Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CA-00808-COA ELLEN HUEBNER APPELLANT v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/20/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. KELLY LEE MIMS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: MONROE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: KEVIN DALE CAMP ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: INDIA MARIAH SPRINKLE NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - POST-CONVICTION RELIEF DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/08/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE BARNES, C.J., McCARTY AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ. LASSITTER ST. PÉ, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. In January 2022, Ellen Huebner pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Huebner filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) on June 17, 2025. In her petition, Huebner relied on Ivy v. State, 731 So. 2d 601 (Miss. 1999),1 to argue that although more than three years had passed since her guilty plea, a fundamental rights exception to Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-5(2) (Rev. 2020) allowed the circuit court to consider her claims. The circuit court “denied and dismissed” Huebner’s petition, “consistent with Howell v. State, 358 So. 3d 613 (Miss. 2023).” 1 Huebner claimed that her plea lacked a factual basis. ¶2. Section 99-39-5(2) provides that a PCR petition must be made within three years after the entry of judgment of conviction following a guilty plea. There are several enumerated exceptions, including proof of an intervening decision of the Supreme Courts of Mississippi or the United States, newly discovered evidence, an illegal sentence, or unlawfully revoked probation or parole. Id. ¶3. In Howell, the Supreme Court overruled prior cases that had applied a judicially created fundamental rights exception to the three-year time-bar. The Supreme Court held that because the statute of limitations for PCR petitions was a “substantive, legislatively enacted law,” the Supreme Court could not “lawfully amend or ignore constitutionally sound law enacted by the legislature.” Id. at 616 (¶¶10, 12). ¶4. Despite the circuit court’s reliance on Howell, Huebner proceeded with the fundamental-rights-exception argument, continuing to argue that Ivy entitled her to relief from the statute of limitations. In fact, Huebner’s brief does not acknowledge Howell or present an argument as to why the exception should still apply—it simply ignores the trial court’s rationale and controlling law. ¶5. Because Huebner’s PCR petition was filed more than three years after her guilty plea and did not allege any valid exception to the statute of limitations, we affirm the circuit court’s dismissal. ¶6. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., WESTBROOKS, McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY AND EMFINGER, JJ., CONCUR. WEDDLE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 2