Full Opinion

10/27/2026 DA 26-0206 Case Number: DA 26-0206 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 255N IN THE MATTER OF: A.B.L., A Youth in Need of Care. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DN 22-66 Honorable Rod Souza, Presiding Judge COUNSEL OF RECORD: For Appellant: Allen P. Lanning, Law Office of Allen P. Lanning, PC, Great Falls, Montana For Appellee: Austin Knudsen, Montana Attorney General, Katie Schulz, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Scott Twito, Yellowstone County Attorney, Brooke Baracker-Taylor, Assistant Attorney General and Special Deputy County Attorney, Billings, Montana Submitted on Briefs: September 16, 2026 Decided: October 27, 2026 Filed: __________________________________________ Clerk Justice Beth Baker delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, we decide this case by memorandum opinion. It shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Mother E.D.L. appeals the Thirteenth Judicial District Court’s order granting permanent guardianship over her daughter A.B.L., who was eight months old at the time of removal in March 2022. Mother asserts that the court committed reversible error when it: (1) determined that the child could not be safely returned to her after she relapsed in August 2024; (2) relied on evidence precluded from consideration by Montana’s Indian Child Welfare Act (MICWA); and (3) found that the Department of Public Health and Human Services (Department) had made active efforts to reunify Mother with A.B.L. when it abandoned all such efforts after Mother’s 2024 relapse. We affirm. ¶3 Mother’s involvement with Department intervention dates back to 2012, when her two oldest children were removed after Mother and the children’s father were intoxicated while driving with the children in the vehicle. Ultimately, Mother acknowledged that she could not handle caring for the two children and relinquished her parental rights in 2014. When her third child was born in 2015, Mother—who was living with her mother and stepfather—agreed to an in-home safety plan. When Mother was unable to maintain sobriety, the child was placed with her two older siblings in foster care. After a year and a 2 half of Department services, Mother was unable to complete her treatment plan and relinquished her rights to the third child. ¶4 A.B.L. was born in July 2021. The child was three months old when Mother reached out to family members to care for her because Mother was homeless and drinking heavily. The Department implemented a voluntary protection plan and assisted Mother in getting into treatment and a sober living home. A.B.L. was returned to her care in early 2022. ¶5 Mother was arrested in March 2022 after driving while intoxicated with A.B.L. in the car. The child was removed from Mother’s care and placed with the family who had adopted Mother’s three oldest children following the prior dependent-neglect proceedings.1 Because A.B.L. is a member of the Crow Tribe, the Department and the District Court followed the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) throughout the proceedings. In June 2022, the District Court adjudicated A.B.L. as a youth in need of care and transferred Mother’s case into the ICWA Family Recovery Court. Mother signed and the court approved her treatment plan that November. Mother’s treatment plan included the primary tasks of addressing concerns related to chemical dependency, mental health, parenting, employment, and domestic violence. Mother completed a thirty-day inpatient treatment program and some day treatment, but she relapsed and voluntarily withdrew from Family Recovery Court after thirteen months. The court extended Temporary Legal 1 A.B.L.’s father was incarcerated and unable to care for her. At the time of the final guardianship order in this case, Father was incarcerated at the Montana State Prison, and the District Court observed that he “will remain there for the foreseeable future.” Father did not appeal the guardianship order. 3 Custody in October 2023 without objection to allow Mother to continue working on her treatment plan. ¶6 In the spring of 2024, after Mother continued to maintain sobriety and engage in treatment recommendations, the Department implemented an in-home safety plan and placed A.B.L. in Mother’s care for a trial home visit. But Mother relapsed within four months. After extending Temporary Legal Custody to allow Mother to work on her treatment plan, the Department petitioned for guardianship in May 2025, just over three years after the child was removed. ¶7 The District Court held a four-day hearing over several different days between the end of August and the first of October 2025. Several months later, it issued a forty-four-page order with detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting the guardianship. The court recounted Mother’s significant history of endangering the lives of all of her children, including A.B.L., by driving under the influence of alcohol or riding in a vehicle along with her children with an intoxicated driver. The court found a pattern over the years, including in this case, that Mother would improve for a time but could not sustain sobriety. It noted Сhild Protection Specialist Nelson’s concerns about Mother’s substance use and her honesty about such use, her history of relapses, her mental health, and her lack of stability, as well as her continued involvement in violent relationships. The court found noteworthy that CPS Nelson’s concerns remained “despite the fourteen months CPS Nelson has been [the] assigned worker” on the case. ¶8 The District Court recounted Mother’s history in detail, explaining her positive tests and her attempts to blame something else for the results. The court acknowledged 4 testimony from Mother’s probation officer that she tested Mother for alcohol twice in 2025 and the tests were negative. “However,” it found, “only two tests for an individual on supervision for an alcohol related felony with a history of substance use disorder are insufficient.” The court found Mother’s history to show a cycle of relapse, then a period of sobriety followed by another relapse. Mother’s inability to remain drug- and alcohol-free, it explained, endangers A.B.L., particularly in light of Mother’s criminal conduct that led to A.B.L.’s removal, her August 2024 conduct that again required removal, and her past conduct involving her other children. The District Court found further that Mother had not completed the treatment plan task requiring her to address her involvement with violent relationships. She recently had reconciled a relationship with a partner who had been abusive, and the court did not believe—given the history—that Mother had the ability or insight to ensure that only safe people come into her home and in contact with her daughter. Based on the evidence, including Mother’s own testimony, the court found that “she still lacks judgment with respect to safe and healthy relationships.” ¶9 Discussing other requirements of the treatment plan, the District Court expressly addressed the testimony of Rhianna Curtiss, Mother’s mental health therapist, that Mother had met her treatment plan goal. The court observed that Curtiss’s testimony revealed that she knew “very little” about Mother’s life or problems and the full scope of her needs: unhealthy relationships, sobriety, and stability. The court did not give weight to Curtiss’s testimony but found that Mother’s therapy had not addressed the causes and conditions that led to the child’s removal and re-removal. “The cycle,” the court explained, “keeps occurring.” 5 ¶10 Ultimately, though Mother could at times maintain sobriety, employment, and housing, the District Court found that she lacks “a foundation of consistency in these domains to ensure [A.B.L.]’s safety.” The court explained in summary: The housing concerns, coupled with lack of stable income and relapses places [Mother] on the precipice of severe setbacks, including homelessness. Moreover, [Mother]’s actions before, during, and after her August 2024 relapse reinforce that [Mother] has not integrated the tools taught in treatment into her decision-making, relationships, and parenting in order to maintain a safe, sober home for [A.B.L.]. [Mother]’s choices have put [A.B.L.]’s safety at risk. The court stressed that despite three admissions to treatment, Mother had not been able to sustain long-term sobriety, and her relapses have put the child at risk. Instead of using the tools from those treatment admissions or relying on sober, supportive people, Mother continued to get involved with unsafe people. ¶11 Addressing the statutory criteria for guardianship and the specific requirements of ICWA and MICWA, the court concluded that further reunification efforts likely would be unproductive given the length of the case, the repeated cycle of Mother’s behavior, and the child’s age and need for permanency and stability. At the time of the hearing, A.B.L. had been in care for more than thirty-nine of her then-forty-eight months of age, the vast majority of the child’s life. The court also determined that the Department made not just active, but exemplary—even if ultimately unsuccessful—efforts to avoid the necessity of placing A.B.L. in a protective out-of-home placement or to make it possible to safely return the child to her home. Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) and § 41-3-1319(1), MCA, the court concluded that the Department “provide[d] remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and . . . these efforts have 6 proved unsuccessful,” to the extent that reunification was not possible. But the court found the Department’s efforts successful to the extent that A.B.L.’s placement with the guardians allows her to have ongoing connection with her Tribe, culture, siblings, extended family, and parents. The court concluded that it was in the child’s best interests to be placed in a guardianship with the same family as her siblings. ¶12 This Court reviews a district court’s conclusions of law for correctness. In re S.S., 2022 MT 75, ¶ 12, 408 Mont. 238, 507 P.3d 1161. We review a district court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re L.B., 2025 MT 6, ¶ 8, 420 Mont. 192, 562 P.3d 497. We will reverse for clear error only in the following circumstances: (1) the court’s finding was not “supported by substantial evidence,” (2) the “court misapprehended the effect of the evidence,” or (3) we are “left with a definite and firm conviction” that the court made a mistake. In re S.S., ¶ 12. We view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party” when “determining whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings.” In re S.S., ¶ 12. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if weak and conflicting.” In re I.D., 2025 MT 299, ¶ 15, 425 Mont. 382, 581 P.3d 380 (quoting In re S.S., ¶ 12). ¶13 The Department may petition the court to appoint a guardian for a child who is in the temporary or permanent legal custody of the Department. Section 41-3-444(1), MCA. Before granting a petition for guardianship, the court must find, among other facts, that “the department has made reasonable efforts to reunite the parent and child, further efforts to reunite the parent and child by the department would likely be unproductive, and reunification of the parent and child would be contrary to the best interests of the child.” 7 Section 41-3-444(2)(d), MCA. Because A.B.L. is an Indian Child, appointing a guardian for her creates a “foster care placement,” bringing additional requirements under ICWA and MICWA. See In re J.S., 2014 MT 79, ¶ 31, 374 Mont. 329, 321 P.3d 103 (ICWA requirements apply to guardianships as well as terminations). A party seeking foster care placement of an Indian child must show the court that active efforts were made to provide rehabilitative services and programs to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and those efforts were unsuccessful. Section 41-3-1319(1), MCA. “Active efforts” includes “affirmative, active, thorough, and timely efforts meeting the requirements of 41-3-1319 that are intended primarily to maintain or reunite an Indian child with the child’s family and that are tailored to the facts and circumstances of the case.” Section 41-3-1303(1), MCA. In re L.B., ¶ 11. ¶14 Mother argues that the District Court improperly found from the hearing evidence that further efforts to reunite her with her child would be unproductive. Mother claims that the court relied on isolated instances of alcohol or drug use, particularly on her relapse in August 2024, which she claims was an isolated occurrence to be expected in her recovery that should not have relieved the Department from continuing to engage in active efforts at reunification. Mother asserts that her one-night, grief-related relapse as her in-home safety plan neared completion of its fourth month was not a basis for the Department to give up on her and immediately switch its permanency plan to guardianship. She contends that the District Court overlooked the requirements of § 41-3-1320(3), MCA, and related federal provisions that substance abuse, by itself, is not clear and convincing evidence that it is unsafe to return a child to her parent. Mother contends that the District Court’s “vehement straining” to find the prerequisites for guardianship “seems colored more by animus than 8 judicious analysis.” She claims that the court relied too heavily on her pre-2018 alcohol use history and mischaracterized her pattern of behavior as taking a “hard dive the other direction” each time she progressed in her recovery. Mother claims that the District Court erroneously relied on speculation and incomplete analysis, whereas the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence to support a decision that mother was abusing substances, was unstable in employment, had unsafe housing, or was engaging in romantic relationships marked by domestic violence that posed a risk to A.B.L. such that reunification efforts should be abandoned or that reunification would be contrary to the child’s best interests. ¶15 Mother concludes with an argument that the Department wrongly abandoned its active efforts after her August 2024 relapse. She contends that if the Department had moved promptly to address the relapse issues and restart the reunification process, the child and mother might have been reunited a year before the District Court’s guardianship order was issued. ¶16 The District Court found that the Department satisfied the “active efforts” requirements throughout the case, including after Mother’s August 2024 relapse, and described those efforts in its final order. The court additionally found that Mother was offered the ICWA Family Recovery Court. The court described the program’s purpose to direct parents seeking reunification into a comprehensive program of drug treatment and related, culturally appropriate, support services. While a participant in Family Recovery Court, Mother had weekly contact with a team of professionals who attempted to assist her 9 in her recovery and troubleshoot barriers and concerns. As noted, Mother voluntarily withdrew from this participation. ¶17 Although Mother characterizes her relapse as an isolated incident, the District Court found it to be part of a long pattern of Mother’s inability to overcome her addiction and maintain sobriety. Once the results were uploaded, Mother’s SCRAM monitor showed that she tested positive for alcohol on July 21st, August 1st, August 6th, August 8th, August 10th, August 11th, and August 12th, 2024.2 Contrary to Mother’s contention, the record shows that CPS Nelson did not abandon Mother after this relapse but continued to make outreach to her and to her probation officer and counselor. Nelson met with Mother six times, and they communicated through nineteen additional text messages or phone calls between August 20, 2024, and mid-March 2025.3 She communicated with Mother’s providers to keep Mother engaged in treatment and coordinated with Mother’s counselor in an attempt to ensure that Mother remained engaged in her treatment plan and had access to culturally relevant support services. None of those professionals suggested alternative programs or services for the Department to consider, so they continued the services in place. ¶18 Before granting a petition for guardianship, the court must find that further efforts to reunify the family would likely be unproductive. Section 41-3-444(2)(d), MCA. 2 Mother claimed that these positive results were caused when she spilled Lysol on the monitor. 3 Some of these meetings and conversations occurred after the Department had decided to seek guardianship. CPS Nelson met jointly with Mother and her psychiatrist to discuss the guardianship option to ensure that Mother “was in a safe space so that we could offer any additional supports that may have been needed at the time.” 10 Though Mother points out the progress she had made with her treatment plan, the court was not required to find that Mother’s treatment plan was unsuccessful before granting its petition for guardianship. In re I.D., ¶ 28. “Whether the parents have complied with their treatment plan, however, is relevant to the court’s determination that further efforts to reunify the family would likely be unproductive.” In re I.D., ¶ 28. ¶19 Although the record establishes that Mother made progress on her treatment plan, the court found from the evidence that Mother had not shown the ability to use the tools and successfully implement the skills she learned to safely parent her child and to prioritize the child’s needs. Mother argues that the court’s findings were based solely or primarily on evidence that MICWA precludes from consideration, citing § 41-3-1320(3)(b), MCA. That section provides: Evidence showing only the existence of community or family poverty, isolation, single parenthood, custodian age, crowded or inadequate housing, substance abuse, or nonconforming social behavior does not by itself constitute clear and convincing evidence or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that continued custody is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. On the contrary, the District Court did not rely only on Mother’s substance abuse problems for clear and convincing evidence of its findings. It relied on a comprehensive review of Mother’s history, her lack of stable income and housing, her continued return to unhealthy relationships, and her actions “before, during, and after her August 2024 relapse” that showed her inability to “integrate[] the tools taught in treatment into her decision-making, relationships, and parenting in order maintain a safe, sober home for [A.B.L.],” putting the child’s safety at risk. Pointedly, we find no indication from the record or in the District 11 Court’s comprehensive findings and conclusions that it evinced any “animus” toward Mother. The court had intimate familiarity with the family and showed conscientious consideration of Mother’s attempts to progress in her addiction recovery. ¶20 “When determining whether substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings, we do not reweigh the evidence or consider whether the evidence could have supported a different result.” In re I.D., ¶ 31. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Department, we conclude that the record supports the District Court’s finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that further efforts to reunify the family would likely be unproductive. The record contains substantial evidence to establish that “a rational trier of fact could have concluded that the [Department] made ‘active efforts’ to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that those efforts were unsuccessful.” In re D.S.B., 2013 MT 112, ¶ 17, 370 Mont. 37, 300 P.3d 702. ¶21 We also consider the child’s need for permanency and stability when determining whether the Department made the required efforts. See In re K.L., 2014 MT 28, ¶ 41, 373 Mont. 421, 318 P.3d 691. A.B.L. had been out of the home for nearly three and a half years by the time of the guardianship hearing. She was in a long-term stable home with her three siblings. As the District Court emphasized, “the Crow Tribe is in full support of the guardianship, recognizing it as an appropriate and stable placement that prioritizes [A.B.L.]’s best interests, maintains family connections and preserves [A.B.L.]’s identity as a member of the Crow Tribe.” The record supports the District Court’s finding that guardianship would best serve the interests of the child. See In re L.B., ¶ 22. 12 ¶22 The District Court was in the best position to weigh the evidence and determine whether the Department met its burden of proof. Mother’s August 2024 relapse, though the focus of her appeal, was not a brief or isolated occurrence for a person with a short history of substance abuse problems. Mother had many years of recalcitrant chemical dependency that she had been unable to overcome. The District Court had substantial evidence upon which to find that she had not demonstrated an ability to achieve long-term sobriety despite years of services. We conclude that the District Court did not clearly err in finding that the Department made active efforts to reunite the family and that further efforts would be unproductive. Mother has not met her burden on appeal to demonstrate reversible error. ¶23 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. Substantial evidence supports the District Court’s findings, and the court did not violate MICWA standards. We therefore affirm the District Court’s order granting the Department’s petition for guardianship. /S/ BETH BAKER We Concur: /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE 13