Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CA-00331-COA ESTATE OF MARTEAL WHITE SMITH, APPELLANT DECEASED: EARNEST CUTLEY v. THE ESTATE OF MARTEAL WHITE SMITH, APPELLEES DOUGAL THOMAS AND SUZANNE THOMAS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/24/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. TIFFANY PIAZZA GROVE COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES CHARLES MARTIN ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: STEVEN CRAIG PANTER STEVE YOUNGER NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART - 11/10/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ. BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. This appeal involves three separate cases filed in Hinds County Chancery Court regarding the ownership of approximately 121 acres located in Hinds County (the “subject property”), which had been owned by Marteal White Smith prior to her death in 1998. ¶2. Marteal had executed two wills before she died—one in 1978 and one in 1995. In 2002, Marteal’s only child, Charlie White, probated the 1995 will, which revoked all prior wills and left the entire estate to Charlie and named him as the executor (Cause No. P2002- 49). On May 27, 2003, Charlie conveyed the subject property to himself by deed. ¶3. One year later, three of Marteal’s step-grandchildren—Earnest Cutley (Cutley), Albertlene C. Henderson, and Ketha Cutley—who were named beneficiaries in the 1978 will, filed (1) a petition to probate the 1978 will (Cause No. P2003-15)1 and (2) a complaint contesting the 1995 will on the basis of Marteal’s lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by Charlie (filed in Cause No. P2002-49).2 Significantly, the 1978 will contained a restriction “that if any of the heirs desire to sell their share[,] it must be sold to” one of the other beneficiaries or the beneficiary’s issue. ¶4. However, the Cutleys took no further legal action for almost twenty years. In the interim, both Charlie and his attorney, William Gowan, died,3 and Cutley and his sisters, Ketha and Albertlene, had bought the subject property at a tax sale in 2018.4 In 2023, Ketha and Albertlene conveyed their two-thirds interest in the property to Dougal and Suzanne Thomas. ¶5. The Thomases filed suit in chancery court to quiet title; the case was assigned to Chancellor Crystal Wise-Martin, who entered a judgment on January 18, 2024, confirming 1 The 1978 will bequeathed five acres of the subject property to Ornie Lee Varnado and the remainder of the property in equal shares to Charlie and Marteal’s five step- grandchildren (the Cutleys). Two beneficiaries/step-grandchildren, Horace Cutley and Jessie Cutley, pre-deceased Marteal in 1986 and 1994, respectively. Varnado’s relationship to the deceased is unclear, and he is not an active participant in these proceedings. 2 A certificate of service noted that the complaint was mailed to the executor’s attorney, William Gowan, on July 21, 2004. 3 Charlie died in 2008; Gowan died in 2023. 4 The subject property was conveyed to the three siblings by tax deed in 2020, with Ketha and Albertlene owning an undivided two-thirds share. 2 the tax sale and vesting “full and complete title” in the Thomases, together with co-owner Cutley (Cause No. G2023-90). A week later, Cutley’s attorney applied for an entry of default, attempting to revive the dormant will-contest case filed in Cause No. P2002-49. After the chancery clerk entered default, Cutley filed a motion for a default judgment with the chancery court in Cause No. P2002-49. ¶6. Cutley also filed a motion for relief from the judgment in Cause No. G2023-90, along with several nieces and nephews who claimed ownership of the subject property by virtue of the conveyance restriction in the 1978 will.5 Upon review of the motion for relief from the judgment, Chancellor Wise-Martin set aside and vacated her prior January 18 judgment in Cause No. G2023-90 without prejudice to the Thomases’ amending their complaint. ¶7. On June 4, 2024, the Thomases filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting the chancery court dismiss the Cutleys’ complaint and find (1) that the subject property interest vested in Charlie by virtue of the 1995 will, (2) that the estate matter in P2003-15 is “moot as it pertains to the subject property,” and (3) that the Thomases now own a two-thirds interest. The Thomases also filed a motion to consolidate the will proceedings “for purposes of reviewing both wills and determining ownership of real property that once was owned by Marteal White Smith and part of her estate” and a motion to set aside Cutley’s motion for a 5 These are the heirs of Horace Cutley and Jessie Cutley. As stated in this motion, Cutley, Ketha (who paid the property taxes until 2017), and Albertlene purchased the property at tax sale as fiduciaries to the heirs of the 1978 will, asserting that “the tax sale should not be considered to take interests of their co-owners.” See, e.g., Clausell v. Riley, 188 Miss. 647, 651, 196 So. 245, 246-47 (1940) (holding that when a co-tenant in possession redeems an interest in the land at tax sale, “this redemption inured to the benefit of all tenants in common of the estate”). 3 default judgment in Cause No. P2002-49. Cutley responded that because the Thomases are neither heirs nor creditors of the estate, they “are not ‘interested parties’ to make these motions or to contest the matters in this proceeding.” ¶8. Chancellor Tiffany Grove denied Cutley’s motion for default on July 18, 2024, finding that “pursuant to [Rule 81(d)(4) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure], an answer was not required to be filed.”6 The Thomases filed a supplemental summary-judgment motion in Cause No. P2002-49, again requesting that Cutley’s “will-contest claims” be dismissed. ¶9. On August 19, 2024, Chancellor Grove found that consolidation of the two will cases was “proper.” Since the 1978 will probate proceeding (P2003-15) was re-assigned to Chancellor Wise-Martin, both chancellors signed an order to assign both causes (P2002-49 and P2003-15) to Chancellor Grove “for purposes of determining all legal issues presently before this court.” ¶10. On November 13, 2024, Chancellor Grove granted the Thomases’ motion for summary judgment, noting that while Cutley had filed his will contest within the applicable two-year statute of limitations,7 he did not pursue the action for twenty years. Finding this delay “cause[d] substantial prejudice to any person defending the 1995 Will,” Chancellor Grove dismissed the Cutleys’ complaint and ruled that Charlie “was vested with full ownership of the subject property immediately upon the death of his mother.” The chancellor 6 Cause No. P2002-49 was originally assigned to Chancellor William Singletary; Cause No. P2003-15 was previously assigned to Chancellor Denise Sweet-Owens. We take judicial notice that both chancellors retired before the renewed proceedings in these cases (2018 and 2022, respectively). 7 See Miss. Code Ann. 91-7-23 (Rev. 2021). 4 also ruled that the Thomases owned the undivided two-thirds interest in the subject property, with Cutley owning the remaining one-third interest.8 ¶11. At a hearing on February 12, 2025, Chancellor Grove noted that Cause No. G2023-90 (tax-sale confirmation) was “pending before Judge Wise-Martin set for hearing on February the 18th,” and she asked counsel to report to her on the outcome of that hearing. In the meantime, the Thomases filed a motion to dismiss “all claims by Earnest Cutley attacking the tax sale and tax confirmation.” In response, Cutley asserted that the Thomases’ request to dismiss was improper, and he sought a stay on the tax-sale confirmation proceeding (Cause No. G2023-90) “until such time as the estate proceedings are determined and final.” ¶12. On February 24, 2025, Chancellor Grove entered an “Order Certifying Final Judgment under Rule 54(b)”:9 Finding no just reason for delay, this Court hereby certifies that its November 13, 2024 Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment is, and should be entered as, its final judgment with regard to the following issues: (1) the subject property vested in Charlie C. White by virtue of the will filed in this action, (2) the will contest filed by movants was never pursued and therefore is dismissed, (3) title to the subject property was divested from Charlie C. White and his heirs pursuant to tax sale dated August 27, 2018 (Tax Sale #9993) and subsequent Tax Deed issued to Earnest Cutley, Ketha Cutley, and Albertlene Cutley, and (4) Dougal Thomas and Suzanne Thomas own an undivided two-third interest and Earnest Cutley owns an undivided one-third interest in the subject property. (Emphasis added). Appealing the chancellor’s judgment and orders, Cutley asserts that the 8 On December 4, 2024, Cutley filed a petition with the Mississippi Supreme Court, seeking interlocutory review of Chancellor Grove’s order. The supreme court denied the petition on January 24, 2025. 9 See M.R.C.P. 54(b). 5 Thomases “do not have standing to intervene in the estate proceedings” and that the chancellor erred in granting the Thomases’ motion for summary judgment. ¶13. We find that the Thomases, as grantees of the tax sale purchasers, have a direct, present pecuniary interest in the proceedings and that they have standing to intervene. Furthermore, determining that all elements of the doctrine of laches existed to prevent Cutley from waiting twenty years to bring his case for a determination, we affirm the chancellor’s decisions granting summary judgment and dismissing Cutley’s complaint, holding that the 1995 will was valid. ¶14. However, because Cause No. G2023-90 (the tax sale and confirmation of title) is assigned to Chancellor Wise-Martin, we find that Chancellor Grove did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate those claims in the consolidated case involving the will-contest proceeding. While the result of this decision will undoubtedly inform Chancellor Wise-Martin’s judgment, we must vacate Chancellor Grove’s ruling regarding the Thomases’ ownership of the subject property, which is still pending before Chancellor Wise-Martin in Cause No. G2023-90. Standard of Review ¶15. “In reviewing a chancellor’s findings, we employ an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Est. of Myles Williams, 431 So. 3d 1284, 1287 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2026) (quoting In re Harvey, 399 So. 3d 186, 193 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2025)). The chancellor’s factual findings in a will contest will not be disturbed on appeal “unless the findings are clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong, or the chancellor applied an incorrect legal standard.” Id. 6 “[W]e employ a de novo standard of review” to questions of law. Id. Discussion I. Jurisdiction ¶16. We first address our Court’s jurisdiction over Chancellor Grove’s February 2025 final judgment, specifically with regard to the rulings on the tax sale and the Thomases’ two-thirds ownership of the subject property. See McRae v. Mitchell, 337 So. 3d 1057, 1060 (¶6) (Miss. 2022) (recognizing an appellate court’s duty “to inquire into its own jurisdiction[] and decline to exercise a power not conferred upon it by law”). In items (3) and (4) in the final order, Chancellor Grove ruled that “title to the subject property was divested from Charlie C. White and his heirs” by the 2018 tax sale and that the Thomases owned “an undivided two-third interest and Earnest Cutley owns an undivided one-third interest in the subject property.” However, Chancellor Wise-Martin had entered an order finding “that the Amended Motion and other matters in this proceeding should be stayed until the estate proceedings in P2002-49 and P2003-15 are fully concluded.” ¶17. Therefore, this Court asked the parties to submit additional briefing to address the following question: “Did Chancellor Grove have jurisdiction to make a ruling related to the tax-sale confirmation proceeding (Issues 3 & 4) in her February 24, 2025 final judgment?” Upon review, we find that the answer to this question is “no.” Although the Thomases claim that “both Chancellors understood that ‘determining ownership of real property’ was an issue to be resolved by Chancellor Grove,” this assertion is not supported by the record. Cause No. G2023-90 was assigned to Chancellor Wise-Martin, who stayed that proceeding pending the 7 resolution of this appeal; so the issue of confirming the tax sale and quieting title in the subject property was not before Chancellor Grove in the will-contest proceeding. Accordingly, we vacate Chancellor Grove’s rulings related to the tax sale and title of the subject property. II. The Thomases’ Standing to Intervene in Cause No. P2002-49 ¶18. Cutley argues that the Thomases are not interested parties and lack standing to intervene in the will-contest proceeding (Cause No. P2002-49) because “[t]heir interest is contingent on the outcome of the estate proceeding.”10 “It is well settled that Mississippi’s standing requirements are quite liberal.” Russell Real Prop. Servs. LLC v. State, 200 So. 3d 426, 429 (¶8) (Miss. 2016) (quoting State v. Quitman County, 807 So. 2d 401, 405 (¶11) (Miss. 2001)). The Mississippi Supreme Court has articulated the general law on standing as follows: [D]ifferent standing requirements are accorded to different areas of the law, and an individual’s legal interest or entitlement to assert a claim against a defendant must be grounded in some legal right recognized by law, whether by statute or by common law. Quite simply, the issue adjudicated in a standing case is whether the particular plaintiff had a right to judicial enforcement of a legal duty of the defendant or, as stated in American Book Co. v. Vandiver, 181 10 The Thomases did not file a motion to intervene in Cause No. P2002-49, but their attorney did file an entry of appearance “on behalf of Dougal Thomas and Suzanne Thomas, interested parties in the above action.” While the issue of standing was discussed at the August 2024 hearing, Chancellor Grove did not make express findings as to the Thomases’ standing in the proceedings. “With respect to issues of fact where the chancellor made no specific finding, we are required by our prior decisions and by sound institutional considerations to proceed on the assumption that the chancellor resolved all such fact issues in favor of appellee.” Est. of Roosa v. Roosa, 376 So. 3d 1225, 1230 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So. 2d 683, 685 (Miss. 1983)). Considering Chancellor Grove ruled in favor of the Thomases’ motions and labeled them as “Interested Parties” in her orders, we presume that she ruled in their favor on this issue. 8 Miss. 518, 178 So. 598 (1938), whether a party plaintiff in an action for legal relief can show in himself a present, existent actionable title or interest, and demonstrate that this right was complete at the time of the institution of the action. Id. at 599. “Such is the general rule.” Id. City of Picayune v. S. Reg’l Corp., 916 So. 2d 510, 526 (¶40) (Miss. 2005) (emphasis added). ¶19. Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) permits a party to intervene in an action “when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest[.]” The supreme court has held that “[i]nterested parties are those whose direct, pecuniary interests will be either detrimentally or advantageously affected by the probate of the will.” Garrett v. Bohannon, 621 So. 2d 935, 937 (Miss. 1993). More recently, the supreme court has clarified, “For standing, the person(s) aggrieved[,] . . . whether one or more, should allege an adverse effect different from that of the general public.” Midsouth Ass’n of Indep. Schs. v. Parents for Pub. Schs., 384 So. 3d 1226, 1229-30 (¶10) (Miss. 2024) (quoting Belhaven Improvement Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So. 2d 41, 47 (Miss. 1987)).11 ¶20. Mississippi Code Annotated section 91-7-25 provides, “In any proceeding to contest the validity of a will, all persons interested in such contest shall be made parties.” Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-25 (Rev. 2021). Interested parties are heirs-at-law, beneficiaries under earlier wills, and beneficiaries under the contested will, as well as creditors who may have 11 Although the Thomases cite the “colorable interest” requirement to establish standing, the supreme court has “abandoned” this standard. See In re Last Will and Testament of Bray, 404 So. 3d 1146, 1147 (¶2) (Miss. 2024) (citing Reeves v. Gunn, 307 So. 3d 436, 438-39 (¶¶10-12) (Miss. 2020)). 9 a direct pecuniary interest in the estate. In re Est. of Cole, 256 So. 3d 1156, 1159 (¶10) (Miss. 2018). Thus, “[t]o be an interested party under the statute, the party must have some legal tie to the estate in the fashion of a direct pecuniary interest.” Id. ¶21. The Thomases acknowledge that they are neither heirs nor creditors under either will. However, we agree with the Thomases that they have a direct pecuniary interest because they purchased their two-thirds interest in the subject property prior to Cutley’s 2024 attempt to revive his dormant claim. Had the chancellor found that the 1995 will was invalid, the Thomases’ property interest may have been extinguished under the terms of the 1978 will (specifically, the will’s restriction that conveyance of a beneficiary’s interest in the subject property must be to other heirs or issue). ¶22. The Thomases therefore would have suffered an adverse impact from the court’s ruling in favor of Cutley. In fact, it is the Thomases who stand to lose the most, especially considering that Chancellor Wise-Martin vacated the order quieting title to the subject property and stayed that proceeding (Cause No. G2023-90) pending resolution of this appeal. For these reasons, we find the Thomases had standing to intervene in the will-contest proceeding (Cause No. P2002-49). III. Summary Judgment ¶23. The remaining issues concern whether the chancellor’s order granting the Thomases’ motion for summary judgment and its final judgment were erroneous. Cutley asks this Court to consider: (i) whether the Thomases failed to meet the burden of proving no genuine issue of material fact exists; (ii) if there is a period of time in which the will contest must be 10 concluded or is subject to summary disposition;12 and (iii) whether an executor may transfer or deed estate property without court authority prior to conclusion of the estate proceedings. ¶24. We find the second issue dispositive. As Chancellor Grove reasoned in the November 13, 2024 order granting summary judgment: Statutes of limitations are imposed for reasons. In this matter, Charlie C. White died in 2008. Counsel for the Estate is also deceased. All medical records for [Marteal] have long been destroyed as she has now been deceased for approximately twenty-five (25) years.[13] Movant now seeks to establish that the Executor, who has been deceased for over sixteen (16) years, exerted undue influence over his mother, who has been deceased for over twenty-five (25) years. The only evidence presented by Movant are self- supporting affidavits. Due to Movant’s delay in pursuing this matter, any and all other evidence concerning the relationship of Charlie C. White and [Marteal], as well as her mental competency in 1995, has long since become unavailable. Clearly, Movant’s delay in pursuit of this action would cause substantial prejudice to any person defending the 1995 Will. This Court cannot allow Movant to sit on his rights for almost twenty (20) years to then pursue the same to the undue prejudice of any other parties. (Emphasis added). Although Chancellor Grove did not use the term “laches” in her findings, it is evident that she found all elements of that doctrine were present. In determining the applicability of laches, “the court looks to three considerations[:] . . . (1) a delay in asserting a right or claim; (2) that the delay was not excusable; and (3) that there was undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted.” Bailey v. Est. of Kemp, 955 So. 2d 777, 784 (¶29) (Miss. 2007). 12 Cutley’s argument that time delays and lack of Marteal’s medical records did not warrant summary judgment is encompassed by this issue. 13 Marteal was a resident of the Clinton HealthCare facility from 1995 to 1997. A July 16, 2024 email from Clinton HealthCare, in response to Cutley’s subpoena duces tecum, stated that Marteal’s records “have been destroyed pursuant to document retention policy, as permitted under MS law.” 11 ¶25. The term “laches” was apparently used by the Thomases for the first time in their appellees’ brief. In Goode v. Woodgreen Homeowners Ass’n, 662 So. 2d 1064, 1077 (Miss. 1995), the supreme court held that an appellant was “procedurally barred from raising the defense of laches for the first time on appeal.” However, as this is the doctrine apparently utilized by Chancellor Grove, it is not improper for the Thomases to raise it on appeal.14 ¶26. “[C]hancellors have long been vested with discretionary authority to decide matters of equity.” Jones Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Covington Cnty. Sch. Dist., 352 So. 3d 1123, 1132-33 (¶29) (Miss. 2022) (quoting Flowers v. Est. of Flowers, 264 So. 3d 775, 779 (¶16) (Miss. 2019)). “The function of the chancellor is, upon equitable considerations, to winnow the wheat from the straw, and [her] decree will not be set aside on appeal unless, as is not the case here, it is made to appear that it is not equitable but inequitable to let it stand.” Flowers, 264 So. 3d at 779 (¶16). Affording Chancellor Grove discretion to fashion an appropriate equitable remedy, we find no error in her decision to dismiss the complaint based on the twenty-year delay in pursuing the will contest, for which Cutley has provided no excuse. See State v. Woodruff, 170 Miss. 744, 776, 150 So. 760, 765 (1933) (holding that the doctrine of laches operates “not only as to delay in instituting the suit, but also in the failure thereafter to bring the case to a final determination” (emphasis added)). ¶27. Although Cutley contends there is no time limit in which an estate proceeding must 14 Mississippi law states that “laches” “is in the nature of an affirmative defense that must be affirmatively pled.” Aron v. Reid, 850 So. 2d 108, 113 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). Here, as Chancellor Grove noted in the order denying Cutley’s motion for default judgment in P2002-49, parties to a will-contest action are not required to file an answer. See supra ¶8. Waiver of an affirmative defense applies “only when a responsive pleading is required.” Brown v. Brown, 822 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002). 12 conclude, the case he cites in support of this argument—Est. of Roosa v. Roosa, 376 So. 3d 1225 (Miss. Ct. App. 2023)—does not afford him relief. The proceedings in Estate of Roosa spanned fifteen years, during which there were ongoing filings and litigation, including an appeal that was assigned to this Court, after which one of the heirs reopened the case. Id. at 1227-29 (¶¶1-12). It is therefore distinguishable from the present case, in which the Cutleys wholly neglected to litigate the will contest for twenty years after the filing of the complaint. ¶28. Moreover, the Mississippi Supreme Court declined to “entertain [a candidate’s] idle contest” of an election when the candidate had “made no effort to correct [an] improper summons or to secure the requisite hearing” and had “failed to diligently prosecute” her election contest claim for two years. See In re Contest of Mun. Gen. Election for Ward 4 Alderman Seat for City of Coldwater, 383 So. 3d 1224, 1228 (¶¶17-18) (Miss. 2024).15 ¶29. We affirm Chancellor Grove’s reasonable and equitable decision that Cutley’s failure to pursue his claim for twenty years warranted dismissal. Cutley’s remaining claims on appeal concerning the merits of the will-contest claim are moot. Conclusion 15 While not addressed by the parties, the record does not indicate a summons was ever issued and served on Charlie, the sole heir under the 1995 will, in accordance with Rule 81(d)(5) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, see M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5) (eff. 2000). The record only shows that a copy of the complaint was mailed to Charlie’s attorney, Mr. Gowan, apparently in accordance with Rule 5. See M.R.C.P. 5(a)-(b) (providing that service of “every pleading subsequent to the original complaint” shall be made upon the attorney representing the party unless the court orders otherwise). Had service of process been properly issued and served, informing Charlie when to appear and defend the action, the entire twenty-year hiatus might have been avoided. Cutley’s conceding in his appellate brief that “default was not proper,” as a responsive pleading was not required under Rule 81, is further acknowledgment that Rule 81 was applicable in this will-contest case; as such, original service of process was required on the party. 13 ¶30. In accordance with our findings, the order granting summary judgment and the final judgment are affirmed in part as to the dismissal of Cutley’s will-contest complaint and finding that the subject property had vested in Charlie by virtue of the 1995 will. We vacate the part of the chancellor’s ruling confirming the tax sale and finding the Thomases own the undivided two-thirds interest in the property, as Chancellor Grove lacked jurisdiction over Cause No. G2023-90, which was, and still is, assigned to another chancellor. ¶31. AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART. CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. 14