Full Opinion

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN SUPREME COURT A24-0271 Court of Appeals Gaïtas, J. Dissenting, Thissen, J. State of Minnesota, Appellant, vs. Filed: August 19, 2026 Nicholas Norton Engel, Office of Appellate Courts Respondent. ________________________ Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Jacob Campion, Assistant Attorney General, Saint Paul, Minnesota; and Nathan Haase, Pennington County Attorney, Thief River Falls, Minnesota, for respondent. Claire Nicole Glenn, Climate Defense Project, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for appellant. Teresa Nelson, David P. McKinney, Alicia Granse, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Craig S. Coleman, Martin S. Chester, Joelle Groshek, Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota and American Civil Liberties Union Foundation. Jill A. Brisbois, Grace Castleberg, Certified Student Practitioner, The JAB Firm, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Joshua P. Preston, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for amicus curiae National Lawyers Guild – Minnesota Chapter. ________________________ 1 SYLLABUS 1. When a suspect commits a new crime in response to law enforcement conduct that violates the Minnesota Constitution, a court should apply the four-factor attenuation test articulated in State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770 (Minn. 1989), to determine whether the evidence of that crime is fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. 2. Applying the four-factor attenuation test, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence of appellant’s vehicular flight in response to a traffic stop that violated the Minnesota Constitution. Affirmed. OPINION GAÏTAS, Justice. In this case we must decide whether evidence of a defendant’s vehicular flight, in response to a traffic stop that violated the Minnesota Constitution, must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. Around midnight, on a rural highway in Thief River Falls, a police officer tried to stop appellant Nicholas Norton Engel because the officer did not see a rear license plate or temporary registration on Engel’s van. Instead of stopping, Engel turned on his hazard lights and continued driving for several miles with the officer in pursuit. Additional officers responded, and Engel ultimately stopped at a location off the highway. Based on his failure to stop, Engel was charged with the felony offense of fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. Engel moved to suppress the evidence of his flight, arguing that the traffic stop was unconstitutional and that his flight resulted from 2 that constitutional violation. The district court denied Engel’s motion to suppress, and a jury found Engel guilty. The court of appeals affirmed. We granted Engel’s petition for further review on the question of whether evidence of flight in response to an unconstitutional seizure is subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. Before our court, Engel rests his arguments exclusively under the Minnesota Constitution. To decide this issue, we first clarify the legal framework that a court should apply when considering whether to suppress evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act committed in response to a law enforcement officer’s constitutional violation. We hold that, under these circumstances, a court should apply our existing four- factor attenuation test, which assesses whether the evidence of the criminal act was “fruit of the poisonous tree” obtained by exploiting the initial constitutional violation. Applying the four-factor attenuation test here, we determine that the evidence of Engel’s vehicular flight did not result from law enforcement’s exploitation of the unconstitutional traffic stop. We therefore conclude that the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the evidence, and we affirm. FACTS Shortly after midnight on September 30, 2021, appellant Nicholas Engel was driving his van on Highway 32 in Thief River Falls when a police officer in a marked squad car attempted to pull the van over to investigate a suspected license plate violation. Although the officer turned on his emergency lights and siren, Engel did not pull over. Instead, Engel turned on his hazard lights and continued driving for several miles with the police officer in pursuit. During this pursuit, the officer commanded Engel to pull 3 over three times through the van’s open window, to no avail. When the van finally exited the highway and arrived at a camp of environmental protesters, Engel stopped driving. At this point, other law enforcement officers, who had been summoned to assist with the stop, arrested Engel. Based on this incident, respondent State of Minnesota charged Engel with one count of felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section 609.487, subdivision 3. Engel moved to suppress the evidence of his vehicular flight. He argued that the officer who initiated the traffic stop did not have a valid basis to stop him, violating his right to be free from unreasonable seizures under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Engel’s motion. Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court made the following findings of fact.1 On the night of September 30, a Thief River Falls police officer drove into the parking lot of a local gas station, where he saw a woman standing outside the gas station store. The woman was wearing yellow scrubs and hospital socks. The officer asked the woman if she was all right, and the woman responded, “Yes, I’m waiting.” The officer then went inside the gas station, where he again saw the woman. This time she was with a man, whom the officer later identified as Engel. The officer observed the woman leave 1 In reviewing a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 849 (Minn. 2011). Although Engel’s brief makes a general challenge to the credibility of the officer’s suppression hearing testimony, he does not challenge the district court’s factual findings as clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we defer to the district court’s findings of fact in its order addressing Engel’s motion to suppress. 4 the store and enter a van with Engel. The officer remained “a little concerned” about the woman and wanted to run a check on the van’s license plate. He began following Engel’s van after it drove away from the gas station and observed that the van had no rear license plate. As the van reached a roundabout that connected the street with the highway, the officer noticed “the outline of some sort of sign in the back window.” However, the officer could not read the sign due to the dark conditions and the distance between the squad car and the van. The officer testified at the hearing that this was when he decided to stop the van to verify its registration. When the van exited the roundabout and continued south on the highway, the officer initiated a traffic stop by turning on his emergency lights. After the officer turned on his emergency lights, the van continued driving at a “slow rate of speed.” The van’s hazard lights turned on, but the van did not stop. According to the officer’s training, when a vehicle does not stop, an officer should notify dispatch and provide updates on the direction and speed of the vehicle. In such situations, officers must continue to pursue the vehicle until someone higher in command orders them to end the pursuit. The officer continued to pursue Engel’s van, activating his siren. Twice during the pursuit, the officer drove into the oncoming lane of traffic, pulled up alongside the van, and ordered Engel to pull over. Both times, Engel responded through his open window. The officer could not understand Engel the first time. But the second time the officer pulled alongside the van, the officer heard Engel say that he would stop further down the 5 road. When Engel continued to drive, the officer accelerated past the van, pulled in front of it, and slowed down so that the van came to a stop. The officer then made a U-turn so that the officer’s squad car was facing Engel’s van. The officer exited his car and again ordered Engel to stop. Instead, Engel slowly drove past the officer, shouting from his window that he would stop down the road. The officer continued pursuing Engel’s van with both his lights and siren on. At this point, according to the officer, Engel’s van was driving at about 45 miles per hour. Several minutes later, the van pulled off the highway and headed toward the Red Lake Treaty Camp, which was a camp of environmental protesters. As Engel headed into the camp, other law enforcement vehicles arrived. Engel continued driving in a ditch alongside the camp. Law enforcement officers boxed the van in with their vehicles, and Engel stopped. Engel told the officers that he did not stop the van “because you guys keep harassing us” and because “it wasn’t a safe location.” Officers then arrested him. The officer testified that, after he turned on his emergency lights to stop Engel, he followed the van for several miles. After the van finally stopped, the officer determined that the sign in the back window was a valid temporary vehicle registration from Wisconsin. The officer explained that he was not familiar with vehicle registration requirements in Wisconsin. The officer further testified that he was aware that the Red Lake Treaty Camp was an encampment of protesters located along the highway, but that he did not know that Engel and his passenger were affiliated with the camp until they stopped in the area. 6 Based on its factual findings, the district court determined that the officer had a “particularized, objective reason” for stopping Engel’s van—the officer’s belief that the van “did not have license plates and there was some type of sign which the officer could not clearly read in a back window of the vehicle.” The district court reasoned that a traffic stop was necessary under these circumstances for the officer “to obtain more information.” Accordingly, the district court concluded that the officer’s initiation of the traffic stop was not an unreasonable seizure in violation of Engel’s federal and state constitutional right to be free from such seizures. After the district court denied Engel’s motion to suppress, Engel had a jury trial. The jury found Engel guilty of felony fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle. At sentencing, the district court stayed imposition of sentence and placed Engel on unsupervised probation for two years. Engel appealed to the court of appeals, challenging, among other things, the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence of his flight. A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed Engel’s conviction. State v. Engel, 18 N.W.3d 540, 559 (Minn. App. 2025). All members of the panel agreed that the traffic stop was unlawful. The majority determined that the traffic stop was an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution because the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that Engel had engaged in criminal activity when he initiated the stop. Id. at 549–50. But the majority concluded that suppression of the evidence of Engel’s flight was unwarranted because it was admissible under controlling precedent. Id. at 552. The dissenter, on the other hand, would have held that Engel’s 7 seizure was unlawful under the Minnesota Constitution and would not have reached this question under the United States Constitution. Id. at 559 (Frisch, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, the dissenter would have concluded that the exclusionary rule applied, requiring suppression of the evidence of Engel’s flight as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. Engel petitioned for review, seeking review of five issues. We granted Engel’s petition as to one issue, which he grounds in the Minnesota Constitution—whether evidence of a defendant’s vehicular flight in response to an unconstitutional traffic stop must be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. ANALYSIS The United States and Minnesota Constitutions prohibit “unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. When the State obtains evidence in violation of this prohibition, courts must address the “separate, analytically distinct issue” of the appropriate remedy. State v. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 872 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243 (2011)). The exclusionary rule—which requires suppression of illegally obtained evidence—is the “normal remedy” for such a violation. State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566, 571 (Minn. 2024). In this case, the constitutional violation was an unreasonable seizure—a law enforcement officer’s initiation of a traffic stop without a valid reason. The evidence obtained as a result of the constitutional violation was evidence of a new crime—Engel’s vehicular flight from the law enforcement officer. We must decide whether Engel is entitled to the remedy of suppression for the officer’s constitutional violation. 8 Before us, Engel’s arguments focus exclusively on the Minnesota Constitution. Accordingly, we consider whether to apply the exclusionary rule under our state constitution.2 The application of the exclusionary rule is a question of law, which we review de novo. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 570. I. We first identify the legal framework that a court should apply when deciding whether to suppress evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act committed in response to a law enforcement officer’s constitutional violation. To identify the appropriate legal framework for addressing this question, we initially consider the purpose and scope of the exclusionary rule under the Minnesota Constitution. Then, we examine the parties’ proposed approaches for deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act. Engel urges us to apply the four-factor attenuation test that we articulated in State v. Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d 770, 776 (Minn. 1989), to determine whether evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act should be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” The State argues that we adopted a bright-line rule in State v. Combs, 2 The parties do not contest that, when the law enforcement officer initiated the traffic stop by turning on his patrol car lights, Engel was seized under Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. See In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993) (holding that, under the Minnesota Constitution, an individual is seized when a reasonable person in the individual’s shoes would conclude that they are not free to leave). Additionally, the State did not seek review of the court of appeals’ determinations that the officer did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful activity when he stopped Engel’s van and that the traffic stop was an unlawful seizure. Thus, we assume without deciding that the traffic stop was an unconstitutional seizure. And because the Minnesota Constitution’s protections are equal to or greater than those under the federal constitution, see State v. Contreras-Sanchez, 33 N.W.3d 700, 710 (Minn. 2026), we do so under Article I, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. 9 398 N.W.2d 563, 565 n.2 (Minn. 1987), that evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act should not be suppressed, subject only to narrow exceptions. After evaluating the parties’ proposed approaches, we conclude that a court should apply the four-factor attenuation test when deciding whether to suppress evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act committed in response to a law enforcement officer’s state constitutional violation. A. We begin with the exclusionary rule under the Minnesota Constitution. The exclusionary rule is a “prudential doctrine … created by [the United States Supreme] Court to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty” of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 868 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When the government obtains evidence in violation of the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, the exclusionary rule generally prohibits using the evidence in a criminal proceeding against the individual whose rights were violated.” State v. Steeprock, 28 N.W.3d 417, 432 (Minn. 2025). Under the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained as a direct result of a constitutional violation must be suppressed as a remedy for the violation. State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 177–78 (Minn. 2007). Consistent with the United States Supreme Court, we have additionally held that evidence that “would not have come to light” but for law enforcement’s exploitation of the constitutional violation is “fruit of the poisonous tree,” which must also be suppressed. See Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 10 The United States Supreme Court first recognized the exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), and then applied it to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). But in Minnesota, we have also developed a body of case law governing the application of the exclusionary rule to violations of the Minnesota Constitution. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 573–74. We employ our independent judgment in interpreting the Minnesota Constitution, including when “determining whether a constitutional remedy, like exclusion, is available.” Id. (emphasis omitted). Like its counterpart under federal law, the central purpose of our exclusionary rule is to deter law enforcement misconduct. Id. at 577–78. But we have acknowledged that the rule serves additional purposes under the Minnesota Constitution, including deterring unlawful government misconduct generally. Id. at 577 n.4, 578. We have observed that the exclusionary rule promotes the “public perception of fairness in the judicial process.” Id. at 578. The exclusionary rule also “exacts a great cost on societal interests” by prohibiting the introduction of incriminating evidence against a defendant. Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d at 871 (quotation omitted). Nonetheless, if suppressing the evidence deters government misconduct and incentivizes lawful conduct, the benefits of excluding the evidence may outweigh the social costs. See Malecha, 3 N.W.3d at 578–79 (determining that the benefits of excluding evidence discovered during an arrest based on a clerical error outweighed the costs of exclusion). 11 “We have declined to apply the exclusionary rule to address violations of Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution when applying the rule would not serve its underlying remedial objectives.” Steeprock, 28 N.W.3d at 432. Accordingly, we have recognized several specific exceptions to the exclusionary rule when suppressing the evidence would not serve the remedial objectives of the rule. Id. at 432–33. If an exception to the exclusionary rule applies, suppression of the evidence is not warranted. Id. at 432. The State bears the burden of showing that an exception to the exclusionary rule applies. See id. at 433 (noting that the State must establish that the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule applies). B. Again, our task is to identify a legal framework for deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act committed in response to a law enforcement officer’s state constitutional violation. Engel and the State offer competing proposals, which we briefly summarize. Engel argues that our case law requires a court to consider whether evidence of a suspect’s new criminal act—such as Engel’s vehicular flight—is “fruit of the poisonous tree.” In other words, a court must determine whether evidence of the new criminal act “would not have come to light” but for law enforcement’s exploitation of the constitutional violation. See Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d at 775 (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88). Engel notes that, under the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule, unless the evidence is sufficiently attenuated from the constitutional violation, it is fruit of the poisonous tree that must be suppressed. See Knapp v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 12 610 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Minn. 2000). To determine whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree, Engel observes that we have long applied a four-factor attenuation test. See Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d at 775–76 (articulating the four-factor attenuation test). Engel asks us to apply that test here, where the evidence at issue is evidence of a new crime. The State argues that we have already adopted a different framework for deciding whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence of a new crime. According to the State, we long ago held in Combs that evidence of a new crime committed in response to an unconstitutional arrest or search is not suppressed as a fruit of the illegality. 398 N.W.2d at 565 n.2. The State acknowledges that we subsequently refined the Combs rule to clarify that the exclusionary rule still applies where law enforcement intentionally exploited the constitutional violation or deliberately provoked a suspect into committing a new crime. See City of St. Louis Park v. Berg, 433 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Minn. 1988). But the State contends that under the “new crime exception” to the exclusionary rule, we need not apply the four-factor attenuation test when the evidence at issue is evidence of a new crime. Instead, under such circumstances, the evidence should not be excluded unless law enforcement intentionally exploited the constitutional violation or deliberately provoked the new crime. We consider each of the parties’ proposals in turn, beginning with the attenuation framework that Engel proposes. C. Engel correctly observes that for violations of the Minnesota Constitution, we follow the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine that the United States Supreme Court 13 adopted in Wong Sun, which requires suppression of evidence that “would not have come to light” but for law enforcement’s exploitation of the constitutional violation. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487–88; accord Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 628 (adopting and applying the Wong Sun rule). Determining whether evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree requires a court to consider “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Knapp, 610 N.W.2d at 628 (quotation omitted). We have devised a test for assessing whether evidence “came to light” as a result of law enforcement’s exploitation of a constitutional violation or is sufficiently attenuated from the violation to be admissible. The origin of our Minnesota test is Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). There, the United States Supreme Court rejected a per se rule that a Miranda warning will always purge the taint of a defendant’s arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment, thereby rendering a defendant’s statements made after the arrest admissible. 422 U.S. 590, 602–03 (1975). Instead, the Court adopted a case-by-case approach for courts to apply in determining whether evidence was sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional act to purge the taint of the illegality. Id. at 603–04. In making this determination, the Court instructed courts to consider factors such as the temporal proximity of the misconduct and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. 14 We first applied the Brown case-by-case approach in State v. Weekes, which also involved a defendant’s statements following an unconstitutional arrest. 268 N.W.2d 705, 708–10 (Minn. 1978). That same year, in State v. Bale, we applied this same approach in analyzing whether physical evidence could be suppressed as the fruit of an unconstitutional arrest. 267 N.W.2d 730, 732–33 (Minn. 1978). In State v. Sickels, we also identified another factor as relevant to the inquiry: “whether it is likely that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of the illegality.” 275 N.W.2d 809, 814 (Minn. 1979). Finally, in Warndahl, we articulated four factors to be considered in deciding whether the attenuation exception to the exclusionary rule applies: (1) “the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct,” (2) “the presence of intervening circumstances,” (3) “whether it is likely that the evidence would have been obtained in the absence of the illegality,” and (4) “the temporal proximity of the illegality and the evidence alleged to be the fruit of the illegality.” 436 N.W.2d at 775–76 (considering the admissibility of the defendant’s statements after the defendant invoked his right to counsel).3 3 In State v. McDonald-Richards, we applied the same fact-specific inquiry to determine whether a defendant’s statements to law enforcement were tainted by an unlawful arrest. 840 N.W.2d 9, 16–19 (Minn. 2013). But there, citing to Weekes, we considered other, additional factors that were particular to a suspect’s statements. The McDonald-Richards factors were: (1) Whether Miranda warnings were given; (2) The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (3) The presence of any intervening circumstances; (4) The purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct; (5) The treatment of defendant while confined; (6) His relationship with his 15 More recently, in State v. Leonard, we applied the four-factor attenuation test to determine whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of evidence found in a defendant’s hotel room after an officer’s unconstitutional search of the hotel guest registry. 943 N.W.2d 149, 161–62 (Minn. 2020). After considering the four factors, we concluded that the evidence was not sufficiently attenuated from the unconstitutional search, and thus, suppression of the evidence was required. Id. at 162. We have never, however, applied the four-factor attenuation test to consider whether a suspect’s commission of a new crime sufficiently attenuated the connection between a constitutional violation and the discovery of evidence for the evidence to be admissible. But the court of appeals has. In State v. Olson, the court of appeals considered whether the defendant’s act of obstructing legal process removed the taint of his initial illegal arrest, precluding the suppression of methamphetamine discovered during a subsequent search incident to his arrest. 634 N.W.2d 224, 227 (Minn. App. 2001). The court of appeals applied the four-factor attenuation test to decide whether the methamphetamine was fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. at 229–30. Although the court of appeals determined that some of the factors favored suppression—including the purpose and flagrancy of the law enforcement officer’s conduct—it ultimately concluded that the defendant’s act of resisting arrest was an intervening act sufficient to purge the taint of interrogators; and (7) His freedom of communication with persons other than law-enforcement officers. Id. at 16 (quoting Weekes, 268 N.W.2d at 708–09). 16 the unlawful seizure. Id. Accordingly, the methamphetamine discovered during the search incident to arrest was not subject to the exclusionary rule. Id. at 230. The court of appeals again applied the four-factor attenuation test in State v. Bergerson, in considering whether the defendant’s flight from a law enforcement officer purged the taint of the officer’s unconstitutional seizure. 659 N.W.2d 791, 797–99 (Minn. App. 2003). There, the officer violated the Minnesota Constitution by initiating a traffic stop without a lawful reason. Id. at 796–97. After the officer activated his squad car lights, the defendant drove for an additional mile, pulled over, exited the car, and ran. Id. at 794. When officers ultimately captured the defendant and searched his car, they found methamphetamine, a gun, and evidence suggesting that the defendant was manufacturing methamphetamine. See id. Following the defendant’s arrest, he was charged with a drug crime and felony fleeing a peace officer. Id. The defendant argued that the exclusionary rule required suppression of the evidence, but the State responded that the defendant’s flight purged the taint of the constitutional violation. Id. at 797–98. Applying the four- factor attenuation test, the court of appeals determined that suppression of the evidence was warranted. Id. at 798–99. As one factor, the court of appeals considered whether the defendant’s flight was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the taint of the illegality. Id. at 798. Noting that it had previously distinguished between “offering physical resistance to arrest and merely fleeing an officer to dispose of evidence,” the court of appeals stated that the defendant’s flight without resistance was an abandonment of evidence. Id. Because abandonment of evidence is a “predictable and common response” to an illegal search, the court of appeals held that such an act does not thwart 17 the application of the exclusionary rule. Id. (quoting Olson, 634 N.W.2d at 230).4 The court of appeals concluded that the defendant’s flight was not an intervening circumstance that attenuated the constitutional violation from the discovery of the evidence. Id.5 Although the court of appeals has applied the four-factor attenuation test to consider whether a suspect’s commission of a new crime (like obstructing legal process or fleeing a peace officer) sufficiently attenuated evidence of contraband discovered as a result of a constitutional violation, none of these cases involved the admissibility of evidence of the commission of the new crime itself. While Engel argues that the same four-factor attenuation test applies in such circumstances, as discussed next, the State argues that a separate line of cases addresses that scenario. 4 The court of appeals’ statement in Bergerson that evidence abandoned in response to an unconstitutional seizure is fruit of the poisonous tree is consistent with our holdings in two earlier cases. In E.D.J., officers violated the Minnesota Constitution when they ordered the juvenile to stop without reasonable, articulable suspicion. 502 N.W.2d at 783. After the officers’ order, the juvenile continued to walk, dropped evidence, and then stopped. Id. at 780. Without analysis, we held that because the juvenile “abandoned the cocaine after he was unlawfully directed to stop, the abandonment was the suppressible fruit of the illegality.” Id. at 783. In State v. Hardy, we likewise determined that evidence that the defendant abandoned when he ran in reaction to an unconstitutional search was fruit of the poisonous tree subject to exclusion. 577 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. 1998). Although we did not consider the attenuation factors in Hardy, we cited our decision in Warndahl and noted that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct. Id. (citing Warndahl, 436 N.W.2d at 776). 5 The court of appeals did not consider in Bergerson whether the evidence of the defendant’s flight was subject to the exclusionary rule. According to the court of appeals’ decision, “the district court denied [the defendant’s] motion to suppress the evidence seized.” 659 N.W.2d at 794. Then, the State dismissed the fleeing charge. Id. 18 D. According to the State, we have already resolved the question of whether evidence of a new crime should be suppressed. The State contends that it is settled law in Minnesota that a new crime committed in response to an unconstitutional search or seizure is not fruit of the illegality. We next explore the case law that the State identifies. In Bale, we considered whether the exclusionary rule required suppression of a gun that the defendant pointed at an officer who had unlawfully arrested him. 267 N.W.2d at 732. The district court in Bale excluded the gun, determining that it was fruit of the unconstitutional arrest. Id. at 731–32. We reversed. Id. at 733. In determining whether the gun was the product of the unlawful arrest, we applied the attenuation test, citing our decision in Weekes. Id. at 732–33. We stated that “[n]umerous factors bear on the application of this test, including the temporal proximity of the illegality and the fruit of that illegality, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the … misconduct.” Id. at 733. As to the last factor—the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct—we observed that this factor was “especially important, because the aim of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct by removing the incentive to disregard constitutional guarantees.” Id. Applying these factors, we concluded that “the causal chain between the initial arrest and the physical evidence seized appears so attenuated that it would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule to exclude the evidence.” Id. In particular, we noted that the assault was “an intervening act of defendant’s free will.” Id. But we also observed that “[m]ore important is the fact 19 that no intent to secure evidence motivated the decision to custodially arrest defendant on the misdemeanor charge.” Id. Following Bale, we decided a series of cases that addressed whether a defendant has a right to physically resist or assault an officer in response to an unconstitutional arrest. Some of these cases did not involve the exclusionary rule. For example, in State v. Hoagland, we considered whether the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants’ convictions for obstructing legal process after defendants threatened conservation officers who entered their farm to investigate an alleged conservation offense. 270 N.W.2d 778, 779–81 (Minn. 1978). At trial, the defendants asserted that they were entitled to resist what they contended was an unconstitutional search. Id. at 779. We stated, “Minnesota law does not recognize defendants’ asserted right to resist a search which they apparently felt was illegal.” Id. at 780. Likewise, in In re Welfare of Burns, we rejected a juvenile’s argument that his assault on two police officers was justified because the officers had unlawfully attempted to search his person and his car. 284 N.W.2d 359, 360 (Minn. 1979). And in State v. Wick, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conviction for interfering with a police officer in the performance of official duties, arguing that he had a right to resist an officer who unlawfully arrested him. 331 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1983). Again, we stated, “Minnesota law does not recognize defendant’s asserted right to resist an unlawful arrest or search.” Id. at 771. On the other hand, several post-Bale cases involving a defendant’s physical resistance or assault on police did address the applicability of the exclusionary rule. In 20 State v. Kittleson, for example, we held that the exclusionary rule did not require suppression of the evidence of the defendant’s assault on an officer following the officer’s arguably unlawful entry into the defendant’s room. 305 N.W.2d 787, 789 (Minn. 1981). We relied on our decision in Bale¸ but we also noted our decisions in Burns and Hoagland as standing for the proposition that it is not a defense to an assault charge that the assault was in response to a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. In State v. Combs, we again addressed the applicability of the exclusionary rule to acts of resistance and assault. There, officers stopped a car to investigate a suspected violation of the open bottle law. 398 N.W.2d at 564. When one of the officers approached the passenger-side window, the passenger threw a cup on the floor, rolled up the window with the officer’s arm in it, and ordered the driver to drive away. Id. With the officer’s arm stuck in the window, the defendant began to drive. Id. The officer was forced to run alongside the car but was able to free himself by breaking the window. Id. When the officers subsequently attempted to arrest the driver and the passenger, they resisted arrest and assaulted the officers. Id. The driver and the passenger were charged with open bottle violations, assault, fleeing an officer, obstructing legal process, and littering. Id. They moved to suppress the evidence underlying these offenses, arguing that the stop was unconstitutional. Id. The district court agreed, suppressing the evidence and dismissing all the charges. Id. In the State’s appeal, the court of appeals determined that the stop was unconstitutional. State v. Combs, 394 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Minn. App. 1986), rev’d in part, 398 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 1987). The court of appeals affirmed the suppression of the open 21 bottle and littering charges. Id. at 569–70. But the court of appeals held that the district court had erred in dismissing the remaining charges against the driver and passenger. Id. at 569. The court of appeals stated, “[i]t is well settled tha