David G. Fitzpatrick and Cloteal A. Fitzpatrick v. Dorothy Faulkner

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CA-00252-COA DAVID G. FITZPATRICK AND CLOTEAL A. APPELLANTS/CROSS- FITZPATRICK APPELLEES v. DOROTHY FAULKNER APPELLEE/CROSS- APPELLANT DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/20/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. VICKI B. DANIELS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: TATE COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS: TAYLOR ALLISON HECK NATHAN E. FITZPATRICK ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GOODLOE TANKERSLEY LEWIS SAMANTHA DAVIS WEATHERSBEE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED - 09/22/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: EN BANC. LAWRENCE, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Dorothy Faulkner filed an adverse-possession suit against David and Cloteal Fitzpatrick. The Fitzpatricks filed counterclaims and, eventually, a motion for summary judgment. The chancellor denied the motion for summary judgment and, following a trial on the merits, entered a final order granting Faulkner’s claim of adverse possession. Aggrieved, the Fitzpatricks appealed, raising two issues. First, they argued that the chancery court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment and second, that the chancery court erred in its findings of facts and conclusions of law in granting adverse possession to Faulkner. Faulkner cross-appealed, asserting the chancery court should have provided her title to more land under adverse possession. After review, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and remands the case to the chancery court. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. On November 8, 2023, Dorothy Faulkner filed a complaint for adverse possession against David and Cloteal Fitzpatrick, the record owners of a portion of real property in Senatobia, Mississippi, in the Tate County Chancery Court.1 The complaint alleged that Faulkner had “adversely possessed” a piece of property “off of” Gravel Springs Road in Senatobia and had continued doing so for over ten years. See Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-13(1) (Rev. 2019). She also stated that “[p]art of her house and part of her driveway is located” on the land she sought to possess, and “a mobile home that she owns and maintains is located 1 The property was described as: A fractional part of Section 7, Township 6 South, Range 6 West, Tate County, Mississippi, more particularly described as follows, to-wit: Beginning at an iron rod at the intersection of the South line of the North Half of the Northwest Quarter of said Section 7 and the East line of the said Northwest Quarter of said Section 7, run thence South 89°28'02" West 2659.92 feet along the said South line of the North Half of the Northwest Quarter of Section 7 to a point in the center line of Gravel Springs county paved road; thence Northward 731. 7 feet along said road centerline to an iron spindle; thence East 2656. 7 feet to the point of beginning, and total net acreage after deducting the exceptions being 39.4 acres, more or less. Reference is hereby made to deed recorded in deed book 2018 at pages 3909- 3911 from Dayle McClinton to David G. Fitzpatrick and wife, Cloteal A. Fitzpatrick, as tenants by the entirety with full rights of survivorship and not as tenants in common. 2 completely on that land.” ¶3. The Fitzpatricks filed separate answers to Faulkner’s complaint on December 12, 2023. In addition, they filed counterclaims accusing Faulkner of trespass, nuisance, and violating the applicable ordinances. On November 8, 2024, the Fitzpatricks filed a motion in chancery court to transfer the case to circuit court. Faulkner filed a response on November 11, arguing that the case involved land that “is clearly and inarguably within the constitutionally established jurisdiction of chancery court” and that the whole basis of the action as a whole was adverse possession. On November 22, 2024, the chancellor entered an order denying the motion to transfer. ¶4. On January 7, 2025, the Fitzpatricks filed a motion for summary judgment encompassing four exhibits: (1) a warranty deed; (2) a land survey; (3) a transcript of Faulkner’s deposition; and (4) an affidavit from Cloteal. The land survey displayed five “encroachments” of Faulkner’s property onto the Fitzpatricks’ property: (1) a portion of Faulkner’s home; (2) Faulkner’s driveway; (3) a small portion of Faulkner’s shed; (4) a mobile home; and (5) the northern portion of Faulkner’s yard. 3 Faulkner filed a response to the motion with additional photographs and diagrams attached. On January 23, 2025, the chancellor denied the Fitzpatricks’ motion for summary judgment. ¶5. The chancellor held a trial on the merits on February 7, 2025. David Fitzpatrick first provided testimony beginning with his marriage to Cloteal in approximately 1974. At that time, the owners of the subject property were George McClinton and his wife, who were Cloteal’s grandparents. David testified that he and Cloteal took ownership of the property next to Faulkner’s in 2018. David had not overheard any conversations between the McClintons and the Faulkners regarding the land at all. In fact, he testified that he knew nothing of Faulkner until the Fitzpatricks had a survey done of the land in 2022. He also stated that he was unaware of any property-line disputes until a land survey was taken in 2022. David contended simply that “Ms. Faulkner is sitting on land that she does not own.” ¶6. Faulkner then testified. She recalled that she and her husband Clarence (now deceased) bought empty land on Gravel Springs Road in 1972. At an unspecified point in time, George McClinton put a spike into the ground between their land, demarcating where the Faulkners’ property ended. The Faulkners built a house on the land in the years following. In approximately 1980, the Faulkners expanded their home to the north (toward the McClinton land) to add two additional rooms for their growing children. Faulkner did not have any knowledge of any land survey or any conversations her husband had with McClinton about the land at the time. Faulkner stated that they expanded their home then, and they thought, “Actually, we did” own the land. She stated that the expanded part of the home on the Fitzpatricks’ land was still part of her home today. Faulkner testified that she 4 and her family had a good relationship with the McClintons as neighbors. She agreed that “the McClintons basically allowed [the Faulkners] to use their land[.]” In approximately 1978, the Faulkners constructed a shed, now known as Faulkner’s “she-shed,” and a gravel driveway. They used the yard apportioned to them via the marked spike. Both the shed and the driveway also sit partially on the Fitzpatricks’ land. ¶7. Faulkner explained that the mobile home she purchased in 1996 had two pieces to it. She agreed that “the two pieces have to be connected” and that “it has to be set down properly so the two pieces line up next to each other[.]” Faulkner asked Cloteal, who then was managing the property while her grandparents still lived there, and received permission to place the mobile “[a]cross over from where . . . her driveway is now.” The mobile home remained in that spot for two to three weeks before being fully assembled and moved to the spot it now occupies. The spot it now occupies is on the Fitzpatricks’ land. Faulkner testified that she was aware that the initial location “belonged to the McClintons” but maintained that she believed the mobile home’s second, current location “was our property.” Additionally, she testified that no one was living in the mobile home but that she was using it “to store a few things in.” ¶8. Several notable exchanges in Faulkner’s testimony regarding the mobile home follow below: Q: [Y]ou’ve only had a few conversations with [Cloteal] about the land; correct? A: Correct. Q: And one of those conversations was in the 1990s; correct? A: Correct. Q: And another one was a few years ago at her house; correct? 5  A: Correct. .... Q: And in that [conversation at her house], you also told her that you had been trying to buy the land from her for 12 years; correct? A: Correct. .... Q: And you state that you got permission from Ms. Fitzpatrick to place the trailer on land that once belonged to her grandfather; correct? A: Correct. .... Q: You didn’t think it was fair that you got permission to place this trailer and now you were being asked to move it, did you? A: Well, actually, it wasn’t. Q: It was not fair? A: It was not fair. Q: Now, you didn’t think it was fair because you never stopped her from doing anything like coming on your land; correct? A: Correct. Q: And you never stopped her from having access to your property; correct? A: Correct. Q: And you never put up a fence around the trailer or the land at issue, did you? A: I did not. Q: And you never put up any “Keep Out” signs telling the Fitzpatricks or anyone else in their family to stay away, did you? A: I did not. Q: So they had full access to the property; correct? A: Correct. Q: And there was never an issue with the land or the trailer until they told you there was one; correct? A: Correct. (Emphasis added). ¶9. Dayle McClinton testified after Faulkner. Dayle stated that he was the grandson of 6 George McClinton and his wife, and he was the cousin of Cloteal. George died in 1987, and his wife died in 2014, leaving Dayle to inherit the land on Gravel Springs Road.2 Dayle sold the land to Cloteal and David in November 2018. Cloteal had been responsible for “mostly” managing the land since “I don’t know exactly [when] with my father, but ever since my mother inherited it[.]” ¶10. The final witness to testify was Cloteal. She clarified that she began managing the property “starting in ‘84, [because George] had gotten incapacitated[.]” Cloteal recalled receiving a phone call from Faulkner in the 1990s but “remember[ing] it a little differently from the way [Faulkner] explained it[,]” stating: I remember her calling me and telling me or informing me that she had bought a trailer and it was a little too large to fit on her property[,] . . . and would it be okay if it stuck over on that property next to her a little bit? And I said, no, I wouldn’t mind. (Emphasis added). Cloteal testified that she was not living on the property at the time and “did not know that [the trailer] was on the [property] line” the first time she saw it. She continued that she “didn’t realize that the whole of it was on our land or I might have objected to it, but I thought, you know, just at a visual, it looked to be over the line.” Cloteal stated that she did not know the precise boundaries between her land and Faulkner’s land until she had the land survey done. ¶11. Cloteal had the land surveyed in preparation for a planned deeding of two acres to “the community center.” Her surveyor “indicated that [Faulkner’s] property - - her house - - half 2 Testimony indicated that another couple in the family, O.B. and Joann, had the property at some point before Dayle. 7 of her house was on my property . . . I had just bought.” Cloteal was “sure” that Faulkner was unaware, so she had a meeting in her home with the land surveyor and Faulkner. She recalled, “[A]s we met and he started to tell her, she said, ‘I already know[,]’” and she had been trying to buy that land for twelve years. Cloteal stated that she did not agree to allow Faulkner to purchase the land because “the trailer is where I need expansion of the driveway to go from Gravel Springs Road to the Community Center . . . . [I]t was about needing the space.” In addition, she testified that she made it clear at the meeting that she wanted the trailer moved. ¶12. In closing, Faulkner’s attorney acknowledged that he “d[id]n’t think there’s an issue about the house or the shed or her driveway, the yard.” After deliberation, the chancellor announced the ruling of the court: It was not real clear about what permission the McClintons gave them to be able to use their property. But they certainly were not giving them permission to build a house on it or to build an addition or to build a shed over on their property[.] . . . The part of the property where the mobile home is gives me a little more pause because Ms. Fitzpatrick did give permission for Ms. Faulkner to place the mobile home on the property, and I think there was a big lack of communication or a lack of complete understanding between the two ladies as to what they were asking. [W]hatever she gave her permission to do, she didn’t give her permission to put the trailer all the way on McClinton property and leave it there since 1990-something until the present time. So I think that defeats the permissive use of the property. (Emphasis added). The chancellor concluded by showing the property lines she would be drawing to each party. ¶13. On February 20, 2025, the chancellor entered the final judgment and order granting Faulkner “fee-simple ownership of the following property north of her existing property 8 line[,]” attaching a photograph and specifying: North Boundary: Five feet north of the northern-most edge of where the trailer home is located straight west to Gravel Springs Road. East Boundary: Five feet east of the eastern-most edge of where the trailer home is located, connecting with the North Boundary to the north and the Faulkner property to the south. West Boundary: Gravel Springs Road. South Boundary: Faulkner’s existing property line. A diagram from the land survey displayed the exact land awarded to Faulkner by the chancery court. The Fitzpatricks appealed this decision on February 28, 2025. On March 13, 2025, Faulkner filed her Appellee’s brief and cross-appealed, arguing that she was entitled to more land than what the chancellor awarded her. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶14. “This Court has a limited standard of review in examining and considering the decisions of a chancellor.” Anderson v. Jackson, 338 So. 3d 629, 641 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 9 2022) (quoting Frazier v. Frazier, 31 So. 3d 1218, 1219 (¶4) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). “A finding that the proof was sufficient to sustain a claim of adverse possession is a fact-finding that requires our application of the substantial-evidence/manifest-error test.” Id. (citing Presley v. Stokes, 290 So. 3d 763, 765 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020); Powell v. Meyer, 203 So. 3d 648, 652 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). “[W]e will accept a chancellor’s findings of fact as long as the evidence in the record reasonably supports those findings” and “will not disturb the findings of a chancellor unless those findings are clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Frazier, 31 So. 3d at 1219-20 (¶4)). DISCUSSION I. The Fitzpatricks’ argument concerning the denial of their motion for summary judgment is moot. ¶15. On appeal, the Fitzpatricks first argue that the chancellor’s denial of summary judgment was erroneous. The chancellor’s order denying summary judgment was entered on January 23, 2025, and a full trial on the merits took place on February 7, 2025. The chancellor made a ruling in the matter following the trial entitled “FINAL JUDGMENT and ORDER[.]” The chancery court’s trial on the merits, however, extinguishes any appellate argument as to the denial of summary judgment for the Fitzpatricks. “[A]ppeals from the denial of a motion for summary judgment are interlocutory in nature and are rendered moot by a trial on the merits.” Newton County v. Deerfield Ests. Subdivision Prop. Owners Ass’n LLC, 385 So. 3d 765, 775 (¶26) (Miss. 2024) (quoting City of Jackson v. Johnson, 343 So. 3d 356, 367 (Miss. 2022)); see also Kennedy v. Claiborne Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Supervisors, 10 233 So. 3d 825, 832 (¶28) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Britton v. Am. Legion Post 058, 19 So. 3d 83, 85 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). Kennedy involved a party that was denied a motion for partial summary judgment. Instead of filing an interlocutory appeal, the party proceeded to participate in a trial on the merits. Id. On appeal, this Court found the arguments concerning the denial of partial summary judgment unavailing because the trial on the merits rendered the issue moot. Id. Likewise, we find that the Fitzpatricks’ issue concerning the denial of summary judgment is moot. II. Faulkner successfully proved she adversely possessed the land containing her home and shed but did not prove adverse possession for the remaining encroachments. ¶16. The Fitzpatricks next contend that Faulkner failed to meet all the required elements of adverse possession. “[F]or possession to be adverse[,] it must be (1) under claim of ownership; (2) actual or hostile; (3) open, notorious, and visible; (4) continuous and uninterrupted for a period of ten years; (5) exclusive; and (6) peaceful.” Winters v. Billings, 281 So. 3d 75, 80 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Powell, 203 So. 3d at 652 (¶18)). As each element is required, the absence of one is dispositive to the analysis as a whole. See Blackburn v. Wong, 904 So. 2d 134, 137 (¶22) (Miss. 2004) (finding that Blackburn did not have a claim of ownership over subject property and that as a result, “[t]he other assignments of error and issues need not be discussed”). ¶17. The burden of proof was on Faulkner, as she was “the party claiming adverse possession, and [she] must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence.” Baur v. Ribelin, 395 So. 3d 1258, 1266 (¶25) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (emphasis added) (citing 11 Signaigo v. Grinstead, 398 So. 3d 922, 926 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024)). Clear and convincing evidence is that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the case. Moore v. Bailey, 46 So. 3d 375, 384 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Johnson v. Bay City S. Mort. Co., 928 So. 2d 888, 892 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). “Clear and convincing evidence is such a high standard of proof that even the overwhelming weight of the evidence does not rise to the same level.” O’Neal v. Blalock, 220 So. 3d 234, 240 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (emphasis added) (quoting Massey v. Lambert, 84 So. 3d 846, 848 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012)); see also Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. Inc. v. Townsend, 993 So. 2d 418, 426 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Moran v. Fairley, 919 So. 2d 969, 975 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005)). ¶18. We discuss each “encroachment” in the Fitzpatricks’ land survey, recognizing that the adverse possession of one area does not necessarily guarantee the adverse possession of another area. Again, the absence of one element of adverse possession concludes the analysis. 1. Faulkner’s Home and Shed a. Under Claim of Ownership ¶19. In an adverse possession case, “the initial element to be proved by clear and convincing evidence is a claim of ownership.” Baur, 395 So. 3d at 1266 (¶26) (quoting 12 Blackburn, 904 So. 2d at 137 (¶19)). To stake claim and establish such, “the possessor must fly [her] flag over the property in such a way as to put the actual owner on notice that the property is being held under an adverse claim of ownership.” Orcutt v. Chambliss, 243 So. 3d 757, 763 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Apperson v. White, 950 So. 2d 1113, 1117 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)). The Faulkners certainly placed their “flag over the property” when expanding their home. See id. Faulkner testified that she had been under the impression that the land onto which her family expanded their home belonged to them: Q: When y’all expanded the house, did you think you were expanding it onto your own property? A: Actually, we did. The Faulkners continued living in the home after its expansion in 1980 for more than forty- two years before the 2022 land survey informed them the home encroached on the Fitzpatricks’ land. In other words, “[t]hey acted at all times while in possession as true owners would[.]” Jordan v. Fountain, 986 So. 2d 1018, 1023 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). We also find that Faulkner successfully proved that she possessed the land on which the shed was built under a claim of ownership. “[A]t all times while in possession[,]” Faulkner acted as a true owner would. See id. Faulkner successfully established that she possessed the land containing the expanded portion of her home and her shed under a claim of ownership; substantial evidence in the record shows this element was met. b. Actual or Hostile ¶20. Hostility in terms of adverse possession is defined as “an assertion of title superior to the potential competing claims of anyone else; it can be rebutted by showing that the actual 13 record title owner gave permission to begin the possession.” Williams v. Est. of Williams ex rel. Fairley, 952 So. 2d 950, 954 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Lynn v. Soterra Inc., 802 So. 2d 162, 166 (¶14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001)). In other words, “[t]he actual or hostile occupation of land necessary to constitute adverse possession requires a corporeal occupation, accompanied by a manifest intention to hold and continue to hold the property against the claim of all other persons, and adverse to the rights of the true owner.” Powell, 203 So. 3d at 652 (¶19) (quoting Hill v. Johnson, 27 So. 3d 426, 431 (¶23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). ¶21. Faulkner’s home expansion and addition of her shed were hostile and accompanied by a “manifest intention” to hold the property against others. Faulkner testified that after the expansion, her family remained living in the home. Further, there is no proof indicating that the McClintons or Fitzpatricks ever took any action to prevent either structure from being built. See O’Neal, 220 So. 3d at 241 (¶20) (“The adverse possessor must present some proof that his occupation of the record owner’s property was hostile, and that the record owner—aware of the adverse possessor’s hostile occupation—took no action to prevent adverse possession.” (quoting Double J Farmlands Inc. v. Paradise Baptist Church, 999 So. 2d 826, 829 (¶15) (Miss. 2008)). The home expansion and shed were obviously over the property boundary and on the Fitzpatricks’ land. The expanded home and shed had remained on the Fitzpatricks’ land for over 40 years. There is no proof in the evidence showing that the Faulkners were ever told to cease construction or tear the expanded structure down because of its location on the neighboring property. While Faulkner was unaware that she 14 was holding the land “adverse to the rights of the true owner[,]” remaining in the expanded home and continuing to use the shed accomplished just that. The chancellor found Faulkner clearly and convincingly met this element, and we agree. c. Open, Notorious, and Visible ¶22. “For possession to be open, notorious, and visible, the possessor must unfurl his flag on the land, and keep it flying, so that the actual owner may see, and if he will, that an enemy has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.” Orcutt, 243 So. 3d at 763- 64 (¶22) (quoting Roberts v. Young’s Creek Inv. Inc., 118 So. 3d 665, 670 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)). “The mere possession of land is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the adverse possessor’s use be open, notorious, and visible.” Powell, 203 So. 3d at 652-53 (¶20) (emphasis added) (quoting Webb v. Drewrey, 4 So. 3d 1078, 1083 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009)). This Court has upheld a chancellor’s determination that a party’s unrestricted use and maintenance of a property (even if not daily) was enough to prove this element. Collins v. Moore Fam. Tr. 1999, 269 So. 3d 181, 190-91 (¶24) (Miss. Ct. App. 2018). Faulkner enjoyed unrestricted use of her home and shed, and she maintained the property of each. Further, she made no attempt to conceal her use of the home or shed. See Jordan, 986 So. 2d at 1023 (¶14) (finding the open, notorious, and visible element met when party maintained and cared for property and “never tried to hide or conceal their use of the property”). We find substantial evidence supports that Faulkner’s use of her home and her shed was clearly and convincingly open and notorious. d. Continuous and Uninterrupted for Ten Years 15 ¶23. Mississippi’s adverse possession statute states the following: Ten (10) years’ actual adverse possession by any person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land, uninterruptedly continued for ten (10) years by occupancy, descent, conveyance, or otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued, shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and complete title, saving to persons under the disability of minority or unsoundness of mind the right to sue within ten (10) years after the removal of such disability, as provided in Section 15-1-7. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-13(1) (emphasis added). In short, “[s]ection 15-1-13 requires a claimant to exercise continuous and uninterrupted possession over the disputed property for at least ten years.” Collins, 269 So. 3d at 191 (¶25). Faulkner’s use of the land containing her home was certainly continuous. She testified that they expanded the home in approximately 1980 and that they have lived in it since. Faulkner also stated that the shed was constructed in approximately 1978 and she has used the shed ever since. We find no error in the chancellor’s finding that Faulkner clearly and convincingly proved her use of the land regarding the home and shed met the statutory time requirement e. Exclusive ¶24. “Exclusive possession means that the possessor evinces an intention to possess and hold land to the exclusion of, and in opposition to, the claims of all others, and the claimant’s conduct must afford an unequivocal indication that he is exercising the dominion of a sole owner.” Anderson v. Fisher, 296 So. 3d 124, 131 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Roberts, 118 So. 3d at 671 (¶15)). In short, “[e]xclusivity . . . means that the adverse possessor’s use of the property was consistent with an exclusive claim to the right to use the property.” Collins, 269 So. 3d at 191 (¶27) (quoting O’Neal, 220 So. 3d at 16 243 (¶26)). ¶25. The evidence likewise supports that Faulkner’s expansion of her own home and construction of the shed were clearly and convincingly established as exclusive. The home was not open to all people at all times. The home belonged to Faulkner and, as is the case with most homes, was exclusively Faulkner’s to possess. Faulkner’s construction of the shed, almost wholly on her own property, was consistent with an exclusive claim to that property. Faulkner testified that the McClintons were not permitted to store things in the shed without permission. Substantial evidence supports that Faulkner’s use and possession of the home and shed were clearly and convincingly exclusive. f. Peaceful ¶26. Finally, “[a]n adverse possessor’s use of a claimed property must be peaceful.” Fisher, 296 So. 3d at 132 (¶37) (quoting O’Neal, 220 So. 3d at 243 (¶28)). There was no evidence presented suggesting that Faulkner’s use of the subject land was not peaceful. Faulkner proved all six elements of the adverse possession analysis concerning her home expansion and shed. We affirm the chancellor’s decision to award Faulkner adverse possession of the home and shed.3 3 The partial dissent reminds us to look at the “possessory acts” of Faulkner to determine if the owner of the land was “sufficiently provided notice.” See infra n.5 (citing Signaigo, 398 So. 3d at 926 (¶13)). The Faulkners added onto their home, which extended over to the Fitzpatricks’ property in approximately 1980. Further, the Faulkners built part of their shed over the Fitzpatrick property line in approximately 1978. And those structures have remained in place, over the Fitzpatricks’ property line, for approximately forty-four years. How could these “flying their flag” acts not provide notice that the Faulkners were “claiming” the land as their own? These facts are without dispute and certainly contributed to meeting the clear-and-convincing burden of proof. 17  2. Driveway a. Under Claim of Ownership ¶27. As established, Faulkner must prove that she possessed the driveway land under a claim of ownership—essentially, that she believed herself to be the owner of that property. In order to stake claim and establish such, “the possessor must fly [her] flag over the property in such a way as to put the actual owner on notice that the property is being held under an adverse claim of ownership.” Orcutt, 243 So. 3d at 763 (¶20) (citing Apperson, 950 So. 2d at 1117 (¶7)). Faulkner testified that her family put gravel down to form the driveway in front of her home (that is partly on the Fitzpatricks’ side of the property line) and that they put a pipe below it as well. But putting gravel down is not sufficient in and of itself to clearly and convincingly prove adverse possession. Faulkner also testified about trying to “buy the land” from the Fitzpatricks, although the record does not show the offer’s exact perimeters. So far as the trial record demonstrates, there is no evidence that Faulkner or her husband asked for permission from the McClintons to construct a driveway leading to their home. Faulkner testified: Q: Were there any discussions with the McClintons about your construction of the driveway and using it - - A: No. Q: - - that you know of? A: No. Faulkner stated only that they put gravel down and had no discussions about it. Yet, she also testified: Q: And did you testify that the McClintons basically allowed you to use their land? 18  A: Correct. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Faulkner believed that the driveway area of the property was hers. It is unclear to this Court whether Faulkner believed the driveway portion of the land encroachments belonged to her, whether she or her husband asked McClinton for permission to place the driveway, or whether the other elements of adverse possession were met. There simply is not enough testimony or evidence to rise to the level of clear and convincing proof. The burden of proof rested with Faulkner to prove each element of adverse possession through clear and convincing evidence. See Moore, 46 So. 3d at 384 (¶35) (quoting Johnson, 928 So. 2d at 892 (¶14)). We reverse the chancellor’s grant of adverse possession of the driveway for want of clear and convincing evidence. 3. Yard a. Under Claim of Ownership ¶28. This Court has held that “[n]o claim of ownership existed during any period after [a] claimant knew that the adjacent parcel belonged to someone else.” Baur, 395 So. 3d at 1266 (¶26) (citing Presley, 290 So. 3d at 767 (¶13)). However, Faulkner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate her belief that she owned the yard. She stated that her children played on this land, she put a picnic table on it, and the light company installed a streetlight on it. But trial testimony did not delve deeper into the yard encroachment. Faulkner was asked when her family began “using that land,” and she stated that the children began using it in the 1970s. It is unclear exactly which portion of the multiple encroachments were referred to by use of the general term, “land.” Again, Faulkner testified: 19  Q: And did you testify that the McClintons basically allowed you to use their land? A: Correct. It is unclear to this Court whether Faulkner believed she was the true owner of the yard or if she was using it with permission from the McClintons. In addition, allowing children to play on someone’s else land or putting a picnic table on that land is hardly sufficient proof to meet the requisite elements of adverse possession. We do not find the evidence substantial enough for the chancellor to find that Faulkner surmounted the clear-and-convincing burden of proof as to the yard where her children played. 4. Mobile Home a. Under Claim of Ownership/Actual or Hostile ¶29. This Court will find that “[n]o claim of ownership existed during any period after [a] claimant knew that the adjacent parcel belonged to someone else.” Id. The record clearly evidences that Faulkner tried to buy the land on which the mobile home sat multiple times over the course of twelve years. See Signaigo, 398 So. 3d at 927-28 (¶18) (stating that “the request of appellant to purchase the land, which was later repeated, is a pointed answer to any contention of an adverse claim, since it was an acknowledgment of a superior title and claim” (quoting Eddy v. Clayton, 44 So. 2d 395, 397 (Miss. 1950))). “[P]ermission defeats any claim of adverse possession.” Roberts, 118 So. 3d at 670 (¶10) (citing Apperson, 950 So. 2d at 1118 (¶12)). Faulkner indicated in her testimony at trial that she knew that land did not belong to her: Q: You didn’t think it was fair that you got permission to place this trailer and now you were being asked to move it, did you? 20  A: Well, actually, it wasn’t. Q: It was not fair? A: It was not fair. (Emphasis added). “Adverse possession is totally inconsistent with that of permissive use.” Massey v. Lambert, 84 So. 3d 846, 849 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Niebanck v. Block, 35 So. 3d 1260, 1265 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010)). The evidence presented at trial supports the notion that Faulkner asked for permission to place the mobile home on the Fitzpatricks’ land. It was Faulkner’s burden to prove that she believed the land was her own and the possession was hostile by clear and convincing evidence. She simply did not do so as far as the land around the trailer is concerned. This Court does not find evidence to reasonably support the chancellor’s finding that the mobile home’s land was adversely possessed by Faulkner. As each adverse possession element is dispositive, she failed to prove at least one element; therefore, we reverse in part and render judgment that Faulkner failed to present evidence to support a finding that she adversely possessed the driveway, the yard, or the mobile home.4 III. In accordance with our holding, we affirm the chancellor’s order so far as Faulkner’s cross-appeal is concerned. ¶30. Finally, we address Faulkner’s cross-appeal arguing that if the chancellor had erred, “it was in not granting more land to Faulkner.” (Emphasis omitted). She requested that we reverse and render “as to the northern portion of the adverse possession grant[.]” Faulkner’s cross-appeal relies fully on adverse possession being decided fully in her favor. We have 4 In sum, Faulkner building a home and shed over the property line is simply not the same as “using” the land in terms of McClinton’s permission given. 21 held otherwise, leaving her less land than before. Therefore, we affirm the chancellor’s decision not to award Faulkner additional land northward. CONCLUSION ¶31. This Court concludes that the chancellor did not err by finding that Faulkner successfully proved—through clear and convincing evidence—she adversely possessed the expansion of her home and her shed. We therefore affirm the chancellor on those two encroachments. However, we hold that it was unreasonable for the chancellor to find that Faulkner proved by clear and convincing evidence that she adversely possessed the driveway, yard, or mobile home. We remand to the chancery court for a modified drawing and recording of the property boundaries to reflect the properties owned by Faulkner and the properties owned by the Fitzpatricks. We affirm the chancellor’s order so far as Faulkner’s cross-appeal is concerned. ¶32. ON DIRECT APPEAL: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. ON CROSS-APPEAL: AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., EMFINGER AND WEDDLE, JJ., CONCUR. McCARTY, J., CONCURS IN PART AND DISSENTS IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION, JOINED BY WESTBROOKS, McDONALD AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ. McCARTY, J., CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART: ¶33. When a so-called adverse possessor fails to present the trial court with even the most basic evidence—like the description of the land they are claiming to own—we cannot uphold a ruling in their favor and