Demarco Ladrelle Marquiz Woodard a/k/a Demarco Woodard a/k/a Demarco L. Woodard v. State of Mississippi
CourtCourt of Appeals of Mississippi
Date FiledSeptember 22, 2026
Docket2025-CP-00637-COA
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-CP-00637-COA
DEMARCO LADRELLE MARQUIZ WOODARD APPELLANT
A/K/A DEMARCO WOODARD A/K/A
DEMARCO L. WOODARD
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/08/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ROBERT THOMAS BAILEY
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: LAUDERDALE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: DEMARCO L. WOODARD (PRO SE)
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ALLISON ELIZABETH HORNE
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/22/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND WEDDLE, JJ.
LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. Demarco L. Woodard was arrested for multiple crimes on July 15, 2020, including
possession of a firearm as a felon. He was indicted for that charge on May 12, 2021. On
December 15, 2022, Woodard pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a felon and was
sentenced to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC),
with six years suspended and four years to serve, followed by five years of post-release
supervision. Woodard’s sentencing order stated the following:
It is the order of the court that you shall comply with the following conditions.
Failure to abide by any one of these conditions is sufficient to revoke the
probationary portion of this order. Probation is a privilege. It is not a right. It
may be revoked for the slightest violation of this order. The conditions are as
follows: (a) The Defendant shall hereafter commit no offense against the laws
of this State or of any other State or the United States of America. . . .
Woodard signed the document in acknowledgment.
¶2. While still in MDOC custody, Woodard was indicted on January 12, 2023, for one
count of touching a child for lustful purposes and three counts of sexual battery. The
indictment alleged those crimes had occurred “between the dates of September 22, 2018
through September 21, 2019,” and “between the dates of June 1, 2021 through July 26,
2021[.]” The record on appeal does not explain what caused the delay in prosecution.
¶3. Regarding the firearm conviction, Woodard filed his first motion for post-conviction
relief (PCR) in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court on November 2, 2023.1 Woodard
alleged that he “had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights,” that “his
confession was not voluntary[,]” that the evidence against him was insufficient to sustain the
conviction[,]” “that his confession was the fruit of an illegal arrest[,]” and “that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel . . . and counsel’s performance was deficient.” He also
alleged that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. On March 6, 2024, the circuit judge
entered an order addressing Woodard’s claims and denying his PCR motion. Woodard did
1
The record before this Court only contains documents associated with Woodard’s
second PCR motion. However, we are permitted to take judicial notice of Woodard’s first
PCR motion and the accompanying order denying it. See Morris v. State, 432 So. 3d 390,
398 (¶8) & n.5 (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (taking judicial notice of a petition filed on the
Mississippi Electronic Courts (MEC) system because the petition “is readily available on
MEC and cannot reasonably be disputed”) (citing Jackson v. State, 394 So. 3d 420, 432
(¶43) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)).
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not appeal.
¶4. On June 7, 2024, Woodard was released from MDOC custody for his felon-in-
possession conviction and began the post-release supervision (PRS) portion of his sentence.
However, Woodard was detained soon after in relation to the 2023 indictment for one count
of lustful touching and three counts of sexual battery. To be clear, these charges were
completely unrelated to the felon-in-possession conviction for which he was placed on PRS.
¶5. On January 28, 2025, Woodard filed a second PCR motion in the Lauderdale County
Circuit Court. He alleged that he had been released from MDOC’s physical custody and on
PRS on June 7, 2024, and was subsequently detained for additional crimes. Woodard’s PCR
motion alleged that his PRS for the felon-in-possession conviction had not been revoked, so
he had been unlawfully detained. In addition, he asserted again that he had received
ineffective assistance of counsel and was denied a speedy trial, and he raised various
arguments associated with search warrants. Woodard attached a civil rights complaint to his
PCR motion as well, arguing that his “pending charges [we]re being used as a weapon for
prosecutorial discretion misconduct to stay [him] and hold him in abeyance without due
process of law[.]” Woodard indicated that he was not in the custody of MDOC at the time
of filing his PCR motion.
¶6. On May 8, 2025, the circuit judge entered an order dismissing Woodard’s PCR motion
as moot because the motion had been filed after Woodard was released from prison due to
the expiration of his sentence. The judge also found the PCR motion was barred as
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successive. Woodard appealed on May 22, 2025.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. This Court will review a “circuit court’s dismissal or denial of a PCR motion for
abuse of discretion and [will] decline to reverse unless the circuit court’s decision is clearly
erroneous.” Hamilton v. State, 367 So. 3d 1039, 1041 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting
Taylor v. State, 348 So. 3d 1017, 1019 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022)). “We review questions
of law de novo.” Id.
ANALYSIS
¶8. Woodard argues on appeal that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that the
court clerk did not mail the “proceedings” related to his first PCR motion to him, causing a
“procedural default” for his chance to appeal, and that misconduct occurred in the form of
a conspiracy between the prosecutor’s and public defender’s offices to withhold “discovery
favorable to his defense.” However, this Court has established that “a defendant who fails
to raise an issue in his motion for post-conviction relief before the trial court may not raise
that issue for the first time on appeal.” Arnold v. State, 312 So. 3d 748, 751 (¶9) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2021) (quoting Fluker v. State, 17 So. 3d 181, 183 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). These
arguments presented by Woodard are not those contained in his second PCR motion before
the circuit court. Therefore, Woodard is procedurally barred from raising those claims.
2
On July 22, 2025, the circuit court clerk for Lauderdale County filed a motion with
this Court requesting an extension of time to prepare the record on appeal. On July 31,
2025, this Court granted the motion.
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¶9. As for the circuit court’s denial of Woodard’s PCR motion, the judgment stated that
Woodard’s motion was moot because he was no longer in custody for the felon-in-possession
conviction and that, even so, the motion was successive. The State concedes in its brief that
Woodard’s case is not moot because “postconviction relief is available to any person
sentenced by a court of record of the State of Mississippi[.]” Howell v. State, 283 So. 3d
1100, 1104 (¶16) (Miss. 2019) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-5(1) (Rev. 2015)). We
agree and continue to address the successive bar.3
¶10. “Mississippi statutory law grants each movant one bite at the apple when requesting
post-conviction relief.” Lambert v. State, 329 So. 3d 1225, 1228 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021)
(emphasis added) (quoting Hayes v. State, 282 So. 3d 1185, 1187 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App.
2019)). Indeed, “[u]nder Mississippi’s Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act
(UPCCRA), any order denying or dismissing a PCR motion is a bar to a second or successive
PCR motion.” Bradley v. State, 395 So. 3d 1015, 1019 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (citing
Evans v. State, 115 So. 3d 879, 880 (¶2) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)); see Miss. Code Ann.
§ 99-39-23 (Rev. 2020) (“[A]ny order dismissing the petitioner’s motion or otherwise
denying relief under this article is a final judgment and shall be conclusive until reversed. It
shall be a bar to a second or successive motion under this article.”). The bar for successive
3
“It is well-settled law that on appeal this Court may affirm a circuit court’s ruling
for different reasons than those offered by the circuit court.” Dunaway v. State, 111 So. 3d
117, 119 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Campbell v. State, 75 So. 3d 1160, 1162 (¶9)
(Miss. Ct. App. 2011)). We are therefore permitted to affirm the denial of Woodard’s PCR
motion as successive.
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motions has three statutory exceptions: “[(1)] when an intervening appellate decision would
have adversely affected the outcome of a defendant’s conviction or sentence; [(2)] when
there is evidence not reasonably discoverable at the time of the trial that would have caused
a different result in the conviction or sentence; or [(3)] when probation, parole, or conditional
release has been unlawfully revoked or the sentence expired.” Bradley, 395 So. 3d at 1019
(¶12) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(6)).
¶11. Woodard’s first PCR motion was filed on November 2, 2023, denied on March 6,
2024, and was never appealed. His second PCR motion was filed on January 28, 2025.
Woodard’s second motion did not show that a recent appellate decision would have changed
his conviction or sentence. Woodard’s second motion did not show there was new evidence
that would have affected the outcome of his conviction or sentence. And Woodard’s second
motion did not show that his PRS had been “unlawfully revoked.”4 Therefore, the issues
raised in Woodard’s second PCR motion are not only procedurally barred for failing to raise
the arguments in the circuit court; his motion is also statutorily barred as a successive motion
under Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-23 and, thus, prohibited.
4
Woodard claims that he was illegally detained during his PRS period. That is not
the case. Woodard was detained for an indictment for touching a child for lustful purposes
and three counts of sexual battery. He was convicted of two counts of sexual battery and
sentenced as a habitual offender to life imprisonment for one and to serve a consecutive term
of thirty years in MDOC custody for the other. He was sentenced to serve a consecutive
term of fifteen years in MDOC custody for the conviction of lustful touching. Woodard
appealed those convictions, and his appeal is currently pending before our state supreme
court. See Woodard v. State, 2026-TS-00228-SCT.
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CONCLUSION
¶12. This Court finds Woodard’s arguments in his PCR motion procedurally barred and
his PCR motion successive. Therefore, this Court affirms the circuit court’s decision to deny
post-conviction relief.
¶13. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS,
McDONALD, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ.,
CONCUR.
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