Full Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A23-1948 Court of Appeals Gaïtas, J. Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Hudson, C.J., Thissen, J. Jeremy McNitt, Concurring in part, dissenting in part, Thissen, J. Took no part, Procaccini, J. Respondent/Cross-Appellant, vs. Filed: September 2, 2026 Office of Appellate Courts Minnesota IT Services (MNIT), Appellant/Cross-Respondent. ________________________ Cassandra C. Wolfgram, Matthew J. Schaap, Dougherty, Molenda, Solfest, Hills & Bauer P.A., Apple Valley, Minnesota, for respondent/cross-appellant. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Farrell, Acting Solicitor General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for appellant/cross-respondent. Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Madeleine DeMeules, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amici curiae Minnesota Departments of Management and Budget, Public Safety, Natural Resources, Human Services, Administration, Education, Employment and Economic Development, and Office of Higher Education. Paul A. Merwin, Patricia Y. Beety, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae League of Minnesota Cities. Ann K. Bloodhart, George N. Henry, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Metropolitan Council. Luke Grundman, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Mid-Minnesota Legal Aid. Brianna H. Boone, Catherine Boruff, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services. 1 Shauna Faye Kieffer, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. ________________________ SYLLABUS 1. An administrative law judge’s report and recommendation does not become the final decision in the case if the agency commissioner timely accepts, modifies, or rejects the recommendation under Minnesota Statutes section 14.62, subdivision 2a (2022). 2. Under Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, subdivision 3 (2024), a public employer has discretion to determine whether an applicant for public employment has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought once the applicant produces competent evidence of rehabilitation under subdivision 3(a). Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. OPINION GAÏTAS, Justice. In this case, we interpret a provision of the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act to determine if a public employer may disqualify a job applicant with a prior criminal conviction from public employment, even after the applicant has produced competent documentary evidence of rehabilitation under Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, subdivision 3(a) (2024). In 2022, respondent/cross-appellant Jeremy McNitt applied for a job with appellant/cross-respondent Minnesota IT Services (MNIT). MNIT offered 2 McNitt the position, subject to a background check. That background check revealed McNitt’s prior conviction for possession of child pornography. Following the process outlined in the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act, MNIT determined that McNitt’s conviction related to the position sought and asked McNitt for evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness for employment. Minn. Stat. § 364.03. McNitt provided MNIT with an order showing that he had been discharged from probation early and evidence that he had remained law-abiding for at least one year since his release from probation. Additionally, McNitt offered, among other things, a description of the circumstances surrounding his offense and several references. After receiving this information, MNIT determined that McNitt’s criminal conviction disqualified him from the position and informed McNitt that he could not apply for public employment for ten years. McNitt administratively appealed his disqualification under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. After the parties cross-motioned for summary disposition, an administrative law judge found that McNitt had provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness, and he rejected MNIT’s argument that under the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act, the agency retained sole discretion to decide whether McNitt demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation once McNitt produced competent evidence of rehabilitation. The administrative law judge recommended that the Commissioner of MNIT rescind McNitt’s disqualification and hire him. The Commissioner rejected the recommendation. The Commissioner remanded for a contested case hearing and a new recommendation as to whether the agency had abused 3 its discretion in disqualifying McNitt and informing McNitt that he could not apply for public employment for ten years. Based on an intervening case from this court, however, the administrative law judge determined that he no longer had jurisdiction to hold a contested case hearing, and he returned the matter to the Commissioner. The Commissioner issued an order dismissing McNitt’s grievance, affirming the decision to disqualify McNitt from public employment based on the conviction, and directing McNitt that he could reapply for public employment in January 2027. McNitt appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded that MNIT did not have discretion to disqualify McNitt because McNitt had provided competent evidence of rehabilitation under the Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. MNIT petitioned for review, and McNitt petitioned for conditional cross-review. We accepted review of two issues: first, whether the administrative law judge’s initial recommendation became the final decision because the Commissioner had no authority to remand the matter for an evidentiary hearing; and second, whether the agency had discretion to disqualify McNitt from the position after McNitt produced competent evidence of rehabilitation under section 364.03, subdivision 3(a). We affirm in part as to the first issue and conclude that the administrative law judge’s recommendation was not the agency’s final decision. As to the second issue, we reverse and hold that a public employer retains discretion to disqualify an applicant after 4 the applicant produces competent evidence of rehabilitation under subdivision 3(a). Finally, because the court of appeals did not address McNitt’s remaining arguments after determining that the disqualification was improper—a determination we now reverse— we remand to the court of appeals to consider those remaining issues. FACTS Minnesota IT Services (MNIT) is a state agency that provides information technology services to state government agencies. In November 2021, MNIT posted a web-developer job opening with the Minnesota Department of Education. Jeremy McNitt applied for the position in January 2022. McNitt was offered the job, subject to a background check. That background check revealed McNitt’s 2017 conviction for possession of child pornography. The Criminal Offenders Rehabilitation Act (CORA) establishes standards and procedures that public employers must follow when considering a job applicant with a criminal history.1 Minn. Stat. §§ 364.01–.10. CORA seeks to “encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders,” acknowledging that “[t]he opportunity to secure employment … is essential to rehabilitation and the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship.” Minn. Stat. § 364.01. At issue here is the CORA provision in Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, which addresses disqualification from public employment due to a prior conviction. 1 CORA defines “public employment” as including “all employment with the state of Minnesota, its agencies, or political subdivisions.” Minn. Stat. § 364.02, subd. 4. As a state agency, MNIT is a public employer. 5 Subdivision 1 states that “no person shall be disqualified from public employment” unless the conviction “directly relate[s] to the position of employment sought.” Subdivision 2 outlines factors that a public employer “shall consider” when determining whether the conviction “directly relates to the position of public employment sought.” Finally, subdivision 3 states that even if the prior conviction does directly relate to the position sought, an applicant “shall not be disqualified from the employment or occupation if the person can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought.” Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a) (2024).2 Subdivision 3(a) states that “[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by the production of” enumerated documents. Id. Subdivision 3(b) also lists evidence that, “[i]n addition to the documentary evidence presented,” an employer “shall consider,” including “the nature and seriousness of the crime,” “all circumstances relative to the crime,” “the age of the person at the time the crime was committed,” “the length of time elapsed since the crime,” and “all other competent evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness presented.” Id., subd. 3(b) (2024). After receiving the results of McNitt’s background check, MNIT first followed the process outlined in subdivision 2 and determined that McNitt’s conviction “directly 2 We accepted review of the 2024 version of Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, subdivision 3. After the court of appeals issued its decision in this case, the Legislature amended subdivision 3. See Act of May 18, 2026, ch. 97, art. 9, § 2. To the extent that the parties submitted supplemental filings requesting that we consider the amended statute, these requests are not properly before us, and we do not consider them. 6 relates to the position of public employment sought.” Id., subd. 2. Next, pursuant to subdivision 3, MNIT requested that McNitt provide proof of “any and all competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the position.” MNIT also identified for McNitt the documentary evidence listed in subdivisions 3(a) and 3(b) that “may be used as competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation.” McNitt provided MNIT with documents listed in subdivision 3(a), including his release order showing his early discharge from probation and a document stating that his background check verified that he had remained law-abiding for at least one year since his release from a correctional institution. He also provided MNIT with documents listed under subdivision 3(b), including a description of the circumstances surrounding his offense and several reference letters. In March 2022, MNIT informed McNitt that the agency would not be hiring him for the position “based upon [his] background check results and [his] prior conviction.” It advised McNitt that he would be disqualified from public employment for ten years. MNIT explained that “the nature and seriousness of the crime is very high.” McNitt administratively appealed his disqualification, and MNIT initiated a contested case hearing pursuant to the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001–.69. In December 2022, both parties cross-moved for summary disposition, which is the “administrative equivalent of summary judgment.” Pietsch v. Minn. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 683 N.W.2d 303, 306 (Minn. 2004). Following a hearing on the motions, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a report and 7 recommendation on February 10, 2023. The ALJ found that McNitt provided sufficient evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness and rejected MNIT’s argument that it retained sole discretion in determining whether McNitt demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation. Thus, the ALJ recommended that McNitt’s motion for summary disposition be granted. The ALJ recommended that MNIT rescind McNitt’s disqualification from public employment and provide McNitt with the applied-for position or a comparable one. The record in the matter closed on March 31, 2023. Under the version of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act then in effect, the Commissioner of MNIT had 90 days to accept, modify, or reject the ALJ’s recommendation. Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2a (2022) (stating that the report or order of the ALJ becomes the final decision unless the agency “modifies or rejects it” within 90 days of the record closing).3 Before issuing his order, the Commissioner asked the parties how they wished to proceed if genuine issues of fact precluded the Commissioner from granting either of the motions for summary disposition. McNitt requested that the matter be remanded for a contested case hearing in such a situation. Within the 90-day window, on June 21, 2023, the Commissioner issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order determining that CORA afforded MNIT with 3 Under this previous version of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, an agency did not have express authority to remand to an ALJ following an ALJ’s report and recommendation. In re Surveillance & Integrity Rev. (SIRS) Appeals by Trinity Home Health Care Servs. & Etyane Ayana, 996 N.W.2d 178, 187 (Minn. 2023). The Legislature has since amended the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act to give agencies the express authority to remand to an ALJ if certain conditions are met. See Act of May 23, 2025, ch. 39, art. 2, §§ 19–21, 2025 Minn. Laws 1195, 1219–21 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 14.62 (Supp. 2025)). 8 discretion to disqualify McNitt. The Commissioner adopted some of the ALJ’s findings of fact and modified others. The Commissioner also adopted some of the ALJ’s legal conclusions. However, the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusion that CORA does not afford MNIT with discretion to determine whether an applicant has been disqualified from public employment, and the Commissioner similarly rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that the subdivision 3(a) evidence submitted by McNitt conclusively established sufficient rehabilitation. Finally, the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s conclusion that there were no genuine issues of material fact and thus rejected the recommendation to grant McNitt’s summary disposition motion. The Commissioner then remanded for an evidentiary hearing to address, in part, whether MNIT abused its discretion when it concluded that McNitt was disqualified from public employment for ten years. Before an evidentiary hearing was held, we issued our decision in In re Surveillance & Integrity Rev. (SIRS) Appeals by Trinity Home Health Care Servs. & Etyane Ayana, 996 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 2023). There, we held that under the then-current version of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, a state agency does not have the authority to remand an ALJ’s report or order. Id. at 179. Given this decision, the ALJ determined that he lacked jurisdiction to conduct a contested case hearing on remand. The ALJ returned the file to MNIT on October 30, 2023. One month later, in November 2023, the Commissioner issued his second Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, affirming the earlier determination of disqualification and dismissing 9 McNitt’s administrative appeal. This time, the Commissioner’s order stated that McNitt could reapply for public employment as of January 28, 2027. McNitt then appealed to the court of appeals by writ of certiorari. McNitt v. Minn. IT Servs., 14 N.W.3d 284 (Minn. App. 2024). In a precedential opinion, the court of appeals held that, once an applicant provides the documents required under Minnesota Statutes section 364.03, subdivision 3(a), public employers lack discretion to disqualify the applicant based on a previous conviction. Id. at 285. The court of appeals further held that because McNitt provided all required documentation under subdivision 3(a), MNIT could not disqualify McNitt from the position. Id. at 292–93. The court of appeals reversed the Commissioner’s final November 2023 order and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 294. In doing so, the court of appeals rejected McNitt’s argument that SIRS independently required reversal. Id. at 288–90. McNitt contended that under this court’s decision in SIRS, the Commissioner did not have authority to remand the matter to the ALJ for an evidentiary hearing, and thus, the Commissioner exceeded the 90-day window for action under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act. Id. He argued that this, in turn, made the ALJ’s original report—recommending that summary disposition be granted in McNitt’s favor—the final decision in the case. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, concluding that SIRS was distinguishable and that the Commissioner “timely modified and rejected the ALJ’s report and recommendation in its order remanding the matter to the ALJ.” Id. at 290. 10 MNIT filed a petition for review challenging the court of appeals’ decision that a public employer lacks discretion to disqualify applicants once the documents in subdivision 3(a) are produced. McNitt petitioned for conditional cross-review, challenging whether the ALJ’s report and recommendation granting summary disposition was instead the final decision. We granted both petitions. ANALYSIS I. We first must determine what is the final decision that we are reviewing. Thus, we begin by addressing the issue raised in McNitt’s cross-petition as to whether the ALJ’s report and recommendation granting summary disposition became the final decision in this case. This is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. SIRS, 996 N.W.2d at 184. “We consider our prior interpretations of a statute in reviewing subsequent disputes over the meaning of the statute.” Keystone Township v. Red Lake Watershed Dist., 20 N.W.3d 612, 620 (Minn. 2025) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act establishes a procedure for state agencies to follow in reviewing an ALJ’s report and recommendations in a contested case. At the time of McNitt’s administrative appeal, Minnesota Statutes section 14.62, subdivision 2a, gave an agency 90 days to “modif[y] or reject[]” an ALJ’s report. Under this provision, if the agency failed to timely modify or reject the report, the ALJ’s report “constitute[d] the final decision in the case.” Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2a. 11 We recently addressed this provision in SIRS. There, the ALJ issued a report and recommendation following a contested case hearing where the agency presented evidence that a company had failed to comply with the requirements of a government program. SIRS, 996 N.W.2d at 182. The agency determined that the ALJ had failed to give proper weight to certain evidence. Id. at 183. Rather than rejecting the ALJ’s report and recommendation, however, the agency issued an order remanding the case to the ALJ for further proceedings. Id. On review, we concluded that the agency in SIRS did not have the authority to remand the case to the ALJ. Id. at 187. Interpreting section 14.62, we stated that the statute “provides the agency with three options after receiving the ALJ’s report with recommendation: to accept the ALJ’s report as the agency’s final decision; to ‘modif[y]’ the ALJ’s report; or to ‘reject’ the ALJ’s report.” Id. Because we determined that a remand was not an implied rejection, and because the agency failed to timely accept, modify, or reject the ALJ’s recommendations, we concluded that the ALJ’s report and recommendation was the binding decision in that case. Id. at 180.4 McNitt argues that here, as in SIRS, the ALJ’s report and recommendation became the final decision in his case because MNIT had no authority to remand to the ALJ for an evidentiary hearing. According to McNitt, the only options available to the agency were accepting, modifying, or rejecting the ALJ’s report. And he asserts that MNIT failed to 4 As noted above, after our decision in SIRS, the Legislature amended the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act to allow agencies to remand to an ALJ when a limited set of conditions exist. See Act of May 23, 2025, ch. 39, art. 2, §§ 19–21, 2025 Minn. Laws 1195, 1219–21 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 14.62 (Supp. 2025)). 12 accept, modify, or reject the ALJ’s report before the 90-day period under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act expired. McNitt contends that the ALJ’s report and recommendation—that McNitt’s motion for summary disposition be granted and that MNIT rescind McNitt’s disqualification from public employment—thus became the agency’s final decision. MNIT responds that the court of appeals properly rejected McNitt’s analysis. The court of appeals distinguished the circumstances in McNitt’s case from those presented in SIRS in two ways. First, the court of appeals noted that in SIRS the ALJ’s report and recommendation followed an evidentiary hearing, whereas here, there was no evidentiary hearing. McNitt, 14 N.W.3d at 289–90. Rather, the ALJ’s report and recommendation was made in connection with the grant of summary disposition to McNitt. Id. Second, the court of appeals observed that, unlike SIRS, here the agency expressly rejected the ALJ’s report and recommendation within the statutory 90-day period. Id. at 290. We disagree with the court of appeals that our holding in SIRS does not apply to an ALJ’s report and recommendation at the summary disposition stage. Our reasoning in SIRS did not depend on the procedural posture of the contested case, but on the fact that the contested-case requirement of Minnesota Statutes section 14.62, subdivision 2a, applied. We determined that the plain language of the statute “does not provide an option to ‘remand.’ ” SIRS, 996 N.W.2d at 191. Noting that, in some instances, agency authority may be implied from express powers granted by the Legislature, we further concluded that agencies did not have an implied power to remand. Id. at 188, 191. Thus, under the then-existing version of the statute, the Commissioner did not have the authority to 13 remand the case back to the ALJ. See id. at 194–97 (Chutich, J., dissenting) (discussing the court’s conclusion “that a commissioner may never remand a case to an ALJ”). To the extent that the court of appeals’ decision holds that under the then-existing version of section 14.62, an agency had authority to remand a contested case at the summary disposition stage, we reverse the decision. However, we are persuaded by the court of appeals’ reasoning that our decision in SIRS does not dictate the outcome here because the cases are distinguishable in one critical respect. As the court of appeals observed, unlike in SIRS, where the agency took no action beyond remanding to the ALJ, the Commissioner’s initial order here expressly rejected a number of the ALJ’s conclusions within the 90-day statutory deadline. The Commissioner’s initial order rejected the ALJ’s legal conclusions that under CORA, an applicant who presents competent evidence of rehabilitation is per se rehabilitated and an agency lacks discretion to determine whether the applicant has been sufficiently rehabilitated. And the Commissioner rejected the ALJ’s ultimate recommendation that summary disposition be granted to McNitt. In SIRS, we held that a remand is not an implicit rejection of an ALJ’s report and recommendation. But here, the Commissioner explicitly rejected the ALJ’s conclusions. Thus, the ALJ’s report and recommendation does not “constitute[] the final decision in the case” because “the agency modifie[d] or reject[ed] it … within 90 days after the record of the proceeding close[d].” Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2a. Instead, the Commissioner’s order—and not the ALJ’s report and 14 recommendation, which was timely rejected and modified by MNIT—is the final decision in the case.5 II. Having determined that the Commissioner’s order was the final decision in the case under the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act, we now turn to the merits of the issue presented here—whether Minnesota Statutes section 364.03 provides a public employer with discretion to decide whether a job applicant has demonstrated sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness once the applicant has presented competent evidence of rehabilitation under subdivision 3(a) of the statute. To address this issue, we must interpret section 364.03. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Holl, 966 N.W.2d 803, 808 (Minn. 2021). First, we determine whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. State v. Henderson, 907 N.W.2d 623, 625 (Minn. 2018). In doing so, we give the text of the statute its plain and ordinary meaning. Emerson v. Sch. Bd. of Indep. Sch. Dist. 199, 809 N.W.2d 679, 682 (Minn. 2012). We examine the language of a statute as a whole to give effect to all its provisions, Minn. Stat. § 645.16, and “no word, phrase, or 5 We, like the court of appeals, treat the Commissioner’s November 2023 Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as the final decision in this case. Critically, the cross-petition issue for which we granted review only asked whether “the administrative law judge’s report and recommendation granting summary disposition bec[a]me the final decision, in accordance with Minn. Stat. § 14.62, subd. 2(a) and In re Surveillance and Integrity Review (SIRS), 996 N.W.2d 178 (Minn. 2023) ….” We have rejected that argument, and we were not otherwise asked to review whether the Commissioner’s June 2023 order or November 2023 order should be treated as the final decision in this case. 15 sentence should be deemed superfluous, void, or insignificant,” In re Reichmann Land & Cattle, LLP, 867 N.W.2d 502, 509 (Minn. 2015) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). A statute is ambiguous only if its language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Am. Fam. Ins. Grp. v. Schroedl, 616 N.W.2d 273, 277 (Minn. 2000). If the statute is ambiguous, we seek to resolve the ambiguity using applicable canons of construction. Holl, 966 N.W.2d at 808. If the statute is unambiguous, however, our inquiry ends there—we must “abide by the plain language of the statute.” Id. Before turning to the specific statutory interpretation questions presented here, we briefly provide an overview of CORA and section 364.03. In CORA, the Legislature “declare[d] that it is the policy of the state of Minnesota to encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders and to assist them in the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship.” Minn. Stat. § 364.01. To that end, CORA establishes when employers may consider a job applicant’s criminal record and the procedures they must follow when doing so. Under section 364.03, subdivision 1, an employer may disqualify an applicant for a prior conviction only when that conviction “directly relate[s] to the position of employment sought.” Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 1. Section 364.03, subdivision 3(a) further provides the following: A person who has been convicted of a crime or crimes which directly relate to the public employment sought or to the occupation for which a license is sought shall not be disqualified from the employment or occupation if the person can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought or the occupation for which the license is sought. 16 Id. Subdivision 3(a) goes on to state that “competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by the production of” documentation listed in that subdivision. These documents are the person’s United States Department of Defense form DD-214 showing their honorable discharge from military service, or: (1) a copy of the local, state, or federal release order; and (2) evidence showing that at least one year has elapsed since release from any local, state, or federal correctional institution without subsequent conviction of a crime; and evidence showing compliance with all terms and conditions of probation or parole; or (3) a copy of the relevant Department of Corrections discharge order or other documents showing completion of probation or parole supervision. Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a). Subdivision 3(b) states that “in addition” to the documentary evidence listed in subdivision 3(a), “the licensing or hiring authority shall consider any evidence presented by the applicant regarding” the crime committed, including its nature and seriousness; “all circumstances relative to the crime,” including mitigating circumstances; the age of the person at the time of the crime; the length of time elapsed since the crime; and “all other competent evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness presented, including, but not limited to, letters of reference by persons who have been in contact with the applicant since the applicant’s release from any local, state, or federal correctional institution.” Id., subd. 3(b). Both McNitt and MNIT contend that the statutory text is unambiguous. But they offer competing interpretations of the text. 17 McNitt focuses on the words “shall not be disqualified” in the first sentence of subdivision 3(a). Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a). He argues that this phrase—and the use of the word “shall” in particular—guarantees that an applicant who produces competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness is not disqualified from public employment. McNitt then directs us to the second sentence in subdivision 3(a), which identifies types of “[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation,” including “a copy of the local, state, or federal release order” and “evidence showing that at least one year has elapsed since release … without subsequent conviction of a crime.” Id. According to McNitt, because he presented an order showing that he had been released from probation and evidence that he had been law-abiding for at least one year following his discharge from probation, he “shall not be disqualified” from public employment. MNIT, on the other hand, focuses on the latter half of the first sentence of subdivision 3(a), which states that the applicant shall not be disqualified “if the person can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness.” Id. Under MNIT’s interpretation of this phrase, an applicant “shall not be disqualified” only if the applicant “can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness.” In other words, according to MNIT, the statute provides a process for demonstrating sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness for a job but does not guarantee a result. MNIT also directs our attention to the second sentence of subdivision 3(a), which states that “[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by the production of” certain documents. Id. (emphasis added). Noting that the word “may” is generally interpreted as permissive, MNIT contends that the listed documents may or may 18 not establish sufficient rehabilitation. See Minn. Stat. § 645.44, subd. 15 (“ ‘May’ is permissive.”). And, MNIT argues, if the documents listed in subdivision 3(a) were conclusive evidence of sufficient rehabilitation, then subdivision 3(b)—which states that a public employer “shall consider any evidence presented by the applicant” regarding the circumstances underlying the conviction and “all other competent evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness presented,” such as “letters of reference”—would be superfluous. Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(b). McNitt interprets the second sentence of subdivision 3(a) differently. He contends that the word “may” simply means that the listed documents are not the exclusive means of proving sufficient rehabilitation. According to McNitt, subdivision 3(a) provides “multiple avenues” that an applicant may use to show sufficient rehabilitation: either by presenting the documents that constitute “competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation” or the other evidence that a public employer must consider. The court of appeals was persuaded by McNitt’s interpretation of section 364.03. It concluded that, under the unambiguous language of the statute, “once an applicant provides the documentation listed in subdivision 3(a), the applicant has satisfied the statutorily defined means of demonstrating rehabilitation and shall not be disqualified from employment.” McNitt, 14 N.W.3d at 292–93. We disagree. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that McNitt’s reading of the statute is unreasonable and that the language and structure of section 364.03 plainly confer discretion on a public employer to decide whether an applicant has established 19 sufficient rehabilitation even after the applicant has produced the documents identified in subdivision 3(a). Our analysis starts with the language of subdivision 3. The first sentence of subdivision 3(a) states that an applicant “shall not be disqualified … if [the applicant] can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought.” Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a) (emphasis added). To state the obvious, the ordinary meaning of the word “if” makes the first part of the sentence conditional upon the latter. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 874 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “if” as “[i]n the event that,” “[g]ranting that,” or “[o]n the condition that”); State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 436 (Minn. 2017) (noting that this court may “look to dictionary definitions to determine the common and ordinary meanings” of terms). Thus, the statute directs that if an applicant “can show competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought” the applicant “shall not be disqualified.” Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a). The critical question, then, is what constitutes “competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation and present fitness to perform the duties of the public employment sought.” This takes us to the second sentence of section 364.03, subdivision 3(a), which lists “documentary evidence” that “may” establish sufficient rehabilitation, and subdivision 3(b), which lists other evidence that the hiring authority “shall consider.” Subdivision 3(a) provides that “[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by the production of” several listed documents, including the United States 20 Department of Defense form DD-214, a release order, or a Department of Corrections discharge order. Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 3(a). Subdivision 3(b) then instructs the following: “In addition to the documentary evidence presented, the licensing or hiring authority shall consider any evidence presented by the applicant regarding” several enumerated factors, such as the nature and seriousness of the crime, the length of time elapsed since the crime, and “all other competent evidence of rehabilitation and present fitness presented.” Id., subd. 3(b). For three reasons we conclude that under this language, a public employer is not stripped of its discretion by the production of documentation under subdivision 3(a). First, we are persuaded by the Legislature’s decision to use words that convey discretion throughout subdivision 3 of the statute. The use of the permissive word “may” in the second sentence of subdivision 3(a)—“[c]ompetent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation may be established by [certain documents]”—indicates the Legislature’s intent to give a public employer discretion to decide whether the documents identified in subdivision 3(a) constitute “competent evidence of sufficient rehabilitation.” Id., subd. 3(a) (emphasis added). The words “competent” and “sufficient” further enforce our conclusion that the Legislature intended to give public employers discretion in decision- making. See The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 376, 1742 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “competent” as “[a]dequate for the purpose” and “sufficient” as “[b]eing as much as is needed; adequate; enough”). We decline to read these words out of the statute. As written, it is not enough for the applicant to merely produce “evidence of 21 rehabilitation”—that evidence must be competent and demonstrate sufficient rehabilitation. Indeed, by requiring evidence of “sufficient” rehabilitation in CORA, the Legislature recognized that the rehabilitation of individuals with criminal convictions is a process, not a black-and-white result. See Rehabilitation, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “rehabilitation” as “[t]he process of seeking to improve a criminal’s character and outlook so that he or she can function in society without committing other crimes” (emphasis added)); Minn. Stat. § 364.01 (declaring it the policy of the state of Minnesota to “encourage and contribute to the rehabilitation of criminal offenders and to assist them in the resumption of the responsibilities of citizenship”). And this necessarily means that some entity must be empowered to decide when an applicant has been sufficiently rehabilitated. The surrounding language makes it evident that this entity is the public employer. See Minn. Stat. § 364.03, subd. 2 (stating that it is the “hiring or licensing authority” that considers the enumerated factors to determine if the conviction “directly relates to the posi