Charlotte K. Davidson v. Stephan F. Davidson

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CA-00350-COA CHARLOTTE K. DAVIDSON APPELLANT v. STEPHAN F. DAVIDSON APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/19/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ASHLEE E. COLE COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: JACKSON COUNTY CHANCERY COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: G. CHARLES BORDIS IV ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: MATTHEW STEPHEN LOTT SAVANNAH FRANCES HERRINGTON NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART - 11/03/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McDONALD AND McCARTY, JJ. BARNES, C.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Charlotte Davidson appeals the judgment of the Jackson County Chancery Court that granted the parties a divorce on the ground of irreconcilable differences, distributed the marital property, provided temporary spousal support, and denied alimony. Charlotte now argues that the chancery court erred in subsequently modifying spousal support because the court lacked jurisdiction over her, as Stephan failed to serve her with a summons under Rule 81 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Charlotte also claims a lack of sufficient evidence to modify the temporary support. Further, she argues the chancery court erred in not allowing her to cross-examine Stephan or call witnesses in support of her claims during trial; dividing the marital assets prior to the entry of divorce; and failing to make findings of fact for the division of marital property and alimony under the respective Ferguson1 and Armstrong2 factors. ¶2. We find the chancery court had jurisdiction to hear the motion to modify spousal support without a Rule 81 summons, and the modification was proper. However, we find error with the remaining three issues. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse and remand in part for proceedings consistent with this opinion. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶3. Charlotte and Stephan married in February 1992 in Jackson County, Mississippi. They had no children. After almost thirty years of marriage, the parties separated in early October 2021. During their marriage, they owned and operated a commercial trucking business, Mid-Coast Construction LLC, which mainly consisted of one Peterbilt truck. They worked together as a team hauling high-security cargo.3 Both Stephan and Charlotte had a Class A commercial driver’s license for over-the-road truck driving. They did not own a home but did own several personal vehicles, a 2020 model 389 Peterbilt truck, and an eighty-foot sailboat, as well as other personal property. The couple had no significant savings or retirement money. ¶4. On October 11, 2021, Stephan filed for a divorce on the grounds of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment or, in the alternative, irreconcilable differences. Stephan contended that 1 Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994). 2 Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993). 3 Tax returns later entered into evidence at trial showed the business had a net income of $105,664 for 2021, a net loss of $1,305 in 2022, and a net income of $89,380 for 2023. 2 Charlotte had been having “an emotional affair” with an individual for the last twelve months. She communicated with him at length via telephone and text messages. Stephan requested a temporary hearing on the use and possession of the Peterbilt truck because hauling freight was his only way to earn income. He also had to hire a second driver immediately because his contracts required two drivers in the truck and one driver with the load at all times. Charlotte answered the complaint and counterclaimed for divorce, requesting a hearing on temporary spousal support. ¶5. On April 20, 2022, the chancery court entered an agreed4 temporary order where Stephan was to pay Charlotte $7,000 per month in spousal support until trial, which was set for November 2022. The court granted Stephan the use and possession of the Peterbilt truck so he could continue working. In July 2022, Stephan filed the first of three motions to modify the temporary spousal support. The motions explained that since the separation, Stephan’s trucking business had been negatively impacted. Because Charlotte quit working with him, he had to hire another driver, which diminished his income. Further, he stated that Charlotte had few expenses because she lived with her mother. Stephan suggested modifying support or letting Charlotte use the truck to work and pay him spousal support of $7,000 per month. A temporary order filed in October 2022 indicated the motion was withdrawn and dismissed. ¶6. Because trial was continued several times, Stephan proceeded to pay Charlotte 4 Stephan claims that his prior counsel “forced” him to agree to this amount of support, which was one-half of his monthly income before expenses. 3 temporary support of $7,000 per month through 2022.5 In October 2023, Stephan had new counsel (who currently represents him on appeal) and filed a third motion to modify the temporary order, including the spousal support, as well as to expedite trial. The motion pointed out that Charlotte had remained unemployed since separation, while Stephan had continued to pay her $7,000 per month for the past two years, totaling $168,000 in spousal support. Charlotte answered, challenging the jurisdiction to grant Stephan’s motion, among other matters. ¶7. On February 16, 2024, after a hearing, the chancery court entered an order abating Stephan’s spousal support payment for the month of April and setting trial for April 17, 2024. On the date of trial, while Stephan and his attorney were ready to proceed, Charlotte failed to appear in court. Charlotte’s counsel explained that Charlotte had been stranded in the Dominican Republic since December 2023.6 Her counsel also complained that Stephan had not properly summoned Charlotte under Rule 81 for his motions for modification of temporary spousal. Stephan requested the chancery court further abate Charlotte’s spousal support until she could avail herself of the court proceedings. The chancery court entered a temporary order abating Stephan’s spousal support until further order of the court and reserving the issue for trial. In June 2024, Charlotte returned to Mississippi from the 5 In January 2023, a newly elected chancellor began hearing the case. 6 The record showed that Charlotte and her long-time boyfriend had gone to the Dominican Republic for a funeral and/or a business venture. The owner of the apartment where Charlotte was staying left the country and remotely locked it, leaving her without access to her passport, identification, money, or personal belongings. She was attempting to gain access to her belongings through the legal system there, without success. 4 Dominican Republic. In August 2024, Charlotte filed a motion for emergency relief to reinstate her spousal support, and in October 2024, a hearing was held on the motion. The court lowered Stephan’s temporary spousal support to $2,000 per month starting in November until trial, which was scheduled for December 2024. ¶8. On December 4, 2024, a trial on the merits was held. The parties informed the chancellor that they had agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, and they filed a consent on this date. The chancellor heard testimony from both parties related primarily to property division and, to a lesser degree, support. However, the chancellor took a more “informal” approach and did not allow Charlotte to cross-examine Stephan or call any witnesses. The court “strongly admonished Charlotte for failing to get a job in the last three and one-half years since Charlotte left the marriage to pursu[e] her romantic interest” and that the court “expected Charlotte to show substantial effort in maintaining financial independence at the next hearing.” The court found Stephan had paid Charlotte more than $160,000 in spousal support since the temporary order in May 2022. ¶9. On January 17, 2025, the chancery court entered a judgment (nunc pro tunc to December 4, 2024) ordering Stephan to continue to pay Charlotte $2,000 per month in temporary spousal support until further order by the court. The chancery court awarded Stephan the Peterbilt truck (valued at approximately $50,000), all the assets and liabilities of the trucking business Mid-Coast Construction LLC, the sailboat, the Ford F350, and his personal properties. Charlotte was awarded $50,000 as her portion of the equity in the marital property, as well as two automobiles and her personal property. The judgment 5 concluded by stating the court would issue a judgment of divorce and address all remaining issues at a hearing scheduled for January 2025. ¶10. On March 18, 2025, a hearing occurred on the remaining issue of alimony. The chancery court entered a judgment of divorce. The court found since the parties’ separation in October 2021, Charlotte had chosen not to work or haul freight with Stephan to earn income, although they had the same credentials. Further, Charlotte “failed to present the court with any evidence of substantial effort to obtain employment”; the court noted that Charlotte testified, “I could drive a semi-truck, but I have no desire to.” Instead, Charlotte was interested in pursuing certification in hypnotherapy. The court found “Charlotte’s unwillingness to obtain any kind of steady employment is disingenuous of her ability to be independent.” The court declined to award Charlotte alimony, finding “no need to address the Armstrong factors of alimony as neither party was left with a deficit after completion of the equitable division of marital property and as the parties are equally licensed and credentialed to obtain employment.” The court also ordered Stephan to pay Charlotte the seven months of abated support from April until November 2024 at $2,000 per month, starting in April 2025 until paid in full. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶11. The scope of this Court’s review in domestic-relations matters is strictly limited. Bolivar v. Bolivar, 378 So. 3d 433, 437 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Curry v. Frazier, 119 So. 3d 362, 365 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013)). The chancery court’s findings will not be disturbed if “supported by substantial evidence, unless the court abused its 6 discretion, was manifestly wrong or clearly erroneous, or applied an erroneous legal standard.” Id. Questions of law, however, are reviewed de novo. Id. (quoting Donaldson v. Cotton, 336 So. 3d 1099, 1105 (¶14) (Miss. 2022)). ANALYSIS I. Modification of Temporary Spousal Support ¶12. Charlotte claims the chancery court erred in modifying her temporary spousal support in its February 16 and April 17, 2024 orders because no personal jurisdiction existed due to the lack of a Rule 81 summons. Second, she argues that Stephan presented “no material and substantial change in circumstances” to warrant the modification. As a result, Charlotte contends both of these orders are void and should be reversed and rendered as such, with “all temporary orders” reinstated. We disagree and shall discuss each argument in turn. A. Summons ¶13. “The requirements for summons and service of process depend upon the type of action.” Deborah H. Bell, Bell on Mississippi Family Law § 19.04, at 700 (3d ed. 2020). Family law matters other than divorce are governed by Rule 81(d), which “prescribes the form of summons to be used; however, the method of service is governed by Rule 4.”7 Id. “Rule 81 requires use of a special summons, which commands that the defendant appear and defend at a specific time and place set by order of the court and informs them that no answer is necessary.” Id. at 701. “Use of a Rule 4 summons does not provide adequate service of 7 As of July 1, 2026, the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure have been significantly amended. The special summons procedure in Rule 81 for certain family law and other matters has been moved to Rule 4(i). M.R.C.P. 4 & 81. As these proceedings predate the amendment, we will continue to refer to Rule 81. 7 process for a Rule 81 matter. . . .” Id. Among those actions where Rule 81(d)(2) applies are “temporary relief in divorce” and “modification or enforcement of . . . support,” which are triable seven days after completion of service of process. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(2). No answer is required for these actions. M.R.C.P. 81(d)(4). Rule 81(d)(5) provides that for the applicable actions and matters listed in Rule 81(d)(1) and (2), “summons shall issue commanding the defendant or respondent to appear and defend at a time and place, either in term time or vacation, at which the same shall be heard.” M.R.C.P. 81(d)(5). Importantly here, Rule 81(d)(6) provides an exception to a Rule 81 summons: “Rule 5(b) notice shall be sufficient as to any temporary hearing in a pending divorce, separate maintenance, custody or support action provided the defendant has been summoned to answer the original complaint.”8 M.R.C.P. 81(d)(6) (emphasis added). Rule 5(b) notice provides how service is made upon a represented party’s attorney or the party. ¶14. It is well settled that “the rules on service of process are to be strictly construed. If they have not been complied with, the court is without jurisdiction . . . .” Clark v. Clark, 43 So. 3d 496, 499 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Kolikas v. Kolikas, 821 So. 2d 874, 878 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002)). “[I]n Rule 81 matters, a Rule 81 summons must be issued; otherwise, service is defective. Actual notice does not cure defective process.” Id. at 499 (¶13) (citations omitted). 8 “[S]ome attorneys and judges question whether [Rule 81(d)(6)] applies if a request for temporary relief was not included in the complaint,” and “some judges apparently require service of both a Rule 4 and Rule 81 summons when a complaint requests temporary relief.” Bell on Mississippi Family Law §19.06[1], at 707. Here, Charlotte requested temporary financial relief in her counter-complaint for divorce. The docket shows Stephan was summoned under both rules. Therefore, Rule 81(d)(6) applies. 8 ¶15. Charlotte argues that a motion to modify temporary spousal support requires issuance of a Rule 81 summons and that failure to do so renders the resulting judgment void. Charlotte is correct that none of Stephan’s three motions to modify spousal support were served with an issued Rule 81 summons. Charlotte challenged the court’s jurisdiction of the third motion via an “Answer” but did not specifically cite Rule 81. Regardless, a Rule 81 summons was not required for these motions due to the exception found in Rule 81(d)(6). The motions were for a temporary hearing on modification of temporary spousal support while the Davidsons’ divorce action was still pending. Further, the chancery court docket shows Charlotte had been properly summoned to answer Stephan’s original complaint for divorce under both Rules 4 and 81.9 The court did not grant the divorce until March 2025, well after these motions were filed. Therefore, a Rule 81 summons was not required for Stephan’s motions, and the court had jurisdiction to rule on them. ¶16. Charlotte cites Bolivar v. Bolivar, 378 So. 3d 433 (Miss. Ct. App. 2024), in support of her position. Bolivar, however, dealt with a contempt matter on the husband’s refusal to pay court-ordered temporary support, not a modification of temporary support. Id. at 434 (¶1). Further, Bolivar supports Stephan’s position over Charlotte’s position. Bolivar overruled several of this Court’s decisions, holding that “Rule 81(d)(6) does not excuse the issuance of a Rule 81 summons when filing a motion for contempt to enforce a court’s temporary order in a divorce proceeding.” Id. at 439 (¶24). However, we acknowledged that the rule “expressly designates the type of actions where Rule 5(b) notice is sufficient.” 9 Stephan’s complaint for divorce requested a temporary hearing on possession and use of the Peterbilt truck, among other matters; therefore, a Rule 81 summons was proper. 9 Id. These actions include the one at issue here—a temporary hearing on modification of spousal support. We conclude that a Rule 81 summons was not necessary for Stephan’s motions; therefore, the chancery court had jurisdiction to rule on them. B. Modification of Temporary Spousal Support ¶17. Relatedly, Charlotte argues that the chancery court was not presented with evidence of a material change in circumstance to modify temporary spousal support. ¶18. The chancery court possesses statutory authority to order temporary spousal support in family law matters when divorce proceedings are pending and to make proper orders and judgments thereafter. McCarrell v. McCarrell, 19 So. 3d 168, 171-72 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-17(2)); Bell on Mississippi Family Law §§19.06[1], at 707; id. §9.01, at 251. “The duty to pay temporary support terminates upon entry of the final judgment of divorce, but the judgment does not eliminate the obligation to pay temporary alimony arrearages which accrued before the entry of the final decree.” McCarrell, 19 So. 3d at 172 (¶14) (citing Prescott v. Prescott, 736 So. 2d 409, 416 (¶35) (Miss. Ct. App. 1999)). The allowance of temporary spousal support is “a matter for the sound discretion of the chancery court.” Neely v. Neely, 52 So. 2d 501, 504 (Miss. 1951). Temporary spousal support “is not subject to revision and correction on appeal, unless it is erroneous on its face, or unjust to either party, or oppressive.” Gresham v. Gresham, 198 Miss. 43, 47, 21 So. 2d 414, 415 (1945) (citing Winkler v. Winkler, 104 Miss. 1, 61 So. 1, 2 (1913)). ¶19. In her counterclaim for divorce, Charlotte requested an immediate hearing for 10 temporary spousal support. On April 20, 2022, the court entered an agreed temporary order of spousal support requiring Stephan to pay Charlotte $7,000 per month, starting on May 1 and lasting until trial, which at that time was set for November 2022. At that time, a chancellor different from the judge in later proceedings was on the bench, and Stephan had different counsel from his counsel on appeal. In July 2022, Stephan filed his first of three motions to modify the temporary support, claiming he made less money without Charlotte’s working with him and had more expenses. Further, he stated Charlotte had removed $37,000 from their joint accounts for her own use and “chooses not to work.” Stephan filed an identical motion on January 27, 2023. Stephan filed a third motion to modify the temporary support and to expedite trial on October 24, 2023, represented by new counsel. He stated Charlotte had been paid $84,000 per year for two years, for a total of $168,000, “an astronomical amount for doing nothing.” The motion further stated that trial had been set for five dates but not yet occurred. At the February 16, 2024 hearing on the motion, Stephan’s counsel complained that $7,000 was more than one-half of his income and an “outrageous amount” of temporary support. He presented the court with a financial statement and tax returns, requesting “some temporary relief” from the support obligation until trial. His counsel explained that Charlotte had the same qualifications and could make the same income as Stephan, but she refused to work. The court entered an order modifying support in which Stephan would pay Charlotte the $7,000 support for March, but support would be abated for the month of April, when trial was set and when the court would reexamine continued support. On April 17, 2024, instead of a trial, another hearing 11 occurred. Charlotte was not present but, instead, in the Dominican Republic. Stephan’s counsel again requested relief from the $7,000 per month temporary support, especially in light of the trial’s numerous continuances. In response, the court abated the spousal support until further notice. ¶20. In August 2024, Charlotte filed a motion for emergency relief, requesting her support be reinstated. In October 2024, the court heard Charlotte’s testimony on the motion regarding her expenses and the situation that left her stranded in the Dominican Republic; however, Charlotte had still not found a job to support herself.10 The court reinstated her temporary support but lowered it to $2,000 per month to be paid until trial was held. During the December 2024 trial on the merits, the court ordered Stephan to pay Charlotte $2,000 per month, until paid in full, the temporary spousal support that had been abated from April to November 2024. The court did not grant Charlotte any further support. ¶21. Charlotte does not cite, nor could we find, any legal authority within Mississippi that there must be a “material and substantial change in circumstance” for modifying temporary spousal support while the divorce is still pending. Temporary spousal support, as the name suggests, is temporary in nature, allowing the chancellor discretion to modify it as circumstances change while the divorce is pending and before final judgment. McCarrell, 19 So. 3d at 171 (¶12). If the chancery court had awarded Charlotte alimony in its final judgment, that award would be “subject to modification based upon a material change of circumstances.” Rogers v. Rogers, 94 So. 3d 1258, 1267 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (citing 10 Stephan was not present at this hearing because he was working. 12 Campbell v. Campbell, 357 So. 2d 129, 130 (Miss. 1978)). Further, the supreme court has held that temporary spousal support cannot be revised on appeal unless erroneous on its face, unjust, or oppressive. Gresham, 198 Miss. at 47, 21 So. 2d at 415. We find none of these factors applicable here. Accordingly, the chancery court did not err in modifying Charlotte’s temporary spousal support. II. Examination of Witnesses ¶22. Charlotte argues that at the December 4, 2024 trial, the chancery court did not allow the proper examination of witnesses to present evidence in support of her claims for property division and alimony. Because the court denied this right, she contends remand must occur. We agree. ¶23. Due process rights are guaranteed by Article 3, Section 14 of the Mississippi Constitution. “Every defendant has a right to introduce evidence at a hearing.” Moore v. Moore, 757 So. 2d 1043, 1046 (¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Morreale v. Morreale, 646 So. 2d 1264, 1270 (Miss. 1994)). We recognize that while “trial judges [have] some measure of control over the operation of trials and the smooth flow of the litigation process,” it must not be at the expense of the parties’ due process rights. Moore, 757 So. 2d at 1046 (¶14) (citing MRE 611). Our supreme court has held: The parties should be afforded a full, complete hearing at which the parties have an opportunity to call witnesses in their behalf and be heard by themselves or counsel. If a full and complete hearing is not allowed by refusing the defendant his opportunity to present evidence, then the defendant is thereby deprived of due process. Weeks v. Weeks, 556 So. 2d 348, 349-50 (Miss. 1990) (citation omitted) (citing Fortenberry 13 v. Fortenberry, 338 So. 2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1976)). ¶24. At the December 4, 2024 trial, the court primarily heard testimony about the marital assets and, to a lesser extent, alimony.11 The chancellor began trial expressing frustration that the case had been before the court for over three years, stating: [This case] ends today. I don’t care how unhappy everybody is. . . . I’m going to hear what I want to hear from each of you, and, then, I’m just going to make a decision. . . . Y’all can all walk out of here and talk about what a terrible experience this was. . . . But this has got to be over. Charlotte’s counsel informed the court that he planned to call additional witnesses, such as Stephan’s mother, who would testify about two loans she made to him.12 The chancellor proceeded to call Stephan as the first witness and then examined the witness herself. The chancellor questioned him about various property, including vehicles, the sailboat, and guns. The court allowed Stephan’s counsel to examine him. Then, the chancellor stated she was ready to hear Charlotte’s testimony. At this point, Charlotte’s counsel asked, “[N]o cross, Judge?” The chancellor responded, “This is probably going to be a little more informal. I want to hear from Ms. Davidson. We’re running out of time.” Charlotte’s counsel then requested the court reserve his ability to cross Stephan, which was granted. The chancellor then heard Charlotte’s testimony and asked the parties a few questions before making a 11 The parties stated they had agreed to an irreconcilable differences divorce, but the chancellor did not grant the divorce until March 2025. Also, most of the testimony on alimony was postponed until a final hearing in March 2025 to see if Charlotte obtained a job. 12 Stephan’s Uniform Chancery Court Rule 8.05 form listed two loans from his mother to him for $45,000 and $150,000, respectively, and he paid $650 per month in repayment to his mother. 14 ruling from the bench on the division of the marital assets, deferring alimony until a later hearing. ¶25. The chancellor proceeded to rule on property distribution without allowing Charlotte’s counsel to cross-examine Stephan, examine Charlotte, or call additional witnesses, despite Charlotte’s reserving her right to do so. We find error in this regard. The record indicated there was additional evidence to present. The chancellor did not hear testimony regarding marital assets and debts that were mentioned in Stephan’s and Charlotte’s testimony. Further, the court did not allow Stephan’s mother to testify about some promissory notes related to the marital assets. ¶26. In Weeks, the supreme court reversed and remanded in a similar situation. The ex- husband was found in contempt for failing to abide by the divorce decree. Weeks, 556 So. 2d at 349. The defendant/ex-husband filed a motion for a new trial. Id. At the hearing, however, the chancellor “shut off defendant’s proof, saying that he was satisfied that the defendant was in contempt,” and denied the motion without hearing important evidence. Id. The court stated that “[p]resentation of such proof would have involved no significant delay, and the policy of the law is to hear all pertinent evidence and to decide cases on fully developed facts.” Id. The supreme court reversed and remanded the case for a hearing on the defendant’s motion for a new trial. Id. at 350. ¶27. Similarly, in D.R. v. Bradford, 292 So. 3d 604, 605 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020), a child-custody case, trial was held over several different days and stretched out over several months. Proceedings ended abruptly after the father presented testimony on direct and 15 cross-examination, and proceedings never resumed. Id. at (¶¶3-4). Soon after, the chancery court entered a judgment against the father. Id. at (¶5). We found the “chancery court’s findings were issued without the benefit of hearing from any of [the father’s] witnesses or allowing his redirect testimony. At this stage, the proof was not fully developed on the issues, and the chancery court was premature in reaching final judgment.” Id. at 606 (¶8). Accordingly, we found it necessary to reverse and remand to allow the father to present his proof. Id. at (¶9). ¶28. As in Weeks and Bradford, this judgment must be reversed and the case remanded for the chancellor to hear all the “important, material, and pertinent facts and available witnesses. . . .” Weeks, 556 So. 2d at 349 (citing In re Prine’s Est., 208 So. 2d 187, 193 (Miss. 1968)). III. Division of Marital Assets ¶29. Next, Charlotte argues the chancery court improperly divided the marital assets before the divorce was actually granted. Further, she complains that additional marital assets were brought to the court’s attention at a subsequent hearing after the assets were distributed. We find no error with her first argument but reverse and remand on the second. ¶30. At the beginning of trial on December 4, 2024, the parties informed the chancellor they had consented to an irreconcilable differences divorce and that all fault grounds had been withdrawn. The consent was filed with the chancery court that day. As stated above, incomplete testimony was taken for the division of marital assets, and alimony was to be determined at a subsequent hearing. The chancery court ruled from the bench on the 16 division of marital assets and issued a related judgment on January 17, 2025, nunc pro tunc to December 4, 2024. The last item on this judgment stated, “The court will issue a JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE after review and addressing all remaining issues. Review of this case is set for January 21, 2025 at 9 am.” Ultimately, the hearing on the remaining issues occurred on March 18, 2025, when support and alimony were discussed. The next day, the court entered the “Judgment of Divorce,” granting the parties’ request for an irreconcilable differences divorce, reiterating the division of marital property, and reinstating spousal support that had been abated for seven months. ¶31. We find no error with the chancery court’s dividing the marital property before the issuance of the judgment of divorce. “Mississippi law requires equitable distribution of the marital estate during divorce proceedings.” Brown v. Brown, 350 So. 3d 1169, 1178 (¶30) (Miss. Ct. App. 2022) (quoting Reynolds v. Reynolds, 287 So. 3d 1019, 1023 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019)). The statute governing an irreconcilable differences divorce provides: No divorce shall be granted pursuant to this subsection until all matters involving custody and maintenance of any child of that marriage and property rights between the parties raised by the pleadings have been either adjudicated by the court or agreed upon by the parties and found to be adequate and sufficient by the court and included in the judgment of divorce. Miss. Code Ann. § 93-5-2(3) (Rev. 2021). Therefore, under this statute, all matters pertaining to an irreconcilable differences divorce must be decided before the final judgment of divorce, which is what occurred here. The parties consented to a divorce, and marital property was divided in December 2024. The remaining issues were heard in March 2025, after which the court issued its final judgment of divorce on all matters. 17 ¶32. The chancellor began the March hearing by asking if the parties needed to present updated Rule 8.05 forms or deal with any outstanding issues. Charlotte’s counsel claimed that certain marital assets were not addressed in the distribution judgment: a Bitcoin account holding $24,513, an Ameritrade/Webull financial account that held $38,000,13 and intellectual property rights on a book Stephan wrote. Stephan responded that he opened the Bitcoin account in 2010 when they “sold a house.” He canceled the account after a month and used the money to buy the sailboat for $50,000. Stephan testified the only account he still held was the Ameritrade/Webull account. He denied the account ever had $38,000, and he said when the stock market plummeted, he lost most of the funds. Stephan testified the account that day held approximately $758. Regarding the book, Stephan acknowledged he wrote a self-published book twenty years ago, but it had not generated any revenue. ¶33. Charlotte now argues the chancery court erred in not allowing her to cross-examine Stephan about these assets. We agree. Further, the court’s final judgment did not reference the only account that may have had any value, the Ameritrade account. We reverse and remand to allow Charlotte’s counsel to cross-examine Stephan about these additional marital assets presented during the final March 18, 2025 hearing. IV. Property Distribution and Alimony ¶34. Lastly, Charlotte argues that the chancery court failed to make specific findings of fact under the Ferguson and Armstrong factors for property distribution and alimony, 13 Charlotte claimed on her Rule 8.05 forms dated March 18 and December 4, 2024, of an Ameritrade securities account with a balance of $38,272. On Stephan’s most recent Rule 8.05 form from 2024, he listed the account with a balance of $2,000. 18 respectively. We agree. A. Ferguson factors ¶35. “When dividing marital property, chancellors are directed to (1) classify the parties’ assets as marital or separate; (2) determine the value of those assets; (3) divide the marital estate equitably based upon the factors set forth in Ferguson; and (4) consider the appropriateness of alimony if either party is left with a deficiency.” Foreman v. Foreman, 223 So. 3d 178, 182 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Ewing v. Ewing, 203 So. 3d 707, 711 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016)). The Mississippi Supreme Court “has held in no uncertain terms, ‘[t]he failure to consider all applicable Ferguson factors is error and mandates reversal.’” Ballard v. Ballard, 255 So. 3d 126, 134 (¶22) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274, 286 (¶29) (Miss. 2009)). Additionally, the supreme court has clarified that “while chancellors need not make ‘findings as to each and every factor set forth in Ferguson,’ they cannot simply ‘mention the guidelines’ and state they are ‘following them and applying them to the facts of the case.’” Sistrunk v. Sistrunk, 407 So. 3d 207, 216 (¶41) (Miss. 2025) (quoting Lee v. Lee, 78 So. 3d 326, 329 (¶10) (Miss. 2012)). ¶36. At the December 2024 trial, testimony was taken on property division, but the chancellor made no mention of the Ferguson factors from the bench or in the January 17, 2025 judgment. Further, the March 2025 judgment of divorce merely stated, “After considering the Ferguson factors, the [c]ourt equitably distributed the marital assets consistent with the parties’ agreement.” However, there was no actual analysis of any applicable Ferguson factors. 19 ¶37. The chancery court distributed the following marital property at the December trial: several vehicles, the sailboat, personal accounts, and the Peterbilt truck. The parties agreed on the distribution of the vehicles. However, they could not agree on who would possess the sailboat; therefore, they decided to sell it through a broker for its fair market value of approximately $50,000. The parties acknowledged that there were no joint banking accounts, and they agreed to keep their separate accounts. The only remaining assets to divide were the trucking company and the actual truck. An informal discussion ensued between the parties, their counsel, and the chancellor about how to divide these assets, as well as the value of the sailboat and the possibility of alimony. Ultimately, the chancery court awarded Charlotte $50,000 as her portion of the equity in the marital property. However, as discussed above, it was at this hearing that reversible error occurred when the chancellor did not allow Charlotte’s counsel to cross-examine Stephan or Charlotte. We reverse and remand on this issue for a more complete analysis of the Ferguson factors. B. Armstrong Factors ¶38. Relatedly, Charlotte argues that remand is also necessary for a more thorough analysis of the Armstrong factors for alimony. We again agree. ¶39. “Whether to award alimony and the amount to be awarded are largely within the discretion of the chancellor.” Cosentino v. Cosentino, 986 So. 2d 1065, 1067 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Creekmore v. Creekmore, 651 So. 2d 513, 517 (Miss. 1995)). In Armstrong, the supreme court set forth twelve factors for the chancellor to consider in awarding alimony. Weeks v. Weeks, 832 So. 2d 583, 587 (¶17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2002) (citing 20 Armstrong, 618 So. 2d at 1280). This Court has held that when the chancellor fails to address all the factors on the record, we need not remand “so long as all facts are available to us so as to allow an equitable determination to be made.” Roberson v. Roberson, 949 So. 2d 866, 869 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Holcombe v. Holcombe, 813 So. 2d 700, 704 (¶12) (Miss. 2002)). ¶40. At the December 2024 trial, Charlotte requested permanent periodic alimony of $7,000 per month, the same amount as the temporary support. Instead, the chancery court awarded her continued temporary support of $2,000, with alimony to be reviewed at the next hearing. The chancellor instructed Charlotte to get a job before the next hearing, or it “was not going to be a positive experience,” stating this was Charlotte’s “opportunity to show what [she could] financially do.” However, at the March 2025 hearing, Charlotte had not yet obtained a job. Testimony ensued about Charlotte’s plans for a job and living expenses, but the court never addressed the Armstrong factors. The final judgment merely stated: “The [c]ourt finds that there is no need to address the Armstrong factors of alimony as neither party was left with a deficit after completion of the equitable division of marital property and as the parties are equally licensed and credentialed to obtain employment.” The chancery court failed to take into account that Stephan was awarded the Peterbilt truck—the asset both parties used to make a living. Charlotte testified that while she “could” drive a semi-truck, she had no desire to, given the dangers of being a single-woman truck driver, especially in bad weather. No evidence showed how much a single truck driver could make without access to his or her own truck. 21 ¶41. Ferguson’s sixth factor on property division asks the chancellor to consider “[t]he extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments. . . .” Cosentino, 986 So. 2d at 1067 (¶6) (quoting Ferguson, 639 So. 2d at 928). Because of the lac