Full Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-FC-01417-SCT MARK STANFORD, BY AND THROUGH ERIK APPELLEE PHILLIPS, AS GUARDIAN AND CONSERVATOR OF THE PERSON OF MARK STANFORD v. BRANDON NURSING AND REHABILITATION APPELLANT CENTER, L.L.C. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: W. DAVIS FRYE HAYLEY RENEE OLDHAM GEORGE CLANTON GUNN, IV ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: RICHARD PAUL WILLIAMS, III DARYL MATTHEW NEWMAN COURTNEY McREYNOLDS WILLIAMS NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - FEDERALLY CERTIFIED QUESTION DISPOSITION: CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED - 11/19/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. ISHEE, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has asked this Court to answer the following question: Does Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act require health care providers, in the absence of a designated surrogate, to identify qualifying family members and ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a health care decision made by a lower-priority family member? Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., 160 F.4th 118, 123 (5th Cir. 2025). This Court holds that Mississippi Code Section 41-41-211(2) (Rev. 2023) of Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act does require healthcare providers to identify qualifying family members and to ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a healthcare decision made by a lower-priority family member. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On May 17, 2017, Mark Stanford was admitted to Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center. Stanford suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and mental impairment. On June 26, 2017, Stanford’s primary physician declared that he lacked capacity to make healthcare decisions. On the same day, Brandon Nursing required an appointment of a surrogate for Stanford. Russell Phillips, Stanford’s brother, accepted the position and signed the surrogate-appointment forms provided by Brandon Nursing. The surrogate-appointment forms incorrectly listed Phillips as an “adult child” of Stanford. Phillips also signed an arbitration agreement on Stanford’s behalf. The arbitration agreement was mandatory for Stanford’s admission and provided that all disputes exceeding $25,000 would be settled through arbitration. ¶3. On January 20, 2022, Stanford was playing with a cigarette lighter in bed and inadvertently engulfed himself, his bed, privacy curtain, and oxygen tank in flames. Stanford suffered severe burns as a result of this incident. The sprinkler system in Stanford’s room failed to deploy, and his upper torso was left black and yellow from second- and third-degree burns. Stanford had previously suffered a similar incident years before, and his care plan 2 noted that he should be monitored for possession of lighters and/or matches. Stanford was subsequently transferred to the burn unit for specialized care. On January 23, 2022, Stanford underwent the first of many skin-graft surgeries. ¶4. On October 7, 2022, Stanford filed a complaint against Brandon Nursing and multiple other defendants in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, Northern Division. Stanford alleged that Brandon Nursing failed to provide proper care and that the lack of proper care resulted in serious injuries that will require treatment for the rest of Stanford’s life. The complaint sought more than $26 million in damages. ¶5. On November 22, 2022, Brandon Nursing filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. Brandon Nursing argued that the arbitration agreement signed by Phillips on Stanford’s behalf mandated arbitration, so the district court should dismiss Stanford’s complaint. On November 28, 2022, the district court responded with an order staying discovery. On December 9, 2022, the district court entered a subsequent order staying proceedings. ¶6. On December 19, 2022, Stanford filed a memorandum in opposition to Brandon Nursing’s motion to compel arbitration. Stanford argued that the arbitration agreement signed by Phillips was invalid because Phillips lacked authority to bind Stanford to arbitration. Stanford argued that Mark Sanderson, Stanford’s son, held higher priority than Phillips, Stanford’s brother, under Section 41-41-211(2) and was reasonably available to act as Stanford’s surrogate, so Phillips was barred from acting as Stanford’s surrogate. ¶7. On January 9, 2023, Brandon Nursing filed a reply in support of its motion to compel 3 arbitration and stay proceedings. Brandon Nursing argued that Phillips was eligible to serve as Stanford’s surrogate and that while Section 41-41-211(2) gave Sanderson priority over Phillips, Sanderson declined to act as Stanford’s surrogate. Brandon Nursing contended that Phillips alone made all the healthcare decisions for Stanford and was also required by Mississippi Code Section 41-41-211(4) (Rev. 2023) to inform Stanford’s family members that he was acting as surrogate. For four years, Sanderson failed to object to Phillips’s acting as surrogate, and Brandon Nursing argued that his sudden objection was made “to skew the surrogate requirements to avoid arbitration” and could be problematic in other healthcare situations. ¶8. On September 3, 2024, the district court entered an order denying Brandon Nursing’s motion to compel arbitration and to stay proceedings. The district court examined the language of Section 41-41-211(2) and found priority to be “a precondition of the statute’s affirmative grant of permission for one to act as a decisionmaker—not a method of determining post hoc which decision controls.” In response to Brandon Nursing’s arguments, the district court found that requiring healthcare providers to determine whether other surrogates with higher priority existed would not be overly burdensome and would ensure that healthcare decisions are made by the party with proper authority. The district court also found that no evidence supported that Sanderson had declined to serve as surrogate; rather, Brandon Nursing had failed to contact Sanderson despite knowing his relationship to Stanford and possessing his contact information. ¶9. On October 2, 2024, Brandon Nursing filed a notice of appeal from the order denying 4 its motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. On November 20, 2025, the Fifth Circuit found that Section 41-41-211(2) is ambiguous and that no cases had interpreted the statute. Stanford, 160 F.4th at 120. The Fifth Circuit found the interpretation of Section 41- 41-211(2) determinative in deciding the case and requested that this Court interpret the statute. Id. The certified question is now before this Court. CERTIFIED QUESTION ¶10. Does Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act require health care providers, in the absence of a designated surrogate, to identify qualifying family members and ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a health care decision made by a lower-priority family member? Stanford, 160 F.4th at 123. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11. Mississippi Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(a) provides that the Fifth Circuit may certify a question to this Court when “questions or propositions of law of this state [arise] which are determinative of all or part of that cause and [when] there are no clear controlling precedents in the decisions of the Mississippi Supreme Court.” M.R.A.P. 20(a). This Court has discretion to decline or to answer the certified question. Id. “The role of this Court is limited to law declaration; fact finding and law application is the responsibility of the fact-finding court, which in this instance is the Fifth Circuit.” Crabtree v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 426 So. 3d 226, 229 (Miss. 2025). This Court will not “rule on the dispositive issues of this case” and “will only address the legal question asked by the Fifth Circuit.” Id. at 230 (citing M.R.A.P. 20 cmt.). 5 DISCUSSION ¶12. Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act governs the appointment of healthcare surrogates. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211 (Rev. 2023). Under the Act, Mississippi Code Section 41-41-211 states, in part: (1) A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult or emancipated minor if the patient has been determined by the primary physician to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the agent or guardian is not reasonably available. (2) An adult or emancipated minor may designate any individual to act as surrogate by personally informing the supervising health-care provider. In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not reasonably available, any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: (a) The spouse, unless legally separated; (b) An adult child; (c) A parent; or (d) An adult brother or sister. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211 (Rev. 2023) (emphasis added). Opposing Arguments ¶13. Brandon Nursing argues that the “purpose of the Act is to allow willing and able (i.e., ‘available’) family members to make health care decisions for incapacitated loved ones for the prompt and appropriate provision of health care.” ¶14. Brandon Nursing argues that Section 41-41-211(2) allows any family member enumerated in the Act to serve as a healthcare surrogate and that priority need only be considered when there is a disagreement between different classes. According to Brandon 6 Nursing, the Act’s language does not require healthcare providers to identify and contact family members of higher priority before relying on decisions made by a properly appointed surrogate; requiring otherwise would place an undue burden on healthcare providers and frustrate the purpose of the Act. ¶15. Stanford argues that “[p]riority is unequivocally a precondition to surrogacy,” and as such, if a family member with higher priority under the Act is reasonably available and willing to serve, a family member with lower priority cannot serve as surrogate. According to Stanford, requiring healthcare providers to identify and contact family members of higher priority does not place an undue burden on healthcare providers; rather, it was intended by the Act to ensure that the proper party is appointed as surrogate. Statutory Interpretation ¶16. “This Court employs a ‘strict interpretation’ of the Health-Care Decisions Act.” Belhaven Senior Care, LLC v. Smith, 359 So. 3d 612, 618 (Miss. 2023) (citing Tarvin v. CLC of Jackson, LLC, 193 So. 3d 633, 637 (Miss. 2016)). When interpreting a statute, this Court looks to “ascertain the intent of the legislature from the statute as a whole and from the language used therein.” DePriest v. Barber, 798 So. 2d 456, 458 (Miss. 2001) (quoting Clark v. State ex rel. Miss. State Med. Ass’n, 381 So. 2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1980)). When a statute is vague or ambiguous, this Court “may look not only to the language used but also to its historical background, its subject matter, and the purposes and objects to be accomplished.” Id. (quoting Clark, 381 So. 2d). ¶17. Looking to Mississippi Code Section 41-41-211(4), (5), and (8) (Rev. 2023), 7 Brandon Nursing argues that interpreting the Act “as a whole” supports its argument. Stanford, 160 F.4th at 122. Subsection (4) requires that a surrogate communicate their “assumption of authority” to other family members enumerated in subsection (2); subsection (5) provides that all members of an evenly divided class in disagreement and all members of lower-priority classes are disqualified; and subsection (8) allows an individual to disqualify another from acting as surrogate. § 41-41-211(4), (5), (8). While not expressly stated by the Act, Brandon Nursing argues that subsections (5) and (8) indicate that “priority only becomes an issue when a conflict arises between surrogates of different classes.” Brandon Nursing interprets the notification requirement of subsection (4) to allow a lower-priority family member to serve as surrogate because the act does not require the lower-priority family member to obtain permission from a higher-priority family member. § 41-41-211(4), (8). ¶18. Conversely, Stanford argues that interpreting the act “as a whole” provides that the burden of determining the correct surrogate is on the healthcare provider, not the family members. Stanford contends that the notice requirement of subsection (4) is not intended to serve as an opportunity for a family member of higher priority to disqualify a family member of lower priority from acting as surrogate; rather, it is merely intended to ensure that the incapacitated party’s best interest is being protected. Stanford supports this contention by pointing out that the notice requirement would apply to a family member with the greatest priority to inform family members of lower priority. Stanford also argues that the district court was correct finding that the plain language of Section 41-41-211(2) supported his argument. The district court found: 8 In the phrase, “any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate,” the “priority” language succeeds the “any member” phrase, indicating “priority” modifies and clarifies “any member.” The language also does not specify anything regarding priority being used to select among or choose between competing decisions. Rather, the phrasing controls who “may act as surrogate.” Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 3:22-CV-589-HTW-LGI, 2024 WL 4028718, at *7 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 3, 2024). Thus, Stanford argues that the plain language of subsection (2) and reading the Act as a whole support his interpretation. ¶19. As the Fifth Circuit noted, “[b]oth parties assert that the plain language of the statute supports their position and that public policy concerns weigh in their favor.” Stanford, 160 F.4th at 122. No case law interprets the priority language of Section 41-41-211(2), and no instructive comments are provided by Section 41-41-211. Id. at 123; see § 41-41-211. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act ¶20. Mississippi has adopted the 1993 version of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Health-Care Decisions Act (2023).1 Section 5 of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 1993 provides crucial insight for interpreting the priority language of Section 41-41-211. Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act § 5 editors’ note. The model act refers to the selection of a surrogate “in descending order of priority” from the enumerated list of a patient’s family members as a 1 Multiple states have also adopted a version of the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act. This Court has not found any case law from these states interpreting the priority language of their respective surrogate statutes. 9 “default rule.” Id. § 12. This language expresses intent that an inquiry into the availability of the family member of highest priority must be made before relying on a lower-priority family member to serve as surrogate. The comment to section 12 the Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act of 2023 further support this intent. Id. cmt. The comment provides that “[b]y adopting a priority list, the Act rejects an alternative approach taken by a minority of states that gives a patient’s physician substantial discretion to select among potential surrogates.” Id. This approach is intended to support the traditional preferences of most patients and to limit healthcare professionals’ discretion in determining a surrogate for the patient. Id. Thus, this comment clearly shows the commission’s intent that the priority language requires healthcare providers to identify qualifying family members and ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a healthcare decision made by a lower-priority family member. Burden on Healthcare Providers ¶21. The requirement for healthcare providers to contact the family member(s) of higher priority would not unduly burden healthcare providers as Brandon Nursing purports. Section 41-41-211(2) provides that a “reasonably available” family member from the enumerated list may serve as surrogate, and Mississippi Code Section 41-41-203(p) defines reasonably available as “readily able to be contacted without undue effort and willing and able to act in a timely manner considering the urgency of the patient’s health-care needs.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-203(p) (Rev. 2023). ¶22. In support of Brandon Nursing, the Mississippi Health Care Association and 10 Mississippi Hospital Association argue: [i]nterpretation of the Act to require a health care provider to identify qualifying family members and to ensure no higher priority family member is available before relying on the decision of a lower priority family member places an onerous burden on all health care providers for each health care decision which might be made in rendering patient care. These worries contradict the plain language of Section 41-41-203(p), as the statute provides that healthcare providers need not exert “undue effort” in attempting to contact potential surrogates. It is far-fetched to argue that such a minimal standard places an onerous burden on healthcare providers. The Mississippi Health Care Association and Mississippi Hospital Association also argue: [h]ealth care providers would be faced with the task of deciphering what the Courts might consider reasonably available (and how to prove the same if called into question years later, as in the present case) rather than being able to rely on the decisions of a family member identified under the Act who is present and willing to assume the role of health care surrogate. While this concern is reasonable, it is also purely speculative. Numerous other states have adopted surrogate statutes that explicitly require healthcare providers to contact the highest priority family member before relying on a decision made by a lower-priority family member,2 and this Court has not found a single case in which this requirement has been an issue. CONCLUSION ¶23. Priority is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as “[t]he status of being earlier in time or higher in degree or rank; precedence.” Priority, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 2 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 137-J:35; Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 5-605; N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2994-d (McKinney 2020); 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 40/25. 11 The district court and Stanford interpret the priority language of Section 41-41-211(2) to mean precedence. This Court agrees and finds that the priority language of Section 41-41- 211(2) should be interpreted to mean precedence. This Court finds that such an interpretation is supported by the language of the Act and best supports the purpose that the Act seeks to achieve in promoting prompt administration of healthcare by a family member most likely to act in accordance with the patient’s wishes. ¶24. The question posed to this Court is: Does Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act require health care providers, in the absence of a designated surrogate, to identify qualifying family members and ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a health care decision made by a lower-priority family member? Stanford, 160 F.4th at 123. This Court holds that the Act does so require. This requirement reflects the intent of the Act and serves the best interest of incapacitated patients without significantly burdening healthcare providers. Accordingly, this Court’s answer to the Fifth Circuit’s certified question is yes. ¶25. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. RANDOLPH, C.J., KING, P.J., SULLIVAN AND WILSON, JJ., CONCUR. GRIFFIS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY COLEMAN, P.J., AND BRANNING, J. TOLLISON, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. GRIFFIS, JUSTICE, DISSENTING: ¶26. Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act (the Act), Mississippi Code Sections 41-41-201 to -229 (Rev. 2023), provides for healthcare decisions to be made by a 12 surrogate3 when an individual is unable to make his or her own healthcare decisions4 and has no appointed guardian or designated agent for healthcare decisions. A. The Statutory Text that Governs Surrogates ¶27. Mississippi Code Section 41-41-211, titled “Surrogates,” provides: (1) A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult . . . if the patient has been determined by the primary physician to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the agent or guardian is not reasonably available. (2) An adult . . . may designate any individual to act as surrogate by personally informing the supervising health-care provider. In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not reasonably available, any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: (a) The spouse, unless legally separated; (b) An adult child; (c) A parent; or (d) An adult brother or sister. (3) If none of the individuals eligible to act as surrogate under subsection (2) is reasonably available, an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available may act as surrogate. (4) A surrogate shall communicate his or her assumption of authority 3 “‘Surrogate’ means an individual, other than a patient’s agent or guardian, authorized under Sections 41-41-201 through 41-41-229 to make a health-care decision for the patient.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-203(s) (Rev. 2023). 4 “‘Health-care decision’ means a decision made by an individual or the individual’s agent, guardian, or surrogate, regarding the individual’s health care, including: (i) Selection and discharge of health-care providers and institutions; . . . .” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41- 203(h) (Rev. 2023). 13 as promptly as practicable to the members of the patient’s family specified in subsection (2) who can be readily contacted. (5) If more than one (1) member of a class assumes authority to act as surrogate, and they do not agree on a health-care decision and the supervising health-care provider is so informed, the supervising health-care provider shall comply with the decision of a majority of the members of that class who have communicated their views to the provider. If the class is evenly divided concerning the health-care decision and the supervising health-care provider is so informed, that class and all individuals having lower priority are disqualified from making the decision. (6) A surrogate shall make a health-care decision in accordance with the patient’s individual instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the surrogate. Otherwise, the surrogate shall make the decision in accordance with the surrogate’s determination of the patient’s best interest. In determining the patient’s best interest, the surrogate shall consider the patient’s personal values to the extent known to the surrogate. (7) A health-care decision made by a surrogate for a patient is effective without judicial approval. (8) An individual at any time may disqualify another, including a member of the individual’s family, from acting as the individual’s surrogate by a signed writing or by personally informing the supervising health-care provider of the disqualification. (9) A surrogate may not be an owner, operator, or employee of a residential long-term health-care institution at which the patient is receiving care unless related to the patient by blood, marriage, or adoption, except in the case of a patient of a state-operated facility who has no person listed in subsection (2) reasonably available to act as a surrogate. (10) A supervising health-care provider may require an individual claiming the right to act as surrogate for a patient to provide a written declaration under penalty of perjury stating facts and circumstances reasonably sufficient to establish the claimed authority. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211 (Rev. 2023). Eligible Surrogates Under the Act 14 ¶28. The Act establishes four categories of individuals who are eligible to make healthcare decisions for a patient unable to make such decisions on their own. This case is decided on the third category, but the other categories are instructive. 1. Category 1—Agent or Guardian ¶29. The first category is the lawfully appointed agent or guardian. Here, the patient must formally appoint the person through the execution of an advance healthcare directive5 and appoint an agent or guardian to make their healthcare decisions. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41- 41-205 through -209 (Rev. 2023). Because Stanford did not appoint an agent or guardian, this category is not applicable. 2. Category 2—Person Designated by Patient ¶30. The second, third, and fourth categories establish the patient’s eligible surrogates. Of note, the appointment of a surrogate does not have to be in writing or signed. The appointment of a surrogate under the Act requires much less formality. “A surrogate may make a health-care decision for a patient who is an adult . . . if the patient has been determined by the primary physician to lack capacity and no agent or guardian has been appointed or the agent or guardian is not reasonably available.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41- 211(1) (Rev. 2023). I address these individually. ¶31. The second category provides that, “[a]n adult . . . may designate any individual to act as surrogate by personally informing the supervising health-care provider.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(2) (Rev. 2023). The Act expressly provides that this appointment may be made 5 Sometimes, this is referred to as a power of attorney or a living will. 15 either orally or in writing. Upon the informal appointment, the provider is obligated to honor the surrogate’s authority. Also, of note, this category of surrogate does not have to be a member of the patient’s family, and no hierarchy or priority is mandated. Because Stanford did not designate a surrogate, this category is not applicable. 3. Category 3—Certain Family Members ¶32. The third category of eligible surrogates applies here. This category was established in the second sentence of subsection 211(2). In the absence of a designation, or if the designee is not reasonably available, any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: (a) The spouse, unless legally separated; (b) An adult child; (c) A parent; or (d) An adult brother or sister. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(2) (Rev. 2023). I will address this further below. 4. Category 4—Nonfamily Members ¶33. The fourth category of eligible surrogates is set forth in subsection 211(3), If none of the individuals eligible to act as surrogate under subsection (2) is reasonably available, an adult who has exhibited special care and concern for the patient, who is familiar with the patient’s personal values, and who is reasonably available may act as surrogate. Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(3) (Rev. 2023). This is the lowest category of eligible surrogates. Admittedly, it is not applicable to our decision. Yet it assists in our interpretation of the Act. Once again, this category requires no formal action, and no hierarchy or priority 16 of possible surrogates is mandated. Here, the nephew of a patient has no priority or preference over a neighbor or friend. B. The Certified Question ¶34. I turn now to address the certified question: Does Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act require health care providers, in the absence of a designated surrogate, to identify qualifying family members and ensure that no such family member with higher priority is reasonably available under the circumstances before relying on a health care decision made by a lower-priority family member? Stanford ex rel. Phillips v. Brandon Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., L.L.C., 160 F.4th 118, 123 (5th Cir. 2025). The Fifth Circuit also directed that “[o]ur framing of the certified question should not be construed as limiting the scope of the Mississippi Supreme Court’s response to the precise form of the question.” Id. ¶35. We are asked to consider the third category of eligible surrogates. And, specifically, we are asked to interpret the duty or responsibility placed on the healthcare provider by the second sentence of subsection 211(2). 1. Legal Principles of Statutory Interpretation. ¶36. Mississippi law provides the following legal principles for courts to use to interpret a statute: “Our duty is to carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case.” “[W]here statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.” “When construing the meaning of a statute, we must look at the words of the statute.” Corp. Mgmt., Inc. v. Greene Cnty., 23 So. 3d 454, 465 (Miss. 2009) (alteration in original) 17 (citations omitted). “[O]ur primary goal in interpreting statutes is ‘to adopt that interpretation [that] will meet the true meaning of the Legislature.’” Hall v. State, 241 So. 3d 629, 631 (Miss. 2018) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Legislature v. Shipman, 170 So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Miss. 2015)). 2. No provision of the Act supports the majority’s conclusion. ¶37. The majority does not cite a provision that supports its conclusion. The majority’s decision rests solely on the fact that subsection 211(2) establishes a hierarchy in this class of surrogates by the inclusion of the phrase “in descending order of priority . . . .” ¶38. In fact, no provision in the Act requires a healthcare provider to take affirmative steps to ensure a higher-priority family member is not reasonably available before relying on a healthcare decision of a known reasonably available lower-priority family member. The other provisions of the Act indicate that this is not a correct reading of this phrase. 3. Provider responsibilities are stated in the statutory text. ¶39. The majority fails to mention that the Act includes a provision titled “Health-care provider or institution responsibilities.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-215 (Rev. 2023). The nine subsections of this section unequivocally state the provider’s responsibilities. Id. Not one word of section 215 requires providers to undertake a search or detailed investigation to determine priority among any category of surrogates, including the class of designated family members. ¶40. But this section does affirmatively impose a responsibility on the healthcare provider to “[c]omply with a health-care decision for the patient made by a person then authorized to 18 make healthcare decisions for the patient.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-215(4)(b) (Rev. 2023). Further, the phrase “then authorized” expressly contemplates that a person properly asserting surrogate authority may later be disqualified under Section 41-41-211(8). 4. The provider is not required to search for family members. ¶41. The Act places a fairly low threshold on the appointment of a surrogate through the use of the term “reasonably available[.]” § 41-41-211(2). This term indicates that the healthcare provider has no responsibility or obligation to undertake a search or detailed investigation to determine priority among any category of surrogates. ¶42. The relevant statutory text states “any member of the following classes of the patient’s family who is reasonably available, in descending order of priority, may act as surrogate: . . . (b) An adult child; . . . or (d) An adult brother . . . .” § 41-41-211(2) (emphasis added). In my opinion, it is conclusive that the primary action contemplated by this sentence is to authorize that “any member of the . . . patient’s family who is reasonably available . . . may act as surrogate . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). ¶43. In this case, Phillips, as Stanford’s adult brother, was certainly a family member as defined by the statute. The evidence indicated that Phillips presented himself as Stanford’s adult brother and was ready, willing, and able to act as his healthcare surrogate. Thus, based on this information, Brandon Nursing determined that Phillips was both reasonably available and was a qualified family member as Stanford’s adult brother. ¶44. Yet the majority arrives at the conclusion that Sanderson was reasonably available. Stanford’s affidavit gave no indication that Sanderson undertook any effort to make himself 19 reasonably available to act on his father’s behalf. This should have been a factual decision for the district court to make, but the record before us contains no evidence Sanderson was reasonably available. ¶45. The threshold of this language is low: “any member . . . who is reasonably available . . . .” Id. “‘Reasonably available’ means readily able to be contacted without undue effort and willing and able to act in a timely manner considering the urgency of the patient’s health-care needs.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-203(p) (Rev. 2023) (emphasis added). This language does not require or obligate the provider to undertake a search or detailed investigation to determine priority among any category of surrogates. 5. The Act imposes a duty on the surrogate, not the healthcare provider, to inform other family members. ¶46. The duty to inform other family members of the surrogacy is clearly stated in the Act. “A surrogate shall communicate his or her assumption of authority as promptly as practicable to the members of the patient’s family specified in subsection (2) who can be readily contacted.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(4) (Rev. 2023). ¶47. The surrogate has three essential and nondelegable duties. First, the surrogate has a duty to communicate to other family members that he or she has assumed surrogate authority over the patient. Id. Second, the surrogate has the duty to make this communication “as promptly as practicable[.]” Id. Third, the surrogate has the duty to communicate this to all family members. Id. (emphasis added). Here, Phillips had the duty to advise Sanderson, and other family members, that he was assuming the role of surrogate for Stanford. ¶48. This directly contradicts the majority’s interpretation that Brandon Nursing had the 20 duty to search for and identify higher-priority class members. A common-sense reading of subsections 211(2) and (4) clearly indicates that if the provider has the obligation to search for all class family members and determine the member with hierarchy or priority, then it serves no purpose for the Act also to require the surrogate to communicate the very same information to all family members, either higher or lower priority. It certainly makes no sense that the surrogate would have to communicate with lower-priority family members. ¶49. The Act clearly and unequivocally imposes the duty to communicate on the surrogate, not the provider. Id. The surrogate’s responsibility of communication with family members is required to go to both higher- and lower-priority family members. Id. The purpose of this communication is to put other family members on notice that they may need to take further action, including legal action, if they disagree with the surrogate’s decisions or if they believe a lower-priority family member may be usurping their right to serve as the surrogate. See Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-211(5) and (8) (Rev. 2023). ¶50. If the majority is correct and the provider has the responsibility to identify the priority among qualifying family members before admission, then I challenge my colleagues to explain the purpose of subsection 211(4). Indeed, accepting the majority’s instruction, this surrogate action and responsibility would serve no purpose and would be a waste of time, energy, and effort. 6. The Act expressly contemplates and provides a remedy for disagreement. ¶51. The Act expressly contemplates and provides a remedy for disagreement among class members. 21 If more than one (1) member of a class assumes authority to act as surrogate, and they do not agree o