Bryce Holstad v.

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A24-1113 Court of Appeals Hennesy, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Moore, III, McKeig, Thissen, JJ. Bryce Holstad, et al., Appellants, vs. Filed: September 23, 2026 Town of May, Office of Appellate Courts Respondent. ________________________ Devon C. Holstad, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellants. Robert A. Alsop, Kennedy & Graven, Chartered, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent. Jason M. Hill, Troy J. Gilchrist, Town Law Center PLLP, Wayzata, Minnesota, for amicus curiae the Minnesota Association of Townships. ________________________ SYLLABUS 1. A cartway established under Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), must be at least two rods wide, regardless of the size of the parcel it connects, and a town does not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, when it rejects a petitioner’s cartway route proposal and selects an alternative route that the town 1 reasonably concludes to be in the public’s best interest and less disruptive and damaging to the affected landowners. 2. A town does not exceed its statutory authority when it conditions opening a cartway on constructing that cartway to particular standards and requires the petitioning landowner to obtain other federal, state, and county regulatory approvals. 3. Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(d), and Minnesota Statutes section 164.10, when read together, grant a town discretion to decide whether to expend public funds on a cartway. 4. Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(c), allows a town to include its attorney fees incurred until a cartway is opened in the town’s damages, including fees incurred in connection with a petitioner’s appeal of the cartway determination. Affirmed. OPINION HENNESY, Justice. This case asks us to consider the scope of a town’s authority when establishing a cartway under Minn. Stat. § 164.08. Appellants Bryce Holstad and Jody Holstad (the Holstads), owners of an approximately 2.5-acre landlocked property, petitioned respondent Town of May (the Town) to establish a cartway providing access to their property after the Holstads failed to reach an agreement with their neighbors to create a private easement that would allow access. After inspecting the relevant properties and hosting multiple public hearings, the Town approved a different cartway route than the 2 one the Holstads proposed, required them to construct the cartway in accordance with a town engineer’s plan, and specified that all relevant regulatory bodies must approve the cartway prior to its opening or use. The Town declined to expend public funds for the cartway, making the Holstads solely responsible for its construction and maintenance. The Town further ordered the Holstads to pay damages to the neighbors1 and to pay the Town’s professional fees and other costs, including attorney fees. The Holstads appealed to the district court. The district court upheld the Town’s cartway determination and ordered the Holstads to pay the Town’s professional fees incurred in connection with establishing the cartway. The Holstads appealed this decision to the court of appeals, which affirmed. We granted the Holstads’ petition for further review. In their appeal before us, the Holstads raise three main arguments. First, they argue that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law when it rejected the Holstads’ proposed cartway route and instead required a route the Holstads claim is more “disruptive and damaging” and fails to give them “meaningful access” to their property. Second, the Holstads claim that the Town exceeded its statutory authority by conditioning the establishment of a cartway on specific construction requirements to improve the route and on federal, state, and county regulatory approval. Third, they assert that the Town erred in requiring them to pay for both the cartway’s construction and the Town’s attorney fees associated with their appeal. 1 These damages were to compensate the owners of the land taken to establish the cartway. Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c). 3  We conclude that the Town did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, when it rejected the Holstads’ petitioned-for cartway route and instead selected the engineer’s route. We further conclude that the Town did not exceed its statutory authority when it required the Holstads to improve the cartway through construction before the cartway could be opened or used, or when it required them to obtain federal, state, and county regulatory approvals before construction. We also conclude that the Town did not err by ordering the Holstads to pay for the cartway’s construction. And finally, we conclude that the Town did not err by requiring the Holstads to pay the Town’s attorney fees associated with the Holstads’ appeals. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. FACTS The Holstads, mother and son, own an approximately 2.5-acre landlocked property (the Holstad Property) along the St. Croix River in the Town of May. For the entire time that the Holstads have owned the property—and the entire time Bryce Holstad’s grandfather owned it before them—the property has been without roadway access. The Holstad Property abuts land owned by the National Park Service to the north and west. It abuts National Park Service land and the St. Croix River to the east. To the south, the Holstad property borders privately owned property (the neighboring property). The public road nearest to the Holstad Property is State Highway 95, commonly known as the “St. Croix Trail.” Prior to submitting their cartway petition, the Holstads attempted to negotiate a private easement with the neighboring property’s owners (the neighbors), but the negotiations were unsuccessful. 4  In June 2022, the Holstads petitioned the Town to establish a cartway over the neighboring property pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2. The Town Board inspected the relevant properties, examined the Holstads’ proposed cartway location on the neighboring property, and held public hearings to determine the cartway’s location and possible damage to the Town and the neighboring property. The Holstads, the neighbors, and an engineer for the Town each made a proposal as to a location for the cartway. The Holstads proposed that the Town establish a cartway over an “existing private driveway” that runs east from St. Croix Trail and provides access to the neighboring property, without any improvement to the driveway. The Town found that the “driveway” the Holstads proposed as a cartway route is “an unimproved gravel/sand path that is used for ingress and egress to [the neighbors’] seasonal cabin on the St. Croix River.” “As it moves from west to east, it traverses the bluff and steep ravines and then drops down to the seasonal cabin. Before doing so, however, it threads through heavily forested areas and steep ravines and drop offs on both sides.” The unimproved “driveway” route, at most points, is barely wide enough for a single passenger vehicle2 and will not accommodate emergency vehicles. During the winter months, the driveway route is almost completely impassable. In fact, an appraiser had to use a snowmobile to reach the lower area of the parcel during the winter. The 2 The Town received evidence that the “driveway” route was, at its narrowest, less than 11 feet wide. 5 Town concluded that establishing a cartway using the existing driveway, without improvements, is neither feasible nor consistent with public health, safety, or welfare. The neighbors opposed both the establishment of a cartway and the Holstads’ proposal. If, however, a cartway were to be established, the neighbors agreed that it should follow the same general path as the Holstads’ proposal, but they argued that it should be two rods3 wide and incorporate improvements, including “retaining walls, guardrails, and extensive grading and filling.” Although the Town did not make specific findings regarding the cost of this option, the town engineer provided very high-level estimates that the improvements would cost between $1.4 million and $1.9 million. The town engineer proposed another route, which would enter the neighboring property in the same fashion as the Holstads’ proposed route, but “turn[] north before reaching many of the extremely steep slopes and ravines on the [neighboring property].” Compared to the Holstads’ proposed route, the engineer’s route is shorter and “avoids steep slopes, drop-offs and ravines.” The engineer’s route is also farther away from the river, closer to the boundary of National Park Service regulations, and comparatively less intrusive to the neighbors because it does not approach their cabin. Again, the Town did not make specific findings regarding the cost of this option, but the town engineer presented estimates that the improvements required for this route would also range from $1.4 million to $1.9 million. 3 A rod is a unit of measurement equaling 16.5 feet. In re Daniel, 656 N.W.2d 543, 546 n.1 (Minn. 2003). 6  Ultimately, the Town adopted a resolution approving a cartway consistent with the engineer’s proposed route. The Town reasoned that because a cartway is open to the public, the Town must expect public traffic on the cartway and must likewise consider potential dangers invited by cross traffic. To address safety concerns, the Town’s resolution requires the cartway to be improved in accordance with the engineer’s recommendations, which includes a requirement that the cartway be at least two rods wide with a paved width of 16 feet and two-foot gravel shoulders. The resolution further requires the Holstads to obtain regulatory approvals from relevant federal and state agencies and the local county before constructing the cartway. Finally, the resolution requires that “[n]o construction, opening, or use of the cartway shall be made until it is certified by the Town Board” as compliant with the conditions set forth in the resolution. With respect to damages, the Town awarded the neighbors $200,000 for the taking of their property in order to establish the cartway. The Town also ordered the Holstads to “pay for the cost of the Town’s professional and other services, hearing costs, administrative costs, recording costs and other costs and expenses which the town may incur in connection with the proceedings for the establishment of the cartway.” See Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c) (providing that a petitioner will pay these costs in damages to the town). The Town estimated its legal, engineering, administrative, and finance fees to be approximately $95,500. The Holstads appealed the Town’s resolution to district court, see Minn. Stat. §§ 164.08, subd. 2(b), 164.07, subd. 7; and moved for partial summary judgment. The Town opposed the motion and requested attorney fees in connection with the Holstads’ 7 appeal. The district court denied the Holstads’ motion. It concluded that both the Town’s selection of an alternative route for the cartway and its requirement that the cartway be improved at the Holstads’ expense were consistent with applicable law and supported by the record. The district court also upheld the Town’s requirement that the Holstads pay for the Town’s professional fees associated with establishing the cartway, including attorney fees in connection with the appeal to district court. The Holstads further appealed to the court of appeals, which affirmed. Holstad v. Town of May, 17 N.W.3d 764, 767 (Minn. App. 2025). The court of appeals held that the Town did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, when it selected an alternative cartway route to the route the Holstads requested. Id. at 775–76. The court of appeals also upheld the construction and federal, state, and county regulatory approval requirements imposed by the Town, reasoning that “the requirement to obtain regulatory approvals does not undermine the establishment of the cartway” and that the Town had “implied authority” to impose construction and improvement conditions when exercising its mandatory duty to establish a cartway pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2. Id. at 771–73. As to damages, the court of appeals held that Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(c), authorizes the Town to “include in the damages award attorney fees in connection with the appeal of the town’s order establishing a cartway and engineer fees in overseeing construction.” Id. at 778. The court of appeals therefore affirmed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings regarding damages. Id. at 778– 79. We granted the Holstads’ petition for further review. 8  ANALYSIS This appeal requires us to determine the scope of a town’s statutory authority under the cartway statute, Minn. Stat. § 164.08. Before we do so, we provide a brief overview of cartways and cartway law in Minnesota, and in particular the history of what is now Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2. Neither section 164.08, nor any other relevant statute, specifically defines a “cartway” or how it differs from other roads or paths. Cases discussing cartways extend back hundreds of years and into English law. See Sarah R. Jewell, Cartways—An Ancient Relic Disturbing Today’s Rural Landscape?, 42 Mitchell Hamline L. Rev. 1139, 1141 (2016). “Cartways” were originally one of many forms of “ways,” or roads, including horseways and footways, “all of which became known as highways, so long as they were open to public use.” Id. A modern cartway, however, is a type of public road or highway open for modern vehicles such as automobiles. See Minn. Stat. § 160.02, subd. 26 (defining “[r]oad” or “highway” to include “cartways”); id., subd. 28 (defining “[t]own roads” to “include[] those roads and cartways which have heretofore been or which hereafter may be established, constructed, or improved under the authority of the several town boards”). Even if cartways are not explicitly defined by statute, they are the subject of Minnesota Statutes section 164.08. The first version of this statute was adopted in 1913; “[i]ts origin and purpose are obscure.” Roemer v. Bd. of Supervisors of Elysian Twp., LeSueur Cnty., 167 N.W.2d 497, 499 (Minn. 1969). “Apparently it was intended to expand the common-law rules governing ways of necessity ….” Id. As all parties agree, 9 the creation of a cartway is related to the power of eminent domain. Specifically, the cartway statute “in effect giv[es] the owner whose property is isolated the right to require the town to condemn an easement for private access on condition the petitioner compensates the owner of the subservient tenement for the taking.” Id. But “[t]he cartway when laid out by public authority is a public way, open to the free use of the public, though laid out and opened primarily for the benefit of a particular person.” Carlson v. Elmo Twp., 169 N.W. 805, 806 (Minn. 1918). If the resulting cartway were not a public way, the condemnation of the land it occupies could amount to an unconstitutional taking of land for private use, because “[i]t is elementary that private property cannot be taken under the power of eminent domain for a purely private purpose.” Powell v. Town Bd. of Sinnott Twp., Marshall Cnty., 221 N.W. 527, 528 (Minn. 1928); see City of Duluth v. State, 390 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn. 1986) (emphasizing that exercising eminent domain powers to benefit private interests is constitutional “[a]s long as the predominant purpose being furthered is a public one”); Trout Brook Realty Co. v. Town of Featherstone, 217 N.W. 499, 500 (Minn. 1928) (rejecting argument that “the land required … was taken for private use, and not public”). Although a cartway is a public way, it is financed differently from other public ways. “Town road and bridge funds shall not be expended on the cartway unless the town board … by resolution determines that an expenditure is in the public interest.” Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d). “If no resolution is adopted to that effect, the grading or other construction work and the maintenance of the cartway is the responsibility of the petitioner ….” Id.; see Minn. Stat. § 164.10 (“Any town board may expend town road and 10 bridge funds upon a legally established cartway the same as on town roads if, in the judgment of the board the public interests require it ….”). But a group of taxpayers may, by petition, call for a town’s electors to vote on whether to expend town funds on a cartway. Minn. Stat. § 164.10; see Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(d) (explicitly providing that its provisions are subject to the section 164.10 petition process). Against this background, we consider the Holstads’ challenges to the Town’s cartway resolution. First, we consider whether the Town acted arbitrarily or capriciously, or contrary to law, by rejecting the Holstads’ proposed cartway route and selecting the town engineer’s route. Second, we discuss whether the Town exceeded its authority under Minn. Stat. § 164.08 when it required the Holstads to construct the cartway in accordance with its resolution and to obtain federal, state, and county regulatory approvals as conditions to opening the cartway. Next, we analyze whether the Town erred by ordering the Holstads to pay for constructing the cartway. Finally, we address whether the Holstads are obligated to pay the Town’s attorney fees associated with the Holstads’ appeals. I. First, the Holstads argue that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law by selecting the town engineer’s proposed cartway route instead of their petitioned-for route. The Town argues that it acted within its statutory authority to select the alternative route because the route the Holstads proposed is neither safe nor compliant with the statutory width requirement for a cartway. The parties’ dispute as they now frame it questions whether, pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), a cartway that serves a landlocked parcel between two and five acres in size must be at least two rods 11 wide. We therefore begin our analysis by interpreting the statutory width requirement. We then consider whether the Town otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law when it selected the engineer’s route. A. 1. “Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo.” Kennedy v. Pepin Twp. of Wabasha Cnty., 784 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 2010). When interpreting a statute, we must first “determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous.” State v. Sanschagrin, 952 N.W.2d 620, 624 (Minn. 2020) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we construe statutes as a whole so that statutory language is understood in context. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning.” Id. If the statute is ambiguous, meaning the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, then we may “go beyond the language at issue to ascertain the intent of the Legislature.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the statutory provision at issue is Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), which provides, in full: [1] Upon petition presented to the town board by the owner of a tract of land containing at least five acres, who has no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others, or whose access thereto is less than two rods in width, the town board by resolution shall establish a cartway at least two rods wide connecting the petitioner’s land with a public road. [2] A town board shall establish a cartway upon a petition of an owner of a tract of land that, as of January 1, 1998, was on record as a separate parcel, contained at least two but less than five acres, and has no access thereto except over a navigable waterway or over the lands of others. [3] The 12  town board may select an alternative route other than that petitioned for if the alternative is deemed by the town board to be less disruptive and damaging to the affected landowners and in the public’s best interest. The Holstads argue that because the “at least two rods wide” requirement appears only in the first sentence of this provision, and not the second, the width requirement applies only to cartways that serve parcels five acres or more in size, not parcels between two and five acres. Because the Holstad Property is approximately 2.5 acres, the Holstads claim that any cartway connecting their property to a public road is not subject to the two rods requirement. We disagree. The plain language of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), requires that a cartway serving a landlocked parcel between two and five acres in size be at least two rods wide. The Holstads’ argument ignores the overall structure of subdivision 2(a), and in particular the connection between its first two sentences. The first sentence not only governs a tract of land that is at least five acres; it also provides defining criteria relevant to the definition of a cartway generally,4 addressing not only its minimum width, but also the requirement that it “connect[] the petitioner’s land with a public road.” Id. The second sentence, standing on its own, requires neither that a cartway be any particular width nor that it connect landlocked property to a public road. See id. In other words, it is impossible to determine a cartway’s characteristics set out in the second sentence without reference to the first. See State v. Riggs, 865 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Minn. 2015) (emphasizing that “we construe a statute as a whole and interpret its language to give effect to all of its 4 As noted above, Minnesota Statutes do not contain an explicit definition of the term “cartway.” 13 provisions”). If we were to accept the Holstads’ reasoning that a cartway serving their property need not be two rods in width, we might also necessarily conclude that the cartway need not connect their property to a public road. We reject this conclusion. Instead, reading Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), as a whole reveals that the only reasonable interpretation is that the first sentence’s width requirement—along with its requirement that a cartway connect the parcel in question to a public road—applies to all cartways in subdivision 2(a), regardless of the size of the landlocked parcels they serve.5 2. In their briefing and during oral argument, the Holstads advanced an alternative argument—namely, that even if, as we have just held, the two-rod width requirement is relevant to cartways serving smaller parcels like theirs, that requirement applies only to land taken to establish a cartway, not the “travelable portion” of the cartway. In the Holstads’ view, the statutory width requirement is met so long as the land designated for cartway purposes satisfies the statutory two-rod width requirement. But the travelable portion, they argue, does not have to be two rods wide. And because they “could be granted a 33-foot wide cartway over the existing driveway even if the travelable portion of the driveway is less than 33-feet wide,” the Holstads argue that the Town acted under 5 We note that Minn. Stat. § 164.11 states that, “[l]and dedicated to public use as a street, road, or cartway, if not less than 30 feet in width, shall be deemed a legal cartway.” But what is before us here is a petition for a cartway under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), and our analysis focuses on that provision; no party argues that this case involves land already dedicated to public use being “deemed a legal cartway.” 14 an erroneous theory of law in concluding that a two-rod-wide cartway was not possible over their requested route. But the Holstads are countering a legal theory the Town never advanced and thus that we need not decide. The Town has never asserted that the two-rod requirement extends to the travelable portion of a cartway. In fact, the Town’s resolution granting the Holstads a cartway calls for the cartway to “be in width provided by the statute [i.e., two rods] but its improved surface should be … 16 feet wide with 2-foot gravel shoulders and … allow for emergency vehicle access.”6 Moreover, although the Town now argues that the petitioned-for route does not “satisfy the 2-rod width requirement for a valid cartway under the statute,” it frames that argument in terms of “the topography of the petitioned route,” which “has one section that is less than 11 feet wide with a sharp cliff face on one side and a steep drop-off on the other.” The resolution itself does not cite the two-rod width requirement in rejecting the Holstads’ requested route. Rather, the resolution reasons that the route the Holstads proposed, “even with superficial modifications such as paving,” would present “health, safety, [and] welfare concerns,” citing both its narrowness and the “existing extreme topography under and adjacent to the driveway.” In other words, although the resolution does consider the narrow width of the 6 The town engineer’s standards, attached to the resolution as Exhibit A, call for a 16-foot paved surface with “[b]oulevard grading/restoration for snow storage” of “4 feet along each side.” The Holstads do not argue that their petitioned-for route would meet such requirements, nor do we see any evidence in the record suggesting that it would. 15 Holstads’ proposed route as a reason to reject their proposal, it does not specifically fault the Holstads’ route for having a travelable surface less than two rods wide.7 Therefore, we reject not only the Holstads’ argument that their cartway is not subject to the statutory two-rod width requirement, but also their argument that the Town improperly applied the two-rod requirement to the entire travelable surface of the cartway. Accordingly, the Holstads’ arguments that the Town acted contrary to law by concluding that the cartway must be two rods wide fail. B. Having rejected the Holstads’ arguments that the Town made an error in law regarding a cartway’s statutorily required width, we next determine whether the Town otherwise acted arbitrarily and capriciously or contrary to law when it selected the engineer’s route. A town “acts in a legislative capacity” when it reviews a petition to establish a cartway. Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 381 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will “set aside a township’s cartway determination only if it appears that the evidence is practically conclusive against it, or that the local board proceeded on an erroneous theory of law, or that it acted arbitrarily and capriciously against the best 7 In this perhaps-unusual case, the petitioners suggest that a town could satisfy its duty under Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), to establish a cartway at least two rods wide by designating a path that is in some places “less than 11 feet wide with a sharp cliff face on one side and a steep drop-off on the other.” We can easily imagine this scenario in reverse in a future case, that is, a town designating a narrow cartway through precarious terrain as an alternative to the cartway petitioner requests. In such a case, the petitioner might then challenge that cartway as not satisfying the two-rod width requirement as a practical matter. Because that case is not before us, however, we express no opinion on it. 16 interests of the public.” Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A local governmental entity’s decision is arbitrary and capricious if it reflects its will rather than its judgment, or when a decision is based on whim or is devoid of articulated reasons.” In re Year 2019 Salary of Freeborn Cnty. Sheriff, 955 N.W.2d 917, 924 (Minn. 2021) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Holstads assert that the Town acted arbitrarily and capriciously, and contrary to law, in selecting the engineer’s route. Although they argue the Town’s decision was “based on whim” and “devoid of articulated reasons,” they do not specify how or how this makes the Town’s decision arbitrary and capricious. See id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the Holstads primarily argue the Town acted contrary to law in three respects, dovetailing that argument with our standard that a decision is arbitrary and capricious if it “relied on factors not intended by the legislature.” See Citizens Advocating Responsible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 713 N.W.2d 817, 832 (Minn. 2006) (“[A]n agency ruling is arbitrary and capricious if the agency (a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; (c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or (d) the decision is so implausible that it could not be explained as a difference in view or the result of the agency's expertise.”). First, the Holstads claim that the engineer’s route is more “disruptive and damaging” than the Holstads’ proposal because the engineer’s route requires the Holstads to construct an expensive cartway in an ecologically sensitive area. Second, the Holstads insist that the Town did not follow our precedent in Kennedy v. Pepin Township of Wabasha County because the Town 17 rejected their proposed cartway before considering alternatives. Finally, the Holstads assert that the Town failed to provide them “meaningful access” to their property, as Kennedy required, because the Town’s designated cartway came with a $1.4 million price tag that is the Holstads’ sole responsibility, making the Town’s chosen cartway “illusory and prohibitively burdensome” for the Holstads. We address each argument in turn. 1. Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), explicitly authorizes a town to select an alternative to a petitioner’s proposed cartway route if the town “deem[s]” the alternative route to be “less disruptive and damaging to the affected landowners and in the public’s best interest.” In Kennedy, we interpreted subdivision 2(a) to require that “a township establish the route requested by the petitioner unless the township determines both that an alternative route will be less disruptive and damaging to neighbors and that the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.” 784 N.W.2d at 384. But we also emphasized that the town—not a reviewing court—has discretion to select an alternative cartway route if it makes such determinations. Id. at 384–85. In this case, the Town determined the engineer’s proposed route would be less disruptive because “it pulls the cartway back from the [neighbors’] seasonal cabin, avoids substantial steep and narrow slopes where two-way vehicle traffic (or even any vehicle traffic[)] is not feasible … and avoids additional clearing, tree cutting and excavation on some of the most sensitive areas of the [neighboring property].” While the Holstads are correct that the engineer’s proposed route requires extensive construction before the cartway can be opened, the Holstads’ proposed route would require similar construction. 18 Indeed, the Town found that “use of the existing driveway in an unimproved state is not feasible nor consistent with public health, safety or welfare.” As discussed above, the Holstads’ proposed route, in its current state, does not allow for two-way vehicle traffic and is not passable for emergency vehicles. Therefore, substantial construction would be required to widen the Holstads’ proposed route to address usability concerns. Compared to the Holstads’ selected route, the engineer’s route avoids several of the steep slopes, ravines, and drop-offs, which suggests that the engineer’s route would also be safer than the Holstads’ proposed route after construction. The Town’s decision to require the engineer’s route was based on a thorough investigation—including photos, a video, landowners’ testimonies, and the engineer’s expert opinion—as well as an in-depth review process that included multiple hearings where all impacted parties could present their arguments. The Town articulated its reasons for selecting the engineer’s proposal in its resolution. As such, the Town’s decision was not “based on whim,” “devoid of articulated reasons,” or simply “its will rather than its judgment.” See Salary of Freeborn Cnty. Sheriff, 955 N.W.2d at 924 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Holstads argue—reasonably—that an over-one-million-dollar construction project in an ecologically sensitive area is “disruptive and damaging.” But it appears that the location of their property, and the configuration of its surroundings, make “disruptive and damaging” construction inevitable to ensure the public can use the cartway and to address safety concerns. Because the Town reasonably found the engineer’s route less disruptive and damaging than the Holstads’, we reject the Holstads’ argument to the contrary. 19  2. The Holstads also claim that the Town acted contrary to law by failing to follow what the Holstads characterize as “Kennedy’s central holding.” As noted above, in Kennedy we interpreted the last sentence of Minn. Stat. § 164.08, subd. 2(a), to require “that a township establish the route requested by the petitioner unless the township determines both that an alternative route will be less disruptive and damaging to neighbors and that the alternative route is in the public’s best interest.” 784 N.W.2d at 384. Relying on this one sentence, the Holstads argue that Kennedy requires the Town to “directly compare” any alternative route with their petitioned-for route, and that the Town failed to follow Kennedy because it rejected their requested route before considering alternatives. We disagree with the Holstads’ reading of Kennedy. In Kennedy, the sequence of the township’s decision-making process was not at issue, nor did our use of “and” suggest that a town is required to conduct its decision- making in a particular order. See id. Even assuming the Holstads’ characterization of Kennedy were correct, the Town’s resolution indicates that it evaluated all proposed cartway routes at public hearings and determined that the engineer’s proposal is the “most practical and least disruptive or damaging route for the cartway.” In other words, the Town did “directly compare” the engineer’s proposed route with the Holstads’. The Holstads’ “direct comparison” argument is therefore unpersuasive. 3. Finally, the Holstads argue that the Town’s mandated cartway route fails to provide them “meaningful access” because it requires them to undertake a $1.4 million 20 construction project, which they argue makes the Town’s cartway designation “illusory and prohibitively burdensome.” The text of Minnesota Statutes section 164.08, subdivision 2(a), does not explicitly require that a cartway route provide a petitioner with “meaningful access.” Instead, this requirement comes from Kennedy. See 784 N.W.2d at 383 (stating that “[i]f a selected route does not provide meaningful access to a tract of land, then it fails to satisfy the requirement that a cartway be provided”). In Kennedy, the petitioner requested that a township establish a cartway for access to his land and a dispute arose as to the cartway’s location. Id. at 380. After evaluating three route options, the town board adopted the adjoining property owners’ proposal because it was the “least costly, and least disruptive to adjoining property owners.” Id. at 381. This route, however, only gave the petitioner access to an unusable portion of his property. Id. Following State ex rel. Rose v. Town of Greenwood, 20 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn. 1945), which held that a petitioner was entitled to a cartway that provided access to a usable portion of his land even though an unusable portion of his land was connected to a public road, we concluded that a cartway route must provide access to a usable portion of the petitioner’s land in order to satisfy the statutory requirements. Kennedy, 784 N.W.2d at 382–84. In that context, we held that the town had “acted upon an erroneous theory of law when it selected a cartway route … that did not provide meaningful access to petitioner’s land.” Id. at 384. In short, Kennedy stands for the proposition that a cartway route that does not provide the petitioner access to a usable portion of their property does not provide “meaningful access.” 21  We have never extended the concept of “meaningful access” beyond the context of access to usable property. The Holstads invite us to do so. Specifically, they argue that “meaningful access” should mean that the petitioner must be able to afford any construction necessary to use the cartway. Here, the Holstads claim that even though the Town granted their cartway petition, they still have to expend time, energy, and a prohibitive amount of money to build the cartway, which demonstrates that the Town’s cartway route does not actually give them “meaningful access” to their property. In short, the Holstads urge us to hold that “meaningful access” must be analyzed from the petitioner’s perspective,