Lisa Jo Chamberlin v. State of Mississippi

FILED Serial: 262233 AUG 10 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI OFFICE OF THE CLERK SUPREME COURT No. 2025-DR-01034-SCT COURT OF APPEALS LISA JO CHAMBERLIN Petitioner vw STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent EN BANC ORDER This matter is before the Court, en banc, on the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by Lisa Jo Chamberlin. The State of Mississippi responded with a Motion to Dismiss Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Chamberlin filed a Response to Motion to Dismiss, and the State filed a Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss. In 2006, Chamberlin was convicted and sentenced to death on two counts of capital murder by a jury in the Circuit Court of Forrest County. This Court affirmed those convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Chamberlin v. State, 989 So. 2d 320 (Miss. 2008). On November 10, 2010, this Court unanimously denied Chamberlin’s first petition for post-conviction collateral relief. Chamberlin v. State (Chamberlin ID), 55 So. 3d 1046 (Miss. 2010). On May 13, 2025, this Court denied Chamberlin’s second petition for post- conviction collateral relief.'! Chamberlin, 417 So. 3d at 159. 'Notably, that ruling rejected Chamberlin’s: claims that (1) trial and initial post-conviction counsel rendered ineffective assistance in the investigation and presentation of evidence on fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD); (2) there is “newly-discovered evidence” that she “acted under extreme distress or under the substantial domination of another In the present petition, Chamberlin argues that her “conviction should be overturned because the State introduced irrelevant testimony about her sex life and her failings as a mother in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and that “this claim is not precluded by the statutory bars” because Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 145 S. Ct. 75, 220 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2025), constitutes an “intervening decision.” The State responds that Chamberlin’s claim is time barred, successive-writ barred, and res judicata barred and that Andrew fails to implicate the intervening-decision exception. “Direct appeal shall be the principal means of reviewing all criminal convictions and sentences ....” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-3(2) (Rev. 2020). A “purpose” of the Mississippi Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act (UPCCRA) is “to provide prisoners with a procedure, limited in nature, to review those objections, defenses, claims, questions, issues or errors which in practical reality could not be or should not have been raised at trial or on direct appeal.” Jd.; see also Moffett v. State, 351 So. 3d 936, 942 (Miss. 2022) (“Review under the [UPCCRA], with some exceptions, is limited to issues that could not or should not have been reviewed at trial and in the direct appeal” (citing Brown v. State, 798 So. 2d 481, 491 (Miss. 2001))). Leave to proceed in the trial court should be granted only if “it appears from the face of the application, motion, exhibits and the prior record that the claims presented” are not barred “and that they further present a substantial showing of the denial person[;]” (3) she is subject to a disproportionate (and/or a cruel and unusual) sentence; ... and (5) cumulative error warrants relief. Chamberlin v. State, 417 So. 3d 154, 156-57 (Miss. 2025) (first alteration in original). 2 of a state or federal right .. . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(5) (Rev. 2020); see also Ronk v. State, 267 So. 3d 1239, 1247 (Miss. 2019). Here, Chamberlin must overcome several statutory bars. For one, the mandate on her direct appeal issued on September 18, 2008. But the present petition was filed on August 27, 2025, and is subject to the one-year time bar. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(2}(b) (Rev. 2020); Brown v. State, 306 So, 3d 719, 729 (Miss. 2020). Unless Chamberlin can show that her claim is excepted, it is barred as untimely. Next, two separate petitions for post-conviction collateral relief filed by Chamberlin were previously denied by this Court. “The dismissal or denial of an application under this section is a final judgment and shall be a bar to a second or successive application under this article.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9} (Rev. 2020). So, apart from a meritorious claim satisfying an exception, her present claim is also foreclosed by the successive-writ bar. Ronk v. State, 391 So. 3d 785, 792 (Miss. 2024) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2020)). Chamberlin is also prohibited from presenting claims that “were capable of determination at trial and/or direct appeal,” or amount to presentation of a previously available “state or federal legal theory” that “could have been raised under” a previously litigated “factual issue[,]” apart from “a showing of cause and actual prejudice.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1), (2) (Rev. 2020), see also Galloway v. State, 418 So. 3d 1237, 1238 (Miss. 2025) (“Res judicata also extends to those claims that could have been raised in prior proceedings but were not.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ambrose v. State, 323 So. 3d 482, 493 (Miss. 2021))). The statutory exceptions to keep an otherwise-barred claim “procedurally alive” include “an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of either the State of Mississippi or the United States that would have actually adversely affected the outcome of [the] conviction or sentence....” § 99-39-27(9); Ronk, 391 So. 3d at 792 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ronk, 267 So. 3d at 1247). As to any “non-procedurally barred claims[,]}” this Court will apply: ““heightened scrutiny’ under which all bona fide doubts are resolved in favor of the accused.” Crawford v. State, 218 So. 3d 1142, 1150 (Miss. 2016) (quoting [Chamberlin HH, 55 So. 3d at 1049-50]). “[W]hat may be harmless error In a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death.” Crawford, 218 So. 3d at 1150 (quoting Chamberlin [IT], 55 So. 3d at 1049-50). Ronk, 267 So. 3d at 1247 (third alteration in original); see also Galloway v. State, 374 So. 3d 452, 467-68 (Miss. 2023). After due consideration, this Court finds that Chamberlin’s claim is time barred, successive-writ barred, and implicates the waiver and res judicata bars. We further find that Chamberlin fails to establish that her claim satisfies any exception to surmount those bars. After a thorough review of Chamberlin’s claim, this Court is unconvinced that Andrew “would have actually adversely affected the outcome of [Chamberlin’s] conviction or sentence ....” § 99-39-27(9). Alternatively, this Court finds that Chamberlin’s claim otherwise fails to present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right entitling her to relief. Accordingly, this Court finds that the State’s Motion to Dismiss Third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by the State of Mississippi should be granted and that Chamberlin’s Petition for Post-Conviction Relief should be dismissed. ITIS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss Third Petition for Post- Conviction Relief filed by the State of Mississippi is hereby granted. ITIS FURTHER ORDERED that the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by Lisa Jo Chamberlin is hereby dismissed. an SO ORDERED, this the \O day of August, 2026. LO ¥ FER B. BRANNING, JUSTICE TO AGREE: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, P.J., ISHEE, GRIFFIS, SULLIVAN AND BRANNING, JJ. TO DISAGREE: _ KING, P.J. NOT PARTICIPATING: WILSON, J. KING, P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT. IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-DR-01034-SCT Lisa Jo Chamberlin v. State of Mississippi KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT: 41. Lisa Jo Chamberlin filed her third Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with this Court. In it, she argues that her petition is not precluded by statutory bars because it is based on a intervening decision of the United States Supreme Court, Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 145 S. Ct. 75, 220 L. Ed. 2d 340 (2025). This Court dismisses Chamberlin’s petition, finding that she did not overcome the statutory bars to her petition because it “is unconvinced that Andrew ‘would have actually adversely affected the outcome of [Chamberlin’s] conviction or sentence ....°” (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2020)). Considering the heightened scrutiny we apply to death penalty cases, I respectfully disagree, and would grant Chamberlin an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. (2. This Court, acknowledging that death is different and that heightened procedures must be adhered to for capital defendants, applies heightened scrutiny to death penalty cases. On appeal to this Court, convictions upon indictments for capital murder and sentences of death must be subjected to “heightened scrutiny.” Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 739 (Miss. 1992). .. . Under this method of review, all doubts are to be resolved in favor of the accused because “what may be harmless error in a case with less at stake becomes reversible error when the penalty is death.” Id. (quoting Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1363 (Miss. 1978)). Loden v. State, 971 So. 2d 548, 562 (Miss. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Thorson v. State, 895 So. 2d 85, 97 (Miss. 2004)). In capital cases, “procedural niceties give way to the search for substantial justice, all because death undeniably is different.” Hansen v. State, 592 So. 2d 114, 142 (Miss. 1991). These heightened standards also apply to post-conviction- relief proceedings in capital cases. “This Court has recognized that post-conviction-relief actions have become part of the death-penalty appeal process.” Chamberlin v. State, 55 So. 3d 1046, 1049 (Miss. 2010). Consequently, the Court reviews post-conviction-relief actions in capital cases under the same standard of heightened scrutiny, under which all doubts are resolved in favor of the capital defendant. 7d. at 1049-50. 493. “Under the UPCCRA, relief is granted ‘only if the application, motion, exhibits, and prior record show that the claims are not procedurally barred and that they “present a substantial showing of the denial of a state or federal right.” Ronk v. State, 391 So. 3d 785, 792 (Miss. 2024) (quoting Garcia v. State, 356 So. 3d 101, 110 (Miss. 2023)), cert. denied, 145 §. Ct. 1129 (mem.), 220 L. Ed. 2d 423 (2025). Excepted from the procedural bars are cases in which “the prisoner can demonstrate . . . that there has been an intervening decision of the Supreme Court of . . . the United States that would have actually adversely affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence... .” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-27(9) (Rev. 2020). "4. Inher third PCR, Chamberlin argues that irrelevant and overly prejudicial evidence of her sexual activities and her failings as a mother were introduced at both the guilt and penalty phases of her trial. She maintains that the intervening United States Supreme Court decision in Andrew applies to this prejudicial evidence. She also argues that cumulative error warrants granting her petition. Applying heightened scrutiny to this case, and particularly in light of the mounting evidence Chamberlin has produced in her second and third PCRs demonstrating that the death penalty may be inappropriate in her case, we should grant her leave to proceed with her petition in the trial court with regard to her sentence. Andrew is an intervening decision that would have adversely affected the outcome of Chamberlin’s sentence, and, further, Chamberlin has presented a substantial showing of the denial of several state and federal rights sufficient to grant her such an evidentiary hearing in the trial court regarding the appropriateness of her death sentence.’ 45. In Andrew, the Supreme Court held that “the Due Process Clause forbids the introduction of evidence so unduly prejudicial as to render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair.” Andrew, 604 U.S. at 96. Moreover, a court “must ask that question separately for the guilt and sentencing phases.” Jd. During the guilt phase of Chamberlin’s trial, the State introduced testimony from two jailhouse informants that Chamberlin had told them that after the murders, she and her co-defendant Roger Gillett had sex in front of the victim’s corpse “and it was the greatest sex that they had ever had and it was an extreme adrenaline rush.” During the penalty phase, the prosecutor repeated the testimony regarding the sexual act after the murders during closing arguments. The State also emphasized Chamberlin’s sexual promiscuity during the penalty phase, asking multiple questions about the “many” men she 'T would not grant the petition as to the guilt phase of trial. 3 had been with, implying that she had had at least one same-sex relationship, and categorized having same-sex propensities as “sexual dysfunction.” {6. | The State also painted Chamberlin as a bad mother during the penalty phase, asking a defense mitigation witness about Chamberlin abandoning her children “like a reptile.” The State continued to emphasize the theme of Chamberlin abandoning or losing custody of her children with additional questioning. It likewise tried to elicit testimony with multiple leading questions indicating that Chamberlin does not love her own children. The State further emphasized its contention that Chamberlin did not love her children and abandoned them in its closing arguments during the penalty phase. 7. Andrew, for the first time, holds that irrelevant (and gender-based) evidence regarding a person’s sexual habits and parenting may constitute evidence so prejudicial as to render a trial fundamentally unfair. Similar to the prosecution’s actions in Chamberlin’s case, in Andrew, “the prosecution elicited testimony about Andrew’s sexual partners reaching back two decades; about the outfits she wore to dinner or during grocery runs; about the underwear she packed for vacation; and about how often she had sex in her car.” Andrew, 604 US. at 88. During the guilt phase, the prosecution had witnesses testify about Andrew’s clothing and “whether a good mother would dress or behave the way Andrew had.” Jd. The prosecution further hammered these themes home in its closing remarks. Jd. at 89. The Supreme Court found that this was enough to remand for a determination of whether the irrelevant evidence was so unduly prejudicial as to render Andrew’s trial fundamentally “It is also problematic that the prosecution depicted Chamberlin as an animal in an apparent attempt to dehumanize her. unfair. Jd. at 96. It further noted that the question must be asked “separately for the guilt and sentencing phases.” Id. As to the sentencing phase, the court may “consider the relevance of the disputed evidence to the . . . sentencing factors, the degree of prejudice... suffered from its introduction, and whether the trial court provided any mitigating instructions.” Id. 98. | Chamberlin argues that this overly prejudicial and irrelevant evidence was further worsened by the jury failing to hear evidence that Chamberlin had brain damage from fetal alcohol syndrome, which could have explained some of her conduct. Chamberlin attaches as an exhibit a psychologist’s report explaining Chamberlin’s significant impairments due to brain damage, noting that the brain damage and “her extensive trauma history further deteriorated her functioning, including her parenting abilities.” 499. | Chamberlin, in her second and third PCR, has now introduced new evidence of her brain damage due to FASD, evidence of how FASD impacts her behavior, and new evidence that Gillett controlled and abused her and that Gillett was the mastermind behind the killings. She now further argues under the 2025 Andrew case that prejudicial, gender-based evidence with no relevance to an aggravating factor was so unduly prejudicial as to render the penalty phase of her trial unfair. The cumulative impact of errors in the penalty phase of a death penalty trial “require a reversal when they deny the defendant the right to a fair trial.” Randall v. State, 806 So. 2d 185, 234 (Miss. 2001). A special need for reliability exists in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment. Id. For that reason, “[t]he impact 3Gillett, who evidence indicates was the primary person to inflict violence upon and murder the victims, had his death penalty reversed and now is serving two life sentences, while Chamberlin sits on death row. of many ‘near errors’ will have a greater impact in a capital case.” Jd. at 235. Further, endless errors cannot “be rectified on procedural grounds[,]” particularly when “the cumulative effect of the errors is simply too detrimental to ignore.” Minor v. State, 402 So. 3d 1272, 1280 (Miss. 2025). 410. As to a substantial showing of the denial of rights, first, Chamberlin has made a substantial showing sufficient to warrant a hearing in the trial court that her due process rights have been violated by the introduction of overly prejudicial, irrelevant evidence during the sentencing phase of trial. Pursuant to the intervening decision in Andrew, irrelevant evidence regarding Chamberlin’s sexual activity and her parenting may be so prejudicial as to render her trial fundamentally unfair. 411. Further, a capital defendant has a right under the Eighth Amendment to have all eee mitigating evidence presented to the jury. Specifically, “in capital cases “the sentencer . . . [should] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”’” Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4, 106 S. Ct. 1669, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) (first alteration in original) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982)). During the penalty phase of Chamberlin’s trial, the jury was never presented with the mitigating factor that “(t]he defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(6)(e) (Rev. 2000). The new affidavit from Gillett and the substantial information regarding Chamberlin’s FASD are both relevant to this mitigating factor. 412. Additionally, the State may not introduce aggravating factors during the sentencing phase that go beyond the factors listed in Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(5) (Supp. 2025). Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 747-48 (Miss. 1992) (“Aggravating circumstances are to be limited to the . . . factors enumerated in Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1991).”). The evidence the State may offer is limited to evidence relevant to one of those factors. Id, Under the statute in effect at the time of Chamberlin’s sentencing, the State was permitted to offer evidence relevant only to the following factors: (5) Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (a) The capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment. (b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. (c) Thedefendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons. (d) The capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5- 39, Mississippi Code of 1972, or the unlawful use or detonation of a bomb or explosive device. (e) The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody. (f) The capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain. (g) The capital offense was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental function or the enforcement of laws. (h) The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. H.B. 114, Reg. Sess., 1994 Miss. Laws ch. 566. Neither her sexual activity nor her parenting qualify under any of the statutory aggravating factors. 413. Consequently, Chamberlin has made a substantial showing that several of her rights have been denied, warranting a hearing in the trial court based on Andrew and that the cumulative evidence she has raised that seriously undermines the appropriateness of her sentence of death. 414. Viewed through the !ens of heightened scrutiny in which we resolve all doubts in favor of Chamberlin, the irrelevant prejudicial evidence introduced during the sentencing phase, as well as cumulative evidence Chamberlin has produced, including the evidence she has FASD and the Gillett affidavit alleging domination, warrant granting Chamberlin an evidentiary hearing in the trial court regarding her sentence of death. The trial court should determine whether the evidence presented at the hearing warrants vacating Chamberlin’s death sentences and holding a new sentencing hearing. I therefore object to the order dismissing Chamberlin’s petition for post-conviction relief.