Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-SA-01168-COA JANET SCITZS APPELLANT v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM APPELLEE OF MISSISSIPPI DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/26/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. ADRIENNE ANNETT HOOPER- WOOTEN COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: GEORGE S. LUTER ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: KRISTEN SHEPPARD JONES EMILY BOYKIN SHEPPARD NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - STATE BOARDS AND AGENCIES DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 11/10/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD AND LAWRENCE, JJ. CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. Janet Scitzs applied for both duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits from the Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi (PERS). Scitzs claimed to have injured her back while working for the Mississippi Department of Child Protection Services. The PERS Medical Board denied her claim for disability benefits, finding that there was insufficient objective medical evidence that she was disabled and that there was insufficient objective medical evidence that she was unable to perform the duties of her position. The PERS Disability Appeals Committee found insufficient evidence of disability or inability to perform her work, and upon the Appeals Committee’s recommendation, the PERS Board of Trustees adopted its findings; after Scitzs appealed, the Hinds County Circuit Court affirmed the decision. Scitzs appealed to the supreme court, arguing that PERS violated her right to due process and that PERS’ denial of disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. The appeal was assigned to this Court, and after our review, we find that the PERS Disability Appeals Committee violated Scitzs’s constitutional right to procedural due process. We therefore reverse and remand this case to PERS for proceedings consistent with this opinion. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶2. Janet Scitzs was employed by the Department of Child Protection Services as a Social Services Specialist II from February 2015 until May 2023. In 2020, Scitzs slipped on wet steps and injured her back. She was later released to return to work on “light duty, desk work only.” In April 2023, Scitzs filed for both duty- and non-duty-related disability retirement benefits. ¶3. Dr. Orhan Ilercil began treating Scitzs in June 2019 and diagnosed her with chronic pain syndrome.1 He treated Scitzs for her pain, including performing multiple back surgeries.2 In April 2023, Dr. Ilercil implanted a spinal cord stimulator and noted that Scitzs 1 Dr. Ilercil indicated this diagnosis on Scitzs’s PERS Statement of Examining Physician Form, which was completed on May 31, 2023. Scitzs first complained of back pain in her visit to Dr. Ilercil in June 2019. 2 Scitzs underwent two lumbar decompression surgeries in September 2019 and lumbar fusion surgery in October 2019. She had another lumbar decompression and fusion surgery in September 2021, and in 2022, she had a “cyst drained and hardware removed.” In 2022, Scitzs also completed a spinal cord stimulator trial, and Dr. Ilercil implanted the 2 “had a successful response.”3 Dr. Ilercil completed a PERS Statement of Examining Physician Form and again indicated that Scitzs had a “successful neurologic intervention.” ¶4. At St. Dominic’s, Scitzs underwent the surgeries performed by Dr. Ilercil, CT and MRI scans, and emergency room visits for pain.4 Auzenne Pain Institute and Rush Pain Treatment Center treated Scitzs for evaluation and management of chronic back pain. For her back pain, Scitzs received treatment via surgeries, epidural steroid injections, medications, and physical therapy. ¶5. The PERS Medical Board deferred action on Scitzs’s application pending an Independent Medical Evaluation (IME). Dr. David Collipp performed the IME. He noted that Scitzs suffered from hypertension, anxiety, depression, and constant low back pain. He indicated that she could not walk for long periods, nor tolerate sitting or standing for extended amounts of time. He reviewed an MRI scan from after her work injury and opined that it “revealed no herniated nucleus pulposis, no root compression, no fracture, dislocation, or ligamentous injury.” He also noted that there were no objective changes in the MRI from before her fall. Dr. Collipp determined that Scitzs’s surgeries and medications were not spinal cord stimulator in April 2023. 3 The PERS Disability Appeals Committee later noted that “a successful response to the implantation of a spinal cord stimulator would mean that the stimulator is able to effectively materially reduce or eliminate the chronic lower back pain and lower extremity pain.” 4 Scitzs presented to the St. Dominic’s Emergency Department on October 18, 2019, June 2, 2021, and September 29, 2021, with complaints of severe lower back and leg pain. 3 causally related to her February 2020 fall. Dr. Collipp ultimately concluded that Scitzs’s “present functional status allow[ed] sedentary duty[.]” ¶6. The Medical Board reviewed Scitzs’s application and related documents, medical records, and Dr. Collipp’s IME. The Medical Board denied the claim for duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits. The Medical Board found that “there was insufficient objective medical evidence to support the claim that [Scitzs’s] medical condition prevent[ed] [her] from performing the duties of a Social Services Specialist II.” The Medical Board also found that her claim “did not meet the statutory definition for duty-related disability.” Scitzs appealed to the PERS Disability Appeals Committee. ¶7. The Appeals Committee held a hearing, but Scitzs did not appear. However, the hearing proceeded under a PERS Regulation providing, “If an appealing party fails to appear at the hearing, the Presiding Officer may proceed with the hearing and prepare a proposed statement of facts and recommendation to the Board [of Trustees] based on the evidence presented at such hearing.” 27 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 210, R. 1:42, § 107.4 (Dec. 1, 2017). PERS Regulations also provide, “Where good cause appears, not contrary to statute, the Board may permit deviation from these rules insofar as it may find compliance therewith to be impracticable or unnecessary.” Id. § 101. ¶8. At the hearing, a CPS employee advised, “Scitzs was an employee of our agency from 2015 until August of 2023. We received a letter from PERS . . . saying that the hearing was scheduled and inviting us to attend.” Counsel for PERS did not have any questions for the 4 employee. The hearing officer then closed the record and noted that the Committee would deliberate. However, there was no testimony in the transcript or evidence offered at the hearing showing that notice of the hearing was provided to Scitzs. ¶9. The order of the Appeals Committee stated, “PERS staff attempted to contact [Scitzs] using information provided by [her] but were unable to make contact.” It further noted, Prior to the hearing the Disability Appeals Committee members had received and reviewed in excess of one thousand pages of medical records in preparation for the hearing. Since a recommendation must be made by the Disability Appeals Committee based on objective medical evidence, the Disability Appeals Committee was confident that an appropriate recommendation could be made with the medical records received and admitted into evidence. ¶10. The PERS Disability Appeals Committee reviewed the records from Dr. Ilercil with Mississippi Brain and Spine, St. Dominic’s Health Services, Auzenne Pain Institute, and Rush Pain Treatment Center. The Appeals Committee additionally compared MRI scans taken before and after the fall. The Appeals Committee concluded that “there [was] no objective evidence of an injury that would result in permanent disability.” ¶11. As for the job duties of a Social Services Specialist II, the Appeals Committee found, [T]here is frequent sitting, repetitive use of hands, exposure to temperature changes, and chemicals. There is occasional walking, standing, climbing stairs, driving an automobile, and exposure to dust. No lifting in excess of fifteen pounds is required. A Social Services Specialist II is able to alternate sitting and standing as needed. The Appeals Committee determined that the position was “largely sedentary.” The Appeals Committee found that “Scitzs would have been able to continue her employment and perform 5 her largely sedentary job duties.” ¶12. Ultimately, the Appeals Committee held that there was insufficient objective medical evidence that Scitzs was disabled or unable to perform the duties of Social Services Specialist II. The Appeals Committee recommended to the PERS Board of Trustees that Scitzs’s claim for duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits be denied. ¶13. The Board of Trustees adopted and approved the recommendation of and the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the Appeals Committee, and the Board denied Scitzs’s request for duty-related and non-duty-related disability benefits. ¶14. Scitzs appealed the decision of the Board of Trustees to the Hinds County Circuit Court. The circuit court found that Scitzs failed to meet her burden of proof showing PERS made an incorrect decision and that PERS’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. The court determined that there was insufficient objective medical evidence that Scitzs was disabled as the result of a physical injury or that she was unable to perform her duties as a Social Services Specialist II. Further, the circuit court held that PERS’ decision was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The circuit court thus affirmed the decision of the Board of Trustees. Scitzs now appeals, raising the following assignments of error: (1) PERS violated her rights to due process and (2) PERS’s denial of disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. STANDARD OF REVIEW ¶15. Our review of a decision by PERS is limited. We may only reverse a decision of 6 PERS if the decision is “(1) not supported by substantial evidence; (2) is arbitrary and capricious; (3) is beyond the scope or power granted to the agency; or (4) violates one’s constitutional rights.” Ulrich v. Public Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 281 So. 3d 259, 262 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Marquez, 774 So. 2d 421, 425 (¶11) (Miss. 2000)). “A decision by PERS has a rebuttable presumption in favor of its initial ruling.” Ulrich, 281 So. 3d at 262 (¶10) (citing Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Card, 994 So. 2d 239, 242 (¶3) (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)). DISCUSSION ¶16. On appeal, Scitzs argues that PERS violated her constitutional right to due process when the hearing before the Appeals Committee was held in her absence and without notice to her. She further argues that PERS’ denial of her application for disability benefits was not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, was arbitrary and capricious.5 Whether PERS violated Scitzs’s due process rights when it proceeded with the hearing in her absence. ¶17. Scitzs argues that she did not receive notice of the hearing before the Appeals Committee and because the hearing was held in her absence, PERS violated her due process right to be notified. In contrast, PERS argues that it complied with the regulatory notice requirements when it issued the notice of hearing, attempted to contact Scitzs, and then proceeded with the hearing in her absence. 5 We find the first issue dispositive and, therefore, decline to address whether substantial evidence supported PERS’ denial of Scitzs’s application for disability benefits. 7 ¶18. “Administrative agencies must afford minimal due process consisting of notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wright, 949 So. 2d 839, 843 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (citing State Oil & Gas Bd. v. McGowan, 542 So. 2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1989)). Minimum due process is found when notice is reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. This notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. Booth v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 588 So. 2d 422, 427 (Miss. 1991). ¶19. During Scitzs’s short hearing before the Appeals Committee, the hearing officer stated: We’ll call the application of . . . Janet Scitzs for duty-related and nonduty- related disability . . . . It is 1:36, and the applicant has not shown up for the hearing, so we will proceed under PERS regulation [Section 107.4] . . . and consider what we have before us and also consider some very brief testimony from two members of the agency who got notice of the hearing and have come to appear, but with limited knowledge about other matters. PERS Rules of Hearing Practice and Procedure Section 107.4 provides, “If the appealing party fails to appear at the hearing, the presiding officer may proceed with the hearing and prepare a proposed statement of facts and recommendation to the Board [of Trustees] based on the evidence presented at the hearing.” 27 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 210, R. 1:42, § 107.4. ¶20. At the hearing, Scitzs’s appeal file was introduced as an exhibit, and an employee of CPS testified that she and another employee received a letter from PERS informing them of 8 the hearing. The hearing officer then concluded the hearing. ¶21. The Appeals Committee’s summary of testimony states, Scitzs failed to appear at the hearing. . . . PERS staff attempted to contact the Claimant using information provided by the Claimant but were unable to make contact. . . . The hearing officer conferred with the other members of the Disability Appeals Committee and determined that the Disability Appeals Committee would proceed with the hearing to consider the medical evidence submitted to PERS in support of the application for disability benefits. As noted above, the Appeals Committee concluded there was insufficient evidence that Scitzs was disabled or unable to perform her job duties. The Appeals Committee recommended that Scitzs’s claim for disability benefits be denied. The Board of Trustees adopted this finding, and the circuit court affirmed its decision. ¶22. The circuit court summarized the relevant procedural history as follows: Scitzs filed a Notice of Appeal to the PERS Disability Appeals Committee. . . . Thereafter, a hearing on her disability retirement claim was conducted. . . . The transcript of the . . . hearing reflects that the PERS Disability Appeals staff attempted multiple times, using the contact information provided by Scitzs, to reach her but were unsuccessful. ¶23. Nothing in the record supports the finding that PERS staff attempted to contact Scitzs. The hearing transcript does not reflect any attempt to contact Scitzs. Further, while the Appeals Committee’s summary notes an attempt to contact Scitzs, it does not indicate any amount of times that staff reached out or by what method. There is no evidence in the record that the notice of the hearing was mailed to Scitzs. ¶24. PERS argues that the CPS employees’ “receipt of notice for the hearing date confirms PERS’ mailing procedures were followed.” PERS asserts that “[t]he presumption of 9 regularity supports the official acts of public officers, and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts must presume that they have properly discharged their official duties.” United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926). ¶25. We acknowledge that the presumption of regularity applies to public officers. We also recognize the rule that “proof that a letter properly directed was placed in a post office, creates a presumption that it reached its destination in usual time and was actually received by the person to whom it was addressed.” Holt v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 724 So. 2d 466, 470 (¶19) (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932)). ¶26. However, as noted, the record before this Court lacks any proof that PERS mailed notice of the hearing to Scitzs. Without evidence of such action by PERS, the presumption of regularity cannot attach. For the presumption of regularity to apply here, there must be some confirmation that PERS complied with its own regulation to notify Scitzs of her hearing. PERS regulations provide that “[a]ll notices and orders required to be served . . . may be served by mail and service thereof shall be complete when a true copy of such document, properly addressed and stamped, is deposited in the United States mail.” 27 Miss. Admin. Code Pt. 210, R. 1:42, § 114 (Dec. 1, 2017). ¶27. There is no dispute that Scitzs was not present for the hearing before the Appeals Committee. Scitzs argues this is because she did not receive notice of the hearing. In contrast, PERS argues that Scitzs was indeed notified of the hearing, relying on the Appeals 10 Committee’s finding that they attempted to contact Scitzs and that CPS employees received notice of the hearing. The Appeals Committee order states that PERS staff attempted to contact Scitzs but were unsuccessful. Yet, such is not reflected in the transcript from the hearing or anywhere else in the record. Hence, the Committee’s finding was not supported by evidence in the record of the hearing. At the hearing, the hearing officer averred that Scitzs was not present but stated that the hearing would proceed anyway. Again, the record does not include an attempt by PERS staff to contact Scitzs, and no evidence was presented at the hearing that she was notified. ¶28. The record before us lacks any proof of notice of the hearing to Scitzs. It does not contain a letter notifying her, evidence of PERS’ mailing the notice, or any evidence of an attempt to inform Scitzs in any way of the hearing. Additionally, no one from PERS testified that they mailed the letter to Scitzs or called her. Notably, the record does include PERS’ prior mail correspondence with Scitzs regarding the IME and the Medical Board’s denial of her benefits, but it does not include a letter notifying her of the Appeals Committee hearing. Simply put, the record is devoid of anything that indicates that Scitzs was notified of her hearing. There is no evidence in the transcript or in the record before this Court to support a finding that Scitzs was on notice of her hearing before the Appeals Committee. ¶29. In Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Wright, this Court remanded a case to the PERS Disability Appeals Committee after finding the Appeals Committee violated a claimant’s procedural due process rights. 949 So. 2d 839, 843 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Wright, the claimant, 11 was denied disability benefits. Id. at 842 (¶13). The circuit court reversed the decision of the Appeals Committee, finding that the decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at (¶14). PERS appealed to this Court, but Wright argued that PERS violated her right to due process when it relied on medical evidence without giving her the opportunity to rebut the evidence. Id. at 843 (¶17). Wright had an initial hearing before the Appeals Committee where it heard testimony and considered medical evidence. Id. at 841 (¶¶9-10). The Appeals Committee then requested a second IME and held a second hearing to “present additional medical testimony.” Id. at 842 (¶11). Markedly, PERS advised Wright to not attend the second hearing because there was going to be no opportunity for testimony. Id. We held that “by accepting new evidence without providing Wright the opportunity to rebut the evidence or supplement her own records,” the Appeals Committee “violated Wright’s procedural due process rights and the concept of fundamental fairness.” Id. at 843 (¶21). Similarly, in this case, Scitzs did not have an opportunity to rebut any of the testimony or evidence submitted at the hearing or to supplement her medical records with the most recent reports. As a result, we find that “PERS denied [Scitzs] the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.” Id. at (¶20). CONCLUSION ¶30. Scitzs had a procedural due process right to be notified of the hearing before the Appeals Committee. Because the record lacks any proof that PERS informed Scitzs of such hearing, we reverse the decisions of the circuit court and PERS and remand the case to the 12 PERS Disability Appeals Committee for a new hearing on both Scitzs’s duty- and non-duty- related disability claims. ¶31. REVERSED AND REMANDED. BARNES, C.J., WILSON, P.J., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. 13