie maintains that she received no comparable benefit. ¶34 Those cases identify circumstances supporting the particular decisions under review; they do not establish that overpayment or a financial windfall is the only permissible basis for declining retroactive support. In In re Marriage of Frick, the mother sought retroactive support based on the father’s asserted lack of financial involvement and her own difficulty maintaining employment without losing public benefits. The parties disputed the extent of past support, and the father had incurred substantial travel costs to respond to the dissolution petition. We affirmed the denial of retroactive support in light of the disputed contributions and financial hardship both parties experienced. In re Marriage of Frick, ¶¶ 43-44. The inquiry therefore requires consideration of the circumstances, not simply comparison of the temporary payment with a later calculation. ¶35 Katie also relies on Welch v. Welch, 273 Mont. 497, 505, 905 P.2d 132, 137 (1995). There, we affirmed an award applying an increased obligation retroactively because the 13 children’s expenses existed before the court entered its order. We rejected the father’s objection that the resulting debt would be burdensome when the mother already had borne the additional expenses. Welch establishes that an obligor’s reluctance to incur debt does not defeat an otherwise warranted retroactive award. It does not make retroactivity mandatory whenever the final obligation exceeds temporary support; the decision expressly recognizes the court’s discretion. Welch, 273 Mont. at 505, 905 P.2d at 137. ¶36 The District Court recognized that discretion and considered the circumstances of both households. It acknowledged that Katie had struggled financially, used savings, and received assistance from her parents. It also found that Colin had maintained the children’s insurance and supported them during his parenting time, including before the temporary order, and had paid the required cash support after that order. It considered his fluctuating income, increased housing expense, and the financial effect of an additional accumulated obligation. The court found that both parents had met the children’s needs, did not find that Colin received regular additional family income, and rejected as speculative Katie’s assertions about the greater lifestyle he could provide. These findings addressed actual past support and the financial circumstances of both parents, not merely compliance with the temporary order. ¶37 Katie’s budget and testimony could support a different exercise of discretion. They do not permit us to disregard the findings the court made after considering that evidence. We do not treat her share of the marital estate as child support paid by Colin, or assistance from her parents as an automatic substitute for his obligation. We do not hold that an obligor’s housing expense takes priority over support. Neither compliance with the 14 temporary order nor the absence of bad faith would alone defeat the request. Rather, as in In re Marriage of Frick, the court weighed competing evidence concerning support and financial hardship and concluded that an additional retroactive obligation was not warranted. Our review asks whether that determination exceeded the bounds of reason, not whether we would have reached the same result in the first instance. ¶38 The court’s statement that the children had not suffered harm also requires context. Child support is not limited to avoiding deprivation of food or shelter. The statute requires consideration of the standard of living the children would have enjoyed had the marriage continued, along with the resources and needs of the children and their parents. Section 40-4-204(2), MCA; In re Marriage of Jackson, ¶ 11. A parent need not prove that children suffered harm before the court may award retroactive support. Here, however, the court did not stop with the absence of harm. It considered the parents’ contributions, their financial circumstances, family assistance, and the evidence concerning the children’s standard of living. We affirm that individualized assessment, not a rule that meeting basic needs alone defeats retroactivity. ¶39 We also reject Colin’s argument that adding the $592 monthly insurance premium identified in the findings to his $193 cash payment establishes that he paid more than the $770 guideline amount. The $770 reflected in the worksheet is a net transfer payment that already credits Colin for his $592 out-of-pocket insurance premium expense. Therefore, comparing Colin’s actual outlay of $785 to the $770 net transfer payment double-counts the insurance expense as a credit. Adding the premium to the cash payment and comparing that sum with the net transfer payment improperly treats the insurance payment as an 15 additional credit. Colin’s total obligation under the worksheet would actually be $1,362 (the $770 transfer payment plus the $592 premium he pays directly). The court could consider insurance Colin actually provided when assessing the support the children received, but those payments do not establish that $193 equaled a correctly calculated $770 transfer obligation. Our affirmance does not depend on that comparison. ¶40 The erroneous finding concerning Katie’s delay does not require another remand. We must disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights. M. R. Civ. P. 61. An erroneous finding unnecessary to support the decision does not require reversal. In re Marriage of Anderson, 220 Mont. 477, 481, 717 P.2d 11, 14 (1986). The amended order identified Colin’s actual contributions as its most important consideration, separately found that both parents had met the children’s needs, and evaluated the asserted disparity in their resources. Although Finding of Fact 38 referred to delay, the court separately concluded in Conclusion of Law 10 that earlier support was unwarranted because of those contributions and its assessment of the evidence, without identifying delay as a reason. Those reasons address the merits of the request regardless of when Katie raised it. They are reasons the District Court itself gave, not findings we supply on appeal. Considering the amended order as a whole, the inaccurate chronology was not necessary to its discretionary determination and does not undermine the independent grounds supporting that determination. ¶41 The discrepancy in the ongoing insurance calculation does not require a different result on retroactivity. The calculation must change because the ordered coverage eliminates an expense the worksheet continues to credit. The earlier period involved 16 insurance Colin actually provided. The District Court did not have to treat that contribution as nonexistent when deciding whether to impose an earlier retroactive obligation. Conversely, affirming that discretionary decision does not validate the $770 calculation for periods governed by the new arrangement. The amount due under the final order and whether to extend that obligation into an earlier period present distinct questions. ¶42 Finally, the amended order incorrectly combined the public-domain citation for In re Marriage of Frank, 2019 MT 130, 396 Mont. 123, 443 P.3d 527, with the reporter citation for In re Marriage of Franks, 275 Mont. 66, 909 P.2d 712. The former concerns maintenance. In re Marriage of Frank, ¶ 1. The latter addresses retroactive child support and the applicable abuse-of-discretion review. In re Marriage of Franks, 275 Mont. at 70-71, 909 P.2d at 714-15. The citation error does not change the governing law or the court’s express recognition that it could award retroactive support. ¶43 The District Court considered the support the children actually received, the financial circumstances of both parents, and Katie’s evidence of hardship, and explained why it declined to impose an earlier retroactive obligation. Its supported findings, independent of the erroneous finding concerning delay addressed above, provide a sufficient basis for that decision. Although the evidence could support a different result, our review does not permit us to substitute our judgment for a reasonable exercise of the District Court’s discretion. See In re Marriage of Frick, ¶¶ 43-44. On this record, the District Court did not act arbitrarily, fail to exercise conscientious judgment, or exceed the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice. In re Marriage of Miller, ¶ 14. We 17 therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion by declining to award child support retroactive to a date before April 1, 2025. ¶44 Because we reverse only the support calculation, we do not direct the District Court to adopt any specific support figure now or direct an award of earlier retroactive support. The record includes a post-hearing CSSD worksheet attached as Exhibit C to Colin’s proposed findings that uses 134 parenting days, one child tax credit for each parent, the earned income tax credit for both children to Katie, and no children’s insurance premium, producing $957 per month. The court did not adopt that calculation or resolve its differences from the other worksheets. Determination of the correct support amount remains for the District Court on remand. Our affirmance of the denial of earlier support does not validate the $770 calculation for periods governed by the new insurance arrangement. ¶45 Finally, we deny Colin’s request for appellate attorney fees and costs as sanctions under M. R. App. P. 19(5). That rule permits sanctions for an appeal that is frivolous, vexatious, brought for harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds. Katie’s appeal raises substantial and reasonable grounds, and she has established reversible error in the support calculation. CONCLUSION ¶46 The child-support calculation in the amended order does not implement the findings and health-insurance arrangement the District Court adopted. We reverse the April 15, 2026 Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order insofar as it fixes child support at $770 per month and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 18 On remand, the District Court shall determine the correct presumptive support amount under the Guidelines consistently with its unchallenged determinations concerning income, parenting days, tax treatment, and health-insurance coverage, and make any required variance findings if it departs from that amount. The parties shall have an opportunity to address the corrected calculation before the court enters its order. The court may take additional evidence if necessary to determine the actual insurance expense for the relevant period. ¶47 The corrected obligation shall apply from April 1, 2025, the effective date specified in the operative provision of the amended order. The court shall credit support already paid and account for any actual insurance expense during the relevant period without allowing a credit for premiums no parent incurred. Correction of the amount due from that effective date does not reopen the request to extend the obligation to January 17, 2024, or an earlier date. Our affirmance of the denial of earlier retroactive support does not postpone correction of the appealed award until entry of the order on remand. ¶48 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY We Concur: /S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE 19