Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CP-01414-SCT DEREK D. HOPSON, SR. v. CITY OF INDIANOLA, MISSISSIPPI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/04/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. W. ASHLEY HINES TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: DEREK D. HOPSON, SR. DEREK DEWAYNE HOPSON, JR. MACK ARTHUR TURNER , II COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: SUNFLOWER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: DEREK D. HOPSON, SR. (PRO SE) DEREK DEWAYNE HOPSON, JR. NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - OTHER DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/19/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE KING, P.J., ISHEE AND WILSON, JJ. ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This is an appeal from the order of the Sunflower County Circuit Court, signed November 3, 2025, and entered November 4, 2025, affirming the decision of the mayor and board of aldermen of the City of Indianola to terminate the retainer agreement of Derek D. Hopson, Sr., the city attorney. The board voted to terminate Hopson at a special-called meeting on June 17, 2025, under an agenda item listed only as “Attorney Bills?” Hopson appealed the decision to the circuit court under Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75 (Rev. 2019). He argued that the meeting was not lawfully called or noticed, that termination of the city attorney was business not specified in the call and therefore could not be transacted at the meeting, and that he was terminated without notice or any opportunity to be heard. The City responded that Hopson was an at-will independent contractor with no property interest in continued engagement, that the Open Meetings Act gave him no standing to complain, and that the board acted within its authority. The circuit court found that Hopson had standing and had timely appealed, applied the arbitrary-and-capricious standard, and affirmed. It found that the board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal; that it was supported by substantial evidence; and that Hopson’s due-process claim failed because his contract was terminable at will. ¶2. The appeal presents two questions. The first is whether the board could lawfully act on the termination of the city attorney at a special-called meeting when the poll of the aldermen the day before listed only a personnel matter and a mural contract and the written call and the agenda listed only “Attorney Bills?” with no supporting materials and no mention of the contract or its termination. Mississippi Code Section 21-3-21 (Rev. 2015) requires that the notice of a special meeting “distinctly specify the subject matters of business to be acted upon” and provides that “business not specified therein shall not be transacted at the meeting.” The City’s own code of ordinances carries the same restriction. Indianola, Miss., Code of Ordinances § 2-24 (2018). Hopson contends that the board never lawfully placed termination on the special-called meeting, that the special-called meeting was defectively noticed to the aldermen and to the public, and that the termination is void. The 2 second question is whether the circuit court’s order, which does not mention the special- meeting statute, the notice issue, or Hopson’s request for findings under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a), gives this Court enough to review. Hopson asks this Court to reverse and render, reinstating his contract and awarding damages, fees, and injunctive relief. The City filed no brief in this Court. ¶3. This Court holds that Hopson served at the pleasure of the board under a retainer terminable at will, with or without cause, that the board owed him no hearing, and that the board could have ended the retainer at any properly called meeting. Whether it did so on June 17 turns on whether the written call for that meeting specified that business. That is a question of law reviewed without deference, and the circuit court did not address it. The City has not defended its judgment in this Court, and under this Court’s precedent, that silence is a confession of error unless the record reveals a sound and unmistakable basis for affirmance. Hopson’s brief, measured against the record, makes out an apparent case of error: the call listed “Attorney Bills?” and nothing about the city attorney’s contract; the only action taken under that item was the vote to terminate the contract, and this Court has held that action on business for which the call for a special meeting was not specified is void. This Court therefore accepts the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error, reverses and sets aside the June 17 termination, and denies the remaining relief Hopson requests. Nothing in this opinion limits the board’s authority to act on Hopson’s contract at a properly called meeting. 3 FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY A. Statement of Facts ¶4. On December 11, 2024, the board voted to hire Hopson as city attorney, and on January 2, 2025, Hopson and Mayor Ken Featherstone signed a retainer agreement. The agreement designates Hopson and the Hopson Law Group as an independent contractor, pays a retainer of $1,500 per month for attendance at meetings and general advice, and bills other work at $200 per hour. It provides that Hopson “shall at all times serve under the terms of this Agreement at the pleasure of the Board of Aldermen,” that the Board “reserves the right to terminate this Agreement at will, with or without cause, by providing written notice,” and that the term runs from December 11, 2024, until terminated. ¶5. The relationship soured within a few months. According to the mayor’s affidavit, the Board took up concerns about Hopson’s invoices and billing practices at a special-called meeting on April 23, 2025, at which an agenda item on city-attorney invoices was tabled and a motion was made to terminate the contract and to recover more than $14,000 in charges. The subject returned at regular meetings on May 12, 2025, when a motion was made to audit Hopson’s invoices, and again on May 27, 2025. Alderman Marvin Elder testified that at a prior meeting, the aldermen had voted three to two against terminating Hopson and that Aldermen Gary Fratesi and Darrell Simpson were the two votes to terminate on that occasion. The mayor stated that in early June 2025, he received an email from Hopson acknowledging the board’s concerns about his billing. 4 ¶6. On Monday, June 16, 2025, at about 11:00 a.m., City Clerk Stephanie Washington emailed the aldermen to poll their availability for a special-called meeting the following day, Tuesday, June 17, 2025, at 5:00 p.m. Two minutes later, she sent each alderman and Hopson a text message asking whether they could attend a special-called meeting at 5:00 p.m. for two stated purposes: a personnel matter in public works and approval of the Alex Brown mural contract. Neither message mentioned attorney bills or any action concerning the city attorney. Fratesi, Simpson, and Alderman Sam Brock, Jr., responded that they were available. Elder responded that he was not because of a prior engagement. Hopson responded that he was not available. Alderman Ruben Woods responded the next day that he could attend. ¶7. The city clerk’s affidavit states that on June 17, 2025, because three or more aldermen had said they could attend, she posted a special-called-meeting notice on the front and back doors of City Hall at approximately 2:15 p.m., and at 2:30 p.m., she emailed the aldermen and Hopson an agenda with supporting materials. The agenda set the meeting for 5:30 p.m. rather than 5:00 p.m. and listed, among other items, “6. Alex Brown Mural Contract Approval[,]” “7. Attorney Bills?[,]” and “8. Executive Session Request: Personnel Matter in Public Works.” The packet contained supporting documents for the mural contract and the personnel matter but nothing concerning item 7, and item 7 did not identify which of the City’s several attorneys it concerned. ¶8. The City also relies on a document issued by the mayor and styled “Call for a Special 5 Meeting of the Mayor and Board of Aldermen,” which was admitted at the hearing as Exhibit 2. The call is addressed to the five aldermen, is signed by the Mayor and attested by the city clerk, sets the meeting for 5:30 p.m. on June 17, 2025, in the board room adjacent to City Hall, and states that “the object of the said meeting” involved three items: “1) Alex Brown Mural Contract Approval[,]” “2) Attorney Bills?[,]” and “3) Executive Session Request: Personnel Matter in Public Works.” Like the agenda, it names no attorney and says nothing about the city attorney’s contract or its termination. ¶9. The meeting convened at 5:30 p.m. on June 17, 2025, with Mayor Featherstone, the clerk, and Aldermen Fratesi, Simpson, Woods, and Brock present. Elder was absent. So was Hopson, who spent the afternoon on a conference call with the attorney general’s office about another City matter and then attended a previously scheduled meeting of the Delta Housing Development Corporation. ¶10. The minutes reflect that the board approved the agenda, tabled the mural contract, and then took up item 7. Woods objected to any discussion of attorney bills because the item had not been noticed and because the city attorney was not present to respond. Fratesi moved “to terminate Attorney Derek Hopson, Sr. and the Hopson Law Firm,” Simpson seconded, and the vote was two to two: Fratesi and Simpson voted in favor of termination, and Woods and Brock opposed termination. Mayor Featherstone broke the tie in favor of termination. ¶11. On June 18, 2025, the mayor emailed Hopson notice of his termination. Hopson received no notice that his termination would be considered and no opportunity to be heard, 6 and the mayor testified that the City does not afford professional independent contractors a hearing before terminating them. The mayor’s affidavit states that the board terminated Hopson for “recent and ongoing billing practices,” including billing for services that predated his appointment, and that on or about June 22, 2025, Hopson returned $4,119 to the City for such services. Elder, Woods, and Brock each testified that they would vote against terminating Hopson. B. Procedural History ¶12. Hopson filed his notice of appeal in the Sunflower County Circuit Court on June 25, 2025, within the ten days allowed by Section 11-51-75. The notice alleged that the clerk had polled the aldermen for a meeting with two stated purposes, that the agenda later added an item for attorney bills, that the action to terminate the contract of the city attorney “was never on the agenda,” and that the City engaged at least four other attorneys; it asked the court to find that the City violated the statutory requirements for a special-called meeting and to reinstate Hopson. The City filed the record of the board’s proceedings on July 25, 2025, including affidavits from the mayor and the city clerk sworn that same day, and filed a designation of additional items on July 29, 2025. On October 12, 2025, Hopson moved to strike portions of the City’s designation. He argued that the record should be limited to what was before the board on June 17, that the board can act only through its minutes, and that because the minutes were never approved, the mayor’s notice of termination was a nullity, and Hopson should be reinstated pending proper action. 7 ¶13. The circuit court heard the appeal on October 13, 2025. Aldermen Elder, Woods, and Brock and Mayor Featherstone, among others, testified. The court took the pending motions and the merits under advisement. On October 23, 2025, the City filed a memorandum brief, arguing that Hopson lacked standing under the Open Meetings Act and that as an at-will independent contractor, he had no property interest entitling him to due process. The same day Hopson filed a listing of fifty-five uncontested facts drawn from the hearing testimony and asked the court to adopt them as findings under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). ¶14. By order signed November 3, 2025, and entered November 4, 2025, the circuit court affirmed. The court found that Hopson was aggrieved by the board’s decision, had standing to appeal, and did so on time. The court stated that a municipal governing body’s action will not be set aside unless clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without substantial evidentiary basis. In a single sentence, the court found that the board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without substantial evidentiary basis and violated no statutory or constitutional right. On due process, the court held that Hopson was an at-will employee under the retainer agreement, that a protected property interest exists only when an express or implied right to continued employment exists, and that his engagement was therefore not protected. The order does not mention Section 21-3-21, the Open Meetings Act, the adequacy of the meeting notice, Hopson’s motion to strike, or Hopson’s request for findings. Hopson appealed and filed his corrected 8 brief on May 7, 2026. The City filed no brief. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶15. An appeal from a decision of a municipal governing authority proceeds under Section 11-51-75, and this Court applies the same standard of review that governed in the circuit court. “We apply the same standard of review to the Board’s legislative act as we apply in our review of administrative agency decisions.” City of Canton v. Slaughter, 358 So. 3d 637, 640 (Miss. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ball v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen of Natchez, 983 So. 2d 295, 304 (Miss. 2008)). That review is limited, and the Board’s decision will be overturned only if it “(1) was beyond its scope or power; (2) violated the constitutional or statutory rights of the aggrieved party; (3) was not supported by substantial evidence; or (4) was arbitrary or capricious.” Id. at 640-41 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. City of Canton, 278 So. 3d 1129, 1131 (Miss. 2019)). The circuit court applied the Court of Appeals’ formulation of the same test, under which the action stands unless “clearly shown to be arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, illegal, or without [a] substantial evidentiary basis.” Hopkins v. City of Mendenhall, 116 So. 3d 166, 169 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Precision Commc’ns, Inc. v. Hinds Cnty., Miss., 74 So. 3d 366, 369 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). “An act is arbitrary and capricious when it is done at pleasure, without reasoned judgment or with disregard for the surrounding facts and circumstances. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that reasonable minds might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 9 Id. (citation modified). ¶16. That deference does not extend to questions of law, which this Court reviews de novo. Slaughter, 358 So. 3d at 641 (citing Wayne Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Quitman Sch. Dist., 346 So. 3d 853, 857 (Miss. 2022)); Hopkins, 116 So. 3d at 169 (quoting Precision Commc’ns, Inc., 74 So. 3d at 369). Whether the board complied with Section 21-3-21 and the City’s ordinance governing special-called meetings and whether it had authority to transact the business of terminating the city attorney at the June 17 meeting are questions of law that this Court decides de novo. ¶17. The City has not filed a brief in this Court. On the merits, the failure to file a brief “is tantamount to a confession of error and will be accepted as such unless we can with confidence say, after considering the record and brief of appellant, that there was no error.” Snow Lake Shores Prop. Owners Corp. v. Smith, 610 So. 2d 357, 361 (Miss. 1992) (citation modified). “This Court may ‘take the appellees’ failure to file a brief as a confession of error and reverse.” Greenwood Leflore Hosp. v. Boykin, 400 So. 3d 445, 448 (Miss. 2025) (quoting Miller v. Pannell, 815 So. 2d 1117, 1119 (Miss. 2002)). And the Court does so when the appellant has thoroughly briefed the issues “with apt and applicable. . . authority so that the brief makes out an apparent case of error.” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Miller, 815 So. 2d at 1119). It may instead disregard the omission and affirm when the record can be conveniently examined and reveals a “sound and unmistakable basis or ground upon which the judgment may be safely affirmed.” Id. (citing Miller, 815 So. 2d at 10 1119). When neither course fits exactly, the choice rests in this Court’s discretion. DISCUSSION ¶18. The circuit court affirmed the board’s termination of Hopson for two reasons: the decision was not arbitrary, capricious, discriminatory, or illegal and was supported by substantial evidence, and Hopson, as an at-will contractor, had no due-process claim. The order does not address whether the board could lawfully transact that business at the June 17, 2025 special-called meeting, which was Hopson’s principal argument in the trial court and here. The City has filed no brief. The analysis that follows proceeds in three parts. The first addresses Hopson’s status: he served at the pleasure of the board, which could end his retainer with or without cause and without a hearing. The second addresses the manner in which the board acted: the City has filed no brief, its silence is a confession of error under this Court’s precedent, and Hopson’s brief makes out an apparent case that the board transacted business on June 17 that the call for the meeting did not specify. The third addresses relief. 1. Hopson served at the pleasure of the Board, which could terminate his retainer with or without cause and without a hearing. ¶19. “Mississippi adheres to the . . . doctrine of employment at will.” Collins v. City of Newton, 240 So. 3d 1211, 1216 (Miss. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Senseney v. Miss. Power Co., 914 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). Absent a contract for a definite term, either party may end the relationship at will, and the employer may do so for a good reason, a wrong reason, or no reason at all. Id. at 1216-17 (citing 11 Senseney, 914 So. 2d at 1228). The same rule governs an appointee who serves at the pleasure of a municipal governing authority; such an appointee may be discharged at any time, with or without cause. Jones v. City of Hattiesburg, 228 So. 3d 816, 818 (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (appointed municipal judge held office at the pleasure of the governing authorities). Hopson’s retainer agreement places him in that position by its own terms. It designates Hopson and the Hopson Law Group as an independent contractor, provides that Hopson “shall at all times serve under the terms of this Agreement at the pleasure of the Board of Aldermen,” reserves to the board “the right to terminate this Agreement at will, with or without cause, by providing written notice,” and fixes no term beyond “until terminated as provided herein.” The mayor gave the written notice the agreement calls for the day after the vote. ¶20. A property interest protected by due process exists only when the person holds “a legitimate claim of entitlement” to continued employment. Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed 2d 548 (1972). Whether such a claim exists is measured by state law and by the terms of the relationship, not by the Constitution itself. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344, 96 S. Ct. 2074, 48 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601, 92 S. Ct. 2694, 33 L. Ed. 2d 570 (1972). The circuit court applied the same rule through Brandon v. Claiborne County, 828 So. 2d 202, 207 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001), in which the Court of Appeals held that a protected interest in public employment exists only when the employee has an express or implied right to continued 12 employment, and it found none. That finding is correct. A contract that reserves to the board the right to terminate at will, with or without cause, creates no entitlement to continued engagement. ¶21. In Slaughter, this Court held that municipal utility commissioners were public officers entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before removal, and it reached that holding under a statute that permitted removal only “for inefficiency or incompetency or any other cause[.]” Slaughter, 358 So. 3d at 642-43 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 21-27-15 (Rev. 2015)) (discussing Jones, 278 So. 3d 1129). Hopson holds no such position. He serves by contract, at the pleasure of the Board. Two further facts confirm the point. Section 21-3-21 directs that notice of a special meeting be given “to the members of the board, including the mayor,” and confers no notice right on the city attorney. And Hopson’s own contract obligated him to “[a]ttend all regularly scheduled and special called Board of Aldermen meetings.” The clerk polled him on June 16 about a meeting the next afternoon, he responded that he was unavailable, and the clerk emailed him the agenda listing “Attorney Bills?” at 2:30 p.m. on June 17. He spent that afternoon on a conference call with the attorney general’s office and then attended a Delta Housing Development Corporation board meeting. In the everyday sense, Hopson had notice that his bills were on the agenda, and after two months of board attention to his invoices, an earlier motion to terminate him that failed three to two, and his own written acknowledgment of the board’s concerns, he knew what was at stake. 13 ¶22. This Court therefore holds that Hopson’s due-process claim fails, that the Board owed him no hearing, and that the Board could have ended the retainer at any properly called meeting. Nothing in this appeal calls that authority into question. Hopson’s own notice, however, is not the question the special-meeting statute asks. Section 21-3-21 and the City’s ordinance regulate the content of the call and the notice given to the members of the board, and they limit what the board may transact at the meeting. They confer no rights on the person affected by the business and take none away. Hopson’s knowledge answers his due- process claim. It does not supply authority the board lacked. Whether the board had that authority on June 17 is the question the City has declined to defend, and it is addressed next. 2. The City filed no brief, which is a confession of error on whether the June 17 meeting was lawfully called for the business of terminating Hopson, and action on business the call did not specify is void. ¶23. When an appellee files no brief, this Court may “take the appellees’ failure to file a brief as a confession of error and reverse” when the appellant’s brief, supported by apt authority, “makes out an apparent case of error.” Boykin, 400 So. 3d 445, 448 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller, 815 So. 2d at 1119). This Court may instead affirm only when the record “reveals a ‘sound and unmistakable basis or ground upon which the judgment may be safely affirmed.’” Id. (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Miller, 815 So. 2d at 1119; Snow Lake Shores, 610 So. 2d at 360). The City filed nothing in this Court. Whether the June 17 meeting was lawfully called for the business the board transacted is therefore a question that Hopson has briefed and the City has left unanswered, 14 and the rule of Miller and Boykin governs how this Court treats that silence. ¶24. A special meeting of the mayor and board may be called only by written notice that states the time of the meeting, “distinctly specif[ies] the subject matters of business to be acted upon,” and is signed by the officer calling it. Wilson v. City of Lexington, 153 Miss. 212, 121 So. 859, 862 (1929). The notice must reach the members who can be found at least three hours before the meeting, “[t]he method of notice shall be entered on the minutes of the special meeting,” and “business not specified therein shall not be transacted at the meeting.” § 21-3-21. The City’s own ordinance says the same thing: the notice “shall specify each matter of business to be transacted thereat,” and “business shall not be transacted which is not specified in the order or notice for such meeting.” § 2-24. Because the ordinance imposes the same restriction as the statute, the result does not depend on which of them governs Indianola, and the City has never argued that either does not. These requirements are strictly construed and mandatory, Wilson, 121 So. at 862, and action taken at a special meeting held in violation of them is void. Kidder v. McClanahan, 126 Miss. 179, 88 So. 508, 511 (1921). The consequence of acting on business the call does not list is settled. In Mississippi State Board of Education v. Noble, 388 So. 2d 488, 490 (Miss. 1980), the call listed six items, and the board took up a seventh that had been discussed at an earlier regular meeting; this Court held that the action had been “completely void” and of “no effect.” The county cases under the same language are to the same effect. Simpson Cnty. v. Floyd, 192 Miss. 501, 6 So. 2d 580 (1942) (conveyance at special meeting void when the order for the 15 meeting did not specify it); City of Grenada v. Grenada Cnty., 167 Miss. 814, 150 So. 657 (1933) (order on unspecified claim invalid, and consent of all parties did not validate it); Davis v. Grice, 141 Miss. 412, 106 So. 631 (1926) (tax exemption invalid because meeting did not specify it). A sufficient call names the action to be taken, as in In re Validation of Municipal Bonds of Natchez, 188 Miss. 817, 196 So. 258 (1940), in which the call stated that the meeting was to consider authorizing a bond issue. ¶25. Hopson’s brief makes out an apparent case that the board did not comply. The clerk’s poll of the aldermen on June 16 stated two purposes for the meeting: a personnel matter and a mural contract and said nothing about attorney bills. The mayor’s written call and the agenda emailed the next afternoon added “Attorney Bills?” and nothing more: no attorney was named, no supporting material accompanied the item, and nothing in either document referred to the city attorney’s contract or its termination. The only action the board took under that item was the vote to terminate the contract, and the City’s own affidavits describe the item as one to discuss Hopson’s invoices and billing practices. Whether the words “Attorney Bills?” distinctly specified the termination of a professional engagement is, at the least, an open question of law, and the board’s dealings with Hopson before June 17 do not answer it. The board had discussed his invoices at three earlier meetings, and its agendas for two of them named the “Contract” as a subject; the June 17 call did not. Under Noble, prior discussion of a subject does not supply what the call omits, and action taken on the omitted subject is void. 388 So. 2d at 489-90. Hopson presents the point with the statute, the 16 ordinance, Kidder, and Wilson. The record does not supply the sound and unmistakable basis that would allow this Court to affirm instead. The City’s best argument would be that “Attorney Bills?” fairly reached the contract under which the bills were rendered. To affirm on that ground, this Court would have to hold, without briefing from the City, that a two- word item followed by a question mark distinctly specified the termination of the city attorney’s contract, contrary to Noble and to the City’s own description of the item. That is the City’s argument to make, and it has not made it. ¶26. This Court therefore accepts the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error and reverses. The consequence follows from the statute, the ordinance, and Noble: business not specified in the call could not be transacted at the June 17 meeting, and the vote to terminate Hopson’s contract, taken on that business, is void. This holding does not disturb the holding in Section 1 of this opinion. The board could have terminated Hopson at any properly called meeting, and it remains free to act on his contract. The retainer was terminable at will and required no hearing, and the reversal rests on the City’s confession of error as to the call for the meeting and on nothing else. 3. The June 17 termination is set aside, and the remaining relief Hopson requests is denied. ¶27. Mississippi Code Section 11-51-75(d) (Rev. 2019) provides that if the judgment is reversed, the circuit court “shall render such judgment or decision as . . . the governing authority of the municipality ought to have rendered.” The Court of Appeals followed that form in Scott v. City of Aberdeen, 419 So. 3d 478, 483 (Miss. Ct. App. 2025), reversing the 17 board’s decision and the circuit court’s judgment, rendering judgement, and remanding the case for a determination of what other relief, if any, was appropriate. We agree. This Court therefore reverses the circuit court’s order, sets aside the board’s June 17, 2025 action terminating Hopson’s retainer as business the call for the meeting did not specify, and remands the case to the circuit court for entry of judgment consistent with Section 11-51-75(d). Because action on unspecified business at a special meeting is void, Noble, 388 So. 2d at 490, this Court vacates the June 17 action rather than ordering Hopson reinstated, as his notice of appeal and brief request. ¶28. The remaining relief Hopson requests is denied. He asks for damages of $250,000 for tortious breach of contract or breach of contract, for an injunction against future conduct of the same kind, and for attorneys’ fees and costs. An appeal under Section 11-51-75 reviews the decision of the governing authority on the record and renders the decision the authority ought to have rendered; it does not carry original claims for tort or contract damages, and Hopson cites no authority that would allow this Court to award them on such an appeal. Nor does he cite any statute or contractual provision authorizing an award of fees, and Mississippi awards attorneys’ fees only on such authority or when punitive damages are proper. Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 375 (Miss. 1992). This Court expresses no view on any claim Hopson may have for compensation under the agreement. Hopson’s alternative request, a remand to the circuit court for findings on the meeting’s legality, is also denied. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies to 18 actions “tried upon the facts without a jury[.]” Under Section 11-51-75(d), the circuit court sits as an appellate court and decides the appeal on the record, and this Court has read the statute as one that “does not contemplate a trial in the circuit court to weigh evidence or resolve disputed facts, only briefing and oral argument as would be expected in an appeal limited to the record.” Bd. of Supervisors of Jackson Cnty. v. Qualite Sports Lighting, LLC, 337 So. 3d 1040, 1046 (Miss. 2022). Rebuild America, Inc. v. Colomb, 344 So. 3d 864 (Miss. Ct. App. 2022), on which Hopson relies, involved an unlawful entry and detainer action tried in county court, not an appeal under Section 11-51-75; it applied Rule 52 to the county court that tried the case and remanded the case because no record or transcript existed from which the appellate courts could determine what evidence the trial court had considered. Here, the record is complete, the legality of the meeting is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo on a documentary record, and a remand for findings would return the parties to the same posture with the same record. Slaughter, 358 So. 3d at 641; Hopkins, 116 So. 3d at 169. Hopson himself concedes that general findings can satisfy Rule 52(a) even when a party requests more detail. Mauldin Co. v. Turnage, 332 So. 3d 331, 339 (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)). CONCLUSION ¶29. Hopson served at the pleasure of the board under a retainer agreement terminable at will, with or without cause, and the board owed him no hearing before ending it. The board could have terminated him at any properly called meeting. It acted instead at a special-called 19 meeting, the written call of which listed “Attorney Bills?” and nothing about the city attorney’s contract or its termination. Hopson’s brief makes out an apparent case that this violated Section 21-3-21 and the City’s own ordinance, both of which provide that business not specified in the call shall not be transacted; this Court held in Noble that action taken on such business is void; and the City has filed no brief in this Court. The record reveals no sound and unmistakable basis on which the judgment may safely be affirmed. This Court accepts the City’s failure to file a brief as a confession of error, reverses the circuit court’s order, sets aside the June 17, 2025 termination, denies the remaining relief Hopson requests, and remands the case to the circuit court for entry of judgment consistent with Section 11-51-75(d). Nothing in this decision limits the board’s authority to act on Hopson’s contract at a properly called meeting. ¶30. REVERSED AND REMANDED. RANDOLPH, C.J., KING AND COLEMAN, P.JJ., GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN, BRANNING, WILSON AND TOLLISON, JJ., CONCUR. 20