Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI NO. 2025-CP-01155-COA REJOHNNA BROWN MITCHELL APPELLANT v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., A/K/A WELLS APPELLEES FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, RUSHMORE LOAN MANAGEMENT SERVICES, U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL ASSOCIATION AS TRUSTEE OF THE LB-CABANA SERVICE IV TRUST DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/19/2025 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. J. DEWAYNE THOMAS COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: REJOHNNA BROWN MITCHELL (PRO SE) ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES: JOSHUA WAYNE STOVER JOHN MARK FRANKLIN III AMANDA McGREGOR BECKETT PETER LAWRENCE LUBLIN NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - REAL PROPERTY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 10/06/2026 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: BEFORE WILSON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND McCARTY, JJ. McCARTY, J., FOR THE COURT: ¶1. A man’s estate sued a bank, arguing it had improperly allowed an elderly couple “to secure a loan using [their] homestead property . . . as collateral.” The bank sought foreclosure for failure to repay the loan, which was secured by a deed of trust on the home. Fourteen years after the deed was recorded, his daughter filed a lawsuit against the bank. The trial court found the lawsuit was time-barred. She now appeals, arguing a different statute of limitations might apply. Finding that the suit would be time-barred in either event, we affirm. BACKGROUND ¶2. The core facts of this case are not in dispute. For the sake of brevity, we address only the general facts and procedural history. ¶3. William and ReJohnna Brown owned a home at 1010 Laura Avenue in Jackson. A deed of trust establishes they were joint tenants with full rights of survivorship. The couple entered into a contractual relationship with Wells Fargo Bank.1 The Browns executed a promissory note whereby they would receive $119,356.26 from the bank, secured by their interest in the property. While Mr. Brown’s signature on the deed of trust is executed in a strong cursive, Mrs. Brown’s is merely an odd scribble. ¶4. It is undisputed that the deed of trust was recorded in Hinds County on October 16, 2008. ¶5. Mrs. Brown passed away in 2009, and Mr. Brown lived until 2017. During their lifetimes, neither took legal action against Wells Fargo or contested the validity of the deed of trust or their relationship with the Bank. ¶6. This changed in 2019. While not contained in the record before us, an estate was opened on behalf of Mr. Brown. The Estate obtained an order to halt the foreclosure on the Browns’ home by the Bank. However, this injunction was later lifted. 1 There are a multitude of corporate forms and other defendants in this matter. For the purposes of this appeal, we refer to the defendants collectively as “Wells Fargo” or “Bank,” as the core theory was that together the defendants deprived the plaintiffs of their real property. 2 ¶7. The case before us begins with a lawsuit filed in 2022 by the daughter of the Browns who is the administratrix of her father’s estate, ReJohnna Mitchell. The suit alleged that Mrs. Brown did not have the mental capacity to enter into the business relationship with Wells Fargo. The suit further alleged she had been under a conservatorship and could not have entered into the deed of trust. The suit posited that the Bank used the Browns’ “real property as collateral” despite that their signatures “were unduly and unlawfully obtained.” ¶8. The complaint was amended by order of the trial court in order to include other heirs of Mr. Brown. As recounted by the trial court, “[t]he Amended Complaint asserted a single cause of action for ‘fraud and bad faith’ based upon the allegation” that Mrs. Brown did not have the mental ability to understand “the Deed of Trust she signed.” ¶9. There was extensive litigation on several points, but Wells Fargo ultimately filed a motion to dismiss. The Bank protested that the sole claim for fraud was time-barred. It argued that “the statute of limitations for fraud is three years[.]” Since the deed of trust was recorded in 2008, and the lawsuit was not filed until 2022, Wells Fargo characterized this as “almost fourteen years” untimely. ¶10. Mitchell did not provide any legal authority in response to this argument. The counter-argument was simply that Mitchell “had no reason to suspect, believe, or know that Wells Fargo had caused Mrs. Brown to execute the subject Deed of Trust in 2008 along with her father, Mr. Brown, to secure the loan as her father was the only signatory on the Promissory Note.” In her view, she did not learn this until 2019, when she “discovered” her mother’s signature on the deed of trust. “Based on the above and foregoing, Plaintiffs submit 3 the instant cause of action is not barred by the three (3)-year statute of limitations,” the response concluded. ¶11. The trial court was unconvinced by this argument. In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that the statute of limitations began running when the deed of trust was recorded. Since that was 2008, the trial court found the suit time-barred. And since the deed of trust was publicly recorded, the trial court found that it was not concealed by anyone and not subject to later “discovery.” ¶12. The dismissal was timely appealed, and it was deflected to our Court for review. DISCUSSION ¶13. Now proceeding pro se, Mitchell argues three points warrant the reversal of the trial court’s order. First, that the deed of trust was improperly recorded because it did not have the signature of both her parents. Second, that the trial court erred by using a three-year statute of limitations instead of a ten-year limitation. Last, she argues Wells Fargo “is barred from seeking equitable relief under the doctrine of unclean hands.” ¶14. “The standard of review for a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is de novo,” so we give no deference to the trial court’s decision. Deere v. Taylor, 394 So. 3d 991, 995 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). However, the trial court’s sole reason for dismissal was that the statute of limitations had run. Although we reach this point in a different fashion, we find it is determinative of all other issues. ¶15. Our Supreme Court has determined that “in regards to actions stemming from deeds, the statute of limitation begins to run on the date the deed in question was filed.” Kelly v. 4 Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, 329 So. 3d 439, 446 (¶25) (Miss. 2021) (emphasis in original) (quotation mark omitted). So, if a dispute stems from a deed of trust, any cause of action is inextricable from the date the deed was recorded. Id. In Kelly, the Court ultimately found the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment and dismiss on a claim for slander of title relating to a warranty deed. Id. ¶16. The trial court applied Kelly to find that Mitchell’s claim was untimely, and upon review we agree. The deed of trust was recorded in 2008. Mrs. Brown’s shaky signature upon the instrument is visible and concerning. Nonetheless, pursuant to Supreme Court precedent, it was at this point any statute of limitation began running. ¶17. Yet, we must clarify the statute of limitations. The trial court missed the mark when figuring that Mitchell’s claim was subject to the three-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has addressed this same point of law and found that while a complaint may plead fraud, it remains an action to recover land. Lott v. Saulters, 133 So. 3d 794, 799 (¶¶7- 8) (Miss. 2014). And actions to recover land are “governed by the ten-year statute of limitations.” Id. ¶18. As explained in Lott, [The defendants] argue that [the plaintiff’s] claim for cancellation of [the] deed falls under the general, three-year statute of limitations because it alleges fraud. This requires us to address the question of whether an action to cancel a deed that was fraudulently conveyed falls under the three-year statute of limitations governing actions based on fraud, or if it falls under the ten-year statute of limitations governing actions to recover land. We hold that, where a plaintiff alleging a possessory interest in the land brings an action to clear title or to recover land obtained by fraudulent conveyance, that action is governed by the ten-year statute of limitations. 5 Id. at (¶7) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court explained it had “twice applied the ten-year statute of limitations in cases where fraud was alleged in an action to recover possession of real estate,” despite that many states rejected this method of interpretation. Id. at 800 (¶10). In adopting a ten-year statute in this fashion, the Court expressly “decline[d] to follow [the] majority rule, because, as mentioned above, the Mississippi Legislature, unlike the majority of states, has not created a statute setting a shorter period of limitation on actions to recover land on the grounds of fraudulent conveyance.” Id. at 800 (¶11). ¶19. Mitchell seizes on this argument to say the trial court used the wrong statute of limitations. However, she agreed in litigation before the trial court that the three-year statute of limitations applied. Our Supreme Court has recently applied the ancient rule that The appellant having relied upon a statute not applicable, cannot invoke the protection of another not pleaded. A party who pleads or replies to a statute of limitations not appropriate to the action must abide the result. Parker v. Ross, 367 So. 3d 151, 156 (¶17) (Miss. 2023). Having agreed that the three-year statute applied in the trial court below, Mitchell cannot now claim it was error to apply it. ¶20. Nonetheless, even if the trial court had relied upon the correct ten-year statute of limitations, the result would not be different. As the deed of trust was recorded in 2008, a lawsuit based upon fraud in the recording of the instrument would have to be filed by 2018 at the latest. As Mitchell’s lawsuit was not filed until 2022, the statute of limitations had long run. ¶21. Finding no error in the trial court’s dismissal on the basis that the statute of limitations had run, we affirm. 6 CONCLUSION ¶22. Because the deed of trust was recorded in 2008, and the lawsuit alleging fraud was not filed until 2022, the trial court properly granted dismissal on the basis of the statute of limitations. While the trial court used a three-year statute of limitations instead of the ten-year statute, the result remains the same. Therefore, we affirm the dismissal with prejudice. ¶23. AFFIRMED. BARNES, C.J., CARLTON AND WILSON, P.JJ., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, EMFINGER, WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WESTBROOKS, J., NOT PARTICIPATING. 7