Coahoma County School District Board of Education, Gerald Johnson, Coreen Richardson, Rico Smith, Milroy Harris and Johnnie Moore v. Daryl Moore

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2024-IA-01316-SCT COAHOMA COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, GERALD JOHNSON, COREEN RICHARDSON, RICO SMITH, MILROY HARRIS AND JOHNNIE MOORE v. DARYL MOORE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/31/2024 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. C. KENT HANEY TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: OLIVER EARL CLARK, JR. LAURA FORD ROSE MARY CLARK JOYNER COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: COAHOMA COUNTY COUNTY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: NATHANIEL ALANDAS ARMISTAD LAURA FORD ROSE MARY CLARK JOYNER ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OLIVER EARL CLARK, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND RENDERED - 08/06/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. BRANNING, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The County Court of Coahoma County denied summary judgment for the Coahoma County School District Board after Daryl Moore asserted claims for unpaid compensation under theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment. Because we find that Moore’s claims were foreclosed by the minutes rule, we now reverse the decision of the county court and render summary judgment in favor of the Board.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Moore was hired by the Board on an at-will basis to handle assistant-coaching duties related to the high-school boys’ basketball team for school years 2019-2020 and 2020-2021. The Board set Moore’s pay for his assistant-coaching duties at $1,500 per school year, which he was paid in full. On August 24, 2021, the Board considered a request to increase Moore’s total pay for the 2020-2021 school year that had just ended from $1,500 to $2,500, but that request failed for a lack of motion. ¶3. Moore claims that the athletic director asked him to serve as the junior-high boys’ head basketball coach while serving as the assistant coach for the high-school boys’ basketball team. Moore contends that he was paid for his assistant-coaching duties for the high-school boys’ basketball team but was not paid for the duties he performed as the head coach of the junior-high boys’ basketball team. ¶4. The Board argued at one point that Derrick Moore, Daryl Moore’s brother, was actually the head coach for the junior-high boys’ basketball team; however, Derrick Moore stated in an affidavit that Daryl Moore was, in fact, the head coach. Courtney Jackson, who was the principal at that time, also stated that Daryl Moore was the head coach. Moore’s position is that the Board owes him $5,000 for the services he performed as the head coach of the junior-high boys’ basketball team during the 2019-2020 and 2020-2021 school years. ¶5. On August 15, 2022, Moore filed suit against the Board in the county court for unjust enrichment regarding alleged underpayment for head coaching duties for the 2019-2020 school year and 2020-2021 school year. On June 16, 2024, the Board moved for summary 2 judgment as a matter of law under the minutes rule, arguing that (1) Moore was not entitled to compensation at the established $2,500 rate for head coaches; (2) Moore failed to present sufficient evidence to support his equitable claims; and (3) the minutes rule bars Moore’s claims as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion, finding that material, factual disputes precluded summary judgment. ¶6. On April 10, 2024, the county court granted Moore’s motion to stay proceedings to allow him additional time to conduct discovery. After the additional discovery, the Board supplemented its memorandum in support of summary judgment based on Moore’s deposition, and Moore supplemented his response in opposition to summary judgment. The Board timely appealed the trial court’s ruling. On March 25, 2025, this Court granted the Board’s petition for interlocutory appeal under Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 5. ¶7. While we recognize that Mississippi Code Section 11-51-79 (Rev. 2019) provides that “[n]o appeals . . . shall be taken from any interlocutory order of the county court,” Mississippi Code section 9-3-61 (Rev. 2019) also provides that “[t]he Supreme Court has the power to prescribe . . . rules [for] . . . the practice and procedure for trials and appeals . . . and for appeals to the Supreme Court from interlocutory or final orders of trial courts . . . .” ¶8. Consistent with that statutory grant of authority, this Court has long recognized its constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules governing appeals. In Newell v. State, the Court explained that it possesses the “inherent power . . . to promulgate procedural rules[.]” Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71, 76 (Miss. 1975). See Brown v. Collections, Inc., 188 So. 3d 1171, 1177 (Miss. 2016) (court rules control when statute conflicts). Pursuant 3 to that authority, this Court adopted the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, including Rule 5, which governs interlocutory appeals and under which will proceed with a review of today’s case. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶9. “This Court reviews de novo the grant or denial of summary judgment.” Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Driskell, 293 So. 3d 261, 264 (Miss. 2020) (citing Mladineo v. Schmidt, 52 So. 3d 1154, 1160 (Miss. 2010)). “[I]f the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Further, “[e]vidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the movant bears the burden to show no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. (citing Mladineo, 52 So. 3d at 1160). DISCUSSION ¶10. Moore alleges that in August 2019, the Board’s athletic director asked him to serve as the head coach of the junior-high boys’ basketball team in addition to serving as the assistant coach for the high-school boys’ basketball team. Moore stated that he verbally agreed to the junior-high head-coach position but was not advised of the stipend amount at that time. Additionally, Moore testified that he signed an at-will agreement for the head- coach position in August 2019 and that he “wants to say it was $2,500 for the coaching stipend[,]” but he was not positive. Moore never produced the at-will agreement. 4 ¶11. Further, Moore admitted in his deposition testimony that he “didn’t pay attention to his pay stubs the first year” and did not approach the superintendent to inquire about his coaching stipend amounts for both years until July 2021. Moore also admitted that while he knows a board speaks through its minutes, he never approached the Board or asked anyone for the Board’s minutes. ¶12. This Court has consistently held that “public boards speak only through their minutes and that their acts are evidenced solely by entries on their minutes.” KPMG, LLP v. Singing River Health Sys., 283 So. 3d 662, 669 (Miss. 2018). When a board contracts with another entity, a contract cannot be implied or presumed but must be stated on the board’s official minutes. Id. (quoting Wellness, Inc. v. Pearl River Cnty. Hosp., 178 So. 3d 1287, 1290 (Miss. 2015)). ¶13. In Colle Towing Co. v. Harrison County, the parties conceded that an attempt by the board to ratify a prior oral contract was “void and that no valid contract was ever made[.]” Colle Towing Co. v. Harrison Cnty., 213 Miss. 442, 57 So. 2d 171, 172-73 (1952). The Court rejected the private party’s argument for equitable relief, noting that “a board of supervisors can contract and render [a private party] liable only by a valid order duly entered upon its minutes.” Id.; see also Butler v. Bd. of Supervisors for Hinds Cnty., 659 So. 2d 578, 580, 582 (Miss. 1995) (affirming dismissal based on the minutes rule even though the contract changes had been approved by the board architect because the changes were not entered upon the board minutes). Further, this Court has previously held that contracts between a board and other entities cannot be implied or presumed. KPMG, 283 So. 3d at 669. 5 ¶14. In the present case, Moore’s pay stubs show that he was paid $1,500 per year for his duties as the assistant junior-high boys’ basketball coach, which is also reflected in the Board’s minutes. Moore did not produce evidence of any agreement nor any entry on the Board’s minutes approving his pay of $2,500 for head-coaching duties. In fact, Moore’s request for an additional stipend for the 2020-2021 school year died for a lack of motion. Thus, the Board’s minutes reflect that Moore was the assistant junior-high boys’ basketball coach and was duly paid for those services. ¶15. Coaching stipends, like other contracts made with a school district, must be approved by the Board and reflected in the meeting minutes. Miss. Code Ann. § 37-7-301(w) (Rev. 2025). Therefore, we find that Moore’s claims were foreclosed by the minutes rule and that the Board was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. ¶16. Additionally, the Board argues that the Moore’s claims are time barred by the one-year statute of limitations that govern oral contracts. But because we hold that the minutes rule applies, this issue is moot. CONCLUSION ¶17. Because Moore’s services and stipend as head coach were never approved by the Board, we find that the minutes rule forecloses his claims for relief. Therefore, we reverse the county court’s decision and render summary judgment in favor of the Board. ¶18. REVERSED AND RENDERED. RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS AND SULLIVAN, JJ., CONCUR. COLEMAN, P.J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION. WILSON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 6  COLEMAN, PRESIDING JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶19. “No appeals . . . shall be taken from any interlocutory order of the county court . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. 11-51-79 (Rev. 2019). Despite the statute’s crystal-clear prohibition, and despite the Legislature’s plenary power to set our appellate jurisdiction, Dialysis Sols., LLC v. Miss. State Dep’t of Health, 96 So. 3d 713, 716–717 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2012), we once again entertain an interlocutory appeal from one of Mississippi’s county courts. ¶20. Our ongoing arrogation of appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from county courts is based on the unsupportable and mistaken belief that our authority to set rules governing procedure in our courts empowers us to set our own jurisdictional limits. As I wrote in Jackson HMA, LLC v. Harris, 242 So. 3d 1, 7-8 (¶¶ 14-19) (Miss. 2018) (Coleman, J., dissenting), and Clinton Healthcare, LLC v. Atkinson, 294 So. 3d 66, 73-75 (¶ 19-26) (Miss. 2019) (Coleman, J., dissenting), the majority’s position cannot be squared with the Mississippi Constitution’s explicit grant of authority to the Legislature to establish the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction. As discussed below, in Belmont Holding, LLC v. Davis Monuments, LLC, 253 So. 3d 323, 329 (¶ 22) (Miss. 2018), we held that the court’s procedural rules could not, in fact, trump Mississippi Constitution’s grant of authority to the Legislature to set appellate jurisdiction in Mississippi’s circuit courts. ¶21. Our continued jurisprudential usurpation of the Legislature’s authority also ignores the fact that subject-matter jurisdiction is not a matter of procedure but, as evidenced, inter alia, by the fact that it can never be waived, a matter of substantive law. Accordingly, even without reference to the Constitutional grant of authority to the Legislature, it should be clear 7 that rules of procedure cannot grant it over a statute setting forth the substantive law of our State. I. Mississippi’s Constitution grants plenary power over Supreme Court jurisdiction to the Legislature. Until January 3, 1984, Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 read, “The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals.” However, Section 146 was then amended to read, in pertinent part, “The Supreme Court shall have such jurisdiction as properly belongs to a court of appeals and shall exercise no jurisdiction on matters other than those specifically provided by this Constitution or by general law.” By its plain meaning, the language added in 1984 limits Supreme Court jurisdiction to matters specifically provided by the Constitution itself or general law. Pursuant to the above-described amendment, the Legislature has “plenary power” over appellate jurisdiction. Dialysis Solutions, LLC v. Miss. State Dep’t of Health, 96 So. 3d 713, 716-717 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2012). The Constitution of 1890 also provides explicit direction regarding the power of the Legislature to set the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts. Article 6, Section 156 provides, “The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law.” (Emphasis added.) In Mississippi Code Section 11-51-79, the Mississippi Legislature prescribed appellate jurisdiction in Mississippi’s circuit courts over appeals from county courts. Among other things, it prohibits interlocutory appeals from county court and prescribes that appeals from the “law side” of county courts be presented to the circuit court. Pursuant to Section 156 of the Constitution, the statute is a wholly constitutional exercise of Legislative authority to set appellate jurisdiction in the circuit courts. Pursuant to Section 11-51-79’s prohibition against interlocutory appeals from county court and directive that appeals of cases sounding in law from county court be filed in the circuit court, we have no jurisdiction over the instant appeal and accordingly should dismiss it. Jackson HMA, 242 So. 3d at 7 (¶¶ 15-17). That appellate jurisdiction is set by statute, and statute alone predates the 1984 constitutional amendment. “[A]ppellate jurisdiction is solely 8 a creature of statute and exists in no case unless conferred by statute, and then only in the manner and to the extent so conferred . . . .” Drummond v. State, 184 Miss. 738, 185 So. 207, 208 (1938). The Drummond Court went on to hold as follows: It follows, therefore, inescapably, that since the legislature has plenary power over this subject of appeals, it could prescribe that an appeal from this inferior court in this class of cases, or in any other particular class of cases, might be direct to the Supreme Court. If the power of the legislature in this regard is to be restricted or limited, then some section of the Constitution must be pointed to which so limits or restricts the power. As already mentioned, no such section of the Constitution can be found. It is, therefore, a matter solely for the legislature to decide, and the legislature having so decided, the Court is without power to avoid this said legislation. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). ¶22. It is worth noting that the 1984 amendment to Section 156 followed our 1975 opinion in Newell v. State, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975), which the majority today and the Court in the past has cited to justify its self-grant of subject matter jurisdiction. Regardless of the timing, interesting though it may be, the text of the Constitution, as held in Dialysis Solutions, gives the Legislature the authority to remove interlocutory appeals from appellate court jurisdiction. Even if the question of jurisdiction were one of procedure, which, as discussed below it is not, the specific grant of authority to the Legislature to set it would govern over the general authority of the Court to make procedural rules. Dye v. State ex rel. Hale, 507 So. 2d 332, 342 (Miss. 1987) (noting that specific constitutional provisions govern over general provisions when conflict between them occurs); see also Harrison v. State, 800 So. 2d 1134, 1137 (¶ 14) (Miss. 2001) (citing Yarbrough v. Camphor, 645 So. 2d 867, 872 (Miss. 1994)). 9  II. The Court’s continued self-grant of jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals from county courts runs afoul of the holding in Belmont Holding, LLC v. Davis Monument, LLC. ¶23. “[I]t is not the Court’s prerogative to establish jurisdiction through rules of procedure.” Belmont Holding, 253 So. 3d at 330 (¶ 30). ¶24. In Belmont Holding, the Court addressed the question of whether the cost bond prepayment requirement for appeals from county courts to circuit courts—also found in Section 11-51-79—governed over two procedural rules promulgated by the Court, i.e., Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and 11(b)(1). Belmont Holding, 253 So. 3d at 326 (¶ 13). After establishing that the cost bond prepayment requirement was a matter of subject matter appellate jurisdiction, id. at 328 (¶ 20), the Belmont Holding Court went on to recognize that the Mississippi Constitution explicitly grants the Legislature authority over appellate jurisdiction in Mississippi’s circuit courts. After acknowledging the effect of Newell on rulemaking authority, the Belmont Holding Court wrote as follows: In contrast, the Mississippi Constitution of 1890 explicitly empowers the Legislature to set the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts. Article 6, Section 156, provides: “The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law.” Thus, the Legislature establishes appellate jurisdiction, including circuit court appellate jurisdiction. Belmont Holding, 253 So. 3d at 328-29 (¶ 22) (citation omitted). ¶25. “It is the prerogative of the Legislature to set the appellate jurisdiction of circuit courts; it is not the Court’s prerogative to establish jurisdiction through rules of procedure.” Id. at 330 (¶ 30). As established with unmistakable clarity almost a century ago in 10 Drummond, confirmed by the 1984 amendment to Section 146 of the Mississippi Constitution, and held by the Court in Dialysis Solutions, it is every bit as much the prerogative of the Legislature to set the Mississippi Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction by forbidding interlocutory appeals from county courts. III. Jurisdiction is unmistakably a matter of substantive law and, therefore, not within the court’s procedural rulemaking authority. ¶26. We have long held, and in cases too numerous to count held, that procedural defects can be waived if not properly preserved. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Yazoo City v. Wright, 391 So. 3d 1161, 1168 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2024) (noting that issues raised for the first time on appeal are waived); Latham v. Latham, 261 So. 3d 1110, 1113 (¶ 9) (Miss. 2019) (noting that failure to object at trial waives an issue for purposes of an appeal); Bell v. State, 879 So. 2d 423, 434 (¶ 28) (Miss. 2004) (failure to cite relevant authority in support of an issue on appeal results in waiver). ¶27. On the other hand, we have been consistent in holding that the lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived and may be raised at any time. Bd. of Supervisors for Lowndes Cnty. v. Lowndes Cnty. Sch. Dist., 367 So. 3d 167, 173 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2023) (quoting Ridgeway v. Hooker, 240 So. 3d 1202, 1208 (Miss. 2018)). Indeed, the Supreme Court must examine the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte even if the parties have not raised it. Scruggs v. Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 359 So. 3d 1045, 1046 (¶ 3) (Miss. 2023) (citing Hotboxxx, LLC v. City of Gulfport, 154 So. 3d 21, 27 (Miss. 2015)). 11 ¶28. Jurisdiction is treated so differently from procedural defects for a very simple, yet important reason. Jurisdiction is not a matter of court procedure; it is substantive law. Accordingly, it lies outside the Court’s procedural rulemaking authority. CONCLUSION ¶29. Examples of procedural matters appropriate for procedural rules and rulemaking authority include how many days one has to respond to a motion for summary judgment. It does not include jurisdiction—the fundamental power of a Court to rule over a given legal matter. As shown above, holding that the Court’s rulemaking authority renders the statutory prohibition against interlocutory appeals from county courts unconstitutional goes against the Mississippi Constitution itself, our longstanding precedent, and the substantive, rather than procedural, nature of jurisdiction itself. Accordingly, and with respect, I dissent. The Court should dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 12